Various - "Knickerbocker, or New York Monthly Magazine, March 1844"

Cyrus Townsend Brady - "For Love of Country"

Robert W. Chambers - "The Fighting Chance"

Norman Douglas - "Fountains In The Sand"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965




But such arguments were under attack by the very civil rights groups
the President was trying to court. "Are we to understand that the
President's promise to end discrimination," one critic asked,

was made for some other purpose than to end discrimination in its
worst form--segregation? General Bradley's statement, subsequent
to the President's orders, would seem to indicate that the
President either did not mean what he said or his orders were not
being obeyed. We should like to point out that General Bradley's
reported observation ... was decidedly wide of the mark.
Segregation is the legal pattern of only a few of our most
backward states.... In view of the trends in law and social
practice, it is high time that the Defense forces were not used
as brakes on progress toward genuine democracy.[13-12]

[Footnote 13-12: Ltr, A. A. Heist, Dir, American Civil
Liberties Union, South California Branch, to
Forrestal, 7 Sep 48, D54-1-4, SecDef files.]

General Bradley apologized to the President for any confusion caused
by his statement, and Truman publicly sloughed off the affair, but not
before he stated to the press that his order specifically directed the
integration of the armed forces.[13-13] It was obvious that the situation
had developed into a standoff. Some of the President's most (p. 318)
outspoken supporters would not let him forget his integration order,
and the Army, as represented by its Chief of Staff, failed to realize
that events were rapidly moving beyond the point where segregation
could be considered a workable policy for an agency of the United
States government.

[Footnote 13-13: Ltrs, Bradley to President Truman, 30
Jul 48, and Truman to Bradley, 4 Aug 48, CSUSA
291.2 (4 Aug 48). See also Ltr, SA to President, 29
Jul 48, OSA 291.2 (Negroes) (7-29-48).]


_The Army: Segregation on the Defensive_

The President's order heralded a series of attacks on the Army's race
policy. As further evidence of the powerful pressures for change,
several state governors now challenged segregation in the National
Guard. Generally the race policy of the reserve components echoed that
of the Regular Army, in part because it seemed logical that state
units, subject to federal service, conform to federal standards of
performance and organization. Accordingly, in the wake of the
publication of the Gillem Board Report, the Army's Director of
Personnel and Administration recommended to the Committee on National
Guard Policy[13-14] that it amend its regulation on the employment of
black troops to conform more closely with the new policy.
Specifically, General Paul asked the committee to spell out the
prohibition against integration of white and black troops below
battalion level, warning that federal recognition would be denied any
state unit organized in violation of this order.[13-15]

[Footnote 13-14: As provided in various laws since
1920, most notably in Section V of the amendments
to the National Defense Act, members of the General
Staff's Committee on National Guard Policy and
Committee on Reserve Policy were the principal
advisers to the Secretary of War on reserve
component matters. All questions regarding these
organizations were referred to the committees,
which usually met in combined session as the
Committee on National Guard and Reserve Policy. The
combined committee was composed of twenty-one
officers, seven each from the Regular Army, the
guard, and the reserves. When the business under
consideration was restricted exclusively to one of
the reserve components, the representatives of the
other would absent themselves, the remaining
members, along with the Regular Army members,
reconstituting themselves as the Committee on
National Guard Policy or the Committee on Reserve
Policy. These groups, familiarly known as the
"Section V Committees," wielded considerable power
in the development of the postwar program for the
reserves.]

[Footnote 13-15: Memo, Chief, Classification and
Personnel Actions Br, P&A, for Brig Gen Ira Swift,
Chief, Liaison, Planning and Policy Coordination
Gp, P&A, 8 Apr 47, sub: Resolution Regarding
Employment of Negro Troops in the National Guard;
Memo, Dir, P&A, for Dir, Intel, 9 Apr 47, same sub;
both in WDGPA 291.2 (3 Apr 47).]

Agreeing to comply with General Paul's request, the National Guard
Committee went a step further and recommended that individual states
be permitted to make their own decisions on the wisdom and utility of
organizing separate black units.[13-16] The Army staff rejected this
proposal, however, on the grounds that it gave too much discretionary
power to the state guard authorities.[13-17] Interestingly enough in view
of later developments, neither the committee nor the staff disputed
the War Department's right to withhold federal recognition in racial
matters, and both displayed little concern for the principle of (p. 319)
states' rights. Their attitude was important, for while the
prohibition against integration sat well in some circles, it drew
severe criticism in others. Unlike the Regular Army, the National
Guard and the Army Reserve were composed of units deeply rooted in the
local community, each reflecting the parochial attitudes of its
members and its section. This truth was forcefully pointed out to the
Army staff in 1946 when it tried to reactivate the 313th Infantry and
designate it as a black unit in the 79th Division (Pennsylvania).
Former members of the old white 313th, now prominent citizens,
expressed their "very strong sentiments" on the matter, and the Army
had to beat a hasty retreat. In the future, the staff decided, either
black reserve units would be given the name and history of inactive
black units or new units would be constituted.[13-18]

[Footnote 13-16: DF, WDGS Cmte on National Guard
Policy, to Chief, NGB, 20 May 47, sub: Integration
of Negro Troops; idem to Dir, P&A, and Dir, O&T,
same date and sub. See also Ltr, Maj Gen Kenneth F.
Cramer, CG, 43d Inf Div (Conn. NG) to Col Russell
Y. Moore, OCofS, 17 Mar 47. All in Office file,
Army Reserve Forces Policy Cmte.]

[Footnote 13-17: Memo, Dir, O&T, for WDGS Cmte on
National Guard Policy, 23 Jun 47, sub: Integration
of Negro Troops, WDGOT 291.2.]

[Footnote 13-18: Memo, Exec for Reserve and ROTC
Affairs, O&T, for Dir, O&T, 22 Jul 46; O&T Memo for
Rcd, 12 Aug 46; both in WDGOT 291.2.]

On the other hand, in 1947 citizen groups sprang up in Connecticut,
New York, New Jersey, Ohio, and California to agitate among their
state adjutants general for liberalization of the National Guard's
racial policy. As early as February 1947 Governor James L. McConnaughy
had publicly deplored segregation of Negroes in his own Connecticut
National Guard. Adopting the states' rights stance more commonly
associated with defenders of racial discrimination, Governor
McConnaughy argued that by requiring segregation the War Department
ran contrary to the wishes of individual states. Marcus Ray, the
secretary's adviser on race, predicted that integration in the reserve
components would continue to be a "point of increasing pressure." As
he pointed out to Assistant Secretary Petersen, the Army had always
supported segregation in its southern installations on the grounds
that it had to conform with local mores. How then could it refuse to
conform with the local statutes and customs of some northern states
without appearing inconsistent? He recommended the Army amend its race
policy to permit reserve components in states which wished it to
integrate at a level consistent with "local community attitudes."[13-19]

[Footnote 13-19: Memo, Ray for Petersen, 2 Apr 47,
sub: Integration of Negro Personnel in the Reserve
Components, ASW 291.2.]

The Army staff would have nothing to do with Ray's suggestion.
Instead, both the Director of Personnel and Administration and the
Director of Organization and Training supported a new resolution by
the National Guard Policy Committee that left the number of black
units and the question of their integration with white units above the
company level up to the states involved. Integration at the company
level was prohibited, and such integrated companies would be denied
federal recognition. The committee's resolution was adopted by the
Secretary of War in May 1947.[13-20]

[Footnote 13-20: Memo, D/O&T for ASW, 17 Apr 47, sub:
Integration of Negro Personnel in the Reserve
Components, WDGOT 291.2; Memo, D/P&A thru D/O&T for
ASW, 10 Apr 47, same sub, WDGPA 291.2; DF, D/P&A to
CofS, 20 May 47, sub: Integration of Negro Troops,
CSUSA 291.2 Negroes.]

But the fight was not over yet. In 1947 New Jersey adopted a new
constitution that specifically prohibited segregation in the state
militia. By extension no New Jersey National Guard unit could receive
federal recognition. In February 1948 Governor McConnaughy brought (p. 320)
Connecticut back into the fray, this time taking the matter up with
the White House. A month later Governor Luther W. Youngdahl appealed
to the Secretary of Defense on behalf of Negroes in the Minnesota
National Guard. Secretary of the Army Royall quickly reappraised the
situation and excepted New Jersey from the Army's segregation rule.
Secretary Symington followed suit by excepting the New Jersey Air
National Guard.[13-21] Royall also let the governors of Connecticut
and Minnesota know that he would be inclined to make similar
concessions to any state which, by legislative action, prohibited its
governor from conforming to the federal requirements. At that time
Connecticut and Minnesota had no such legislation, but Royall
nevertheless agreed to refer their requests to his Committee on
National Guard Policy.[13-22]

[Footnote 13-21: Ltr, Kenneth Royall to Alfred
Driscoll, 7 Feb 48; Ltr, W. Stuart Symington to
Driscoll, 17 Mar 48; copies of both in CMH.]

[Footnote 13-22: Ltrs, SA to Luther Youngdahl and
James C. Shannon, 20 May 48, both in OSA 291.2
Negroes (5-28-48); Memos, CofSA for Dir, O&T, 2 Jan
and 9 Mar 48, sub: Utilization of Negroes in the
National Guard, CSUSA 291.2. Shannon succeeded
McConnaughy as governor of Connecticut in March
1948.]

[Illustration: MP'S HITCH A RIDE ON ARMY TANKS, AUGSBURG, GERMANY,
1949.]

Here the secretary did no more than comply with the National Defense
Act, which required that all National Guard policy matters be
formulated in the committee. Privately, Royall admitted that he did
not feel bound to accept a committee recommendation and would be
inclined to recognize any state prohibition against segregation. But
he made a careful distinction between constitutional or legislative
action and executive action in the states. A governor's decision to
integrate, he pointed out, would not be recognized by the Army because
such an action was subject to speedy reversal by the governor's
successor and could cause serious confusion in the guard.[13-23] (p. 321)
The majority of the National Guard Committee, supported by the
Director of Organization and Training, recommended that the secretary
make no exceptions to the segregation policy. The Director of
Personnel and Administration, on the other hand, joined with the
committee's minority in recommending that Royall's action in the New
Jersey case be used as a precedent.[13-24] Commenting independently,
General Bradley warned Royall that integrating individual Negroes in
the National Guard would, from a military point of view, "create
problems which may have serious consequences in case of national
mobilization of those units."[13-25]

[Footnote 13-23: Remarks by Kenneth Royall in the
Committee of Four, 9 Mar 48, OSD Historical Office
files.]

[Footnote 13-24: P&A Summary Sheet, 7 Jul 48, sub:
Utilization of Negro Manpower in the National
Guard, WDGPA 291.2; O&T Summary Sheet, 8 Apr 48,
same sub. See also Memo, Col William Abendroth,
Exec, Cmte on NG and Reserve Policy, for CofSA, 30
Jun 48, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower in the
National Guard of the United States, Office file,
Army Reserve Forces Policy Cmte. Thirteen of the
seventeen committee members concurred with the
staff study without reservation; the remaining four
concurred with the proviso that states prohibiting
segregation be granted the right to integrate.]

[Footnote 13-25: Memo, CofSA for SA, 7 Jul 48, CSUSA
291.2 Negroes (1 Jul 48).]

Here the matter would stand for some time, the Army's segregation
policy intact, but an informal allowance made for excepting individual
states from prohibitions against integration below the company level.
Yet the publicity and criticism attendant upon these decisions might
well have given the traditionalists pause. While Secretary Royall, and
on occasion his superior, Secretary of Defense Forrestal, reiterated
the Army's willingness to accommodate certain states,[13-26] civil rights
groups were gaining allies for another proposition. The American
Veterans Committee had advanced the idea that to forbid integration at
the platoon level was a retreat from World War II practice, and to
accept the excuse that segregation was in the interest of national
defense was to tolerate a "travesty on words."[13-27] Hearings were
conducted in Congress in 1949 and 1951 on bills H.R. 1403 and H.R.
1389 to prohibit segregation in the National Guard. Royall's
interpretation of the National Defense Act did not satisfy advocates
of a thoroughly integrated guard, for it was clear that not many
states were likely to petition for permission to integrate. At the
same time the exceptions to the segregation rule promised an
incompatible situation between the segregated active forces and the
incompletely integrated reserve organization.

[Footnote 13-26: See Ltrs, James Forrestal to A. A.
Heist, Dir, American Civil Liberties Union, 13 Sep
48, and Augustus F. Hawkins, 22 Sep 48; both in
D54-1-2, SecDef files; DF, Dir, P&A, to CofSA, 2
Nov 49, sub: Executive Order to Permit Integration
of Negroes Into Minnesota National Guard, CSUSA
291.2 Negroes (2 Nov 49).]

[Footnote 13-27: Ltr, J. Steward McClendon, Secy,
Minneapolis Chapter, Am Vets Cmte, to SecDef
[_sic_] Royall, 28 May 48, CSUSA 291.2 Negroes (28
May 48).]

Royall's ruling, while perhaps a short-term gain for traditionalists,
was significant because it established a precedent that would be used
by integrationists in later years. The price for defending the Army's
segregation policy, guard officials discovered, was the surrender of
their long-cherished claim of state autonomy. The committee's
recommendation on the matter of applying the Gillem Board policy to
the guard was inflexible, leaving no room for separate decisions by
officials of the several states. Maj. Gen. Jim Dan Hill of the
Wisconsin National Guard recognized this danger. Along with a minority
of his colleagues he maintained that the decision on segregation "will
have to be solved at the state level."[13-28] The committee (p. 322)
majority argued the contrary, agreeing with Brig. Gen. Alexander G.
Paxton of Mississippi that the National Defense Act of 1945 prohibited
the sort of exception made in the New Jersey case. General Paxton
called for a uniform policy for all guard units:

National Security is an obligation of all the states, and its
necessity in time of emergency transcends all local issues.
Federal recognition of the National Guard units of the several
States is extended for the purpose of affording these units a
Federal status under the National Defense Act. The issue in
question is purely one of compliance with Federal Law.[13-29]

[Footnote 13-28: Ltr, Maj Gen Jim Dan Hill, Wisconsin
National Guard, to Secy, WD Advisory Cmte, 24 Jun
48; see also Ltr, Brig Gen Harry Evans, Maryland
National Guard, to Col William Abendroth, Exec,
Cmte on NG and Reserve Policy, 22 Jun 48, Office
file, Army Reserve Forces Policy Cmte.]

[Footnote 13-29: Ltr, Brig Gen A. G. Paxton,
Mississippi National Guard, to Col William
Abendroth, 13 May 1948, Office file, Army Reserve
Forces Policy Cmte.]

Here was tacit recognition of federal supremacy over the National
Guard. In supporting the right of the Secretary of the Army to dictate
racial policy to state guards in 1948, the National Guard Committee
adopted a position that would haunt it when the question of
integrating the guard came up again in the early 1960's.

Despite the publicity given to General Bradley's comments at Fort
Knox, it was the Secretary of the Army, not the Chief of Staff, who
led the fight against change in the Army's racial practices. As the
debate over these practices warmed in the administration and the
national press, Kenneth C. Royall emerged as the principal spokesman
against further integration and the principal target of the civil
rights forces. Royall's sincere interest in the welfare of black
soldiers, albeit highly paternalistic, was not in question. His
trouble with civil rights officials stemmed from the fact that he
alone in the Truman administration still clung publicly to the belief
that segregation was not in itself discrimination, a belief shared by
many of his fellow citizens. Royall was convinced that the separate
but equal provisions of the Army's Gillem Board policy were right in
as much as they did provide equal treatment and opportunity for the
black minority. His opinion was reinforced by the continual assurances
of his military subordinates that in open competition with white
soldiers few Negroes would ever achieve a proportionate share of
promotions and better occupations. And when his subordinates added to
this sentiment the notion that integration would disrupt the Army and
endanger its efficiency, they quickly persuaded the already
sympathetic Royall that segregation was not only correct but
imperative.[13-30] The secretary might easily have agreed with General
Paul, who told an assembly of Army commanders that aside from some
needed improvement in the employment of black specialists "there isn't
a single complaint anyone can make in our use of the Negro."[13-31]

[Footnote 13-30: Ltr, Marx Leva to author, 24 May 70,
CMH files; see also Testimony of Royall at National
Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, 26 Apr 48,
copy in CMH.]

[Footnote 13-31: General Paul's Remarks at Army
Commanders Conference, 30 Mar-2 Apr 48, p. 30,
CSUSA 337.]

Secure in his belief that segregation was right and necessary, Royall
confidently awaited the judgment of the recently appointed President's
committee. He was convinced that any fair judge could draw but one
conclusion: under the provisions of Circular 124, Negroes had (p. 323)
already achieved equal treatment and opportunity in the Army. His job,
therefore, was relatively simple. He had to defend Army policy against
outside attack and make sure it was applied uniformly throughout the
service. His stand marked one of the last attempts by a major federal
official to support a racially separate but equal system before the
principle was finally struck down by the Supreme Court in _Brown_ v.
_Board of Education_.

[Illustration: SECRETARY ROYALL REVIEWS MILITARY POLICE, _Yokohama,
Japan, 1949_.]

Royall readily conceded that it was proper and necessary for Negroes
to insist on integration, but, echoing a long-cherished Army belief,
he adamantly opposed using the Army to support or oppose any social
cause. The Army, he contended, must follow the nation, not lead it, in
social matters. The Army must not experiment. When, "without prejudice
to the National Defense," the Army could reduce segregation to the
platoon level it would do so, but all such steps should be taken one
at a time. And 1948, he told the conference of black leaders in April
of that year, was not the time.[13-32]

[Footnote 13-32: See Testimony of Royall at National
Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, 26 Apr 48, pp.
24-26.]

Convinced of the rightness of the Army's policy, Secretary Royall was
understandably agitated by the unfavorable publicity directed at him
and his department. The publicity, he was convinced, resulted from
discrimination on the part of "the Negro and liberal press" (p. 324)
against the Army's policy in favor of the Navy and Air Force. He was
particularly incensed at the way the junior services had escaped the
"rap"--his word--on racial matters. He ascribed it in large part, he
told the Secretary of Defense in September 1948, to the "unfortunate"
National Defense Conference, the gathering of black spokesmen held
under Forrestal's auspices the previous spring.[13-33] The specific
object of Royall's indignation was Lester Granger's final report on
the work of the National Defense Conference. That report emphasized
the conferees' rebuttal to Royall's defense of segregation on the
grounds of military expediency and past experience with black
soldiers. The Army has assumed a position, Granger claimed, that was
unjustified by its own experience. Overlooking evidence to the
contrary, Granger added that the Army position was at variance with
the experience of the other services. His parting shot was aimed at
the heart of the Army's argument: "It is as unwise as it is unsound to
cite the resistance of military leadership against basic changes in
policy as sufficient cause for delaying immediate and effective
action."[13-34]

[Footnote 13-33: Memo, SA for SecDef, 22 Sep 48, copy
in CD30-1-2, SecDef files.]

[Footnote 13-34: Ltr, Granger and Conferees to
Forrestal, 26 Aug 48, D54-1-3, SecDef files.]

Adding to Royall's discomfort, Forrestal released the report on 8
September, and his letter of appreciation to Granger and the conferees
assured them he would send their report to the President's committee.
The New York _Times_ promptly picked up Granger's reference to
opposition among military leaders.[13-35] Royall tried to counter this
attack. Since neither the President nor the Secretary of Defense had
disapproved the Army's racial policy nor suggested any modifications,
Royall told Forrestal he wanted him to go on record as approving the
Army position. This course would doubtless be more palatable to
Forrestal, Royall suggested, than having Royall announce that
Forrestal had given tacit approval to the Army's policy.[13-36]

[Footnote 13-35: NME Press Release, 8 Sep 48; New York
_Times_, September 9, 1948; Memo, Leva for
Forrestal, 30 Aug 48; Ltr, Forrestal to Granger, 30
Aug 48. Last two in D54-1-3, SecDef files.]

[Footnote 13-36: Memo, SA for SecDef, 22 Sep 48, copy
in CD30-1-2, SecDef files.]

Forrestal quickly scotched this maneuver. It was true, he told Royall,
that the Army's policy had not been disapproved. But neither had the
Army's policy or that of the Navy or Air Force yet been reviewed by
the Secretary of Defense. The President's committee would probably
make such a review an early order of business. Meanwhile, the Army's
race policy would continue in effect until it was altered either by
Forrestal's office or by action from some other source.[13-37]

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