Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

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[Footnote 12-61: Interv, Nichols with Ewing.]

Clifford, Ewing, and Philleo Nash, who was a presidential specialist
on minority matters, worked on drafting both orders. After consulting
with Truman Gibson, Nash proposed that the order directed to the
services should create a committee within the military establishment
to push for integration, one similar to the McCloy committee in World
War II. Like Gibson, Nash was convinced that change in the armed
forces racial policy would come only through a series of steps
initiated in each service. By such steps progress had been made in the
Navy through its Special Programs Unit and in the Army through the
efforts of the McCloy committee. Nash argued against the publication
of an executive order that spelled out integration or condemned
segregation. Rather, let the order to the services call for equal
treatment and opportunity--the language of the Democratic platform.
Tie it to military efficiency, letting the services discover, under
guidance from a White House committee, the inefficiency of segregation.
The services would quickly conclude, the advisers assumed, that equal
treatment and opportunity were impossible in a segregated (p. 311)
system.[12-62] After a series of discussions with the President, Nash,
Clifford, and Ewing drew up a version of the order to the services
along the lines suggested by Nash.[12-63]

[Footnote 12-62: Memo, Niles for Clifford, 12 May 48;
Memo, Clifford for SecDef, 13 May 48, Nash
Collection, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 12-63: Interv, Nichols with Ewing.]

The draft underwent one significant revision at the request of the
Secretary of Defense. In keeping with his theory that the services
should be given the chance to work out their own methods of compliance
with the order to integrate, Forrestal wanted no deadlines set. To
keep antagonisms to a minimum he wanted the order to call simply for
progress "as rapidly as feasible." The President agreed.[12-64]

[Footnote 12-64: Nichols, _Breakthrough on the Color
Front_, p. 86.]

The timing of the order was politically important to Truman, and by
late July the White House was extremely anxious to publish the
document. The President now had his all-important selective service
legislation; he was beginning to campaign on a platform calling for a
special session of Congress--a Congress dominated by Republicans, who
had also just approved a party platform calling for an end to
segregation in the armed forces. Haste was evident in the fact that
the order, along with copies for the service secretaries, was sent to
the Secretary of Defense on the morning of 26 July--the day it was
issued--for comment and review by that afternoon.[12-65] The order was
also submitted to Walter White and A. Philip Randolph before it was
issued.[12-66]

[Footnote 12-65: Ltr, Donald S. Dawson, Admin Asst to
the President, to SecDef, 26 Jul 48. The executive
order on equal opportunity for federal employees
was also issued on 26 July.]

[Footnote 12-66: Columbia University Oral Hist Interv
with Wilkins.]

Actually, the order had been read to Forrestal on the evening of the
previous day, and his office had suggested one more change. Marx Leva
believed that the order would be improved if it mentioned the fact
that substantial progress in civil rights had been made during the war
and in the years thereafter. Since a sentence to this effect had been
included in Truman's civil rights message of February, Leva thought it
would be well to include it in the executive order. Believing also
that policy changes ought to be the work of the government or of the
executive branch of the government rather than of the President alone,
he offered a sentence for inclusion: "To the extent that this policy
has not yet been completely implemented, such alterations or
improvements in existing rules, procedures and practices as may be
necessary shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible." Although
Forrestal approved the sentence, it was not accepted by the
President.[12-67]

[Footnote 12-67: Memo, Leva for Forrestal, 26 Jul 48,
SecDef files.]

Approvals were quickly gathered from interested cabinet officials. The
Attorney General passed on the form and legality of the order.
Forrestal was certain that Stuart Symington of the Air Force and John
L. Sullivan, Secretary of the Navy, would approve the order, but he
suggested that Oscar Ewing discuss the draft with Kenneth Royall.
According to Ewing, the Secretary of the Army read the order twice (p. 312)
and said, "tell the President that I not only have no objections but
wholeheartedly approve, and we'll go along with it."[12-68]

[Footnote 12-68: Interv, Nichols with Ewing: Ltr, Atty
Gen to President, 26 Jul 48, 1285-0, copy in
Eisenhower Library.]

The historic document, signed by Truman on 26 July 1948, read as
follows:

EXECUTIVE ORDER 9981

Whereas it is essential that there be maintained in the armed
services of the United States the highest standards of democracy,
with equality of treatment and opportunity for all those who
serve in our country's defense:

Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as
President of the United States, and as Commander in Chief of the
armed services, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that
there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all
persons in the armed services without regard to race, color,
religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect
as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to
effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or
morale.

2. There shall be created in the National Military Establishment
an advisory committee to be known as the President's Committee on
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services,
which shall be composed of seven members to be designated by the
President.

3. The Committee is authorized on behalf of the President to
examine into the rules, procedures and practices of the armed
services in order to determine in what respect such rules,
procedures and practices may be altered or improved with a view
to carrying out the policy of this order. The Committee shall
confer and advise with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air
Force, and shall make such recommendations to the President and
to said Secretaries as in the judgment of the Committee will
effectuate the policy hereof.

4. All executive departments and agencies of the Federal
Government are authorized and directed to cooperate with the
Committee in its work, and to furnish the Committee such
information or the services of such persons as the Committee may
require in the performance of its duties.

5. When requested by the Committee to do so, persons in the armed
services or in any of the executive departments and agencies of
the Federal Government shall testify before the Committee and
shall make available for the use of the Committee such documents
and other information as the Committee may require.

6. The Committee shall continue to exist until such time as the
President shall terminate its existence by Executive Order.

The White House HARRY S. TRUMAN
July 26, 1948

As indicated by the endorsement of such diverse protagonists as Royall
and Randolph, the wording of the executive order was in part both
vague and misleading. The vagueness was there by design. The failure
to mention either segregation or integration puzzled many people and
angered others, but it was certainly to the advantage of a president
who wanted to give the least offense possible to voters who supported
segregation. In fact integration was not the precise word to describe
the complex social change in the armed forces demanded by civil rights
leaders, and the emphasis on equality of treatment and opportunity with
its portent for the next generation was particularly appropriate.
Truman, however, was not allowed to remain vague for long. (p. 313)
Questioned at his first press conference after the order was issued, the
President refused to set a time limit, but he admitted that he expected
the order to abolish racial segregation in the armed forces.[12-69]
The order was also misleading when it created the advisory committee
"in" the National Military Establishment. Truman apparently intended
to create a presidential committee to oversee the manpower policies of
all the services, and despite the wording of the order the committee
would operate as a creature of the White House, reporting to the
President rather than to the Secretary of Defense.

[Footnote 12-69: Presidential News Conference, 29 Jul
48, _Public Papers of the President_, 1948, p.
422.]

The success of the new policy would depend to a great extent, as
friends and foes of integration alike recognized, on the ability and
inclination of this committee. The final choice of members was the
President's, but he conspicuously involved the Democratic National
Committee, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army. He
repeatedly solicited Forrestal's suggestions, and it was apparent that
the views of the Pentagon would carry much weight in the final
selection. Just four days after the publication of Executive Order
9981, the President's administrative assistant, Donald S. Dawson,
wrote Forrestal that he would be glad to talk to him about the seven
members.[12-70] Before Forrestal replied he had Leva discuss possible
nominees with the three military departments and obtain their
recommendations. The Pentagon's list went to the White House on 3
August. A list compiled subsequently by Truman's advisers, chiefly
Philleo Nash and Oscar Ewing, and approved by the Democratic National
Committee, duplicated a number of Forrestal's suggestions; its
additions and deletions revealed the practical political
considerations under which the White House had to operate.[12-71]

[Footnote 12-70: Ltr, Dawson to Forrestal, 30 Jul 48,
SecDef files.]

[Footnote 12-71: Memos, Leva for Forrestal, 3 and 12
Aug 48; Ltr, Forrestal to President, 3 Aug 48,
D54-1-3, SecDef files.]

By mid-September the committee was still unformed. The White House had
been unable to get either Frank Graham, president of the University of
North Carolina, a member of the President's Committee on Civil Rights,
and the first choice of both the White House and the Pentagon for
chairman, or Charles E. Wilson, second choice, to accept the
chairmanship. Secretary of the Army Royall was particularly incensed
that some of the men being considered for the committee "have publicly
expressed their opinion in favor of abolishing segregation in the
Armed Services. At least one of them, Lester Grainger [_sic_], has
been critical both of the Army and of me personally on this particular
matter."[12-72] Royall wanted no one asked to serve on the President's
committee who had fixed opinions on segregation, and certainly no one
who had made a public pronouncement on the subject. He wanted the
nominees questioned to make sure they could give "fair consideration"
to the subject.[12-73] Royall favored Jonathan Daniels, Ralph McGill of
the Atlanta _Constitution_, Colgate Darden, president of the
University of Virginia, and Douglas Southall Freeman, distinguished
Richmond historian.[12-74] Names continued to be bruited about. (p. 314)
Dawson asked Forrestal if he had any preferences for Reginald E.
Gillmor, president of Sperry Gyroscope, or Julius Ochs Adler, noted
publisher and former military aide to Secretary Stimson, as
possibilities for chairman. Forrestal inclined toward Adler; "I
believe he would be excellent although as a Southerner he might have
limiting views."[12-75]

[Footnote 12-72: Ltr, Royall to President, 17 Sep 48,
OSA 291.2 (17 Sep 48).]

[Footnote 12-73: Ibid.]

[Footnote 12-74: Memo, Royall for Forrestal, 10 Sep
48, OSA 291.2 (10 Sep 48).]

[Footnote 12-75: Memo, Leva for Forrestal, 1 Sep 48,
and Handwritten Note by Forrestal, D54-1-3, SecDef
files.]

With the election imminent, the need for an announcement on the
membership of the committee became pressing. On 16 September Dawson
told Leva that a chairman and five of the six members had been
selected and had agreed to serve: Charles Fahy, chairman, Charles
Luckman, Lester Granger, John H. Sengstacke, Jacob Billikopf, and
Alphonsus J. Donahue. The sixth member, still uninvited, was to be
Dwight Palmer. Dawson said he would wait on this appointment until
Forrestal had time to consider it, but two days later he was back,
telling the secretary that the President had instructed him to release
the names. There was final change: William E. Stevenson's name was
substituted for Billikopf's.[12-76]

[Footnote 12-76: Memo, Leva for Forrestal, 18 Sep 48,
D54-1-3, SecDef files.]

Although only two of Forrestal's nominees, Lester Granger and John
Sengstacke, survived the selection process, the final membership was
certainly acceptable to the Secretary of Defense. Charles Fahy was
suggested by presidential assistant David K. Niles, who described the
soft-voiced Georgian as a "reconstructed southerner liberal on race."
A lawyer and former Solicitor General, Fahy had a reputation for
sensitive handling of delicate problems, "with quiet authority and the
punch of a mule." Granger's appointment was a White House bow to
Forrestal and a disregard for Royall's objections. Sengstacke, a noted
black publisher suggested by Forrestal and Ewing and supported by
William L. Dawson, the black congressman from Chicago, was appointed
in deference to the black press. Moreover, he had supported Truman's
reelection "in unqualified terms." William Stevenson was the president
of Oberlin College and was strongly recommended by Lloyd K. Garrison,
president of the National Urban League. Finally, there was a trio of
businessmen on the committee: Donahue was a Connecticut industrialist,
highly recommended by Senator Howard J. McGrath of Rhode Island and
Brian McMahon of Connecticut; Luckman was president of Lever Brothers
and a native of Kansas City, Missouri; and Dwight Palmer was president
of the General Cable Corporation.[12-77]

[Footnote 12-77: Interv, Nichols with Ewing; Interv,
Blumenson with Leva. Donahue resigned for health
reasons shortly after the committee began its work;
see Ltr, Donahue to Truman, 23 May 49, Truman
Library. Luckman did not participate at all in the
committee's work or sign its report. The
committee's active members, in addition to its
chairman, were Granger, Sengstacke, Palmer, and
Stevenson.]

These were the men with whom, for a time at least, the Secretary of
Defense would share his direction over the racial policies of the
armed forces.

CHAPTER 13 (p. 315)

Service Interests Versus Presidential Intent

Several months elapsed between the appointment of the President's
Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services and its first meeting, a formal session with the President at
the White House on 12 January 1949. Actually, certain advantages
accrued from the delay, for postponing the meetings until after the
President's reelection enabled the committee to face the services with
assurance of continued support from the administration. Renewed
presidential backing was probably necessary, considering the services'
deliberations on race policy during this half-year hiatus. Their
reactions to the order, logical outgrowths of postwar policies and
practices, demonstrated how their perceived self-interests might
subvert the President's intentions. The events of this six-month
period also began to show the relative importance of the order and the
parochial interests of the services as factors in the integration of
the armed forces.

_Public Reaction to Executive Order 9981_

Considering the substantial changes it promised, the President's order
provoked surprisingly little public opposition. Its publication
coincided with the convening of the special session of a Congress
smarting under Truman's "do-nothing" label. In this charged political
atmosphere, the anti-administration majority in Congress quietly
sidestepped the President's 27 July call for civil rights legislation.
To do otherwise would only have added to the political profits already
garnered by Truman in some important voting areas. For the same reason
congressional opponents avoided all mention of Executive Order 9981,
although the widely expected defeat of Truman and the consequent end
to this executive sally into civil rights might have contributed to
the silence. Besides, segregationists could do little in an immediate
legislative way to counteract the presidential command. Congress had
already passed the Selective Service Act and Defense Appropriations
Act, the most suitable vehicles for amendments aimed at modifying the
impact of the integration order. National elections and the advent of
a new Congress precluded any other significant moves in this direction
until later in the next year.

Yet if it was ignored in Congress, the order was nevertheless a clear
signal to the friends of integration and brought with it a tremendous
surge of hope to the black community. Publishing the order made Harry
Truman the "darling of the Negroes," Roy Wilkins said later. Nor did
the coincidence of its publication to the election, he added, bother a
group that was becoming increasingly pragmatic about the reasons (p. 316)
for social reform.[13-1] Both the declaredly Democratic Chicago
_Defender_ and Republican-oriented Pittsburgh _Courier_ were aware of
the implications of the order. The _Defender_ ran an editorial on 7
August under the heading "Mr. Truman Makes History." The "National
Grapevine" column of Charlie Cherokee in the same issue promised its
readers a blow-by-blow description of the events surrounding the
President's action. An interview in the same issue with Col. Richard
L. Jones, black commander of the 178th Regimental Combat Team
(Illinois), emphasized the beneficial effects of the proposed
integration, and in the next issue, 14 August, the editor broadened
the discussion with an editorial entitled "What About Prejudice?"[13-2]
The _Courier_, for its part, questioned the President's sincerity
because he had not explicitly called for an end to segregation. At the
same time it contrasted the futility of civil disobedience with the
efficiency of such an order on the services, and while maintaining its
support for the candidacy of Governor Dewey the paper revealed a
strong enthusiasm for President Truman's civil rights program.[13-3]

[Footnote 13-1: Columbia University Oral Hist Interv
with Wilkins.]

[Footnote 13-2: Chicago _Defender_, August 7 and
August 14, 1948.]

[Footnote 13-3: Pittsburgh _Courier_, August 7, August
28, and September 25, 1948.]

These affirmations of support for Executive Order 9981 in the major
black newspapers fitted in neatly with the administration's political
strategy. Nor was the Democratic National Committee averse to using
the order to win black votes. For example it ran a half-page
advertisement in the _Defender_ under the heading "By His Deeds Shall
Ye Know Him."[13-4] At the same time, not wishing to antagonize the
opponents of integration further, the administration made no special
effort to publicize the order in the metropolitan press. Consequently,
when the order was mentioned at all, it was usually carried without
comment, and the few columnists who treated the subject did so with
some caution. Arthur Krock's "Reform Attempts Aid Southern Extremists"
in the New York _Times_, for example, lauded the President's civil
rights initiatives but warned that any attempt to force social
integration would only strengthen demagogues at the expense of
moderate politicians.[13-5]

[Footnote 13-4: Chicago _Defender_, August 21, 1948.]

[Footnote 13-5: New York _Times_, September 12, 1948.]

If the President's wooing of the black voter was good election
politics, his executive order was also a successful practical response
to the threat of civil disobedience and the failure of the Secretary
of Defense to strive actively for racial equality throughout the
services. Declaring the President's action a substantial gain, A.
Philip Randolph canceled the call for a boycott of the draft, leaving
only a small number of diehards to continue the now insignificant
effort. The black leaders who had participated in Secretary
Forrestal's National Defense Conference gave the President their full
support, and Donald S. Dawson, administrative assistant to the
President, was able to assure Truman that the black press, now
completely behind the committee on equal treatment and opportunity,
had abandoned its vigorous campaign against the Army's racial
policy.[13-6]

[Footnote 13-6: Memo, Donald Dawson for President, 9
Sep 48, Nash Collection, Truman Library; Memo,
SecDef for [Clark] Clifford, 2 Aug 48, and Ltr,
Bayard Rustin of the Campaign to Resist Military
Segregation to James V. Forrestal, 20 Aug 48; both
in D54-1-14, SecDef files. It should be noted that
Dawson's claim that the black press universally
supported the executive order has not been accepted
by all commentators; see McCoy and Ruetten, _Quest
and Response_, p. 130.]

Ironically, the most celebrated pronouncement on segregation at (p. 317)
the moment of the Truman order came not from publicists or politicians
but from the Army's new Chief of Staff, General Omar N. Bradley.[13-7]
Speaking to a group of instructors at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and unaware
of the President's order and the presence of the press, Bradley
declared that the Army would have to retain segregation as long as it
was the national pattern.[13-8] This statement prompted questions at
the President's next news conference, letters to the editor, and
debate in the press.[13-9] Bradley later explained that he had
supported the Army's segregation policy because he was against making
the Army an instrument of social change in areas of the country which
still rejected integration.[13-10] His comment, as amplified and
broadcast by military analyst Hanson W. Baldwin, summarized the Army's
position at the time of the Truman order. "It is extremely dangerous
nonsense," Baldwin declared, "to try to make the Army other than one
thing--a fighting machine." By emphasizing that the Army could not
afford to differ greatly in customs, traditions, and prejudices from
the general population, Baldwin explained, Bradley was only
underscoring a major characteristic of any large organization of
conscripts. Most import, Baldwin pointed out, the Chief of Staff
considered an inflexible order for the immediate integration of all
troops one of the surest ways to break down the morale of the Army and
destroy its efficiency.[13-11]

[Footnote 13-7: Bradley succeeded Eisenhower as Chief
of Staff on 7 February 1948.]

[Footnote 13-8: Washington _Post_, July 28, 1948;
Atlanta _Constitution_, July 28, 1948.]

[Footnote 13-9: News Conference, 29 Jul 48, _Public
Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948_,
p. 165; New York _Times_, July 30, 1948; Chicago
_Defender_, August 7, 1948; Pittsburgh _Courier_,
August 21, 1948; Washington _Post_, August 23,
1948.]

[Footnote 13-10: Interv, Nichols with Bradley.]

[Footnote 13-11: Hanson Baldwin, "Segregation in the
Army," New York _Times_, August 8, 1948.]