Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

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Limiting black enlistment to 300 per month did little to ease the
situation in the Tactical Air Command. There, the percentage of black
personnel, although down from its postwar high of 28 percent to 15.4
percent by the end of 1947, remained several points above the Gillem
Board's 10 percent quota throughout 1948. In March 1948 the command's
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Col. John E. Barr, found that the
large number of Negroes gave the command a surplus of "marginal (p. 281)
individuals," men who could not be trained economically for the
various skills needed. He argued that this theoretical surplus of
Negroes was "potentially parasitic" and threatened the command's
mission.[11-36]

[Footnote 11-36: Memo, DCofS/P&A, TAC, for CG, TAC, 18
Mar 48, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower,
AFSHRC.]

[Illustration: SQUADRON F, 318TH AAF BATTALION, _in review, Lockbourne
Air Force Base, Ohio, 1947_.]

At the same time, the command's personnel director found that Negroes
were being inefficiently used. With one squadron designated for their
black airmen, most commanders deemed surplus any Negroes in excess of
the needs of that squadron and made little attempt to use them
effectively. Even when some of these men were given a chance at
skilled jobs in the Tactical Air Command their assignments proved
short-lived. Because of a shortage of white airmen at Shaw Air Force
Base, South Carolina, in early 1948, for example, Negroes from the
base's Squadron F were assigned to fill all the slots in Squadron C,
the base fire department. The Negroes performed so creditably that
when enough white airmen to man Squadron C became available the
commander suggested that the black fire fighters be transferred to
Lockbourne rather than returned to their menial assignments.[11-37] The
advantage of leaving the all-black Squadron C at Shaw was apparently
overlooked by everyone.

[Footnote 11-37: Memo, Adj, 20th Fighter Wing, for CG,
Ninth AF, undated, sub: Transfer of Structural
Firefighters; 2d Ind, Hq 332d Fighter Wing,
Lockbourne, to CG, Ninth AF, 26 Apr 48, Hist of
Ninth AF, AFSHRC.]

Even this limited chance at occupational preferment was exceptional
for black airmen in the Tactical Air Command. The command's personnel
staff admitted that many highly skilled black technicians were
performing menial tasks and that measures taken to raise the
performance levels of other black airmen through training were
inadequate. The staff also concluded that actions designed by the
command to raise morale among black airmen left much to be desired. It
mentioned specifically the excessively high turnover of officers
assigned to black units, officers who for the most part proved
mediocre as leaders. Most devastating of all, the study admitted that
promotions and other rewards for duties performed by black airmen were
not commensurate with those received by whites.[11-38]

[Footnote 11-38: Memo, DCofS/P&A, TAC, for CG, TAC, 18
Mar 48, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower,
AFSHRC.]

Colonel Barr offered a solution that echoed the plea of Air Force (p. 282)
commanders everywhere: revise Circular 124 to allow his organization
to reduce the percentage of Negroes. Among a number of "compromise
solutions" he recommended raising enlistment standards to reduce the
number of submarginal airmen; designating Squadron E, the
transportation squadron of the combat wings, a black unit; assigning
all skilled black technicians to Lockbourne or declaring them surplus
to the command; and selecting only outstanding officers to command
black units.

One of these recommendations was under fire in Colonel Barr's own
command. All-black transportation squadrons had already been discussed
in the Ninth Air Force and had brought an immediate objection from
Maj. Gen. William D. Old, its commander. Old explained that few black
airmen in his command were qualified for "higher echelon maintenance
activities," that is, major motor and transmission overhaul, and he
had no black officers qualified to command such troops. On-the-job
training would be impossible during total conversion of the squadrons
from white to black; formal schooling for whole squadrons would have
to be organized. Besides, Old continued, making transportation
squadrons all black would only aggravate the command's race problems,
for it would result in a further deviation from the "desired ratio of
one to ten." Old wanted to reduce the number of black airmen in the
Ninth Air Force by 1,633 men. The loss would not materially affect the
efficiency of his command, he concluded. It would leave the Ninth Air
Force with a ratio of one black officer to ten white and one black
airman to eight white, and still permit the manning of black tactical
units at full strength.[11-39] In the end none of these recommendations
was followed. They needed the approval of Air Force headquarters, and
as Lt. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada, commander of the Tactical Air Command,
explained to General Old, the headquarters was in the midst of a
lengthy review of Circular 124. In the meantime the command would have
to carry on without guidance from higher headquarters.[11-40] Carry on it
did, but the problems associated with the distribution of black
airmen, problems the command constantly shared with Air Force
headquarters, lingered throughout 1948.[11-41]

[Footnote 11-39: Memo, Maj Gen Old for CG, TAC, 26 Jan
48, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower, 9AF 200.3,
Hist of Ninth AF, AFSHRC.]

[Footnote 11-40: Ltr, Lt Gen Quesada to Maj Gen Old,
Ninth AF, 9 Apr 48, Hist of Ninth AF, AFSHRC.]

[Footnote 11-41: Ltrs, CG, TAC, to CS/USAF, 1 Sep 48,
sub: Reception of Submarginal Enlisted Personnel;
VCS/USAF to CG, TAC, 11 Sep 48, sub: Elimination of
Undesirable or Substandard Airmen; CG, TAC, to
CS/USAF, 24 Sep 48, same sub. All in AFSHRC.]

The Air Force's segregation policy had meanwhile created a critical
situation in the black tactical units. The old 332d, now the 332d
Fighter Wing, shared with the rest of the command the burden of too
many low-scoring men--35 percent of Lockbourne's airmen were in the
two lowest groups, IV and V--but here the problem was acute since the
presence of so many persons with little ability limited the number of
skilled black airmen that the Tactical Air Command could transfer to
the wing from other parts of the command. Under direction of the
command, the Ninth Air Force was taking advantage of a regulation that
restricted the reenlistment of low-scoring airmen, but the high
percentage of unskilled Negroes persisted at Lockbourne. Negroes (p. 283)
in the upper test brackets were not reenlisting while the low scorers
unquestionably were.[11-42]

[Footnote 11-42: Ltr, DCofS/P&A, TAC, to CG, Ninth AF,
19 May 48, sub: Submarginal Enlisted Personnel;
Record of Dir of Per Staff, TAC, Mtg, 28 Oct 48;
both in AFSHRC.]

At the same time there was a shortage of rated black officers. The
332d Fighter Wing was authorized 244 officers, but only 200 were
assigned in February 1948. There was no easy solution to the shortage,
a product of many years of neglect. Segregation imposed the necessity
of devising a broad and long-range recruitment and training program
for black officers, but not until April 1948 did the Tactical Air
Command call for a steady flow of Negroes through officer candidate
and flight training schools.[11-43] It hoped to have another thirty-one
black pilot graduates by March 1949 and planned to recall thirty-two
others from inactive status.[11-44] Even these steps could not possibly
alleviate the serious shortage caused by the perennial failure to
replace the wing's annual pilot attrition.

[Footnote 11-43: Ltr, CG, TAC, to CG, Ninth AF, 9 Apr
48, TAC 314 (9 Apr 48), AFSHRC.]

[Footnote 11-44: Hq TAC, Record and Routing Sheet, 16
Apr 48, sub: Supervisory Visit 332d Ftr Gp,
Lockbourne AFB, AFSHRC.]

The chronic shortage of black field grade officers in the 332d was the
immediate cause of the change in Air Force policy. By February 1948
the 332d had only thirteen of its forty-eight authorized field grade
officers on duty. The three tactical units of the wing were commanded
by captains instead of the authorized lieutenant colonels. If Colonel
Davis were reassigned, and his attendance at the Air War College was
expected momentarily, his successor as wing commander would be a major
with five years' service.[11-45] The Tactical Air Commander was trying to
have all field grade Negroes assigned to the 332d, but even that
expedient would not provide enough officers.[11-46] Finally, General
Quesada decided to recommend that "practically all" the key field
grade positions in the 332d Wing be filled by whites.[11-47]

[Footnote 11-45: Ltr, CG, Ninth AF, to CG, TAC, 10 Feb
48, sub: Assignment of Negro Personnel, Hist of
Ninth AF, AFSHRC.]

[Footnote 11-46: Hq TAC, Record and Routing Sheet, 16
Apr 48, sub: Supervisory Visit 332d Ftr Gp,
Lockbourne AFB, AFSHRC.]

[Footnote 11-47: Ltrs, CG, TAC, to CG, Ninth AF, 9 Apr
48, and DCG, TAC, to CG, Ninth AF, 7 May 48, TAC
210.3; both in Hist of Ninth AF, AFSHRC.]

Subsequent discussions at Air Force headquarters gave the Air Force
Chief of Staff, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, three choices: leave
Lockbourne manned exclusively by black officers; assign a white wing
commander with a racially mixed staff; or permit Colonel Davis to
remain in command with a racially mixed staff. Believing that General
Vandenberg would approve the last course, the Tactical Air Command
proceeded to search for appropriate white officers to fill the key
positions under Davis.[11-48]

[Footnote 11-48: Memo, A-1, Ninth AF, for C/S, Ninth
AF, 18 May 48, sub: Manning of 332d Fighter Wing,
Hist of Ninth AF; Record of the TAC Staff Conf, 18
May 48; both in AFSHRC.]

The deputy commander of the Ninth Air Force, Brig. Gen. Jarred V.
Crabb, predicted that placing whites in key positions in the 332d
would cause trouble, but leaving Davis in command of a mixed staff
"would be loaded with dynamite."[11-49] The commander of the Ninth (p. 284)
Air Force called the proposal to integrate the 332d's staff contrary
to Air Force policy, which prescribed segregated units of not less
than company strength. General Old was forthright:

[Integration] would be playing in the direction in which the
negro press would like to force us. They are definitely
attempting to force the Army and Air Force to solve the racial
problem. As you know, they have been strongly advocating mixed
companies of white and colored. For obvious reasons this is most
undesirable and to do so would definitely limit the geographical
locations in which such units could be employed. If the Air
Forces go ahead and set a precedent, most undesirable
repercussions may occur. Regardless of how the problem is solved,
we would certainly come under strong criticism of the negro
press. That must be expected.

In view of the combat efficiency demonstrated by colored
organizations during the last war, my first recommendation in the
interest of national defense and saving the taxpayer's money is
to let the organization die on the vine. We make a big subject of
giving the taxpayers the maximum amount of protection for each
dollar spent, then turn around and support an organization that
would contribute little or nothing in an emergency. It is my own
opinion that it is an unnecessary drain on our national
resources, but for political reasons I presume the organization
must be retained. Therefore, my next recommended solution is to
transfer all of the colored personnel from the Wing Headquarters
staff to the Tactical and Service Organizations within the Wing
structure and replace it with a completely white staff.[11-50]

[Footnote 11-49: Ltr, Brig Gen J. V. Crabb to Maj Gen
Robert M. Lee, Hq TAC, 19 May 48, Hist of Ninth AF,
AFSHRC.]

[Footnote 11-50: Ltr, CG, Ninth AF, to Maj Gen R. M.
Lee, TAC, 18 May 48, Hist of Ninth AF, AFSHRC.]

It is difficult to estimate the extent to which these views were
shared by other senior commanders, but they were widespread and
revealed the tenacious hold of segregation.[11-51]

[Footnote 11-51: For discussion of these views and
their influence on officers, see USAF Oral History
Program, Interviews with Brig Gen Noel Parrish, 30
Mar 73, Col Jack Marr, 1 Oct 73, and Eugene
Zuckert, Apr 73.]

The Ninth Air Force's deputy commander offered another solution: use
"whatever colored officers we have" to run Lockbourne. He urged that
Colonel Davis's absence at the Air War College be considered a
temporary arrangement. Meanwhile, the general added, "we can carry
Lockbourne along for that period of time by close supervision from
this headquarters."[11-52] As Davis later put it, cost effectiveness, not
prejudice, was the key factor in the Air Force's wish to get rid of
the 332d. The Air Force, he concluded, "wasn't getting its money's
worth from negro pilots in a black air force."[11-53]

[Footnote 11-52: Ltr, Brig Gen J. V. Crabb to Maj Gen
Robert M. Lee, Hq TAC, 19 May 48, Hist of Ninth AF,
AFSHRC.]

[Footnote 11-53: Interv, author with Davis.]

The Tactical Air Command's use of black troops is always singled out
because of the numbers involved, but the problem was common to nearly
all commands. Most Negroes in the Strategic Air Command, for example,
were assigned to aviation engineer units where, as construction
workers, they built roads, runways, and housing for the command's
far-flung bases. These duties were transient, however, and like
migrant workers at home, black construction crews were shifted from
base to base as the need arose; they had little chance for promotion,
let alone the opportunity to develop other skills.[11-54]

[Footnote 11-54: See history of various aviation air
units in "History of the Strategic Air Command,
1948," vols VI and VIII, AFSHRC.]

The distribution of Negroes in all commands, and particularly the
shortage of black specialists and officers in the 332d Fighter Wing,
strongly influenced the Air Force to reexamine its racial policy, (p. 285)
but pressures came from outside the department as well as from the
black community which began to press its demands on the new
service.[11-55] The prestigious Pittsburgh _Courier_ opened the
campaign in March 1948 by directing a series of questions on Air Force
policy to the Chief of Staff. General Carl Spaatz responded with a
smooth summary of the Gillem Board Report, leaning heavily on that
document's progressive aims. "It is the feeling of this Headquarters,"
the Chief of Staff wrote, "that the ultimate Air Force objective must
be to eliminate segregation among its personnel by the unrestricted
use of Negro personnel in free competition for any duty within the Air
Force for which they may qualify."[11-56] Unimpressed with this
familiar rhetoric, the _Courier_ headlined its account of the
exchange, "Air Force to Keep Segregated Policy."

[Footnote 11-55: For discussion of the strength of
this outside pressure, see USAF Oral History
Program. Interviews with Davis and Brig Gen Lucius
Theus, Jan 73.]

[Footnote 11-56: Ltr, Lemuel Graves to Gen Carl
Spaatz, 26 Mar 48; Ltr, Spaatz to Graves, 19 Apr
48. A copy of the correspondence was also sent to
the SecAF. See Col Jack F. Marr, "A Report on the
First Year of Implementation of Current Policies
Regarding Negro Personnel," n.d., PPB 291.2.]

[Illustration: COLONEL DAVIS.]

Assistant Secretary Eugene M. Zuckert followed General Spaatz's line
when he met with black leaders at the National Defense Conference on
Negro Affairs in April 1948, but his audience also showed little
interest in future intentions. Putting it bluntly, they wanted to know
why segregation was necessary in the Air Force. Zuckert could only
assure them that segregation was a "practical military expediency,"
not an "endorsement of belief in racial distribution."[11-57] But the
black leaders pressed the matter further. Why was it expedient in a
system dedicated to consideration of the individual, asked the
president of Howard University, to segregate a Negro of superior
mentality? At Yale or Harvard, Dr. Mordecai Johnson continued, he
would be kept on the team, but if he entered the Air Force he would be
"brigaded with all the people from Mississippi and Alabama who had had
education that costs $100 a year."[11-58]

[Footnote 11-57: Department of National Defense,
"National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs," 26
Apr 48 (morning session) p. 62. The conference,
convened by Secretary of Defense Forrestal,
provided an opportunity for a group of black
leaders to question major defense officials on the
department's racial policies. See ch. 13.]

[Footnote 11-58: Department of National Defense,
"National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs," 28
Apr 48, (morning session), p. 67.]

Answering for the Air Force, Lt. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, admitted segregation was unnecessary,
promised eventual integration, but stated firmly that for the present
segregation remained Air Force policy. As evidence of progress, (p. 286)
Edwards pointed to the peaceful integration of black officers in
training at Randolph Field. For one conferee this "progress" led to
another conclusion: resistance to integration had to emanate from the
policymakers, not from the fighting men. All Edwards could manage in
the way of a reply was that Air Force policy was considered "the best
way to make this thing work under present conditions."[11-59] Later
Edwards, who was not insensitive to the arguments of the black
leaders, told Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington that
perhaps some recommendation "looking toward the integration of whites
and negroes in the same units may be forthcoming" from the Air Board's
study of racial policy which was to commence the first week in
May.[11-60]

[Footnote 11-59: Ibid., p. 69.]

[Footnote 11-60: Memo, Edwards for SecAF, 29 Apr 48,
sub: Conference With Group of Prominent Negroes,
Negro Affairs 1948, SecAF files.]

If the logic of the black leaders impressed General Edwards, the
demands themselves had little effect on policy. It remained for James
C. Evans, now the adviser to Secretary of Defense Forrestal, to
translate these questions and demands into recommendations for
specific action. Taking advantage of a long acquaintance with the
Secretary of the Air Force, Evans discussed the department's race
problem with him in May 1948. Symington was sympathetic. "Put it on
paper," he told Evans.[11-61]

[Footnote 11-61: Interv, author with Evans, 7 Apr 70;
Note, Evans to Col Marr, 8 Jun 50, SD 291.2.]

Couching his recommendations in terms of the Gillem Board policy,
Evans faithfully summarized for the secretary the demands of black
leaders. Specifically, he asked that Colonel Davis, the commander of
Lockbourne Air Force Base, be sent for advanced military schooling
without delay. Diversification of career was long overdue for Davis,
the ranking black officer in the Air Force, as it was for others who
were considered indispensable because of the small number of qualified
black leaders. For Davis, most of all, the situation was unfair since
he had always been in command of practically all rated black officers.
Nor was it good for his subordinates. The Air Force should not
hesitate to assign a white replacement for Davis. In effect, Evans was
telling Symington that the black community would understand the
necessity for such a move.

Besides, under the program Evans was recommending, the all-black wing
would soon cease to exist. He wanted the Air Force to "deemphasize"
Lockbourne as the black air base and scatter the black units
concentrated there. He wanted to see Negroes dispersed throughout the
Air Force, either individually or in small units contemplated by the
Gillem Board, but he wanted men assigned on the basis of technical
specialty and proficiency rather than race. It was unrealistic, he
declared, to assume all black officers could be most effectively
utilized as pilots and all enlisted men as Squadron F laborers.
Limiting training and job opportunity because of race reduced fighting
potential in a way that never could be justified. The Air Force should
open to its Negroes a wide variety of training, experience, and
opportunity to acquire versatility and proficiency.[11-62]

[Footnote 11-62: Memo, Evans for SecAF, 7 Jun 48, sub:
Negro Air Units, D54-1-12. SecDef files.]

If followed, this program would fundamentally alter Air Force (p. 287)
racial practices. General Edwards recommended that the reply to Evans
should state that certain policy changes would be forthcoming,
although they would have to await the outcome of a departmental
reevaluation currently under way. The suggestions had been solicited
by Symington, and Edwards was anxious for Evans to understand the
delay was not a device to defer action.[11-63]

[Footnote 11-63: DCofS/P Summary Sheet for CofS, 15
Jul 48, sub: Negro Air Units, Negro Affairs 1948,
SecAF files.]

[Illustration: GENERAL EDWARDS.]

Edwards was in a position to make such assurances. He was an
influential member of the Air staff with considerable experience in
the field of race relations. As a member of the Army staff during
World War II he had worked closely with the old McCloy committee on
black troops and had strongly advocated wartime experiments with the
integration of small-scale units.[11-64] His background, along with his
observations as chief personnel officer in the new Air Force, had
taught him to avoid abstract appeals to justice and to make
suggestions in terms of military efficiency. Concern with efficiency
led him, soon after the Air Force became a separate service, to order
Lt. Col. Jack F. Marr, a member of his staff, to study the Air Force's
racial policy and practices. Testifying to Edwards's pragmatic
approach, Marr later said of his own introduction to the subject:
"There was no sociology involved. It was merely a routine staff action
along with a bunch of other staff actions that were taking place."[11-65]

[Footnote 11-64: During World War II, Edwards served
as the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. For a
discussion of his opposition at that time to the
concentration of large groups of men in categories
IV and V, see Edwin W. Kenworthy, "The Case Against
Army Segregation," _The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science_ 275 (May
1951):29. See also Lee's _Employment of Negro
Troops_, p. 159. Edward's part in the integration
program is based on USAF Oral History Program,
Interviews with Zuckert, General William F. McKee,
Davis, Senator Stuart Symington, and Marr. See also
Interv, author with Lt Gen Idwal H. Edwards, Nov
73, CMH files.]

[Footnote 11-65: Ltr, Marr to author, 19 Jun 70, CMH
files.]

A similar concern for efficiency, this time triggered by criticism at
the National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs in April 1948 and
Evans's discussions with Secretary Symington the following month, led
Edwards, after talking it over with Assistant Secretary Zuckert, to
raise the subject of the employment of Negroes in the Air Board in
May.[11-66] In the wake of the Air Board discussion the Chief of Staff
appointed a group under Maj. Gen. Richard E. Nugent, then Director (p. 288)
of Civilian Personnel, to reexamine the service's race policy.[11-67]
Nugent was another Air Force official who viewed the employment of
Negroes as a problem in military efficiency.[11-68] These three,
Edwards, Nugent, and Marr, were the chief figures in the development
of the Air Force integration plan, which grew out of the Nugent
group's study. Edwards and Nugent supervised its many refinements in
the staff while Marr, whom Zuckert later described as the
indispensable man, wrote the plan and remained intimately connected
with it until the Air Force carried it out.[11-69] Antedating the
Truman order to integrate the services, the provisions of this plan
eventually became the program under which the Air Force was
integrated.[11-70]