Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

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[Footnote 10-15: Norfolk _Journal and Guide_, May 4,
1946. See also Murray, _Negro Yearbook_, 1949 pp.
272-73. On the general accuracy of the press
charges, see Shaw and Donnelly, _Blacks in the
Marine Corps_, pp. 47-51.]

[Footnote 10-16: CO, Montford Point, Press Conference
(ca. 1 May 47), quoted in Div of Plans and Policies
Staff Report, "Rescinding Ltr of Instruction #421,"
MC files; unsigned, untitled Memo written in the
Division of Plans and Policies on black marines and
the black press (ca. Aug 55).]

Considering the critical shortages, temporarily and "undesirably" made
up for by white marines, and the "leisurely" rate at which black
reservists were reenlisting, General Thomas recommended in May 1946
that the corps recruit some 1,120 Negroes from civilian sources. This,
he explained to the commandant, would accelerate black enlistment but
still save some spaces for black reservists.[10-17] The commandant
agreed,[10-18] and contrary to the staff's expectations, most Negroes in
the postwar service were new recruits. The mass departure of World (p. 259)
War II veterans eloquently expressed the attitude of experienced black
servicemen toward the Marines' racial policy.

[Footnote 10-17: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 3 May 46, sub: Enlisting of Negroes in the
Marine Corps From Civilian Sources, A0-1.]

[Footnote 10-18: Ibid., 23 Oct 46, sub: Enlistment of
Negroes, 1335-110; Memo, CMC to Off in Charge,
Northeastern Recruiting Div, et al., 23 Oct 46,
sub: Negro First Enlistments, Quota for Month of
November, 1946, AP-1231. There was an attempt to
stall first enlistment, see Memo, Dir of Personnel,
for Dir, Div of Plans and Policies, 17 May 46, sub:
Enlisting of Negroes in the Marine Corps From
Civilian Sources; but it was overruled, Memo, Dir,
Div of Plans and Policies, for Dir of Personnel. 23
May 46, same sub, A0-1.]

The word spread quickly among the new black marines. When in mid-1947
the Division of Plans and Policies was looking for ways to reduce the
number of black marines in keeping with the modified manpower ceiling,
it discovered that if offered the opportunity about one-third of all
Negroes would apply for discharge. An even higher percentage of
discharge requests was expected from among black marines overseas. The
commandant agreed to make the offer, except to the stewards, and in
the next six months black strength dropped by 700 men.[10-19]

[Footnote 10-19: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 28 May 47, sub: Program for Accelerated
Attrition of Negro Marines, A0-1; Maj S. M. Adams,
"Additional Directives From Plans and Policies--3
June 1947," 3 Jun 47; Speed Ltr, CMC to CG, Marine
Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, N.C., et al., 8
May 47, A0-1; Memo, CMC to Depot Quartermaster,
Depot of Supplies, 3 Jun 47, sub: Discharge for the
Convenience of the Government Certain Enlisted
Negro Members of the Marine Corps, 070-15-447.]

Even the recruitment of stewards did not go according to predictions.
Thomas had assured the commandant in the spring of 1946 that a
concrete offer of steward duty to black reservists would produce the
300-man quota for the regular corps. He wanted the offer published at
all separation centers and a training program for stewards instituted
at Camp Lejeune.[10-20] General Vandegrift approved the proposal, but a
month later the commander of Camp Lejeune reported that only three
reservists and one regular had volunteered.[10-21] He advised the
commandant to authorize recruitment among qualified civilians. Faced
with wholesale rejection of such duty by black marines, General Thomas
in March 1947 opened the Steward's Branch to Negroes with previous
military service in any of the armed forces and qualifications for
such work.[10-22] This ploy also proved a failure. Looking for 250
stewards, the recruiters could find but one acceptable applicant in
the first weeks of the program. Retreating still further, the
commandant canceled the requirement for previous military service in
April, and in October dropped the requirement for "clearly established
qualifications."[10-23] Apparently the staff would take a chance on any
warm body.

[Footnote 10-20: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 12 Mar 46, sub: Steward's Branch
Personnel, Information Concerning, A0-3, MC files.]

[Footnote 10-21: Ltr, CG, Cp Lejeune, to CMC, 4 Apr
46, sub: Steward's Branch Personnel, 060105.]

[Footnote 10-22: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 18 Mar 47, sub: Enlistment of Negro
Personnel, 01A7647.]

[Footnote 10-23: Ibid., 16 Apr 47, sub: First
Enlistment of Negro Personnel, A0-1, and 9 Oct 47,
sub: Procurement and Assignment of Stewards
Personnel, Box 1515-30; Ltr, CMC (Div of
Recruiting) to Off in Charge, Northeastern
Recruiting Div, 29 Apr 47, sub: Negro First
Enlistments, 07A11947.]

In dropping the requirement for prior military service, the corps
introduced a complication. Recruits for steward duty would be obliged
to undergo basic training and their enlistment contracts would read
"general duty"; Navy regulations required that subsequent
reclassification to "stewards duty only" status had to be made at the
request of the recruit. In August 1947 three men enlisted under the
first enlistment program for stewards refused to execute a change of
enlistment contract after basic training.[10-24] Although these men could
have been discharged "for the good of the service," the commandant (p. 260)
decided not to contest their right to remain in the general service.
This action did not go unnoticed, and in subsequent months a number of
men who signed up with the intention of becoming stewards refused to
modify their enlistment contract while others, who already had changed
their contract, suddenly began to fail the qualifying tests for
stewards school.

[Footnote 10-24: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 15 Sep 47, sub: Disposition of Negro
Personnel Who Enlisted With a View Toward
Qualifying for Stewards Duties..., 01A25847.]

The possibility of filling the quota became even more distant when in
September 1947 the number of steward billets was increased to 380.
Since only 57 stewards had signed up in the past twelve months,
recruiters now had to find some 200 men, at least 44 per month for the
immediate future. The commandant, furthermore, approved plans to
increase the number of stewards to 420. In December the Plans and
Policies Division, conceding defeat, recommended that the commandant
arrange for the transfer of 175 men from the Navy's oversubscribed
Steward's Branch. At the same time, to overcome what the division's
new director, Brig. Gen. Ray A. Robinson, called "the onus attached to
servant type duties," the commandant was induced to approve a plan
making the rank and pay of stewards comparable to those of general
duty personnel.[10-25]

[Footnote 10-25: Ibid., 26 Dec 47, sub: Procurement of
Steward Personnel, A0-1; see also Ltr, CMC to Chief
of Naval Personnel, 6 Jan 48, sub: Discharge of
Steward Personnel From Navy to Enlist in the Marine
Corps, MC 967879; Memo, Chief of Naval Personnel
for CMC, 28 Jan 48, sub: Discharge of Certain
Steward Branch Personnel for Purpose of Enlistment
in the Marine Corps.]

These measures seemed to work. The success of the transfer program and
the fact that first enlistments had finally begun to balance
discharges led the recruiters to predict in March 1948 that their
steward quota would soon be filled. Unfortunately, success tempted the
planners to overreach themselves. Assured of a full steward quota,
General Robinson recommended that approval be sought from the
Secretary of the Navy to establish closed messes, along with the
requisite steward billets, at the shore quarters for bachelor officers
overseas.[10-26] Approval brought another rise in the number of steward
billets, this time to 580, and required a first-enlistment goal of
twenty men per month.[10-27] The new stewards, however, were not
forthcoming. After three months of recruiting the corps had netted ten
men, more than offset by trainees who failed to qualify for steward
school. Concluding that the failures represented to a great extent a
scheme to remain in general service and evade the ceiling on general
enlistment, the planners wanted the men failing to qualify discharged
"for the good of the service."[10-28]

[Footnote 10-26: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 19 Mar 48, sub: Procurement and
Distribution of Steward Personnel, A0-1.]

[Footnote 10-27: Ibid., 12 Aug 48, sub: Steward
Personnel, Allowances and Procurement, A0-1; Ltr,
CMC to CG, Marine Barracks, Cp Lejeune, 16 Aug 48,
sub: Negro Recruits, 01A22948.]

[Footnote 10-28: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 15 Oct 48, sub: Disposition of Negro
Personnel Who Enlist "For Steward Duty Only" and
Subsequently Fail to Qualify for Such Duty, Study
#169-48; Ltr, QMG of MC to CMC, 17 Sep 48, same
sub, CA6.]

The lack of recruits for steward duty and constant pressure by
stewards for transfer to general duty troubled the Marine Corps
throughout the postwar period. Reviewing the problem in December
1948, the commanding general of Camp Lejeune saw three causes: (p. 261)
"agitation from civilian sources," which labeled steward duty
degrading servant's work; lack of rapid promotion; and badgering from
black marines on regular duty.[10-29] But the commander's solution--a
public relations campaign using black recruits to promote the
attractions of steward duty along with a belated promise of more rapid
promotion--failed. It ignored the central issue, the existence of a
segregated branch in which black marines performed menial, nonmilitary
duties.

[Footnote 10-29: Msg, CG, Cp Lejeune, N.C., to CMC, 31
Dec 48.]

Headquarters later resorted to other expedients. It obtained
seventy-five more men from the Navy and lowered the qualification test
standards for steward duty. But like earlier efforts, these steps also
failed to produce enough men.[10-30] Ironically, while the corps aroused
the ire of the civil rights groups by maintaining a segregated
servants' branch, it was never able to attract a sufficient number of
stewards to fill its needs in the postwar period.

[Footnote 10-30: Memo, Chief of Naval Personnel and
CMC for All Ships and Stations, 28 Feb 49, sub:
Discharge of Stewards, USN, For the Purpose of
Immediate Enlistment in Marine Corps, Pers-66,
GenRecsNav; Memo, CMC for Dir of Recruiting, 25 Feb
49, sub: Mental Requirements for Enlistment for
"Steward Duty Only," A0-1; Ltr, CMC (Div of
Recruiting) to Off in Charge, Northeastern
Recruiting Div, 3 Mar 49, sub: Mental Standards for
Enlistment for Steward Duty Only, MC1088081; Msg,
CMC to Div of Recruiting, 7 Apr 49.]

Many of the corps' critics saw in the buildup of the Steward's Branch
the first step in an attempt to eliminate Negroes from the general
service. If such a scheme had ever been contemplated, it was
remarkably unsuccessful, for the corps would enter the Korean War with
most of its Negroes still in the general service. Nevertheless, the
apprehension of the civil rights advocates was understandable because
during most of the postwar period enlistment in the general service
was barred to Negroes or limited to a very small number of men. Closed
to Negroes in early 1947, enlistment was briefly reopened at the rate
of forty men per month later that year to provide the few hundred
extra men called for in the reorganization of the Operating Force
Plan.[10-31] Enlistment was again opened in May 1948 when the recruiting
office established a monthly quota for black recruits at ten men for
general duty and eight for the Steward's Branch. The figure for
stewards quickly rose to thirty per month, but effective 1 May 1949
the recruitment of Negroes for general service was closed.[10-32]

[Footnote 10-31: Memo, CMC for CG, Marine Barracks, Cp
Lejeune, N.C., 8 Dec 47, sub: Negro Recruits,
01A33847.]

[Footnote 10-32: Ltr, CMC to CG, Cp Lejeune, 24 May
48, A0-1; Memo, CMC for Off in Charge of Recruiting
Div, 29 Jan 49, sub: Enlistment of Negroes,
07D14848; Msg, CMC to Offs in Charge of Recruiting
Divs, 25 Apr 49.]

These rapid changes, indeed the whole pattern of black enlistment in
the postwar Marine Corps, demonstrated that the staff's manpower
practices were out of joint with the times. Not only did they invite
attack from the increasingly vocal civil rights forces, but they also
fostered a general distrust among black marines themselves and among
those young Negroes the corps hoped to attract.

_Segregation and Efficiency_

The assignment policies and recruitment practices of the corps were
the inevitable result of its segregation policy. Prejudice and
discrimination no doubt aggravated the situation, but the policy of
separation limited the ways Negroes could be employed and places (p. 262)
to which they might be assigned. Segregation explained, for example,
why Negroes were traditionally employed in certain types of combat
units, and why, when changing missions and manpower restrictions
caused a reduction in the number of such units, Negroes were not given
other combat assignments. Most Negroes with combat military
occupational specialties served in defense battalions during World War
II. These units, chiefly antiaircraft artillery, were self-contained
and could therefore be segregated; at the same time they cloaked a
large group of men with the dignity of a combat assignment. But what
was possible during the war was no longer practical and efficient in
the postwar period. Some antiaircraft artillery units survived the
war, but they no longer operated as battalions and were divided
instead into battery-size organizations that simply could not be
segregated in terms of support and recreational facilities. In fact,
the corps found it impossible after the war to maintain segregation in
any kind of combat unit.

Even if segregated service had been possible, the formation of
all-black antiaircraft artillery battalions would have been precluded
by the need of this highly technical branch for so many kinds of
trained specialists. Not only would separate training facilities for
the few Negroes in the peacetime corps be impossibly expensive and
inefficient, but not enough black recruits were eligible for such
training. A wartime comparison of the General Classification Test and
Mechanical Aptitude Test scores of the men in the 52d Defense
Battalion with those of men in two comparable white units showed the
Negroes averaging considerably lower than the whites.[10-33] It was
reasonable to expect this difference to continue since, on the whole,
black recruits were scoring lower than their World War II
counterparts.[10-34] Under current policies, therefore, the Marine Corps
saw little choice but to exclude Negroes from antiaircraft artillery
and other combat units.

[Footnote 10-33: Ltr, CO, 52d Defense Battalion, to
CMC, 15 Jan 46, sub: Employment of Colored
Personnel as Antiaircraft Artillery Troops,
Recommendations on, 02-46, MC files.]

[Footnote 10-34: Memo, Dir of Personnel for Dir, Div
of Plans and Policies, 21 Jul 48, sub: General
Classification Test Scores of Colored Enlisted
Marines, 07DZ0348. The GCT distribution of 991
black marines as of 1 March 1948 was as follows:
Group I (130-163), 0%; Group II (110-129), 4.94%;
Group III (90-109), 24.7%; Group IV (60-89),
61.45%; and Group V (42-59), 9.54%. Memo, Dir of
Personnel to Dir, Div of Plans and Policies, 30 May
48, sub: Marines--Tests and Testing.]

Obviously the corps had in its ranks some Negroes capable of
performing any task required in an artillery battalion. Yet because
the segregation policy demanded that there be enough qualified men to
form and sustain a whole black battalion, the abilities of these
high-scoring individuals were wasted. On the other hand, many billets
in antiaircraft artillery or other types of combat battalions could be
filled by men with low test scores, but less gifted black marines were
excluded because they had to be assigned to one of the few black
units. Segregation, in short, was doubly inefficient, it kept both
able and inferior Negroes out of combat units that were perpetually
short of men.

Segregation also promoted inefficiency in the placement of black
Marine units. While the assignment of an integrated unit with a few
black marines would probably go unnoticed in most naval
districts--witness the experience of the Navy itself--the task of (p. 263)
finding a naval district and an American community where a large
segregated group of black marines could be peacefully assimilated was
infinitely more difficult.

The original postwar racial program called for the assignment of black
security units to the Marine Barracks at McAlester, Oklahoma, and
Earle, New Jersey. Noting that the station was in a strict Jim Crow
area where recreational facilities for Negroes were limited and
distant, the commanding officer of the Marine Barracks at McAlester
recommended that no Negroes be assigned. He reminded the commandant
that guard duty required marines to question and apprehend white
civilian employees, a fact that would add to the racial tension in the
area. His conclusions, no doubt shared by commanders in many parts of
the country, summed up the problem of finding assignments for black
marines: any racial incident which might arise out of disregard for
local racial custom, he wrote,

would cause the Marine Corps to become involved by protecting
such personnel as required by Federal law and Navy Regulations.
It is believed that if one such potential incident occurred, it
would seriously jeopardize the standing of the Marine Corps
throughout the Southwest. To my way of thinking, the Marine Corps
is not now maintaining the high esteem of public opinion, or
gaining in prestige, by the manner in which its uniform and
insignia are subjected to such laws. The uniform does not count,
it is relegated to the background and made to participate in and
suffer the restrictions and limitations placed upon it by virtue
of the wearer being subject to the Jim Crow laws.[10-35]

[Footnote 10-35: Ltr, CO, MB, NAD, McAlester, Okla.,
to CMC, 5 Nov 46, sub: Assignment of Colored
Marines, 2385.]

The commander of the McAlester ammunition depot endorsed this
recommendation, adding that Oklahoma was a "border" state where the
Negro was not accepted as in the north nor understood and tolerated as
in the south. This argument moved the Director of Plans and Policies
to recommend that McAlester be dropped and the black unit sent instead
to Port Chicago, California.[10-36] With the approval of the commandant
and the Chief of Naval Operations, plans for the assignment were well
under way in June 1947 when the commandant of the Twelfth Naval
District intervened.[10-37] The presence of a black unit, he declared,
was undesirable in a predominantly white area that was experiencing
almost constant labor turmoil. The possibility of clashes between
white pickets and black guards would invite racial conflict. His
warnings carried the day, and Port Chicago was dropped in favor of the
Marine Barracks, Naval Shipyard, Brooklyn, New York, with station at
Bayonne, New Jersey. At the same time, because of opposition from
naval officials, the plan for assigning Negroes to Earle, New Jersey,
was also dropped, and the commandant launched inquiries about the (p. 264)
depots at Hingham, Massachusetts, and Fort Mifflin, Pennsylvania.[10-38]

[Footnote 10-36: Ltr, CO, NAD, McAlester, Okla., to
CMC, 5 Nov 46, 1st Ind to Ltr, CO, MB, McAlester,
2385; Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies, for
CMC, 3 Dec 46, sub: Assignment of Negro Marines to
MB, Naval Magazine, Port Chicago, Calif., in lieu
of MB, NAD, McAlester, Okla., A0-1.]

[Footnote 10-37: Memo, CMC for CNO, 3 Dec 46, sub:
Assignment of Negro Marines to MB, Naval Magazine,
Port Chicago, Calif., and MB, NAD, Earle, N.J.,
A0-1; idem for CO, MB, NAD, Earle, N.J., 9 Jan 47,
sub: Assignment of Colored Marines to Marine
Barracks, Naval Ammunition Depot, Earle, N.J.; idem
for CO, Department of the Pacific, and CO, MB, NAD,
McAlester, Okla., A0-1; Memo, CNO for CMC, 6 Jan
47, same sub, OP 30 M.]

[Footnote 10-38: Speed Ltr, CMC to Cmdt, Twelfth Naval
District, 12 Jun 47; Memo, CMC for CO, MB, Naval
Shipyard, Brooklyn, N.Y., 13 Jun 47, sub:
Assignment of Negro Marines to Second Guard
Company, Marine Barracks Naval Shipyard, Brooklyn,
N.Y., A0-1; idem for CO, MB, USNAD, Hingham, Mass.,
18 Jun 47, sub: Assignment of Negro Marines, A0-1;
Speed Ltr, CMC to Cmdt, Twelfth Naval District, 18
Jun 47, 01A76847; Memo, CMC for CO, MB, NAD, Ft.
Mifflin, Pa., 18 Jun 47, sub: Assignment of Negro
Marines, A0-1; Memo, Cmdt, Fourth Naval District
for CO, MB, NAD, Ft. Mifflin, Pa., 18 Jun 47, same
sub.]

Fort Mifflin agreed to take fifty black marines, but several officials
objected to the proposed assignment to Hingham. The Marine commander,
offering what he called his unbiased opinion in the best interests of
the service, explained in considerable detail why he thought the
assignment of Negroes would jeopardize the fire-fighting ability of
the ammunition depot. The commanding officer of the naval depot
endorsed these reasons and added that assigning black marines to guard
duty that included vehicle search would create a problem in industrial
relations.[10-39] The commandant of the First Naval District apparently
discounted these arguments, but he too voted against the assignment of
Negroes on the grounds that the Hingham area lacked a substantial
black population, was largely composed of restricted residential
neighborhoods, and was a major summer resort on which the presence of
black units would have an adverse effect.[10-40]

[Footnote 10-39: Memo, CO, MB, NAD, Hingham, Mass.,
for CMC, 26 Jun 47, sub: Comments on Assignment of
Negro Marines, AB-1; Memo, CO, NAD, Hingham, Mass.,
for CMC, 26 Jun 47, 1st Ind to AB-1, 26 Jun 47.]

[Footnote 10-40: Ltr, Cmdt, First Naval District, to
CMC, 30 Jun 47, sub: Assignment of Negro Marines,
2d Ind to AB-1, 26 Jun 47.]

The commander of the Naval Base, New York, meanwhile had refused to
approve a plan to assign a black unit to Bayonne, New Jersey, and
suggested that it be sent to Earle, New Jersey, instead because there
the unit "presented fewer problems and difficulties than at any other
Naval activity." The commander noted that stationing Negroes at
Bayonne would necessitate a certain amount of integration in mess and
ship service facilities. Bayonne was also reputed to have the toughest
gate duty in the New York area, and noncommissioned officers had to
supervise a white civilian police force. At Earle, on the other hand,
the facilities were completely separate, and although some complaints
from well-to-do summer colonists in the vicinity could be expected,
men could be bused to Newark or Jersey City for recreation. Moreover,
Earle could absorb a 175-man unit.[10-41] But chief of the Navy's Bureau
of Ordnance wanted to retain white marines at Earle because a recent
decision to handle ammonium nitrate fertilizer there made it unwise to
relieve the existing trained detachment. Earle was also using contract
stevedores and expected to be using Army troops whose use of local
facilities would preclude plans for a segregated barracks and
mess.[10-42]