Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

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[Footnote 8-32: Ltr, Huebner to D/P&A, 1 Oct 47,
CSGPA 291.2.]

[Footnote 8-33: Memo, DCofS for D/P&A, 14 May 48,
sub: Report of Visit by Negro Publishers and
Editors to the European Theater, CSUSA 291.2
Negroes (14 May 48).]

The European Command had requisitioned only five black officers during
the last eight months, General Paul noted; this might have caused its
shortage of black officers. Still, Paul knew the problem went deeper,
and he admitted that many black officers now on duty were relatively
undesirable and many desirable ones were being declared surplus. He
was searching for a solution.[8-34] The Personnel and Administration
Division could do very little about the major cause of the shortage,
for the lack of black officers was fundamentally connected with the
postwar demobilization affecting all the services. Most black officers
were unable to compete in terms of length of service, combat experience,
and other factors that counted heavily toward retention. (p. 220)
Consequently their numbers dropped sharply from an August 1945 high of
7,748 to a December 1947 low of 1,184. The drop more than offset the
slight rise in the black percentage of the whole officer corps, .8
percent in 1945 to 1.0 percent in 1947.

[Footnote 8-34: Ltr, D/P&A to Huebner, 15 Oct 47,
CSGPA 291.2.]

At first General Paul was rather passive in his attitude toward the
shortage of black officers. Commenting on Assistant Secretary of War
Petersen's suggestion in May 1946 that the Army institute a special
recruitment program to supplement the small number of black officers
who survived the competition for Regular Army appointments, Paul noted
that all appointments were based on merit and competition and
that special consideration for Negroes was itself a form of
discrimination.[8-35] Whether through fear of being accused of
discrimination against whites or because of the general curtailment of
officer billets, it was not until April 1948 that the Personnel and
Administration Division launched a major effort to get more black
officers.

[Footnote 8-35: Memo, ASW for D/P&A, 23 May 46, sub:
Negro Officers in the Regular Establishment; Memo,
D/P&A for ASW, 29 May 46, same sub; Memo, "D. R."
(Exec Asst to ASW, Lt Col D. J. Rogers) for
Petersen, 12 Jun 46. Copies of all in ASW 291.2 (23
May 46).]

In April 1948 General Paul had his Manpower Control Group review the
officer strength of seventy-eight black units stationed in the United
States. The group uncovered a shortage of seventy-two officers in the
seventy-eight units, but it went considerably beyond identifying
simple shortages. In estimating the number of black officers needed,
the group demonstrated not only how far the Gillem Board policy had
committed the Army, but in view of contemporary manpower shortages
just how impossible this commitment was of being fulfilled. The
manpower group discovered that according to Circular 124, which
prescribed more officers for units containing a preponderance of men
with low test scores, the seventy-eight units should have 187
additional officers beyond their regular allotment. Also taking into
account Circular 124's provision that black officers should command
black troops, the group discovered that these units would need another
477 black officer replacements. The group temporized. It recommended
that the additional officers be assigned to units in which 70 percent
or more of the men were in grades IV and V and without mentioning
specific numbers noted that high priority be given to the replacement
of white officers with Negroes. Assuming the shortages discovered in
the seventy-eight units would be mirrored in the 315 black units
overseas as well as other temporary units at home, the group also
wanted General Paul to order a comprehensive survey of all black
units.[8-36]

[Footnote 8-36: Memo, Chief, Manpower Survey Gp, for
Paul, 29 Apr 48, sub: Assignment of Officers of
Negro T/O&E Units in Compliance with WD Cir 124,
1946, CSGPA 210.31 (29 Apr 48); "Report on Negro
Officer Strength in Army," incl w/Memo, D/P&A for
DCofS, 21 Jun 48, sub: Report of Negro Publishers
and Editors on Tour of European Installations,
CSUSA 291.2 Negroes (14 May 48).]

Paul complied with the group's request by ordering the major
commanders in May to list the number of officers by branch, grade, and
specialty needed to fill the vacant spaces in their black units.[8-37]
But there was really little need for further surveys because the (p. 221)
key to all the group's recommendations--the availability of suitable
black officers--was beyond the immediate reach of the Army. General
Paul was able to fill the existing vacancies in the seventy-eight
continental units by recalling black officers from inactive duty, but
the number eligible for recall or available from other sources was
limited. As of 31 May 1948, personnel officials could count on only
2,794 black reserve and National Guard officers who could be assigned
to extended active duty. This number was far short of current needs;
Negroes would have to approximate 4.1 percent (3,000 officers) of the
Army's officer corps if all the whites in black units were replaced.
As for the other provisions of the Gillem Board, the Organization and
Training Division urged restraint, arguing that Circular 124 was not
an authorization for officers in excess of organization table
ceilings, but rather that the presence of many low-scoring men
constituted a basis for requesting more officers.[8-38]

[Footnote 8-37: Memo, D/P&A for TAG, 24 May 48, sub:
Negro Officers in TO&E Units, CSGPA 291.2 (24 May
48).]

[Footnote 8-38: Ibid.; "Report on Negro Officer
Strength in Army," incl w/Memo, D/P&A for DCofS, 21
Jun 48, sub: Report of Negro Publishers and
Editors..., CSUSA 291.2 Negroes (14 May 48).]

General Paul did not argue the point. Admitting that the 4.1 percent
figure was "an objective to be achieved over a period of time," he
could do little but instruct the commanders concerned to indicate in
future requisitions that they wanted black officers as fillers or
replacements in black units. Clearly, as long as the number of black
officers remained so low, the provisions of Circular 124 calling for
black officers to replace whites or supplement the officer strength of
units containing men with low test scores would have to be ignored.

There were other long-range possibilities for procuring more black
officers, the most obvious the expansion of the Reserve Officers'
Training Corps. As of January 1948 the Army had ROTC units at nine
predominantly black colleges and universities with a total enrollment
of 3,035 cadets. The Organization and Training Division contemplated
adding one more unit during 1948, but after negotiations with
officials from Secretary Royall's office, themselves under
considerable congressional and public pressure, the division added
three more advanced ROTC units, one service and two combat, at
predominantly black institutions.[8-39] At the same time some hope
existed for increasing the number of black cadets at West Point. The
academy had nine black cadets in 1948, including five plebes. General
Paul hoped that the graduation of these cadets would stimulate further
interest and a corresponding increase in applications from
Negroes.[8-40]

[Footnote 8-39: Memo, Asst Secy, GS, for DCofS, 2 Jun
48, sub: Negro ROTC Units, CSUSA 291.2 Negroes (2
Jun 48); see also Department of National Defense,
"National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs," 26
Apr 48, morning session, pp. 31-34, copy in CMH.]

[Footnote 8-40: "Report on Negro Officer Strength in
Army," incl w/Memo, D/P&A for DCofS, 21 Jun 48,
sub: Report of Negro Publishers and Editors...,
CSUSA 291.2 Negroes (14 May 48).]

It was probably naive to assume that an increase of black cadets from
four to nine would stir much interest when other statistics suggested
that black officers had a limited future in the service. As Secretary
Royall pointed out, even if the total number of black officers could
not be quickly increased, the percentage of black officers in the (p. 222)
Regular Army could.[8-41] Yet by April 1948 the Army had almost
completed the conversion of reservists into regulars, and few black
officers had been selected. In June 1945, for example, there were 8
black officers in the Regular Army; by April 1948 they numbered only
41, including 4 West Point graduates and 32 converted reservists.[8-42]
The Army had also recently nominated 13 young Negroes, designated
Distinguished Military Graduates of the advanced ROTC program, for
Regular Army commissions.

[Footnote 8-41: Department of National Defense,
"National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs," 26
Apr 48, morning session, pp. 20-21. Prior to World
War II, an officer held a commission in the Regular
Army, in the Army Reserve, or in the National
Guard. Another type of commission, one in the Army
of the United States (AUS), was added during World
War II, and all temporary promotions granted during
the war were to AUS rank. For example, a Regular
Army captain could become an AUS major but would
retain his Regular Army captaincy. Many reservists
and some National Guard officers remaining on
active duty sought conversion to, or "integration"
into, the Regular Army for career security.]

[Footnote 8-42: These black officers were converted
to Regular Army officers in the following arms and
services: Infantry, 13; Chaplain Corps, 9; Medical
Service Corps, 1; Army Nurse Corps, 1; Field
Artillery, 1; Quartermaster, 7 (4 of whom were
transferred later to the Transportation Corps).
These figures include the first black doctor and
nurse converted to Regular Army officers.]

During the Regular Army integration program, 927 Negroes and 122,520
whites applied for the Regular Army; the Army and the Air Force
awarded commissions to 27,798 white officers (22.7 percent of those
applying) and 96 black officers (10.3 percent of the applicants).
Preliminary rejections based on efficiency and education ran close to
40 percent of the applicants of both races. The disparity in
rejections by race appeared when applicants went before the Selection
Board itself; only 18.55 percent of the remaining black applicants
were accepted while 39.35 percent of the white applicants were
selected for Regular Army commissions.[8-43]

[Footnote 8-43: "Analysis of Negro Officers in the
Army," incl w/Memo, D/P&A for DCAS, 21 Jun 48, sub:
Report of Negro Publishers and Editors..., CSUSA
291.2 Negroes (14 May 48).]

Given statistics like these, it was difficult to stimulate black
interest in a career as an Army officer, as General Paul was well
aware. He had the distribution of black officers appointed to the
Regular Army studied in 1947 to see if it was in consonance with the
new racial policy. While most of the arms and services passed muster
with the Personnel and Administration Division, Paul felt compelled to
remind the Chief of Engineers, whose corps had so far awarded no
Regular Army commission to the admittedly limited number of black
applicants, that officers were to be accepted in the Regular Army
without regard to race. He repeated this warning to the Quartermaster
General and the Chief of Transportation; both had accepted black
officers for the Regular Army but had selected only the smallest
fraction of those applying. Although the black applicants did score
slightly below the whites, Paul doubted that integration would lower
the standards of quality in these branches, and he wanted every effort
made to increase the number of black officers.[8-44]

[Footnote 8-44: DF, D/P&A to Chief of Engrs, 25 Jul
47, sub: Appointment of Negro Officers to the
Regular Army, w/attached Memo for Rcd, WDGPA 291.2
(23 Jul 47).]

The Chief of Engineers, quick to defend his record, explained that the
race of candidates was difficult to ascertain and had not been
considered in the selection process. Nevertheless, he had reexamined
all rejected applications and found two from Negroes whose (p. 223)
composite scores were acceptable. Both men, however, fell so short of
meeting the minimum professional requirements that to appoint either
would be to accord preferential treatment denied to hundreds of other
underqualified applicants.[8-45] It would appear that bias and prejudice
were not the only governing factors in the shortage of black officers,
but rather that in some ways at least Circular 124 was making
impossible demands on the Army's personnel system.

[Footnote 8-45: DF, Chief of Engrs to D/P&A, 1 Aug
47, sub: Appointment of Negro Officers to the
Regular Army, copy in WPGPA 291.2 (23 Jul 47).]

_Discrimination and the Postwar Army_

Training black soldiers and trying to provide them with black officers
was a practical move demanded by the Army's new race policy. At the
same time, often with reluctance and only after considerable pressure
had been brought to bear, the Army also began to attack certain
practices that discriminated against the black soldier. One was the
arbitrary location of training camps after the war. In November 1946,
for example, the Army Ground Forces reorganized its training centers
for the Army, placing them at six installations: Fort Dix, New Jersey;
Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Knox, Kentucky; Fort Jackson, South
Carolina; Fort Lewis, Washington, and Fort Ord, California. White
enlisted and reenlisted men were sent to the training centers within
the geographical limits of the Army area of their enlistment. Because
it was impossible for the Army Ground Forces to maintain separate
black training cadres of battalion size at each of the six centers,
all Negroes, except those slated for service in the Army Air Forces,
were sent to Fort Jackson.[8-46]

[Footnote 8-46: WD Memo 615-500-4, 21 Nov 46, sub:
Flow of Enlisted Personnel From Induction Centers
and Central Examining Stations.]

The Gillem Board had called for the assignment of Negroes to
localities where community attitudes were favorable, and Marcus Ray
protested the Ground Forces action. "It is in effect a restatement of
policy and ... has implications which will affect adversely the
relationship of the Army and our Negro manpower potential.... I am
certain that this ruling will have the immediate effect of
crystallizing Negro objections to the enlistment of qualified men and
also Universal Military Training."[8-47]

[Footnote 8-47: Memo, Marcus Ray for ASW, 23 Jan 47,
ASW 291.2.]

Ray reminded Assistant Secretary of War Petersen that the Fort Jackson
area had been the scene of many racial disturbances since 1941 and
that an increase in the black troop population would only intensify
the hostile community attitude. He wanted to substitute Fort Dix and
Fort Ord for Fort Jackson. He also had another suggestion: Why not
assign black training companies to white battalions, especially in
those training centers that drew their populations from northern,
eastern, and western communities?

Petersen ignored for the time being Ray's suggestion for composite
training groups, but he readily agreed on training black soldiers at
more congenial posts, particularly after Ray's views were aired in the
black press. Petersen also urged the Deputy Chief of Staff to (p. 224)
coordinate staff actions with Ray whenever instructions dealing
with race relations in the Army were being prepared.[8-48] At the same
time, Secretary of War Patterson assured Walter White of the NAACP,
who had also protested sending Negroes to Fort Jackson, that the
matter was under study.[8-49] Within a matter of months Negroes entering
the Army from civilian life were receiving their training at Fort Dix
and Fort Ord.

[Footnote 8-48: Memo, ASW for DCofS, 7 Feb 47, ASW
291.2.]

[Footnote 8-49: Ltr, SW Robert P. Patterson to Walter
White, 7 Feb 47, SW 291.2.]

Turning its back on the overt racism of some southern communities, the
Army unwittingly exposed an example of racism in the west. The plan to
train Negroes at Fort Ord aroused the combined opposition of the
citizens around Monterey Bay, who complained to Senator William F.
Knowland that theirs was a tourist area unable to absorb thousands of
black trainees "without serious threat of racial conflict." The Army
reacted with forthright resistance. Negroes would be trained at Fort
Ord, and the Secretary of the Army would be glad to explain the
situation and cooperate with the local citizenry.[8-50]

[Footnote 8-50: Telg, Hugh F. Dormody, Mayor of
Monterey, Calif., et al., to Sen. William F.
Knowland, 31 Jul 48; Ltr, SA to Sen. Knowland, 16
May 48; both in CSUSA 291.2 Negroes (10 Aug 48).]

On the recommendation of the civilian aide, the Assistant Secretary of
War introduced another racial reform in January 1947 that removed
racial designations from overseas travel orders and authorizations
issued to dependents and War Department civilian employees.[8-51] The
order was strongly opposed by some members of the Army staff and had
to be repeated by the Secretary of the Army in 1951.[8-52] Branding
racial designations on travel orders a "continuous source of
embarrassment" to the Army, Secretary Frank Pace, Jr., sought to
include all travel orders in the prohibition, but the Army staff
persuaded him it was unwise. While the staff agreed that orders
involving travel between reception centers and training organizations
need not designate race, it convinced the secretary that to abolish
such designations on other orders, including overseas assignment
documents, would adversely affect strength and accounting procedures
as well as overseas replacement systems.[8-53] The modest reform
continued in effect until the question of racial designation became a
major issue in the 1960's.

[Footnote 8-51: AG Memo for Office of SW et al., 10
Jan 47, sub: Designation of Race on Overseas Travel
Orders, AGAO-C 291.2 (6 Jan 47), WDGSP; Memo for
Rcd attached to Memo, D/SSP for TAG, 6 Jan 47, same
sub, AG 291.2 (6 Jan 47).]

[Footnote 8-52: Memo, SA for CofSA, 2 Apr 52, sub:
Racial Designations on Travel Orders, CS 291.2 (2
Apr 51).]

[Footnote 8-53: G-1 Summary Sheet, 26 Apr 52, sub:
Racial Designations on Travel Orders; Memo, CofS
for SA, 5 May 51, same sub; both in CS 291.2 (2 Apr
51).]

Not all the reforms that followed the Gillem Board's deliberations
were so quickly adopted. For in truth the Army was not the monolithic
institution so often depicted by its critics, and its racial
directives usually came out of compromises between the progressive and
traditional factions of the staff. The integration of the national
cemeteries, an emotion-laden issue in 1947, amply demonstrated that
sharp differences of opinion existed within the department. Although
long-standing regulations provided for segregation by rank only, local
custom, and in one case--the Long Island National Cemetery--a 1935
order by Secretary of War George H. Dern, dictated racial (p. 225)
segregation in most of the cemeteries. The Quartermaster General
reviewed the practice in 1946 and recommended a new policy
specifically opening new sections of all national cemeteries to
eligible citizens of all races. He would leave undisturbed segregated
grave sites in the older sections of the cemeteries because
integration would "constitute a breach of faith with the next of kin
of those now interred."[8-54] As might be expected, General Paul
supported the quartermaster suggestion, as did the commander of the
Army Ground Forces. The Army Air Forces commander, on the other hand,
opposed integrating the cemeteries, as did the Chief of Staff, who on
22 February 1947 rejected the proposal. The existing policy was
reconfirmed by the Under Secretary of War three days later, and there
the matter rested.[8-55]

[Footnote 8-54: Memo, QMG for DCofS, 15 Apr 47,
CSUSA, copy in CMH.]

[Footnote 8-55: WDSP Summary Sheet, 22 Jan 47, sub:
Staff Study--Segregation of Grave Sites, WDGSP/C3
1894.]

Not for long, for civil rights spokesmen and the black press soon
protested. The NAACP confessed itself "astonished" at the Army's
decision and demanded that Secretary Patterson change a practice that
was both "un-American and un-democratic."[8-56] Marcus Ray predicted
that continuing agitation would require further Army action, and he
reminded Under Secretary Royall that cemeteries under the jurisdiction
of the Navy, Veterans Administration, and Department of the Interior
had been integrated with considerable publicity. He urged adoption of
the Quartermaster General's recommendation.[8-57] That was enough for
Secretary Patterson. On 15 April he directed that the new sections of
national cemeteries be integrated.[8-58]

[Footnote 8-56: Telg, Secy Veterans Affairs, NAACP,
to SW, attached to Memo, SW for DCofS, 11 Apr 47,
copy in CMH.]

[Footnote 8-57: Memo, Civilian Aide for USW, 15 Mar
47, sub: Segregation in Grave Site Assignment, copy
in CMH.]

[Footnote 8-58: Memo, SW for DCofS, 15 Apr 47, copy
in CMH. The secretary's directive was incorporated
in the _National Cemetery Regulations_, August
1947, and Army Regulation 290-5, 2 October 1951.]

It was a hollow victory for the reformers because the traditionalists
were able to cling to the secretary's proviso that old sections of the
cemeteries be left alone, and the Army continued to gather its dead in
segregation and in bitter criticism. Five months after the secretary's
directive, the American Legion protested to the Secretary of War over
segregation at the Fort Snelling National Cemetery, Minnesota, and in
August 1950 the Governor's Interracial Commission of the State of
Minnesota carried the matter to the President, calling the policy "a
flagrant disregard of human dignity."[8-59] The Army continued to
justify segregation as a temporary and limited measure involving the
old sections, but a decade after the directive the commander of the
Atlanta Depot was still referring to segregation in some
cemeteries.[8-60] The controversial practice would drag on into the next
decade before the Department of Defense finally ruled that there would
be no lines drawn by rank or race in national cemeteries.

[Footnote 8-59: Ltr, Royall to Rep. Edward J. Devitt
of Minnesota, 4 Sep 47; Ltr, Clifford Rucker to the
President, 9 Aug 50; both in SW 291.2.]

[Footnote 8-60: Ltr, CG, Atlanta Depot, to DQMG, 19
Mar 56, MGME-P. See also Memo, ASA (M&RF) for CofS,
27 Sep 52, sub: Segregation of National Cemeteries;
DF, QMF to G-4, 6 Oct 52, same sub; both in CS 687
(27 Sep 52).]

An attempt to educate the rank and file in the Army's racial (p. 226)
policy met some opposition in the Army staff. At General Paul's
request, the Information and Education Division prepared a pamphlet
intended to improve race relations through troop indoctrination.[8-61]
_Army Talk 170_, published on 1 April 1947, was, like its World War II
predecessors, _Command of Negro Troops_ and _The Negro Soldier_,
progressive for the times. While it stressed the reforms projected in
the Army's policy, including eventual integration, it also clearly
defended the Army's continued insistence on segregation on the grounds
that segregation promoted interracial harmony. The official position
of the service was baldly stated. "The Army is not an instrument of
social reform. Its interest in matters of race is confined to
considerations of its own effectiveness."