Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

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[Footnote 7-102: Memo, Brig Gen J. J. O'Hare, Dep
Dir, P&A, for SA, 9 Mar 48, sub: Implementation of
WD Circular 124, CSGPA 291.2.]

The Personnel and Organization Division made no further requests for
increased school quotas for Negroes, and even those increases already
approved were short-lived. As soon as the needs of the converted units
were met, the school quotas for Negroes were reduced to a level
sufficient to fill the replacement needs of the black units. By March
1949, spaces for black students in the replacement stream courses had
declined from the 237 recommended by Major Fowler to eighty-two; the
number of replacement stream courses open to Negroes fell from 48
percent of all courses offered to 19.8 percent. Fowler had expected to
follow up his study of school quotas in the Military Police, Signal
Corps, and Medical Corps with surveys of other schools figuring in the
Career Guidance Program, but since no additional overhead positions
were ever converted from white to black, no further need existed for
school quota studies. The three-point study suggested by Paul to find
ways to increase school quotas for Negroes was never made.

The War Department's problems with its segregation policy were only
intensified by its insistence on maintaining a racial quota. Whatever
the authors' intention, the quota was publicized as a guarantee of
black participation. In practice it not only restricted the number of
Negroes in the Army but also limited the number and variety of (p. 203)
black units that could be formed and consequently the number and
variety of jobs available to Negroes. Further, it restricted the
openings for Negroes in the Army's training schools.

[Illustration: BRIDGE PLAYERS, SEAVIEW SERVICE CLUB, TOKYO, JAPAN,
1948.]

At the same time, enlistment policies combined with Selective Service
regulations to make it difficult for the Army to produce from its
black quota enough men with the potential to be trained in those
skills required by a variety of units. Attracted by the superior
economic status promised by the Army, the average black soldier
continued to reenlist, thus blocking the enlistment of potential
military leaders from the increasing number of educated black youths.
This left the Army with a mass of black soldiers long in service but
too old to fight, learn new techniques, or provide leadership for the
future. Subject to charges of discrimination, the Army only fitfully
and for limited periods tried to eliminate low scorers to make room
for more qualified men. Yet to the extent to which it failed to
attract educated Negroes and provide them with modern military skills,
it failed to perform a principal function of the peacetime Army, that
of preparing a cadre of leaders for future wars.

In discussing the problem of low-scoring Negroes it should be
remembered that the Army General Classification Test, universally
accepted in the armed services as an objective device to measure
ability, has been seriously questioned by some manpower experts. (p. 204)
Since World War II, for example, educational psychologists have
learned that ethnic, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds have an
important influence on performance in general testing. Davenport, who
eventually became a senior manpower official in the Department of
Defense has, for one, concluded that the test scores created a
distorted picture of the mental ability of the black soldier. He has
also questioned the fairness of the Army testing system, charging that
uniform time periods were not always provided for black and white
recruits taking the tests and that this injustice was only one of
several inequalities of test administration that might have
contributed to the substantial differences in the scores of
applicants.[7-103]

[Footnote 7-103: Ltr, Roy K. Davenport to author, 11
Dec 71, CMH files. Davenport became Deputy Under
Secretary of the Army and later Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Manpower Planning and
Research) in the Johnson administration.]

The accuracy of test scores can be ignored when the subject is viewed
from the perspective of manpower utilization. In the five years after
World War II, the actual number of white soldiers who scored in the
lowest test categories equaled or exceeded the number of black
soldiers. The Army had no particular difficulty using these white
soldiers to advantage, and in fact refused to discharge all Class V
men in 1946. Segregation was the heart of the matter; the less gifted
whites could be scattered throughout the Army but the less gifted
blacks were concentrated in the segregated black units.

Reversing the coin, what could the Army do with the highly qualified
black soldier? His technical skills were unneeded in the limited
number and variety of black units; he was barred from white units. In
an attempt to deal with this problem, the Gillem policy directed that
Negroes with special skills or qualifications be employed in overhead
detachments. Such employment, however, depended in great part on the
willingness of commanders to use school-trained Negroes. Many of these
officers complained that taking the best qualified Negroes out of
black units for assignment to overhead detachments deprived black
units of their leaders. Furthermore, overhead units represented so
small a part of the whole that they had little effect on the Army's
problem.

The racial quota also complicated the postwar reduction in Army
strength. Since the strength and composition of the Army was fixed by
the defense budget and military planning, the majority of new black
soldiers produced by the quota could be organized into units only at
the expense of white units already in existence. In light of past
performance of black units and in the interests of efficiency and
economy, particularly at a time of reduced operating funds and a
growing cold war, how could the Army justify converting efficient
white units into less capable black units? The same question applied
to the formation of composite units. Grouping lower scoring black
units with white units, many of the Army staff believed, would lower
the efficiency of the whole and complicate the Army's relations with
the civilian community. As a result, the black units remained largely
separate, limited in number, and tremendously overstrength throughout
the postwar period.

Some of these problems, at least, might have been solved had the (p. 205)
Army created a special staff group to oversee the new policy, a key
proposal of the Gillem Board. The Personnel and Administration
Division was primarily interested in individuals, in trying to place
qualified Negroes on an individual basis; the Organization and
Training Division was primarily concerned with units, in trying to
expand the black units to approximate the combat to service ratio of
white units. These interests conflicted at times, and with no single
agency possessing overriding authority, matters came to an impasse,
blocking reform of Army practices. Instead, the staff played a sterile
numbers game, seeking to impose a strict ratio everywhere. But it was
impossible to have a 10 percent proportion of Negroes in every post,
in every area, in every overseas theater; it was equally impossible to
have 10 percent in every activity, in every arm and service, in every
type of task. Yet wherever the Army failed to organize its black
strength by quota, it was open to charges of racial discrimination.

It would be a mistake to overlook the signs of racial progress
achieved under the Gillem Board policy. Because of its provisions
thousands of Negroes came to serve in the postwar Regular Army, many
of them in a host of new assignments and occupations. But if the
policy proved a qualified success in terms of numbers, it still failed
to gain equal treatment and opportunity for black soldiers, and in the
end the racial quotas and diverse racial units better served those who
wanted to keep a segregated Army.

CHAPTER 8 (p. 206)

Segregation's Consequences

The Army staff had to overcome tremendous obstacles in order to carry
out even a modest number of the Gillem Board's recommendations. In
addition to prejudices the Army shared with much of American society
and the institutional inertia that often frustrates change in so large
an organization, the staff faced the problem of making efficient
soldiers out of a large group of men who were for the most part
seriously deficient in education, training, and motivation. To the
extent that it overcame these difficulties, the Army's postwar racial
policy must be judged successful and, considered in the context of the
times, progressive.

Nevertheless, the Gillem Board policy was doomed from the start.
Segregation was at the heart of the race problem. Justified as a means
of preventing racial trouble, segregation only intensified it by
concentrating the less able and poorly motivated. Segregation
increased the problems of all commanders concerned and undermined the
prestige of black officers. It exacerbated the feelings of the
nation's largest minority toward the Army and multiplied demands for
change. In the end Circular 124 was abandoned because the Army found
it impossible to fight another war under a policy of racial quotas and
units. But if the quota had not defeated the policy, other problems
attendant on segregation would probably have been sufficient to the
task.

_Discipline and Morale Among Black Troops_

By any measure of discipline and morale, black soldiers as a group
posed a serious problem to the Army in the postwar period. The
standard military indexes--serious incidents statistics, venereal
disease rates, and number of courts-martial--revealed black soldiers
in trouble out of all proportion to their percentage of the Army's
population. When these personal infractions and crimes were added to
the riots and serious racial incidents that continued to occur in the
Army all over the world after the war, the dimensions of the problem
became clear.

In 1945, when Negroes accounted for 8.5 percent of the Army's average
strength, black prisoners entering rehabilitation centers,
disciplinary barracks, and federal institutions were 17.3 percent of
the Army total. In 1946, when the average black strength had risen (p. 207)
to 9.35 percent of the Army's total, 25.9 percent of the soldiers sent
to the stockade were Negroes. The following tabulation gives their
percentage of all military prisoners by offense:

Negro
Military Offenses Percentage

Absent without leave 13.4
Desertion 17.4
Misbehavior before the enemy 1.9
Violation of arrest or confinement 12.6
Discreditable conduct toward superior 49.6

Civil Offenses

Murder 62.2
Rape 53.1
Robbery 33.1
Manslaughter 46.3
Burglary and housebreaking 29.0
Larceny 17.2
Forgery 8.9
Assault 59.0

_Source_: Correction Branch, TAGO, copy in CMH.

The most common explanation offered for such statistics is that
fundamental injustices drove these black servicemen to crime. Probably
more to the point, most black soldiers, especially during the early
postwar period, served in units burdened with many disadvantaged
individuals, soldiers more likely to get into trouble given the
characteristically weak leadership in these units. But another
explanation for at least some of these crime statistics hinged on
commanders' power to define serious offenses. In general, unit
commanders had a great deal of discretion in framing the charges
brought against an alleged offender; indeed, where some minor offenses
were concerned officers could even conclude that a given infraction
was not a serious matter at all and simply dismiss the soldier with a
verbal reprimand and a warning not to repeat his offense. Whereas one
commander might decide that a case called for a charge of aggravated
assault, another, faced with the same set of facts, might settle for a
charge of simple assault. If it is reasonable to assume that, as a
part of the pattern of discrimination, Negroes accused of offenses
like misconduct toward superiors, AWOL, and assault often received
less generous treatment from their officers than white servicemen,
then it is reasonable to suspect that statistics on Negroes involved
in crime may reflect such discriminatory treatment.

The crime figures were particularly distressing to the individual
black soldier, as indeed they were to his civilian counterpart,
because as a member of a highly visible minority he became identified
with the wrongdoing of some of his fellows, spectacularly reported in
the press, while his own more typical attendance to orders and
competent performance of duty were more often buried in the Army's
administrative reports. In particular, Negroes among the large
overseas commands suffered embarrassment. The Gillem Board policy (p. 208)
was announced just as the Army began the occupation of Germany and
Japan. As millions of veterans returned home, to be replaced in lesser
numbers by volunteers, black troops began to figure prominently in the
occupation forces. On 1 January 1947 the Army had 59,795 Negroes
stationed overseas, 10.77 percent of the total number of overseas
troops, divided principally between the two major overseas commands.
By 1 March 1948, in keeping with the general reduction of forces,
black strength overseas was reduced to 23,387 men, but black
percentages in Europe and the Far East remained practically
unchanged.[8-1] It was among these Negroes, scattered throughout
Germany and Japan, that most of the disciplinary problems occurred.

[Footnote 8-1: STM-30, Strength of the Army, 1 Jan 47
and 1 Mar 48.]

During the first two years of peace, black soldiers consistently
dominated the Army's serious-incident rate, a measure of indictments
and accusations involving troops in crimes against persons and
property. In June 1946, for example, black soldiers in the European
theater were involved in serious incidents (actual and alleged) at the
rate of 2.57 cases per 1,000 men. The rate among white soldiers for
the same period was .79 cases per 1,000. The rate for both groups rose
considerably in 1947. The figure for Negroes climbed to a yearly
average of 3.94 incidents per 1,000; the figure for whites, reflecting
an even greater gain, reached 1.88. These crime rates were not out of
line with America's national crime rate statistics, which, based on a
sample of 173 cities, averaged about 3.25 during the same period.[8-2]
Nevertheless, the rate was of particular concern to the government
because the majority of the civil offenses were perpetuated against
German and Japanese nationals and therefore lowered the prestige and
effectiveness of the occupation forces.

[Footnote 8-2: Geis Monograph, pp. 138-39 and Chart
4.]

Less important but still a serious internal problem for the Army was a
parallel rise in the incidence of venereal disease. Various reasons
have been advanced for the great postwar rise in the Army's venereal
disease rate. It is obvious, for example, that the rapid conversion
from war to peacetime duties gave many American soldiers new leisure
and freedom to engage in widespread fraternization with the civilian
population. Serious economic dislocation in the conquered countries
drove many citizens into a life of prostitution and crime. By the same
token, the breakdown of public health services had removed a major
obstacle to the spread of social disease. But whatever the reasons, a
high rate of venereal disease--the overseas rate was three times
greater than the rate reported for soldiers in the United
States--reflected a serious breakdown in military discipline, posed a
threat to the combat effectiveness of the commands, and produced lurid
rumors and reports on Army morality.

As in the case of crime statistics, the rate of venereal disease for
black soldiers in the overseas commands far exceeded the figure for
whites. The Eighth Army, the major unit in the Far East, reported for
the month of June 1946 1,263 cases of venereal disease for whites, or
139 cases per 1,000 men per year; 769 cases were reported for Negroes,
or 1,186 cases per 1,000 men per year. The rates for the European (p. 209)
Command for July 1946 stood at 806 cases per 1,000 Negroes per year as
compared with 203 for white soldiers. The disease rate improved
considerably during 1947 in both commands, but still the rates for
black troops averaged 354 per 1,000 men per year in Eighth Army
compared to 89 for whites. In Europe the rate was 663 per 1,000 men
per year for Negroes compared to 172 for whites. At the same time the
rate for all soldiers in the United States was 58 per 1,000 per
year.[8-3] Some critics question the accuracy of these statistics,
charging that more white soldiers, with informal access to medical
treatment, were able to escape detection by the Medical Department's
statisticians, at least in cases of more easily treated strains of
venereal disease.

[Footnote 8-3: Ibid., pp. 138-39; Eighth Army (AFPAC)
Hist Div, _Occupational Monograph of the Eighth
Army in Japan_ (hereafter AFPAC Monograph), 3:171.]

The court-martial rate for black soldiers serving overseas was also
higher than for white soldiers. Black soldiers in Europe, for example,
were court-martialed at the rate of 3.48 men per 1,000 during the
third quarter of 1946 compared with a 1.14 rate for whites. A similar
situation existed in the Far East where the black service units had a
monthly court-martial rate nearly double the average rate of the
Eighth Army as a whole.[8-4]

[Footnote 8-4: Geis Monograph; AFPAC Monograph,
3:87-88 and charts, 4:91-97 and JAG Illus. No. 3.
It should be noted that on occasion individual
white units registered disciplinary rates
spectacularly higher than these averages. In a
nine-month period in 1946-47, for example, a
120-man white unit stationed in Vienna, Austria,
had 10 general courts-martial, between 30 and 40
special and summary courts-martial, and 40 of its
members separated under the provisions of AR
368-369.]

The disproportionate black crime and disease rates were symptomatic of
a condition that also revealed itself in the racially oriented riots
and disturbances that continued to plague the postwar Army. Sometimes
black soldiers were merely reacting to blatant discrimination
countenanced by their officers, to racial insults, and at times even
to physical assaults, but nevertheless they reacted violently and in
numbers. The resulting incidents prompted investigations,
recriminations, and publicity.

Two such disturbances, more spectacular than the typical flare-up, and
important because they influenced Army attitudes toward blacks,
occurred at Army bases in the United States. The first was a mutiny at
MacDill Airfield, Florida, which began on 27 October 1946 at a dance
for black noncommissioned officers to which privates were denied
admittance. Military police were called when a fight broke out among
the black enlisted men and rapidly developed into a belligerent
demonstration by a crowd that soon reached mob proportions. Police
fire was answered by members of the mob and one policeman and one
rioter were wounded. Urged on by its ringleaders, the mob then
overwhelmed the main gate area and disarmed the sentries. The rioters
retained control of the area until early the next day, when the
commanding general persuaded them to disband. Eleven Negroes were
charged with mutiny.[8-5] A second incident, a riot with strong racial
overtones, occurred at Fort Leavenworth in May 1947 following an
altercation between white and black prisoners in the Army Disciplinary
Barracks. The rioting, caused by allegations of favoritism (p. 210)
accorded to prisoners, lasted for two days; one man was killed and six
were injured.[8-6]

[Footnote 8-5: "History of MacDill Army Airfield,
326th AAB Unit, October 1946," pp. 10-11, AFCHO
files.]

[Footnote 8-6: Florence Murray, ed., _The Negro
Handbook, 1949_ (New York: Macmillan, 1949), pp.
109-10.]

Disturbances in overseas commands, although less serious, were of deep
concern to the Army because of the international complications. In
April 1946, for example, soldiers of the 449th Signal Construction
Detachment threw stones at two French officers who were driving
through the village of Weyersbusch in the Rhine Palatinate. The
officers, one of them injured, returned to the village with French
MP's and requested an explanation of the incident. They were quickly
surrounded by about thirty armed Negroes of the detachment who,
according to the French, acted in an aggressive and menacing manner.
As a result, the Supreme French Commander in Germany requested his
American counterpart to remove all black troops from the French zone.
The U.S. commander in Europe, General Joseph T. McNarney, investigated
the incident, court-martialed its instigators, and transferred the
entire detachment out of the French zone. At the same time his staff
explained to the French that to prohibit the stationing of Negroes in
the area would be discriminatory and contrary to Army policy. Black
specialists continued to operate in the French zone, although none
were subsequently stationed there permanently.[8-7]

[Footnote 8-7: Geis Monograph, pp. 145-47.]

The Far East Command also suffered racial incidents. The Eighth Army
reported in 1946 that "racial agitation" was one of the primary causes
of assault, the most frequent violent crime among American troops in
Japan. This racial agitation was usually limited to the American
community, however, and seldom involved the civilian population.[8-8]

[Footnote 8-8: AFPAC Monograph, 2:176.]

The task of maintaining a biracial Army overseas in peacetime was
marked with embarrassing incidents and time-consuming investigations.
The Army was constantly hearing about its racial problems overseas and
getting no end of advice. For example, in May 1946 Louis Lautier,
chief of the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association news service,
informed the Assistant Secretary of War that fifty-five of the seventy
American soldiers executed for crimes in the European theater were
black. Most were category IV and V men. "In light of this fact,"
Lautier charged, "the blame for the comparatively high rate of crime
among black soldiers belongs to the American educational system."[8-9]

[Footnote 8-9: Ltr, Louis R. Lautier to Howard C.
Petersen, 28 May 46. ASW 291.2 (NT).]

But when a delegation of publishers from Lautier's organization toured
European installations during the same period, the members took a more
comprehensive look at the Seventh Army's race problems. They told
Secretary Patterson that they found all American soldiers reacting
similarly to poor leadership, substandard living conditions, and
menial occupations whenever such conditions existed. Although they
professed to see no difference in the conduct of white and black
troops, they went on to list factors that contributed to the bad
conduct of some of the black troops including the dearth of black
officers, hostility of military police, inadequate recreation, and
poor camp location. They also pointed out that many soldiers in the
occupation had been shipped overseas without basic training, (p. 211)
scored low in the classification tests, and served under young and
inexperienced noncoms. Many black regulars, on the other hand, once
proud members of combat units, now found themselves performing menial
tasks in the backwaters of the occupation. Above all, the publishers
witnessed widespread racial discrimination, a condition that followed
inevitably, they believed, from the Army's segregation policy.
Conditions in the Army appeared to them to facilitate an immediate
shift to integration; conditions in Europe and elsewhere made such a
shift imperative. Yet they found most commanders in Europe still
unaware of the Gillem Board Report and its liberalizing provisions,
and little being done to encourage within the Army the sensitivity to
racial matters that makes life in a biracial society bearable. Until
the recommendations of the board were carried out and discrimination
stopped, they warned the secretary, the Army must expect racial
flare-ups to continue.[8-10]