Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

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The replies of the Secretary of War to all these protests were very
much alike. The Army's enlistment practices, he wrote, were based on a
belief that black strength in the Army ought to bear a direct
relationship to the percentage of Negroes in the population. As for the
basic premise of what seemed to him a perfectly logical course of action,
Patterson concluded that "acceptance of the Negro-white ratio existing
in the civilian population as a basis for the Army's distribution of
units and personnel is not considered discriminatory."[7-54] The
secretary's responses were interesting, for they demonstrated a
significant change in the Army's attitude toward the quota. There is
evidence that the quota was devised by the Gillem Board as a temporary
expedient to guarantee the substantial participation of Negroes. It
was certainly so viewed by civil rights advocates. As late as December
1946 Assistant Secretary Petersen was still echoing this view when he
explained that the quota was a temporary ceiling and the Army had no
right to use it as a permanent bar to black enlistment.[7-55]

[Footnote 7-54: See Ltrs, SW to Wesley P. Brown,
Adjutant, Jesse Clipper American Legion Post No.
430, Buffalo, N.Y., 30 Aug 46, and to Jesse O.
Dedmon, Jr., Secy, Veterans Affairs Bureau, NAACP,
18 Nov 46; both in SW 291.2. The quote is from the
latter document.]

[Footnote 7-55: Memo, Maj Gen Parks for SW, et al.,
19 Dec 46 (with attached note signed "HP"), SW
291.2.]

Nevertheless it is also clear that the traditionalists considered the
quota a means of permanently limiting black soldiers to a percentage
equivalent to Negroes in the population. Assistant Secretary (p. 188)
McCloy belonged to neither group. More than a year before in reviewing
the Gillem Board's work he had declared: "I do not see any place for a
quota in a policy that looks to utilization of Negroes on the basis of
ability."

After a year of dealing with black overstrengths and juggling
enlistment standards, General Paul and his staff thought otherwise.
They believed that a ceiling must be imposed on the Army's black
strength if a rapid and uncontrolled increase in the number of black
troops was to be avoided. And it had to be avoided, they believed,
lest it create a disproportionately large pool of black career
soldiers with low aptitudes that would weaken the Army. Using the
quota to limit the number of black troops, they maintained, was not
necessarily discriminatory. It could be defended as a logical reading
of the Gillem Board's declaration that "the proportion of Negro to
white manpower as exists in the civil population" should be accepted
in the peacetime Army to insure an orderly and uniform mobilization in
a national emergency. With the Gillem policy to support it, the Army
staff could impose a strict quota on the number of black soldiers and
justify different enlistment standards for blacks and whites, a course
that was in fact the only alternative to the curtailment of white
enlistment under the manpower restrictions being imposed upon the
postwar Army.[7-56]

[Footnote 7-56: DF, D/P&A to D/O&T, 28 Apr 47, sub:
Negro Enlisted Strength, WDGPA 291.2 (12 Jul 46);
idem for SA, 6 Aug 48, sub: Removing Restrictions
on Negro Enlistments, CSGPA 291.2.]

Paul's reasoning was eventually endorsed by the new Chief of Staff,
General Omar N. Bradley, Secretary Patterson, and his successor,
Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall.[7-57] Beginning in mid-1947 the
enlistment of Negroes was carefully geared to their percentage of the
total strength of the Army, not to a fixed quota or percentage of
those enlisting. This limitation on black enlistment was made more
permanent in 1949 when it was included in the Army's mobilization
plan, the basic manpower planning document.[7-58]

[Footnote 7-57: Memo, ONB (Gen Bradley) for Gen Paul,
9 Aug 48, CSUSA 291.2 Negroes (6 Aug 48). Bradley
succeeded Eisenhower as Chief of Staff on 7
February 1948, and Royall succeeded Patterson on 19
July 1947. Royall assumed the title Secretary of
the Army on 17 September 1947 under the terms of
the National Security Act of 1947.]

[Footnote 7-58: AMP-1 Personnel Annex, 1 Jun 49, P&D
370.0 (25 Apr 49); see also Memo, Chief, Planning
Office, P&A, for Brig Gen John E. Dahlquist (Dep
P&A), 4 Feb 49, sub: Utilization of Negroes in
Mobilization, D/PA 291.2 (4 Feb 49).]

The adjustment of enlistment quotas to increase or curtail black
strength quickly became routine in the Army. When the number of
Negroes dropped below 10 percent of the Army's total strength in June
1947, The Adjutant General set a quota for the enlistment of black
soldiers.[7-59] When this quota was met in late August, the enlistment
of Negroes with no special training was reduced to 500 men per
month.[7-60] As part of a Personnel and Administration Division program
to increase the number and kinds of black units, the quota was
temporarily increased to 3,000 men per month for four months beginning
in December 1947.[7-61] Finding itself once again exceeding the 10 (p. 189)
percent black strength figure, the Army suspended the enlistment of
all Negroes for nine months beginning in April 1949.[7-62]

[Footnote 7-59: Ltr, TAG to CG, Each Army, et al., 9
Jul 47, sub: Enlistment of Negroes AGSE-P291.2. (27
Jun 47).]

[Footnote 7-60: T-7286, TAG to CO, Gen Ground, Ft.
Monroe (AGF), 27 Aug 47, 291.254 Negroes; Ltr, TAG
to CG, Each Army, et al., 3 Sep 47, sub: Enlistment
of Negroes, AGSE-P291.2.]

[Footnote 7-61: Msg, TAG to CG's, All ZI Armies, 19
Dec 47, AGSE-P 291.254.]

[Footnote 7-62: Msg, TAG to CG, All Armies (ZI), et
al., 17 Mar 49, WCL 22839; D/PA Summary Sheet for
VCofS, 1 Sep 49, sub: Method of Reducing the Negro
Reenlistment Rate, CSGPA 291.2 (6 Apr 49).]

In effect, the Gillem Board's critics who predicted that the quota
would become permanent were correct, but the quota was only the most
publicized manifestation of the general scheme of apportioning
manpower by race throughout the Army. General Paul had offered one
solution to the problem in July 1946. He recommended that each major
command and service be allocated its proportionate share of black
troops; that such troops "have the over-all average frequency of AGCT
grades occurring among Negro military personnel"; and that major
commands and services submit plans for establishing enough units and
overhead positions to accommodate their total allocations.[7-63] But
Paul did not anticipate the low-scoring soldier's penchant for
reenlistment or the ability of some commanders, often on the basis of
this fact, to justify the rejection of further black allotments. Thus,
in pursuit of a racial policy designed to promote the efficient use of
manpower, the G-1 and G-3 sections of the General Staff wrestled for
almost five years with the problem of racial balances in the various
commands, continental armies, and training programs.

[Footnote 7-63: DF, D/PA to D/OT, 30 Jul 46, sub:
Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army,
WDGPA 291.2 (15 Jul 46).]

_Broader Opportunities_

The equitable distribution of Negroes throughout each major command
and service was complicated by certain provisions of Circular 124.
Along with the quota, the policy prescribed grouping black units, not
to exceed regimental size, with white units in composite organizations
and integrating black specialists in overhead organizations. The
composite organizations were primarily the concern of the G-3 (later
the Organization and Training Division) section of the General Staff,
and in June 1946 its director, Lt. Gen. Charles P. Hall, brought the
matter to the attention of major commanders. Although the War
Department did not want to establish an arbitrary number of black
combat units, Hall explained, the new policy stressed the development
of such units to provide a broader base for future expansion, and he
wanted more black combat units organized as rapidly as trained troops
became available. To that end he called for a survey of all black
units to find out their current organization and assignment.[7-64]

[Footnote 7-64: Cir as Memo, TAG for CG, AAF et al.,
10 Jun 46, sub: Organization of Negro Manpower in
Postwar Army, AG 291.2 (4 Jun 46).]

Army Ground Forces reported that it had formed some composite units,
but its largest black unit, the 25th Regimental Combat Team, had been
attached to the V Corps at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, instead of
being made an organic element in a division. Practically all service
group headquarters reported separate black and white battalions (p. 190)
under their control, but many of the organizations in the Army Service
Forces--those under the Provost Marshal General and the Surgeon
General, for example--still had no black units, let alone composite
organizations. The Caribbean Defense Command, the Trinidad Base
Command, and the Headquarters Base Command of the Antilles Department
reported similar situations. The Mediterranean theater was using some
Negroes with special skills in appropriate overhead organizations, but
in the vast European Command Negroes were assigned to separate
regiments and smaller units. There were two exceptions: one
provisional black regiment was attached to the 1st Infantry Division,
and a black field artillery battalion was attached to each of the
three occupation divisions. The Alaskan Department and the Okinawa
Base Command had black units, both separate and grouped with white
units, but the Yokohama Base Command continued to use specially
skilled Negroes in black units because of the great demand for
qualified persons in those units.[7-65]

[Footnote 7-65: Memo, D/O&T for ASW, 18 Jul 46, sub:
Organization of Negro Manpower in Postwar Army,
WDGOT 291.2.]

To claim, as Hall did to Assistant Secretary Petersen, that black
units were being used like white units was misleading. Despite the
examples cited in the survey, many black units still remained
independent organizations, and with one major exception black combat
units grouped with white units were attached rather than assigned as
organizational elements of a parent unit. This was an important
distinction.[7-66] The constant imposition of attached status on a unit
that under normal circumstances would be assigned as an organic
element of a division introduced a sense of impermanence and
alienation just as it relieved the division commander of considerable
administrative control and hence proprietary interest in the unit.

[Footnote 7-66: An attached unit, such as a tank
destroyer battalion, is one temporarily included in
a larger organization; an assigned unit is one
permanently given to a larger organization as part
of its organic establishment. On the distinction
between attached and assigned status, see Ltr, CSA
to CG, CONARC, 21 Jul 55, CSUSA 322.17 (Div), and
CMH, "Lineages and Honors: History, Principles, and
Preparation," June 1962, in CMH.]

Attached status, so common for black units, thus weakened morale and
hampered training as Petersen well understood. Noting the favorable
attitude of the division commander, he had asked in April 1946 if it
was possible to assign the black 555th Parachute Battalion to the
celebrated 82d Airborne Division.[7-67] The answer was no. The
commanding general of the Army Ground Forces, General Devers,
justified attachment rather than assignment of the black battalion to
the 82d on the grounds that the Army's race policy called for the
progressive adoption of the composite unit and attachment was a part
of this process. Assignment of such units was, on the other hand, part
of a long-range plan to put the new policy into effect and should
still be subject to considerable study. Further justifying the _status
quo_, he pointed to the division's low strength, which he said
resulted from a lack of volunteers. Offering his own variation (p. 191)
of the "Catch-22" theme, he suggested that before any black battalion
was assigned to a large combat unit, the effect of such an assignment
on the larger unit's combat efficiency would first have to be studied.
Finally, he questioned the desirability of having a black unit assume
the history of a white unit; evidently he did not realize that the
intention was to assign a black unit with its black history to the
division.[7-68]

[Footnote 7-67: Memo, Actg, ACofS, G-3, for CG, AGF,
3 Jun 46, sub: Formation of Composite White-Negro
Units, with attachment, WDGOT 291.21 (30 Apr 46).]

[Footnote 7-68: Memo, CG, AFG, for CofS, 21 June 46,
sub: Formation of Composite White-Negro Units,
GNGCT-41 291.2 (Negro) (3 Jun 46).]

[Illustration: GENERAL EICHELBERGER, EIGHTH ARMY COMMANDER, _inspects
24th Infantry troops, Camp Majestic, Japan, June 1947_.]

In the face of such arguments Hall accepted what he called the
"nonfeasibility" of replacing one of the 82d's organic battalions with
the 555th, but he asked whether an additional parachute battalion
could be authorized for the division so that the 555th could be
assigned without eliminating a white battalion. He reiterated the
arguments for such an assignment, adding that it would invigorate the
555th's training, attract more and better black recruits, and better
implement the provisions of Circular 124.[7-69] General Devers remained
unconvinced. He doubted that assigning the black battalion to the (p. 192)
division would improve the battalion's training, and he was
"unalterably opposed" to adding an extra battalion. He found the idea
unsound from both a tactical and organizational point of view. It was,
he said, undesirable to reorganize a division solely to assign a black
unit.[7-70]

[Footnote 7-69: DF, D/O&T to CG, AGF, 24 Jul 46, sub:
Formation of Composite White-Negro Units, WDGOT
291.21 (30 Apr 46).]

[Footnote 7-70: Memo, CG, AGF, for D/O&T, 1 Aug 46,
sub: Formation of Composite White-Negro Units, CMT
2 to DF, D/O&T to CG, AGF, 24 Jul 46, same sub,
WDGOT 291.21 (30 Apr 46).]

General Hall gave up the argument, and the 555th remained attached to
the 82d. Attached status would remain the general pattern for black
combat units for several years.[7-71] The assignment of the 24th
Infantry to the 25th Infantry Division in Japan was the major
exception to this rule, but the 24th was the only black regiment left
intact, and it was administratively difficult to leave such a large
organization in attached status for long. The other black regiment on
active duty, the 25th Infantry, was split; its battalions, still
carrying their unit designations, were attached to various divisions
to replace inactive or unfilled organic elements. The 9th and 10th
Cavalry, the other major black units, were inactivated along with the
2d Cavalry Division in 1944, but reactivated in 1950 as separate tank
battalions.

[Footnote 7-71: Memo, D/O&T for SW, 19 Sep 46, sub:
Request for Memorandum, WDGOT 291.21 (12 Sep 46).]

That this distinction between attached and assigned status was
considered important became clear in the fall of 1947. At that time
the personnel organization suggested that the word "separate" be
deleted from a sentence of Circular 124: "Employment will be in Negro
regiments or groups, separate battalions or squadrons, and separate
companies, troops, or batteries." General Paul reasoned that the word
was redundant since a black unit was by definition a separate unit.
General Devers was strongly opposed to deletion on grounds that it
would lead to the indiscriminate organization of small black units
within larger units. He argued that the Gillem Board had provided for
black units as part of larger units, but not as organic parts. He
believed that a separate black unit should continue to be attached
when it replaced a white unit; otherwise it would lose its identity by
becoming an organic part of a mixed unit. Larger considerations seem
also to have influenced his conclusion: "Our implementation of the
Negro problem has not progressed to the degree where we can accept
this step. We have already progressed beyond that which is acceptable
in many states and we still have a considerable latitude in the
present policy without further liberalizing it from the Negro
viewpoint."[7-72] The Chief of Staff supported Paul's view, however, and
the word "separate" was excised.[7-73]

[Footnote 7-72: DF, CG, AGF, to D/P&A, 15 Sep 47,
sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar
Army. Policy; AGF DF, 27 Aug 47, same sub; both in
GNGAP-M 291.2 (27 Aug 47). The quote is from the
former document.]

[Footnote 7-73: DA Cir 32-III, 30 Oct 47. The life of
Circular 124 was extended indefinitely by DA
Circular 24-II, 17 Oct 47, and DA Ltr AGAO 291.2
(16 Mar 49).]

But the practice of attaching rather than assigning black units
continued until the end of 1949. Only then, and increasingly during
1950, did the Army begin to assign a number of black units as organic
parts of combat divisions. More noteworthy, Negroes began to be
assigned to fill the spaces in parts of white units. Thus the 3d (p. 193)
Battalion of the 9th Infantry and the 3d Battalion of the 188th
became black units in 1950.

Despite the emergence of racially composite units, the Army's
execution of the Gillem Board recommendation on the integration of
black and white units was criticized by black leaders. The board had
placed no limitation on the size of the units to be integrated, and
its call for progressive steps to utilize black manpower implied to
many that the process of forming composite black and white units would
continue till it included the smaller service units, which still
contained the majority of black troops. It was one thing, the Army
staff concluded, to assign a self-sustaining black battalion to a
division, but quite another to assign a small black service unit in a
similar fashion. As a spokesman for the Personnel and Administration
Division put it in a 1946 address, the Army was "not now ready to mix
Negro and white personnel in the same company or battery, for messing
and housing." Ignoring the Navy's experience to the contrary, he
concluded that to do so might provoke serious opposition from the men
in the ranks and from the American public.[7-74]

[Footnote 7-74: Col. H. E. Kessinger, Exec Off,
ACofS, G-1, "Utilization of Negro Manpower, 1946,"
copy in WDGPA 291.2 (1946).]

Accordingly, G-1 and G-3 agreed to reject the Mediterranean theater's
1946 plan to organize composite service units in the 88th Infantry
Division because such organization "involves the integration of Negro
platoons or Negro sections into white companies, a combination which
is not in accordance with the policy as expressed in Circular
124."[7-75] In the separate case of black service companies--for
example, the many transportation truck companies and ordnance
evacuation companies--theater commanders tended to combine them first
into quartermaster trains and then attach them to their combat
divisions.[7-76]

[Footnote 7-75: DF, ACofS, G-1, to CofS, 3 Jun 46,
sub: Implementation of the Gillem Board, WDGAP
291.2 (24 Nov 45); see also Routing Form, ACofS,
G-1, same date, subject, and file.]

[Footnote 7-76: For the formation of quartermaster
trains in Europe, see Geis Monograph, pp. 89-90.]

Despite the relaxation in the distinction between attached and
assigned status in the case of large black units, the Army staff
remained adamantly opposed to the combination of small black with
small white units. The Personnel and Administration Division jealously
guarded the orthodoxy of this interpretation. Commenting on one
proposal to combine small units in April 1948, General Paul noted that
while grouping units of company size or greater was permissible, the
Army had not yet reached the stage where two white companies and two
black companies could be organized into a single battalion. Until the
process of forming racially composite units developed to this extent,
he told the Under Secretary of the Army, William H. Draper, Jr., the
experimental mixing of small black and white units had no place in the
program to expand the use of Negroes in the Army.[7-77] He did not say
when such a process would become appropriate or possible. Several
months later Paul flatly told the Chief of Staff that integration of
black and white platoons in a company was precluded by stated Army
policy.[7-78]

[Footnote 7-77: Memo, D/P&A for Under SA, 29 Apr 48,
sub: Negro Utilization in the Postwar Army, CSGPA
291.2.]

[Footnote 7-78: Idem for CofS, 21 Jun 48, CSGPA
291.2.]

_Assignments_ (p. 194)

The organization of black units was primarily the concern of the
Organization and Training Division; the Personnel and Administration
Division's major emphasis was on finding more jobs for black soldiers
in keeping with the Gillem Board's call for the use of Negroes on a
broader professional scale. This could best be done, Paul decided, by
creating new black units in a variety of specialties and by using more
Negroes in overhead spaces in unit headquarters where black
specialists would be completely interspersed with white. To that end
his office prepared plans in November 1946 listing numerous
occupational specialties that might be offered black recruits. It also
outlined in considerable detail a proposal for converting several
organizations to black units, including a field artillery (155-mm.
howitzer) battalion, a tank company, a chemical mortar company, and an
ordnance heavy automotive maintenance company. These units would be
considered experimental in the sense that the men would be specially
selected and distributed in terms of ability. The officers, Negroes
insofar as practical, and cadre noncommissioned officers would be
specially assigned. Morale and learning ability would be carefully
monitored, and special training would be given men with below average
AGCT scores. At the end of six months, these organizations would be
measured against comparable white units. Mindful of the controversial
aspects of his plan, Paul had a draft circulated among the major
commands and services.[7-79]

[Footnote 7-79: DF, D/P&A to CG, AGF, et al., 16 Nov
46, sub: Proposed Directive, Utilization of Negro
Military Personnel; see also P&A Memo for Rcd, 14
Nov 46; both in WDGPA 291.2 (12 Jul 46).]

The Army Ground Forces, first to answer, concentrated on Paul's
proposal for experimental black units. Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte,
speaking for the commanding general, reported that in July 1946 the
command had begun a training experiment to determine the most
effective assignments for black enlisted men in the combat arms.
Because of troop reductions and the policy of discharging individuals
with low test scores, he said, the experiment had lasted only five
weeks. Five weeks was apparently long enough, however, for Brig. Gen.
Benjamin F. Caffey, commander of the 25th Regimental Combat Team
(Provisional), to reach some rather startling conclusions. He
discovered that the black soldier possessed an untrained and
undisciplined mind and lacked confidence and pride in himself. In the
past the Negro had been unable to summon the physical courage and
stamina needed to withstand the shocks of modern battle. Integrating
individual Negroes or small black units into white organizations would
therefore only lower the standard of efficiency of the entire command.
He discounted the integration after the Battle of the Bulge, saying
that it succeeded only because it came at the end of the war and
during pursuit action. "It still remains a moot question," Caffey
concluded, "as to whether the Negroes in integrated units would have
fought in a tough attack or defensive battle." Curiously enough he
went on to say that until Negroes reached the educational level of
whites, they should be organized into small combat units--battalions
and smaller--and attached to white organizations in order to learn the
proper standards of military discipline, conduct, administration, (p. 195)
and training. Despite its unfavorable opinion of experimental black
units, the Army Ground Forces did not reject the whole proposal
outright but asked for a postponement of six months until its own
reorganization, required by the War Department, was completed.[7-80]