Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

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[Footnote 7-20: Memo, Actg ACofS, G-3, for CG, AAF,
14 Mar 46, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower in
the Postwar Army, WDGOT 291.2.]

Again the Army staff turned down a request for a reduction in black
troops. This time the Air Forces bowed to the inevitable--15 percent
of its enlisted strength black--but grudgingly, for a quota of 50,419
Negroes, General Spaatz charged, "seriously jeopardizes the ability of
the AAF to perform its assigned mission."[7-21]

[Footnote 7-21: Memo, ACofS, G-3, for CG, AAF, 21 Mar
46, sub: Authorized Military Personnel as of 31
December 1946 and 30 June 1947, WDGOT 320.2 (21 Mar
46); DF, CG, AAF, to ACofS, G-3, 26 Mar 46, same
sub, WDGOT 291.21 (12 Feb 46).]

The Army Service Forces also objected. When queried,[7-22] the chiefs of
its technical and administrative services all agreed they could use
only small percentages of black troops, and only those men in the
higher categories of the classification test. From the replies of the
chiefs it was plain that none of the technical services planned to use
Negroes in as much as 10 percent of spaces, and several wanted to
exclude black units altogether. Furthermore, the test qualifications
they wanted set for many jobs were consistently higher than those
achieved by the men then performing the tasks. The staff of the Army
Service Forces went so far as to advocate that no more than 3.29
percent of the overhead and miscellaneous positions in the Army
Service Forces be entrusted to black troops.[7-23]

[Footnote 7-22: Memo, Actg Dir, Plans and Policy,
ASF, for PMG et al., 23 May 46, sub: Utilization of
Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army, AG 291.2 (23
May 46).]

[Footnote 7-23: The replies of the individual
technical and administrative service chiefs, along
with the response of the ASF Personnel Director,
are inclosed in Memo, Chief, Plans and Policy Off,
Dir of SS&P, for Dir, O&T, 21 Jun 46, sub:
Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army,
WDGSP 291.2 (Negro).]

These answers failed to impress the War Department's Director of
Personnel and Administration and the Director of Organization and
Training.[7-24] Both agreed that the technical and administrative
services had failed to appreciate the problems and responsibilities
outlined in War Department Circular 124; the assumption that black
troops would not be used in certain types of duty in the future
because they had not been so used in the past was unwarranted, General
Paul added. Limited or token employment of Negroes, he declared, was
no longer acceptable.[7-25]

[Footnote 7-24: Under WD Circular 134, 14 May 46, the
War Department General Staff was reorganized, and
many of its offices, including G-1 and G-3, were
redesignated as of 11 June 1946. For an extended
discussion of these changes, see James E. Hewes,
Jr., _From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and
Administration, 1900-1963_ (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1975), Chapter IV.]

[Footnote 7-25: DF, D/OT to D/PA, 13 Jul 46, sub:
Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army,
WDGOT 291.21 (21 Jun 46); DF, D/PA to D/OT, 30 Jul
46, same sub, WDGAP 291.2 (15 Jul 46).]

Yet somehow the reality of black enlistments and inductions in 1946
never quite matched the Army's dire predictions. According to plans
for 1 April 1946, Negroes in the continental United States would
comprise 15.2 percent of the Army Service Forces, 15.4 percent of the
Army Ground Forces, and 17 percent of the Army Air Forces. Actually,
Negroes in continental commands on 30 April 1946 made up 14.86 percent
of the Army Service Forces, 5.62 percent of the Army Ground Forces,
and 11.86 percent of the Army Air Forces. The 116,752 black soldiers
amounted to 12.35 percent of all troops based in the United States;
overseas, the 67,372 Negroes constituted 7.73 percent of American (p. 182)
force. Altogether, the 184,124 Negroes in the Army amounted to 10.14
percent of the whole.[7-26]

[Footnote 7-26: Strength of the Army (STM-30), 1 May
46; see also Memo, ACofS, G-1, for Chief, MPD, ASF,
3 Jun 46, sub: Utilization of Negro Personnel,
WDGPA 291.2. (12 Jul 46).]

_The Quota in Practice_

While the solution to the problem of too many black enlistees and too
many low-scoring men was obvious, it was also replete with difficulty.
The difficulty came from the complex way the Army obtained its
manpower. It accepted volunteers for enlistment in the Regular Army
and qualified veterans for the Organized Reserves; until November 1946
it also drafted men through the Selective Service and accepted
volunteers for the draft.[7-27] At the same time, under certain
conditions it accepted enlistment in the Regular Army of drafted men
who had completed their tours. To curtail enlistment of Negroes and
discharge low-scoring professionals, the Army would be obliged to
manipulate the complex regulations governing the various forms of
enlistment and sidestep the egalitarian provisions of the Selective
Service System at a time when the service was trying to attract
recruits and avoid charges of racial discrimination. Altogether it was
quite a large order, and during the next two years the Army fought the
battle of numbers on many fronts.

[Footnote 7-27: Volunteers for the draft were men
classified 1-A by Selective Service who were
allowed to sign up for immediate duty often in the
service of their choice. The volunteer for the
draft was only obliged to serve for the shorter
period imposed on the draftee rather than the
36-month enlistment for the Regular Army.]

It first took on the draft. Although to stop inducting Negroes when
the administration was trying to persuade Congress to extend the draft
act was politically unwise, the Army saw no way to restrict the number
of Negroes or eliminate substandard men so long as Selective Service
insisted on 10 percent black calls and a minimum classification test
score of seventy. In April 1946 the Army issued a call for 126,000
men, boldly specifying that no Negroes would be accepted. Out of the
battle of memos with Selective Service that followed, a compromise
emerged: a black call of 4 percent of the total in April, a return to
the usual 10 percent call for Negroes in May, and another 4 percent
call in June.[7-28] No draft calls were issued in July and August, but
in September the Army staff tried again, canceling the call for
Negroes and rejecting black volunteers for induction.[7-29] Again it
encountered resistance from the Selective Service and the black
community, and when the Secretary of War was sued for violation of the
Selective Service Act the Army issued a 3 percent call for Negroes in
October, the last call made under the 1940 draft law. In all, 16,888
Negroes were drafted into the Army in 1946, some 10.5 percent of the
total.[7-30]

[Footnote 7-28: Report of the Director, Office of
Selective Service Review, 31 March 1947, Table 56,
copy in CMH.]

[Footnote 7-29: Memo, Chief, Manpower Control Gp,
D/PA, for TAG, 6 Sep 46, Utilization of Negro
Manpower in Postwar Army, WDGPA 291.2; D/PA Memo
for Rcd, 1 Sep 46. WDGPA 291.2 (1 Sep 46-31 Dec
46).]

[Footnote 7-30: Figures vary for the number actually
drafted; those given above are from Selective
Service Monograph No. 10, _Special Groups_,
Appendix, p. 201. See also "Review of the Month,"
_A Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race
Relations_ 4 (October 1946):67.]

The Army had more success restricting black enlistments. In April (p. 183)
1946, at the same time it adopted the Gillem Board recommendations,
the Army began to deny enlistment or reenlistment in the Regular Army
to anyone scoring below seventy on the Army General Classification
Test. The only exceptions were men who had been decorated for valor
and men with previous service who had scored sixty-five and were
recommended for reenlistment by their commanders.[7-31] The Army also
stopped enlisting men with active venereal disease, not because the
Medical Department was unable to cure them but because by and large
their educational levels were low and, according to the classification
tests, they had little aptitude for learning. The Army stopped
recruiting men for special stations, hoping a denial of the European
theater and other attractive assignments would lower the number of
unwanted recruits.

[Footnote 7-31: WD Cir 110, 17 Apr 46.]

Using the new enlistment standards as a base, the Army quickly revised
its estimated black strength downward. On 16 April 1946 the Secretary
of War rescinded the order requiring major commands to retain a black
strength of 15 percent.[7-32] The acting G-3 had already informed the
commanding general of the Army Air Forces of the predicted drop in the
number of black troops--from 13.3 percent in June 1946 to 10 percent a
year later--and agreed the Army Air Forces could reduce its planned
intake accordingly.[7-33] Estimating the European theater's capacity to
absorb black troops at 21,845 men, approximately 10 percent of the
command total, the Army staff agreed to readjust its planned allotment
of Negroes to that command downward by some 1,500 spaces.[7-34]

[Footnote 7-32: Ltr, TAG to CG, AAF, et al., 16 Apr
46, sub: Utilization of Negro Personnel, AGAO-S-A-M
291.2 (12 Apr 46).]

[Footnote 7-33: Memo, Actg ACofS, G-3, for CG, AAF,
12 Apr 46, sub: Utilization of Negro Personnel,
WDGOT 291.21 (12 Feb 46).]

[Footnote 7-34: Memo, ACofS, OPD, for CofS, 13 May
46, sub: Augmentation of the ETO Ceiling Strengths
as of 1 Jul 46 (less AAF), WDCSA 320.2 (1946).]

These changes proved ill-advised, for the effort to curb the number of
Negroes in the Regular Army was largely unsuccessful. The staff had
overlooked the ineffectiveness of the Army's testing measures and the
zeal of its recruiters who, pressed to fill their quotas, accepted
enlistees without concern for the new standards. By mid-June the
effect was readily apparent. The European theater, for example,
reported some 19,000 Negroes in excess of billets in black units and
some 2,000 men above the theater's current allotment of black troops.
Assignment of Negroes to Europe had been stopped, but the number of
black regulars waiting for overseas assignment stood at 5,000, a
figure expected to double by the end of the summer. Some of this
excess could be absorbed in eight newly created black units, but that
still left black units worldwide 18 to 40 percent overstrength.[7-35]

[Footnote 7-35: G-1 Memo for Rcd (signed Col E. L.
Heyduck, Enl Div), 18 Jun 46, WDGAP 291.2; see also
EUCOM Hist Div (prepared by Margaret L. Geis),
"Negro Personnel in the European Command, 1 January
1946-30 June 1950," Occupation Forces in Europe
Series (Historical Division, European Command,
1952) (hereafter Geis Monograph), pp. 14-18, copy
in CMH.]

Notice that Negroes totaled 16 percent of the Regular Army on 1 July
1946 with the personnel staff's projections running to a 24 percent
level for the next year precipitated action in the War Department. (p. 184)
On 15 July Marcus Ray and Dean Rusk, Special Assistant to the
Assistant Secretary of War, met with representatives of the Army staff
to discuss black strength. Basing his decision on the consensus of
that meeting, the Secretary of War on 17 July suspended enlistment of
Negroes in the Regular Army. He excepted two categories of men from
this ruling. Men who qualified and had actually served for six months
in any of forty-eight unusual military occupational specialties in
which there were chronic manpower shortages would be enlisted without
promise of specific assignment to branch or station. At the same time,
because of manpower shortages, the Army would continue to accept
Negroes, already regulars, who wanted to reenlist.[7-36]

[Footnote 7-36: Ltr, TAG to CG, Each Army, et al., 17
Jul 46, sub: Enlistment of Negroes, AGSE-P342.06 (9
Jul 46); D/PA Summary Sheet to CofS, 9 Jul 46, sub:
Enlistment of Negroes in Regular Army, WDGPA
291.2.]

[Illustration: MARCUS RAY.]

While the new enlistment policy would help restore the Gillem Board's
quantitative equilibrium to the Army, the secretary's exception
allowing reenlistment of regulars would only intensify the qualitative
imbalance between black and white soldiers. The nation's biracial
educational system had produced an average black soldier who scored
well below the average white soldier on all the Army's educational and
training tests. The segregation policy had only complicated the
problem by denying the talented Negro the full range of Army
occupations and hence an equal chance for advancement. With the
suspension of first-time enlistments, the qualitative imbalance was
sure to grow, for now the highly qualified civilian would be passed
over while the less qualified soldier was permitted to reenlist.

This imbalance was of particular concern to Marcus Ray who was present
when the suspension of black enlistments had been decided upon. Ray
had suggested that instead of barring all new enlistees the Army
should discharge all Class V soldiers, whites and blacks alike, for
the convenience of the government and recruit in their place an equal
number of Class I and II candidates. Manpower officials had objected,
arguing there was no point in enlisting more Negroes in Class I and II
until the 10 percent ratio was again reached. Such a reduction, with
current attrition, would take two years. At the same time, the Army
manpower shortages made it impractical to discharge 92,000 soldiers,
half of whom were white, in Class V. The organization and training
representatives, on the other hand, agreed with Ray that it was (p. 185)
in the best interest of the Army to discharge these men, pointing
out that a recent increase in pay for enlisted men together with the
continuing need for recruits with greater aptitude for learning would
make the policy palatable to the Congress and the public.[7-37]

[Footnote 7-37: D/OT Memo for Red, 15 Jul 46; DF,
D/OT to D/PA, 15 Jul 46, sub: Basic Training of
Negro Personnel; both in WDGOT 291.2.]

The conferees deferred decision on the matter, but during the
following months the War Department set out to achieve a qualitative
balance between its black and white recruits. On 10 August 1946 the
Chief of Staff directed commanders, under the authority of Army
Regulation 615-369 which defined ineptness for military service, to
eliminate after six months men "incapable of serving in the Army in a
desirable manner after reasonable attempts have been made to utilize
their capabilities." He went on to explain that this category included
those not mentally qualified, generally defined as men scoring below
seventy, and those repeatedly guilty of minor offenses.[7-38] The Army
reissued the order in 1947, further defining the criteria for
discharge to include those who needed continued and special
instruction or supervision or who exhibited habitual drunkenness,
ineptness, or inability to conform to group living. A further
modification in 1949 would deny reenlistment to married men who had
failed during their first enlistment to make corporal or single men
who did not make private first class.[7-39]

[Footnote 7-38: WD Cir 241, 10 Aug 46.]

[Footnote 7-39: WD Cir 93, 9 Apr 47; D/PA Summary
Sheet, 1 Sep 49, sub: Method of Reducing Negro
Reenlistment Rate, WDGPA 291.2 (6 Apr 49).]

The measures were aimed at eliminating the least qualified men of both
races, and in October 1946 General Paul decided the Army could now
begin taking black recruits with the qualifications and background
that allowed them "to become useful members of the Army."[7-40] To that
end The Adjutant General announced on 2 October that as a further
exception to the prohibition against black enlistments in the Regular
Army all former officers and noncommissioned officers who volunteered
would be accepted without limitation.[7-41] On 31 October he announced
the establishment of a selective procurement program. With the
exception of men who had been in certain specialized occupations for
six months, all Negroes enlisting in the Regular Army had to score one
hundred on the Army General Classification Test; the minimum score for
white enlistees remained seventy.[7-42] At the same time, The Adjutant
General rescinded for Negroes the choice-of-assignment provision of
Regular Army enlistment contracts.

[Footnote 7-40: P&A Memo for Red, 30 Sep 46, attached
to copy of Ltr, TAG to CG, Each Army, et al., 2 Oct
46, sub: Enlistment of Negroes, AGSE-P342.06, WDGAP
291.2.]

[Footnote 7-41: Ltr, TAG to CG, Each Army, et al., 2
Oct 46, sub: Enlistment of Negroes, AGSE-P342.06
(30 Sep 46).]

[Footnote 7-42: Ibid., 31 Oct 46, sub: Enlistment of
Negroes, AGSE-P342.06 (23 Oct 46); see also WD Cir
103, 1947. An exception to the AGCT 70 minimum for
whites was made in the case of enlistment into the
AAF which remained at 100 for both races.]

These measures helped lower the percentage of Negroes in the Army and
reduced to some extent the differential in test scores between white
and black soldiers. The percentage of Negroes dropped by 30 June 1947
to 7.91 percent of the Army, 8.99 percent of its enlisted strength (p. 186)
and 9.4 percent of its Regular Army strength. Black enlisted strength
of all the overseas commands stood at 8.75 percent, down from the
10.77 percent of the previous December. Percentages in the individual
theaters reflected this trend; the European theater, for example,
dropped from 10.33 percent black to 9.96, the Mediterranean theater
from 10.05 to 8.03, and Alaska from 26.6 to 14.54.[7-43]

[Footnote 7-43: All figures are from STM-30, Strength
of the Army. Figures for the Pacific theater were
omitted because of the complex reorganization of
Army troops in that area in early 1947. On 30 June
1947 the Army element in the Far East Command, the
major Army organization in the Pacific, had 18,644
black enlisted troops, 8.56 percent of the
command's total.]

Precise figures on the number of poorly qualified troops eliminated
are unknown, but the European command expected to discharge some
12,000 low-scoring and unsuitable men, many of them black, in
1947.[7-44] Several commands reported that the new regulations
materially improved the quality of black units by opening vacancies to
better qualified men. General Paul could argue with considerable
justification that in regulating the quality of its recruits the Army
was following the spirit if not the letter of the Gillem Board Report.
If the Army could set high enough standards it would get good men, and
to this end the General Staff's Personnel and Administration Division
asked for the support of commanders.[7-45]

[Footnote 7-44: Memo, Brig Gen J. J. O'Hare, Dep Dir,
P&A, for SA, 9 Mar 48, sub: Implementation of WD
Cir 124, CSGPA 291.2.]

[Footnote 7-45: G-1 Memo for Rcd, 30 Sep 46, attached
to Ltr, TAG to CG, Each Army, et al., 2 Oct 46,
sub: Enlistment of Negroes, AGSE-P342.06 (30 Sep
46).]

Although these measures were helpful to the Army, they were frankly
discriminatory, and they immediately raised a storm of protest. During
the summer of 1946, for example, many black soldiers and airmen
complained about the Army's rejection of black enlistments for the
European theater. The NAACP, which received some of the soldiers'
complaints, suggested that the War Department honor its pledges or
immediately release all Negroes who were refused their choice of
location.[7-46] The Army did just that, offering to discharge honorably
those soldiers who, denied their theater of choice, rejected any
substitute offered.[7-47]

[Footnote 7-46: Ltr, Walter White to SW, 18 Jun 46;
Telg, White to SW, 24 Jun 46; both in SW 291.2
(Negro Troops).]

[Footnote 7-47: DF, OTIG to D/PA, 23 Jul 46, sub:
Assignment of Negro Enlistees Who Have Selected ETO
as Choice of Initial Assignment, WDSIG 220.3--Negro
Enlistees.]

Later in 1946 a young Negro sued the Secretary of War and a Pittsburgh
recruiting officer for refusing to enlist him. To make standards for
black applicants substantially higher than those for whites, he
alleged, violated the Preamble and Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution, while the inducements offered for enlistment, for
example the GI Bill of Rights, constituted a valuable property right
denied him because of race. The suit asked that all further
enlistments in the Army be stopped until Negroes were accepted on
equal terms with whites and all special enlistment requirements for
Negroes were abolished.[7-48] Commenting on the case, the chief of the
War Department's Public Relations Division, Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks,
defended the Gillem Board's 10 percent quota, but agreed that (p. 187)
"we are on weak ground [in] having a different standard for admission
between white and colored.... I think the thing to do is to put a
ceiling over the number you take in, and then take the best
ones."[7-49]

[Footnote 7-48: Pittsburgh _Post Gazette_, December
19, 1946.]

[Footnote 7-49: Memo, D/PRD for SW, ASW, and D/P&A,
19 Dec 46, ASW 291.2.]

The suit brought to a climax the feeling of indignation against Army
policy that had been growing among some civil rights activists. One
organization called on the Secretary of War to abandon the Gillem
Board policy "and unequivocably and equitably integrate Negroes ...
without any discrimination, segregation or quotas in any form, concept
or manner."[7-50] Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., of Wisconsin called
the decision to suspend black enlistments race discrimination.[7-51]
Walter P. Reuther, president of the United Automobile Workers and the
codirector of his union's Fair Practices Department, branded the
establishment of a quota "undemocratic and in violation of principles
for which they [Negroes] fought in the war" and demanded that black
enlistment be reinstated and the quota abolished.[7-52] Invoking
American tradition and the United Nations Charter, John Haynes Holmes,
chairman of the board of directors of the American Civil Liberties
Union, called for the abolition of enlistment quotas. The national
commander of the United Negro and Allied Veterans of America announced
that his organization unreservedly condemned the quota because it
deliberately deprived citizens of their constitutional right to serve
their country.[7-53]

[Footnote 7-50: Ltr, American Veterans Committee,
Manhattan Chapter, to SW, 17 Jul 46, SW 291.2
(NT).]

[Footnote 7-51: Ltr, LaFollette to SW, 25 Jul 46, SW
291.2.]

[Footnote 7-52: Ltr, Reuther and William Oliver to
SW, 23 Jul 46, SW 291.2.]

[Footnote 7-53: Ltr, J. H. Holmes to SW, 26 Jul 46;
Ltr, Arthur D. Gatz, Nat'l Cmdr, United Negro and
Allied Veterans of America, to SW, 20 Jul 46; both
in SW 291.2.]