Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

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Comments from the staff's personnel organization set the tone of this
criticism.[6-12] The Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, G-1, Maj.
Gen. Willard S. Paul, approved the board's recommendations, calling
them a "logical solution to the problem of effective utilization of
Negro manpower." Although he thought the report "sufficiently (p. 159)
detailed to permit intelligent, effective planning," he passed along
without comment the criticisms of his subordinates. He was opposed to
the formation of a special staff group. "We must soon reach the
point," he wrote, "where our general staff must be able to cope with
such problems without the formation of ad hoc committees or
groups."[6-13]

[Footnote 6-12: For examples of this extensive review
of the Gillem Board Report in G-1, see the
following Memos: Col J. F. Cassidy (Exec Office,
G-1) for Col Parks, 10 Dec 45; Chief, Officer
Branch, G-1, for Exec Off, G-1 Policy Group, 14 Dec
45; Actg Chief, Req and Res Br, for Chief, Policy
Control Group, 14 Dec 45; Lt Col E. B. Jones,
Special Projects Br, for G-1, 19 and 21 Dec 45,
sub: Policy for Utilization of Negro Manpower in
Post-War Army. All in WDGAP 291.2.]

[Footnote 6-13: Memo, Gen Paul, G-1, for CofS, 27 Dec
45, sub: Policy for Utilization of Negro Manpower
in Post-War Army, WDGAP 291.2 (24 Nov 45).]

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Organization and Training, G-3, Maj.
Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, was chiefly concerned with the timing of the
new policy. In trying to employ black manpower on a broader
professional scale, he warned, the Army must recognize the "ineptitude
and limited capacity of the Negro soldier." He wanted various phases
of the new policy timed "with due consideration for all factors such
as public opinion, military requirements and the military situation."
If the priority given public opinion in the sequence of these factors
reflected Edwards's view of their importance, the list is somewhat
curious. Edwards concurred in the recommendations, although he wanted
the special staff group established in the personnel office rather
than in his organization, and he rejected any arbitrary percentage of
black officers. More black officers could be obtained through
expansion of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, he suggested, but
he rejected the board's call for special classification of all
enlistees in reception and training centers, on grounds that the
centers were not adequate for the task.[6-14]

[Footnote 6-14: G-3 Summary Sheet to ADCofS, 2 Jan
46, sub: War Department Special Board on Negro
Manpower, WDGCT 291.21 (24 Nov 45).]

The chief of the General Staff's Operations Division, Lt. Gen. John E.
Hull, dismissed the Gillem report with several blunt statements: black
enlisted men should be assigned to black units capable of operational
use within white units at the rate of one black battalion per
division; a single standard of professional proficiency should be
followed for white and black officers; and "no Negro officer be given
command of white troops."[6-15]

[Footnote 6-15: Memo, Lt Gen John E. Hull, ACofS, OPD
(signed Brig Gen E. D. Post, Dep Chief, Theater Gp,
OPD), for ACofS, G-3, 4 Jan 46, sub: War Department
Special Board on Negro Manpower, WDGCT 291.21.]

The deputy commander of the Army Air Forces, Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker,
agreed with the board that the Army should not be "a testing ground
for problems in race relationships." Neither did he think the Air
Forces should organize units for the sole purpose of "advancing the
prestige of one race, especially when it is necessary to utilize
personnel that do not have the proper qualifications in order to keep
these units up to strength." Black combat units should be limited by
the 10 percent quota and by the small number of Negroes qualified for
tactical training. Most Negroes should be placed in Air Forces service
units, where "their wartime record was the best," even though such
placement would leave the Air Forces open to charges of
discrimination. The idea of experimental groupings of black and white
units in composite organizations might prove "impractical," Eaker
wrote to the Chief of Staff, because an Air Forces group operated as
an integral unit rather than as three or four separate squadrons;
units often exchanged men and equipment, and common messes were used.
Composite organizations were practical "only when it is not (p. 160)
necessary for the units to intermingle continually in order to carry
on efficiently." Why intermingling could not be synonymous with
efficiency, he failed to explain. The inference was clear that
segregation was not only normal but best.

Yet he advocated continuing integrated flying schools and agreed that
Negroes should be stationed where community attitudes were favorable.
He cited the difficulties involved in stationing. For more than two
years the Army Air Forces had tried to find a suitable base for its
only black tactical group. Even in northern cities with large black
communities--Syracuse, New York, Columbus, Ohio, and Windsor Locks,
Connecticut, among others--officials had vehemently protested against
having the black group.

The War Department, Eaker concluded, "should never be ahead of popular
opinion on this subject; otherwise it will put itself in a position of
stimulating racial disorders rather than overcoming them." Along these
lines, and harking back to the Freeman Field incident, he protested
against regulations reaffirmed by the Gillem Board for the joint use
of clubs, theaters, post exchanges, and the like at stations in
localities where such use was contrary to civilian practices.[6-16]

[Footnote 6-16: 1st Ind, Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker, Deputy
Cmdr, AAF, to CofS, 19 Dec 45, sub: War Department
Special Board on Negro Manpower, copy at Tab H,
Supplemental Report of Board of Officers on
Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army,
26 Jan 46, copy in CMH.]

The Army Ground Forces headquarters concurred generally with the
Gillem Board's conclusions and recommendations but suggested the Army
not act alone. The headquarters recommended a policy be formulated for
the entire military establishment; only then should individual
elements of the armed forces come forward with their own policies. The
idea that Negroes should serve in numbers proportionate to their
percentage of the population and bear their share of battle losses
"may be desirable but is impracticable and should be abandoned in the
interest of a logical solution."[6-17] Since the abilities of Negroes
were limited, the report concluded, their duties should be restricted.

[Footnote 6-17: Memo, Lt Col S. R. Knight (for CG,
AGF) for CofS, 18 Dec 45, sub: Army Ground Forces
Comments and Recommendations on Report of the War
Department Special Board (Gillem) on Negro
Manpower, dated 17 Nov 45, GNGPS 370.01 (18 Dec
45); AGF Study, "Participation of Negro Troops in
the Postwar Military Establishment," 28 Nov 45,
forwarded to CofS, ATTN: Dir, WD Special Planning
Div, GNDCG 370.01 (28 Nov 45).]

The commanding general of the Army Service Forces claimed the Gillem
Board Report was advocating substantially the same policy his
organization had followed during the war. The Army Service Forces had
successfully used an even larger percentage of Negroes than the Gillem
Board contemplated. Concurring generally with the board's
recommendations, he cautioned that the War Department should not
dictate the use of Negroes in the field; to do so would be a serious
infringement of command prerogatives that left each commander free to
select and assign his men. As for the experimental groupings of black
and white units, the general believed that such mixtures were
appropriate for combat units but not for the separate small units
common to the Army Service Forces. Separate, homogeneous companies or
battalions formed during the war worked well, and experience proved
mixed units impractical below group and regimental echelons.

The Service Forces commander called integration infeasible "for (p. 161)
the present and foreseeable future." It was unlawful in many areas, he
pointed out, and not common practice elsewhere, and requiring soldiers
to follow a different social pattern would damage morale and defeat
the Army's effort to increase the opportunities and effectiveness of
black soldiers. He did not try to justify his contention, but his
meaning was clear. It would be a mistake for the Army to attempt to
lead the nation in such reforms, especially while reorganization,
unification, and universal military training were being
considered.[6-18]

[Footnote 6-18: Memo, Maj Gen Daniel Noce, Actg CofS,
ASF, for CofS, 28 Dec 45, sub: War Department
Special Board on Negro Manpower, copy at Tab J,
Supplemental Report of War Department Special Board
on Negro Manpower, 26 Jan 46, CMH files.]

Reconvened in January 1946 to consider the comments on its original
report, the Gillem Board deliberated for two more weeks, heard
additional witnesses, and stood firm in its conclusions and
recommendations.[6-19] The policy it proposed, the board emphasized, had
one purpose, the attainment of maximum manpower efficiency in time of
national emergency. To achieve this end the armed forces must make
full use of Negroes now in service, but future use of black manpower
had to be based on the experience gained in two major wars. The board
considered the policy it was proposing flexible, offering opportunity
for advancement to qualified individuals and at the same time making
possible for the Army an economic use of national manpower as a whole.

[Footnote 6-19: Supplemental Report of War Department
Special Board on Negro Manpower, "Policy for
Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War
Army," 26 Jan 46. The following quotations are
taken from this amended version of the Gillem Board
Report, a copy of which, with all tabs and annexes,
is in CMH.]

To its original report the board added a statement at once the hope
and despair of its critics and supporters.

_The Initial Objectives_: The utilization of the proportionate
ratio of the manpower made available to the military
establishment during the postwar period. The manpower potential
to be organized and trained as indicated by pertinent
recommendations.

_The Ultimate Objective_: The effective use of _all_ manpower
made available to the military establishment in the event of a
major mobilization at some unknown date against an undetermined
aggressor. The manpower to be utilized, in the event of another
major war, in the Army without regard to antecedents or race.

When, and if such a contingency arises, the manpower of the
nation should be utilized in the best interests of the national
security.

The Board cannot, and does not, attempt to visualize at this
time, intermediate objectives. Between the first and ultimate
objective, timely phasing may be interjected and adjustments made
in accordance with conditions which may obtain at this
undetermined date.

The board based its ultimate objective on the fact that the black
community had made important advances in education and job skills in
the past generation, and it expected economic and educational
conditions for Negroes to continue to improve. Since such improvement
would make it possible to employ black manpower in a variety of ways,
the board's recommendations could be only a guide for the future, a
policy that must remain flexible.

To the specific objections raised by the reviewing agencies, the board
replied that although black units eventually should be commanded by
black officers "no need exists for the assignment of Negro commanders
to units composed of white troops." It also agreed with those who (p. 162)
felt it would be beneficial to correlate Army racial policies with
those of the Navy. On other issues the board stood firm. It rejected
the proposal that individual commanders be permitted to choose
positions where Negroes could be employed in overhead installations on
the grounds that this delegation of responsibility "hazards lack of
uniformity and makes results doubtful." It refused to drop the quota,
arguing it was needed for planning purposes. At the same time the
board did admit that the 10 percent ratio, suitable for the moment,
might be changed in the future in the interest of efficiency--though
changed in which way it did not say.

[Illustration: SECRETARY PATTERSON.]

The board rejected the proposition that the Army Service Forces and
the Army Air Forces were unable to use small black units in white
organizations and took a strong stand for elimination of the
professional private, the career enlistee lacking the background or
ability to advance beyond the lowest rank. Finally, the board rejected
demands that the color line be reestablished in officers' messes and
enlisted recreational facilities. "This large segment of the
population contributed materially to the success attained by our
military forces.... The Negro enjoyed the privileges of citizenship
and, in turn, willingly paid the premium by accepting service. In many
instances, this payment was settled through the medium of the supreme
sacrifice."

The board's recommendations were well received, at least in the
highest echelons of the War Department. General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
now Chief of Staff,[6-20] quickly sent the proposed policy to the
Secretary of War with a recommendation for approval "subject to such
adjustment as experience shows is necessary."[6-21] On 28 February 1946
Secretary Patterson approved the new policy in a succinct restatement
of the board's recommendations. The policy and the full Gillem Board
Report were published as War Department Circular 124 on 27 April 1946.
At the secretary's direction the circular was dispatched to the field
"without delay."[6-22] On 4 March the report was released to the
press.[6-23] The most exhaustive and intensive inquiry ever made (p. 163)
by the Army into the employment of black manpower had survived the
review and analysis process with its conclusions and recommendations
intact.

[Footnote 6-20: Eisenhower succeeded Marshall as
Chief of Staff on 19 November 1945.]

[Footnote 6-21: Memo, CofS for SW, 1 Feb 46, sub:
Supplemental Report of Board of Officers on
Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army,
WDCSA 320.2 (1 Feb 46).]

[Footnote 6-22: Ltr, TAG for CG's, AGF et al., 6 May
46, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower in the
Post-War Army, WDGAP 291.2.]

[Footnote 6-23: WD Press Release, 4 Mar 46, "Report
of Board of Officers on Utilization of Negro
Manpower in the Post-War Army."]

Attitudes toward the new policy varied with interpretations of the
board's statement of objectives. Secretary Patterson saw in the report
"a significant development in the status of the Negro soldiers in the
Army." The immediate effect of using Negroes in composite units and
overhead assignments, he predicted, would be to change War Department
policy on segregation.[6-24] But the success of the policy could not be
guaranteed by a secretary of war, and some of his advisers were more
guarded in their estimates. To Truman Gibson, once again in government
service, but briefly this time, the report seemed a good beginning
because it offered a new approach, one that had originated within the
Army itself. Yet Gibson was wary of its chances for success: The
board's recommendations, he told the Assistant Secretary of War, would
make for a better Army "only if they are effectively carried out."[6-25]
The newly appointed assistant secretary, Howard C. Petersen, was
equally cautious. Explaining the meaning of the report to the Negro
Newspaper Publishers Association, he warned that "a strong policy
weakly enforced will be of little value to the Army."[6-26]

[Footnote 6-24: Memo, SW for CofS, 28 Feb 46, WDCSA
320.2 (28 Feb 46).]

[Footnote 6-25: Memo, Truman Gibson, Expert
Consultant to the SW, for Howard C. Petersen, 28
Feb 46, ASW 291.2 Negro Troops (Post-War).]

[Footnote 6-26: Remarks of the Assistant Secretary of
War at Luncheon for Negro Newspaper Publishers
Association, 1 Mar 46, ASW 291.2.]

Marcus H. Ray, Gibson's successor as the secretary's adviser on racial
affairs,[6-27] stressed the board's ultimate objective to employ
manpower without regard to race and called its recommendations "a step
in the direction of efficient manpower utilization." It was a
necessary step, he added, because "any racial group which lives under
the stigma of implied inferiority inherent in a system of enforced
separation cannot give over-all top performance in peace or in
war."[6-28]

[Footnote 6-27: Ray, a former commander of an
artillery battalion in the 92d Infantry Division,
was appointed civilian aide on 2 January 1946; see
WD Press Release, 7 Jan 46.]

[Footnote 6-28: Ltr, Marcus Ray to Capt Warman K.
Welliver, 10 Apr 46, copy in CMH. Welliver, the
commander of a black unit during the war, was a
student of the subject of Negroes in the Army; see
his "Report on the Negro Soldier."]

On the whole, the black community was considerably less sanguine about
the new policy. The _Norfolk Journal and Guide_ called the report a
step in the right direction, but reserved judgment until the Army
carried out the recommendations.[6-29] To a distinguished black
historian who was writing an account of the Negro in World War II, the
Gillem Board Report reflected the Army's ambiguity on racial matters.
"It is possible," L. D. Reddick of the New York Public Library wrote,
"to interpret the published recommendations as pointing in opposite
directions."[6-30] One NAACP official charged that it "tries to dilute
Jim-Crow by presenting it on a smaller scale." After citing the
tremendous advances made by Negroes and all the reasons for ending
segregation, he accused the Gillem Board of refusing to take the (p. 164)
last step.[6-31] Most black papers adopted the same attitude,
characterizing the new policy as "the same old Army." The Pittsburgh
_Courier_, for one, observed that the new policy meant that the Army
command had undergone no real change of heart.[6-32] Other segments of
the public were more forebearing. One veterans' organization commended
the War Department for the work of the Gillem Board but called its
analysis and recommendations incomplete. Citing evidence that Jim
Crow, not the enemy, "defeated" black combat units, the chairman of
the American Veterans Committee called for an immediate end to
segregation.[6-33]

[Footnote 6-29: Norfolk _Journal and Guide_, March 9,
1946.]

[Footnote 6-30: Ltr, L. D. Reddick, N.Y. Pub. Lib.,
to SW, 12 Mar 46, SW 291.]

[Footnote 6-31: Ltr, Bernard Jackson, Youth Council,
NAACP Boston Br, to ASW, 4 Apr 46, ASW 291.2 (NT).]

[Footnote 6-32: Pittsburgh _Courier_, May 11, 1946.]

[Footnote 6-33: Ltr, Charles G. Bolte, Chmn, Amer
Vets Cmte, to SW, 8 Mar 46; see also Ltr, Ralph
DeNat, Corr Secy, Amer Vets Cmte, to SW, 28 May 46,
both in SW 291.2 (Cmte) (9 Aug 46).]

Clearly, opposition to segregation was not going to be overcome with
palliatives and promises, yet Petersen could only affirm that the
Gillem Board Report would mean significant change. He admitted
segregation's tenacious hold on Army thinking and that black units
would continue to exist for some time, but he promised movement toward
desegregation. He also made the Army's usual distinction between
segregation and discrimination. Though there were many instances of
unfair treatment during the war, he noted, these were individual
matters, inconsistent with Army policy, which "has consistently
condemned discrimination." Discrimination, he concluded, must be
blamed on "defects" of enforcement, which would always exist to some
degree in any organization as large as the Army.[6-34]

[Footnote 6-34: Ltrs, ASW to Bernard H. Solomon and
to Bernard Jackson, 9 Apr 46, both in ASW 291.2.]

Actually, Petersen's promised "movement" toward integration was likely
to be a very slow process. So substantive a change in social practice,
the Army had always argued, required the sustained support of the
American public, and judging from War Department correspondence and
press notices large segments of the public remained unaware of what
the Army was trying to do about its "Negro problem." Most military
journalists continued to ignore the issue; perhaps they considered the
subject of the employment of black troops unimportant compared with
the problems of demobilization, atomic weaponry, and service
unification. For example, in listing the principal military issues
before the United States in the postwar period, military analyst
Hanson Baldwin did not mention the employment of Negroes in the
service.[6-35]

[Footnote 6-35: Hanson Baldwin, "Wanted: An American
Military Policy," _Harper's_ 192 (May
1946):403-13.]

Given the composition of the Gillem Board and the climate of opinion
in the nation, the report was exemplary and fair, its conclusions
progressive. If in the light of later developments the recommendations
seem timid, even superficial, it should be remembered to its credit
that the board at least made integration a long-range goal of the Army
and made permanent the wartime guarantee of a substantial black
representation.

Nevertheless the ambiguities in the Gillem Board's recommendations
would be useful to those commanders at all levels of the Army who were
devoted to the racial _status quo_. Gillem and his colleagues (p. 165)
discussed black soldiers in terms of social problems rather than
military efficiency. As a result, their recommendations treated the
problem from the standpoint of how best Negroes could be employed
within the traditional segregated framework even while they spoke of
integration as an ultimate goal. They gave their blessing to the
continued existence of segregated units and failed to inquire whether
segregation might not be a factor in the inefficiency and
ineffectiveness of black units and black soldiers. True, they sought
to use qualified Negroes in specialist jobs as a solution to better
employment of black manpower, but this effort could have little
practical effect. Few were qualified--and determination of
qualifications was often done by those with little sympathy for the
Negro and even less for the educated Negro. Black serviceman holding
critical specialties and those assigned to overhead installations
would never amount to more than a handful of men whose integration
during duty hours only would fall far short even of tokenism.

To point out as the board did that the policy it was recommending no
longer required segregation was meaningless. Until the Army ordered
integration, segregation, simply by virtue of inertia, would remain.
As McCloy, along with Gibson and others, warned, without a strong,
explicit statement of intent by the Army the changes in Army practice
suggested by the Gillem Board would be insignificant. The very
acceptance of the board's report by officials traditionally opposed to
integration should have been fair warning that the report would be
difficult to use as a base for a progressive racial policy; in fact it
could be used to justify almost any course of action. From the start,
the War Department encountered overwhelming difficulties in carrying
out the board's recommendations, and five years later the ultimate
objective was still out of reach.