Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

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Despite the breadth and acuity of his observations, Granger suggested
remarkedly few changes. Impressed by the progress made in the
treatment of Negroes during the war, he apparently expected it to
continue uninterrupted. Although his investigations uncovered basic
problems that would continue to trouble the Navy, he did not (p. 151)
recognize them as such. For his part, Forrestal sent Granger's
voluminous reports with their few recommendations to his military
staff and thanked the Urban League official for his contribution.[5-63]

[Footnote 5-63: Memo, J.F. [James Forrestal] for Vice
Adm Jacobs (Chief of Naval Personnel), 23 Aug 45;
Ltr, SecNav to Granger, 29 Dec 45, both in 54-1-13,
Forrestal file, GenRecsNav.]

Although different in approach and point of view, Granger's
observations neatly complemented the findings and recommendations of
the Committee on Negro Personnel. Both reinforced the secretary's
postwar policy aims and both supported his gradualist approach to
racial reform. Granger cited segregation, in particular the
concentration of masses of black sailors, as the principal cause of
racial unrest and poor morale among Negroes. The committee urged the
gradual integration of the general service in the name of military
efficiency. Granger and the committee also shared certain blind spots.
Both were encouraged by the progress toward full-scale integration
that occurred during the war, but this improvement was nominal at
best, a token bow to changing conditions. Their assumption that
integration would spread to all branches of the Navy neglected the
widespread and deeply entrenched opposition to integration that would
yield only to a strategy imposed by the Navy's civilian and military
leaders. Finally, the hope that integration would spread ignored the
fact that after the war few Negroes except stewards would be able to
meet the enlistment requirements for the Regular Navy. In short, the
postwar Navy, so far as Negroes were concerned, was likely to resemble
the prewar Navy.

The search for a postwar racial policy led the Army and Navy down some
of the same paths. The Army manpower planners decided that the best
way to avoid the inefficient black divisions was to organize Negroes
into smaller, and therefore, in their view, more efficient segregated
units in all the arms and services. At the same time Secretary
Forrestal's advisers decided that the best way to avoid the
concentration of Negroes who could not be readily assimilated in the
general service was to integrate the small remnant of black
specialists and leave the majority of black sailors in the separate
Steward's Branch. In both instances the experiences of World War II
had successfully demonstrated to the traditionalists that large-scale
segregated units were unacceptable, but neither service was yet ready
to accept large-scale integration as an alternative.

CHAPTER 6 (p. 152)

New Directions

All the services developed new racial policies in the immediate
postwar period. Because these policies were responses to racial
stresses peculiar to each service and were influenced by the varied
experiences of each, they were, predictably, disparate in both
substance and approach; because they were also reactions to a common
set of pressures on the services they proved to be, perhaps not so
predictably, quite similar in practical consequences. One pressure
felt by all the services was the recently acquired knowledge that the
nation's military manpower was not only variable but also limited in
quantity. Military efficiency demanded, therefore, that the services
not only make the most effective use of available manpower, but also
improve its quality. Since Negroes, who made up approximately 10
percent of the population, formed a substantial part of the nation's
manpower, they could no longer be considered primarily a source of
unskilled labor. They too must be employed appropriately, and to this
end a higher proportion of Negroes in the services must be qualified
for specialized jobs.

Continuing demands by civil rights groups added to the pressure on the
services to employ Negroes according to their abilities. Arguing that
Negroes had the right to enjoy the privileges and share the
responsibilities of citizenship, civil rights spokesmen appeared
determined to test the constitutionality of the services' wartime
policies in the courts. Their demands placed the Truman administration
on the defensive and served warning on the armed forces that never
again could they look to the exclusion of black Americans as a
long-term solution to their racial problems.

In addition to such pressures, the services had to reckon with a more
immediate problem. Postwar black reenlistment, particularly among
service men stationed overseas, was climbing far beyond expectation.
As the armed forces demobilized in late 1945 and early 1946, the
percentage of Negroes in the Army rose above its wartime high of 9.68
percent of the enlisted strength and was expected to reach 15 percent
and more by 1947. Aside from the Marine Corps, which experienced a
rapid drop in black enlistment, the Navy also expected a rise in the
percentage of Negroes, at least in the near future. The increase
occurred in part because Negroes, who had less combat time than whites
and therefore fewer eligibility points for discharge, were being
separated from service later and more slowly. The rise reflected as
well the Negro's expectation that the national labor market would
deteriorate in the wake of the war. Although greater opportunities for
employment had developed for black Americans, civilians already filled
the posts and many young Negroes preferred the job security of a
military career. But there was another, more poignant reason why many
Negroes elected to remain in uniform: they were afraid to reenter (p. 153)
what seemed a hostile society and preferred life in the armed forces,
imperfect as that might be. The effect of this increase on the
services, particularly the largest service, the Army, was sharp and
direct. Since many Negroes were poorly educated, they were slow to
learn the use of sophisticated military equipment, and since the best
educated and qualified men, black and white, tended to leave, the
services faced the prospect of having a large proportion of their
enlisted strength black and unskilled.

_The Gillem Board Report_

Clearly, a new policy was necessary, and soon after the Japanese
surrender Assistant Secretary McCloy sent to the recently appointed
Secretary of War the accumulated pile of papers on the subject of how
best to employ Negroes in the postwar Army. Along with the answers to
the questionnaires sent to major commanders and a collection of
interoffice memos went McCloy's reminder that the matter ought to be
dealt with soon. McCloy wanted to form a committee of senior officers
to secure "an objective professional view" to be used as a base for
attacking the whole race problem. But while he considered it important
to put this professional view on record, he still expected it to be
subject to civilian review.[6-1]

[Footnote 6-1: Memo, McCloy for SW, 17 Sep 45, SW
291.2; Ltr, McCloy to author, 25 Sep 69, CMH
files.]

Robert P. Patterson became Secretary of War on 27 September 1945,
after serving with Henry Stimson for five years, first as assistant
and later as under secretary. Intimately concerned with racial matters
in the early years of the war, Patterson later became involved in war
procurement, a specialty far removed from the complex and
controversial racial situation that faced the Army. Now as secretary
he once again assumed an active role in the Army's black manpower
problems and quickly responded to McCloy's request for a policy
review.[6-2] In accordance with Patterson's oral instructions, General
Marshall appointed a board, under the chairmanship of Lt. Gen. Alvan
C. Gillem, Jr., which met on 1 October 1945. Three days later a formal
directive signed by the Deputy Chief of Staff and approved by the
Secretary of War ordered the board to "prepare a policy for the use of
the authorized Negro manpower potential during the postwar period
including the complete development of the means required to derive the
maximum efficiency from the full authorized manpower of the nation in
the event of a national emergency."[6-3] On this group, to be known as
the Gillem Board, would fall the responsibility for formulating a
policy, preparing a directive, and planning the use of Negroes in the
postwar Army.

[Footnote 6-2: See, for example, Memo, SW for CofS, 7
Nov 45, SW 291.2; see also Ltr, McCloy to author,
25 Sep 69.]

[Footnote 6-3: Quoted in Memo, Gen Gillem for CofS,
17 Nov 45, sub: Report of Board of General Officers
on Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War
Army, copy in CSGOT 291.2 (1945) BP.]

None of the board members was particularly prepared for the new
assignment. General Gillem, a Tennessean, had come up through the
ranks to command the XIII Corps in Europe during World War II.
Although he had written one of the 1925 War College studies on the (p. 154)
use of black troops and had many black units in his corps, Gillem
probably owed his appointment to the fact that he was a three-star
general, available at the moment, and had recently been selected by
the Chief of Staff to direct a Special Planning Division study on the
use of black troops that had been superseded by the new board.[6-4]
Burdened with the voluminous papers collected by McCloy, Gillem headed
a board composed of Maj. Gen. Lewis A. Pick, a Virginian who had built
the Ledo Road in the China-Burma-India theater; Brig. Gen. Winslow C.
Morse of Michigan, who had served in a variety of assignments in the
Army Air Forces culminating in wartime duties in China; and Brig. Gen.
Aln D. Warnock, the recorder without vote, a Texan who began his
career in the Arizona National Guard and had served in Iceland during
World War II.[6-5] These men had broad and diverse experience and gave
the board a certain geographical balance. Curiously enough, none was a
graduate of West Point.[6-6]

[Footnote 6-4: Interv, Capt Alan Osur, USAF, with Lt
Gen Alvan C. Gillem (USA Ret.), 3 Feb 72, copy in
CMH.]

[Footnote 6-5: Memo, Maj Gen Ray Porter, Dir, Spec
Planning Div, for Gillem, 28 Sep 45, sub: War
Department Special Board on Negro Manpower, WDCSA
320.2.]

[Footnote 6-6: In a later comment on the selections,
McCloy said that the geographical spread and lack
of West Point representation was accidental and
that the use of general officers reflected the
importance of the subject to him and to Patterson.
See Ltr, McCloy to author, 25 Sep 69, and Ltr, Gen
Morse to author, 10 Sep 74, CMH files.]

[Illustration: GENERAL GILLEM.]

Although new to the subject, the board members worked quickly. Less
than a month after their first session, Gillem informed the Chief of
Staff that they had already reached certain conclusions. They
recognized the need to build on the close relationships developed
between the races during the war by introducing progressive measures
that could be put into operation promptly and would provide for the
assignment of black troops on the basis of individual merit and
ability alone. After studying and comparing the racial practices of
the other services, the board decided that the Navy's partial
integration had stimulated competition which improved black
performance without causing racial friction. By contrast, strict
segregation in the Marine Corps required longer training periods and
closer supervision for black marines. In his memorandum Gillem
refrained from drawing the logical conclusion and simply went on to
note that the Army had, for example, integrated its black and white
patients in hospitals because of the greater expense, inefficiency,
and general impracticality of duplicating complex medical (p. 155)
equipment and installations.[6-7] By inference the same disadvantages
applied to maintaining separate training facilities, operational units,
and the rest of the apparatus of the shrinking Army establishment. At
one point in his progress report, Gillem seemed close to recommending
integration, at least to the extent already achieved in the Navy. But
stated explicitly such a recommendation would have been a radical
step, out of keeping with the climate of opinion in the country and in
the Army itself.

[Footnote 6-7: Memo, Gen Gillem for CofS, 26 Oct 45,
sub: Progress Rpt on Board Study of Utilization of
Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army, WDCSA 291.2;
see also Interv, Osur with Gillem.]

On 17 November 1945 the Gillem Board finished the study and sent its
report to the Chief of Staff.[6-8] In six weeks the board had questioned
more than sixty witnesses, consulted a mass of documentary material,
and drawn up conclusions and recommendations on the use of black
troops. The board declared that its recommendations were based on two
complementary principles: black Americans had a constitutional right
to fight, and the Army had an obligation to make the most effective
use of every soldier. But the board also took into account reports of
the Army's wartime experience with black units. It referred constantly
to this experience, citing the satisfactory performance of the black
service units and some of the smaller black combat units, in
particular the artillery and tank battalions. It also described the
black infantry platoons integrated into white companies in Europe as
"eminently successful." At the same time large black combat units had
not been satisfactory, most often because their junior officers and
noncommissioned officers lacked the ability to lead. The difficulties
the Army encountered in properly placing its black troops during the
war, the board decided, stemmed to some extent from inadequate staff
work and improper planning. Poor staff work allowed a disproportionate
number of Negroes with low test scores to be allocated to combat
elements. Lack of early planning, constant reorganization and
regrouping of black units, and continuous shifting of individuals from
one type of training to another had confused and bewildered black
troops, who sometimes doubted that the Army intended to commit them to
combat at all.

[Footnote 6-8: Memo, Gillem for CofS, 17 Nov 45, sub:
Report of Board of General Officers on the
Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army.
Unless otherwise noted this section is based on the
report.]

It was necessary, the board declared, to avoid repetition of this
experience. Advance planning was needed to develop a broader base of
trained men among black troops to provide cadres and leaders to meet
national emergencies more efficiently. The Army had to realize and
take advantage of the advances made by Negroes in education, industry,
and government service. The wide range of skills attained by Negroes
had enhanced their military value and made possible a broader
selectivity with consequent benefit to military efficiency. Thus, the
Army had to adopt a racial policy that provided for the progressive
and flexible use of black manpower "within proportions corresponding
to those in the civilian population." This policy, it added, must "be
implemented _promptly ... must_ be objective by nature ... must (p. 156)
eliminate, at the earliest practicable moment, any special
consideration based on race ... and should point towards the immediate
objective of an evaluation of the Negro on the basis of individual
merit and ability."

The board made eighteen specific recommendations, of which the
following were the most important.

"That combat and service units be organized and activated from the
Negro manpower available in the postwar Army to meet the requirements
of training and expansion and in addition qualified individuals be
utilized in appropriate special and overhead units." The use of
qualified Negroes in overhead units was the first break with the
traditional policy of segregation, for though black enlisted men would
continue to eat and sleep in segregated messes and barracks, they
would work alongside white soldiers and perform the same kind of duty
in the same unit.

"The proportion of Negro to white manpower as exists in the civil
population be the accepted ratio for creating a troop basis in the
postwar Army."[6-9]

[Footnote 6-9: The 10 percent quota that eventually
emerged from the Gillem Board was an approximation;
Gillem later recalled that the World War II
enlisted ratio was nearer 9.5 percent, but that
General Eisenhower, the Chief of Staff, saying he
could not remember that, suggested making it "an
even 10 percent." See Interv, Osur with Gillem.]

"That Negro units organized or activated for the postwar Army conform
in general to other units of the postwar Army but the maximum strength
of type [sic] units should not exceed that of an infantry regiment or
comparable organization." Here the board wanted the Army to avoid the
division-size units of World War II but retain separate black units
which would be diversified enough to broaden the professional base of
Negroes in the Regular Army by offering them a larger selection of
military occupations.

"That in the event of universal training in peacetime additional
officer supervision is supplied to units which have a greater than
normal percentage of personnel falling into A.G.C.T. classifications
IV and V." Such a policy had existed in World War II, but was never
carried out.

"That a staff group of selected officers whose background has included
commanding troops be formed within the G-1 Division of the staffs of
the War Department and each major command of the Army to assist in the
planning, promulgation, implementation and revision of policies
affecting all racial minorities." This was the administrative
machinery the board wanted to facilitate the prompt and efficient
execution of the Army's postwar racial policies.

"That reenlistment be denied to regular Army soldiers who meet only
the minimum standards." This provision was in line with the concept
that the peacetime Army was a cadre to be expanded in time of
emergency. As long as the Army accepted all reenlistments regardless
of aptitude and halted black enlistments when black strength exceeded
10 percent, it would deny enlistment to many qualified Negroes. It
would also burden the Army with low-scoring men who would never rise
above the rank of private and whose usefulness in a peacetime (p. 157)
cadre, which had the function of training for wartime expansion,
would be extremely limited.

"That surveys of manpower requirements conducted by the War Department
include recommendations covering the positions in each installation of
the Army which could be filled by Negro military personnel." This
suggestion complemented the proposal to use Negroes in overhead
positions on an individual basis. By opening more positions to
Negroes, the Army would foster leadership, maintain morale, and
encourage a competitive spirit among the better qualified. By forcing
competition with whites "on an individual basis of merit," the Army
would become more attractive as a career to superior Negroes, who
would provide many needed specialists as a "nucleus for rapid
expansion of Army units in time of emergency."

"That groupings of Negro units with white units in composite
organizations be continued in the postwar Army as a policy." Since
World War II demonstrated that black units performed satisfactorily
when grouped or operated with white combat units, the inclusion of a
black service company in a white regiment or a heavy weapons company
in an infantry battalion could perhaps be accomplished "without
encountering insurmountable difficulties." Such groupings would build
up a professional relationship between blacks and whites, but, the
board warned, experimentation must not risk "the disruption of
civilian racial relationships."

"That there be accepted into the Regular Army an unspecified number of
qualified Negro officers ... that all officers, regardless of race, be
required to meet the same standard for appointment ... be accorded
equal rights and opportunities for advancement and professional
improvement; and be required to meet the same standard for
appointment, promotion and retention in all components of the Army."
The board set no limit on the number of black officers in the Army,
nor did it suggest that black officers be restricted to service in
black units.

Its report rendered, the board remained in existence ready to make
revisions "as may be warranted" by the comments of the many
individuals and agencies that were to review the policy in conformance
with a directive of the Secretary of War.[6-10]

[Footnote 6-10: Memo, Brig Gen H. I. Hodes, ADCofS,
for Gillem, 24 Nov 45, sub: War Department Special
Board on Negro Management, WDCSA 320.2 (17 Nov
45).]

No two individuals were more intimately concerned with the course of
events that led to the Gillem Board Report than John J. McCloy and
Truman Gibson, and although both were about to leave government
service, each gave the new Secretary of War his opinion of the
report.[6-11] McCloy called the report a "fine achievement" and a "great
advance over previous studies." It was most important, he said, that
the board had stated the problem in terms of manpower efficiency. At
the same time both men recognized ambiguities in the board's (p. 158)
recommendations, and their criticisms were strong, precise, and,
considering the conflicts that developed in the Army over these
issues, remarkedly acute. Both agreed the report needed a clear
statement on the basic issue of segregation, and they wanted the board
to eliminate the quota. Gibson pointed out that the board proposed as
a long-range objective the utilization of all persons on the basis of
individual ability alone. "This means, of course," he announced with
more confidence than was warranted, "a completely integrated Army." In
the interest of eventually achieving an integrated Army he was willing
to settle for less than immediate and total integration, but
nevertheless he attacked the board for what he called the vagueness of
its recommendations. Progressive and planned integration, he told
Secretary Patterson, demanded a clear and explicit policy stating that
segregation was outmoded and integration inevitable, and the Army
should move firmly and steadily from one to the other.

[Footnote 6-11: Memo, Civilian Aide for ASW, 13 Nov
45, ASW 291.2 Negro Troops (Post War); Ltr, idem to
SW, 13 Nov 45; Memo, McCloy for Patterson, 24 Nov
45; Memo, Gibson for SW, 28 Nov 45. Last three in
SW 291.2. The Gibson quote is from the 28 November
memo.]

On some fundamental issues McCloy thought the board did "not speak
with the complete clarity necessary," but he considered the ambiguity
unintentional. Experience showed, he reminded the secretary, "that we
cannot get enforcement of policies that permit of any possibility of
misconstruction." Directness, he said, was required in place of
equivocation based on delicacy. If the Gillem Board intended black
officers to command white officers and men, it should have said so
flatly. If it meant the Army should try unsegregated and mixed units,
it should have said so. Its report, McCloy concluded, should have put
these matters beyond doubt. He was equally forthright in his rejection
of the quota, which he found impractical because it deprived the Army
of many qualified Negroes who would be unable to enlist when the quota
was full. Even if the quota was meant as a floor rather than a
ceiling, McCloy thought it objectionable. "I do not see any place," he
wrote, "for a quota in a policy that looks to utilize Negroes on the
basis of ability."

If the Gillem Board revealed the Army's willingness to compromise in
treating a pressing efficiency problem, detailed comments by
interested staff agencies revealed how military traditionalists hoped
to avoid a pressing social problem. For just as McCloy and Gibson
criticized the board for failing to spell out concrete procedures
toward integration, other staff experts generally approved the board's
report precisely because its ambiguities committed them to very
little. Their specific criticisms, some betraying the biases of the
times, formed the basis of the standard traditionalist defense of the
racial _status quo_ for the next five years.