Various - "The American Missionary Volume 50, No. 4, April 1896"

Edward P. Cogger - "Funny Alphabet"

John Ruskin - "Mornings in Florence"

A. T. Quiller Couch - "Major Vigoureux"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965




[Footnote 5-52: Memo, Exec Off, ASW, for McCloy, 28
Aug 45, ASW 291.2 (NT).]

Sommers had, in effect, adopted Gibson's gradualist approach to the
problem, suggesting an inquiry to determine "the areas in which
nonsegregation can be attempted first and the methods by which it can
be introduced ... instead of merely generalizing, as in the past, on
the disappointing and not very relevant experiences with large
segregated units." He foresaw difficulties: a certain amount of social
friction and perhaps a considerable amount of what he called
"professional Negro agitation" because Negroes competing with whites
would probably not achieve comparable ranks or positions immediately.
But Sommers saw no cause for alarm. "We shall be on firm ground," he
concluded, "and will be able to defend our actions by relying on the
unassailable position that we are using men in accordance with their
ability."

Competing with these calls for gradual desegregation was the Army's
growing concern with securing some form of universal military
training. Congress would discuss the issue during the summer and fall
of 1945, and one of the questions almost certain to arise in the
congressional hearings was the place contemplated for Negroes. Would
the Army use Negroes in combat units? Would the Army train and use
Negroes in units together with whites? Upon the answers to these
questions hinged the votes of most, if not all, southern congressmen.
Prudence dictated that the Army avoid any innovations that might
jeopardize the chance for universal military training. In other words,
went the prevalent view, what was good for the Army--and universal
military training was in that category--had to come before all
else.[5-53]

[Footnote 5-53: Memos, Col Frederick S. Skinner for
Dir, Special Planning Div, WDSS, 25 May and 2 Jun
45, sub: Participation of Negro Troops in the
Postwar Military Establishment, WDSSP 291.2
(1945).]

Even among officers troubled by the contradictory aspects of an (p. 143)
issue clouded by morality, many felt impelled to give their prime
allegiance to the Army as it was then constituted. The Army's
impressive achievement during the war, they reasoned, argued for its
continuation in conformance with current precepts, particularly in a
world still full of hostilities. The stability of the Army came first;
changes would have to be made slowly, without risking the menace of
disruption. An attempt to mix the races in the Army seemed to most
officers a dangerous move bordering on irresponsibility. Furthermore,
the majority of Army officers, dedicated to the traditions of the
service, saw the Army as a social as well as a military institution.
It was a way of life that embraced families, wives and children. The
old manners and practices were comfortable because they were well
known and understood, had produced victory, and had represented a life
that was somewhat isolated and insulated--particularly in the
field--from the currents and pressures of national life. Why then
should the old patterns be modified; why exchange comfort for possible
chaos? Why should the Army admit large numbers of Negroes; what had
Negroes contributed to winning World War II; what could they possibly
contribute to the postwar Army?

Although opinion among Army officials on the future role of Negroes in
the Army was diverse and frankly questioning in tone, opinion on the
past performance of black units was not. Commanders tended to agree
that with certain exceptions, particularly small service and combat
support units, black units performed below the Army average during the
war and considerably below the best white units. The commanders also
generally agreed that black units should be made more efficient and
usually recommended they be reduced in size and filled with better
qualified men. Most civil rights spokesmen and their allies in the
Army, on the other hand, viewed segregation as the underlying cause of
poor performance. How, then, could the conflicting advice be channeled
into construction of an acceptable postwar racial policy? The task was
clearly beyond the powers of the War Department's Special Planning
Division, and in September 1945 McCloy adopted the recommendation of
Sommers and Gibson and urged the Secretary of War to turn over this
crucial matter to a board of general officers. Out of this board's
deliberations, influenced in great measure by opinions previously
expressed, would emerge the long-awaited revision of the Army's policy
for its black minority.


_The Navy's Informal Inspection_

In contrast to the elaborate investigation conducted by the Army, the
Navy's search for a policy consisted mainly of an informal
intradepartmental review and an inspection of its black units by a
civilian representative of the Secretary of the Navy. In general this
contrast may be explained by the difference in the services' postwar
problems. The Army was planning for the enlistment of a large cross
section of the population through some form of universal military
training; the Navy was planning for a much smaller peacetime
organization of technically trained volunteers. Moreover, the Army
wanted to review the performance of its many black combat units, (p. 144)
whereas the naval establishment, which had excluded most of its
Negroes from combat, had little to gain from measuring their wartime
performance.

The character and methods of the Secretary of the Navy had an
important bearing on policy. Forrestal believed he had won the senior
officers to his view of equal treatment and opportunity, and to be
assured of success he wanted to convince lower commanders and the
ranks as well. He wrote in July 1945: "We are making every effort to
give more than lip service to the principles of democracy in the
treatment of the Negro and we are trying to do it with the minimum of
commotion.... We would rather await the practical demonstration of the
success of our efforts.... There is still a long road to travel but I
am confident we have made a start."[5-54]

[Footnote 5-54: Ltr, Forrestal to Field, 14 Jul 45,
54-1-13, Forrestal file, GenRecsNav.]

Forrestal's wish for a racially democratic Navy did not noticeably
conflict with the traditionalists' plan for a small, technically elite
force, so while the Army launched a worldwide quest in anticipation of
an orthodox policy review, the Navy started an informal investigation
designed primarily to win support for the racial program conceived by
the Secretary of the Navy.

The Navy's search began in the last months of the war when Secretary
Forrestal approved the formation of an informal Committee on Negro
Personnel. Although Lester Granger, the secretary's adviser on racial
matters, had originally proposed the establishment of such a committee
to "help frame sound and effective racial policies,"[5-55] the Chief of
Naval Personnel, a preeminent representative of the Navy's
professionals, saw an altogether different reason for the group. He
endorsed the idea of a committee, he told a member of the secretary's
staff, "not because there is anything wrong or backward about our
policies," but because "we need greater cooperation from the technical
Bureaus in order that those policies may succeed."[5-56] Forrestal did
little to define the group's purpose when on 16 April 1945 he ordered
Under Secretary Bard to organize a committee "to assure uniform
policies" and see that all subdivisions of the Navy were familiar with
each other's successful and unsuccessful racial practices.[5-57]

[Footnote 5-55: Ltr, Lester Granger to SecNav, 19 Mar
45, 54-1-13, Forrestal file, GenRecsNav.]

[Footnote 5-56: Memo, Chief, NavPers, for Cmdr
Richard M. Paget (Exec Off, SecNav), 21 Apr 45,
sub: Formation of Informal Cmte to Assure Uniform
Policies on the Handling of Negro Personnel, P-17,
BuPersRecs.]

[Footnote 5-57: Memo, SecNav for Cmdr Richard M.
Paget, 16 Apr 45, 54-1-19, Forrestal file,
GenRecsNav.]

By pressing for the uniform treatment of Negroes, Forrestal doubtless
hoped to pull backward branches into line with more liberal ones so
that the progressive reforms of the past year would be accepted
throughout the Navy. But if Forrestal's ultimate goal was plain, his
failure to give clear-cut directions to his informal committee was
characteristic of his handling of racial policy. He carefully followed
the recommendations of the Chief of Naval Personnel, who wanted the
committee to be a military group, despite having earlier expressed his
intention of inviting Granger to chair the committee. As announced on
25 April, the committee was headed by a senior official of the Bureau
of Naval Personnel, Capt. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, with another (p. 145)
of the bureau's officers serving as committee recorder.[5-58]
Restricting the scope of the inquiry, Forrestal ordered that "whenever
practical" the committee should assign each of its members to
investigate the racial practices in his own organization.

[Footnote 5-58: Other members of the committee
included four senior Navy captains and
representatives of the Marine Corps and Coast
Guard. Memo, SecNav for Under SecNav, 25 Apr 45,
QB495/A3-1, GenRecsNav.]

Nevertheless when the committee got down to work it quickly went
beyond the limited concept of its mission as advanced by the Chief of
Naval Personnel. Not only did it study statistics gathered from all
sections of the department and review the experiences of various
commanders of black units, it also studied Granger's immediate and
long-range recommendations for the department, an extension of his
earlier wartime work for Forrestal. Specifically, Granger had called
for the formulation of a definite integration policy and for a
strenuous public relations campaign directed toward the black
community. He had also called for the enlistment and commissioning of
a significant number of Negroes in the Regular Navy, and he wanted
commanders indoctrinated in their racial responsibilities. Casting
further afield, Granger had warned that discriminatory policies and
practices in shipyards and other establishments must be eliminated,
and employment opportunities for black civilians in the department
broadened.[5-59]

[Footnote 5-59: Ltr, Granger to SecNav, 19 Mar 45,
54-1-13, Forrestal file, GenRecsNav.]

The committee deliberated on all these points, and, after meeting
several times, announced in May 1945 its findings and recommendations.
It found that the Navy's current policies were sound and when properly
executed produced good results. At the same time it saw a need for
periodic reviews to insure uniform application of policy and better
public relations. Such findings could be expected from a body headed
by a senior official of the personnel bureau, but the committee then
came up with the unexpected--a series of recommendations for sweeping
change. Revealing the influence of the Special Programs Unit, the
committee asked that Negroes be declared available for assignment to
all types of ships and shore stations in all classifications, with
selections made solely on merit. Since wholesale reassignments were
impractical, the committee recommended well-planned, gradual
assimilation--it avoided the word integration--as the best policy for
ending the concentration of Negroes at shore activities. It also
attacked the Steward's Branch as the conspicuous symbol of the
Negroes' second-class status and called for the assignment of white
stewards and allowing qualified stewards to transfer to general
service.

The committee wanted the Judge Advocate General to assign legal
advisers to all major trials, especially those involving minorities,
to prevent errors in courts-martial that might be construed as
discrimination. It further recommended that Negroes be represented in
the secretary's public relations office; that news items concerning
Negroes be more widely disseminated through bureau bulletins; and,
finally, that all bureaus as well as the Coast Guard and Marine Corps
be encouraged to enroll commanders in special indoctrination programs
before they were assigned to units with substantial numbers of (p. 146)
Negroes.[5-60]

[Footnote 5-60: Memo, Cmte on Personnel for Under
SecNav, 22 May 45, sub: Report and Recommendations
of Committee on Negro Personnel, P. 16-3,
GenRecsNav.]

[Illustration: GRANGER INTERVIEWING SAILORS _on inspection tour in the
Pacific_.]

The committee's recommendations, submitted to Under Secretary Bard on
22 May 1945, were far more than an attempt to unify the racial
practices of the various subdivisions of the Navy Department. For the
first time, senior representatives of the department's often
independent branches accepted the contention of the Special Programs
Unit that segregation was militarily inefficient and a gradual but
complete integration of the Navy's general service was the solution to
racial problems.

Yet as a formula for equal treatment and opportunity in the Navy, the
committee's recommendations had serious omissions. Besides overlooking
the dearth of black officers and the Marine Corps' continued strict
segregation, the committee had ignored Granger's key proposal that
Negroes be guaranteed a place in the Regular Navy. Almost without
exception, Negroes in the Navy's general service were reservists,
products of wartime volunteer enlistment or the draft. All but a few
of the black regulars were stewards. Without assurance that many of
these general service reservists would be converted to regulars or
that provision would be made for enlistment of black regulars, (p. 147)
the committee's integration recommendations lacked substance.
Secretary Forrestal must have been aware of these omissions, but he
ignored them. Perhaps the problem of the Negro in the postwar Navy
seemed remote during this last, climactic summer of the war.

[Illustration: GRANGER WITH CREWMEN OF A NAVAL YARD CRAFT.]

To document the status of the Negro in the Navy, Forrestal turned
again to Lester Granger. Granger had acted more than once as the
secretary's eyes and ears on racial matters, and the association
between the two men had ripened from mutual respect to close
rapport.[5-61] During August 1945 Granger visited some twenty
continental installations for Forrestal, including large depots and
naval stations on the west coast, the Great Lakes Training Center, and
bases and air stations in the south. Shortly after V-J day Granger
launched a more ambitious tour of inspection that found him traveling
among the 45,000 Negroes assigned to the Pacific area.

[Footnote 5-61: Columbia University Oral Hist Interv
with Granger.]

Unlike the Army staff, whose worldwide quest for information stressed
black performance in the familiar lessons-learned formula and only
incidentally treated those factors that affected performance, Granger,
a civilian, never really tried to assess performance. He was, (p. 148)
however, a race relations expert, and he tried constantly to discover
how the treatment accorded Negroes in the Navy affected their
performance and to pass on his findings to local commanders. He later
explained his technique. First, he called on the commanding officer
for facts and opinions on the performance and morale of the black
servicemen. Then he proceeded through the command, unaccompanied,
interviewing Negroes individually as well as in small and large
groups. Finally, he returned to the commanding officer to pass along
grievances reported by the men and his own observations on the
conditions under which they served.[5-62]

[Footnote 5-62: Granger's findings and an account of
his inspection technique are located in Ltrs,
Granger to SecNav, 4 Aug, 10 Aug, 27 Aug, and 31
Oct 45; and in "Minutes of Press Conference Held by
Mr. Lester B. Granger," 1 Nov 45. All in 54-1-13,
Forrestal file, GenRecsNav. See also Columbia
University Oral Hist Interv with Granger.]

Granger always related the performance of enlisted men to their
morale. He pointed out to the commanders that poor morale was at the
bottom of the Port Chicago mass mutiny and the Guam riot, and his
report to the secretary confirmed the experiences of the Special
Programs Unit: black performance was deeply affected by the extent to
which Negroes felt victimized by racial discrimination or handicapped
by segregation, especially in housing, messing, and military and
civilian recreational facilities. Although no official policy on
segregated living quarters existed, Granger found such segregation
widely practiced at naval bases in the United States. Separate housing
meant in most cases separate work crews, thereby encouraging voluntary
segregation in mess halls. In some cases the Navy's separate housing
was carried over into nearby civilian communities where no segregation
existed before. In others shore patrols forced segregation on civilian
places of entertainment, even when state laws forbade it. On southern
bases, especially, many commanders willingly abandoned the Navy's ban
against discrimination in favor of the racial practices of local
communities. There enforced segregation was widespread, often made
explicit with "colored" and "white" signs.

Yet Granger found encouraging exceptions which he passed along to
local commanders elsewhere. At Camp Perry, Virginia, for example,
there was a minimum of segregation, and the commanding officer had
intervened to see that Virginia's segregated bus laws did not apply to
Navy buses operating between the camp and Norfolk. This situation was
unusual for the Navy although integrated busing had been standard
practice in the Army since mid-1944. He found Camp Perry "a pleasant
contrast" to other southern installations, and from his experiences
there he concluded that the attitude of the commanding officer set the
pace. "There is practically no limit," Granger said, "to the
progressive changes in racial attitudes and relationships which can be
made when sufficiently enlightened and intelligent officer leadership
is in command." The development of hard and fast rules, he concluded,
was unnecessary, but the Bureau of Naval Personnel must constantly see
to it that commanders resisted the "influence of local conventions."

At Pearl Harbor Granger visited three of the more than two hundred
auxiliary ships manned by mixed crews. On two the conditions were
excellent. The commanding officer in each case had taken special (p. 149)
pains to avoid racial differentiation in ratings, assignments,
quarters, and messes; efficiency was superior, morale was high, and
racial conflict was absent. On the third ship Negroes were separated;
they were specifically assigned to a special bunk section in the
general crew compartment and to one end of the chow table. Here there
was dissatisfaction among Negroes and friction with whites.

At the naval air bases in Hawaii performance and morale were good
because Negroes served in a variety of ratings that corresponded to
their training and ability. The air station in Oahu, for example, had
black radar operators, signalmen, yeomen, machinist mates, and others
working amiably with whites; the only sign of racial separation
visible was the existence of certain barracks, no different from the
others, set aside for Negroes.

Morale was lowest in black base companies and construction battalions.
In several instances able commanding officers had availed themselves
of competent black leaders to improve race relations, but in most
units the racial situation was generally poor. Granger regarded the
organization of the units as "badly conceived from the racial
standpoint." Since base companies were composed almost entirely of
nonrated men, spaces for black petty officers were lacking. In such
units the scaffold of subordinate leadership necessary to support and
uphold the authority of the officers was absent, as were opportunities
for individual advancement. Some units had been provisionally
re-formed into logistic support companies, and newly authorized
ratings were quickly filled. This partial remedy had corrected some
deficiencies, but left unchanged a number of the black base companies
in the Pacific area. Although construction battalions had workers of
both races, Granger reported them to be essentially segregated because
whites were assigned to headquarters or to supervisory posts. Some
officers had carried this arbitrary segregation into off-duty areas,
one commander contending that strict segregation was the civilian
pattern and that everyone was accustomed to it.

The Marine Corps lagged far behind the rest of the naval
establishment, and there was little pretense of conforming with the
Navy's racial policy. Black marines remained rigidly segregated and
none of the few black officer candidates, all apparently well
qualified, had been commissioned. Furthermore, some black marines who
wanted to enlist as regulars were waiting word whether they could be
included in the postwar Marine Corps. Approximately 85 percent of the
black marines in the Pacific area were in depot and ammunition
companies and steward groups. In many cases their assignments failed
to match their qualifications and previous training. Quite a few
specialists complained of having been denied privileges ordinarily
accorded white men of similar status--for example, opportunities to
attend schools for first sergeants, musicians, and radar operators.
Black technicians were frequently sent to segregated and hastily
constructed schools or detached to Army installations for schooling
rather than sent to Marine Corps schools. Conversely, some white
enlisted men, assigned to black units for protracted periods as
instructors, were often accorded the unusual privilege of living in
officers' quarters and eating in the officers' mess in order to
preserve racial segregation.

Most black servicemen, Granger found, resented the white fleet (p. 150)
shore patrols in the Pacific area which they considered biased in
handling disciplinary cases and reporting offenders. The commanding
officer of the shore patrol in Honolulu defended the practice because
he believed the use of Negroes in this duty would be highly dangerous.
Granger disagreed, pointing to the successful employment of black
shore patrols in such fleet liberty cities as San Diego and Miami. He
singled out the situation in Guam, which was patrolled by an all-white
Marine Corps guard regarded by black servicemen as racist in attitude.
Frequently, racial clashes occurred, principally over the attentions
of native women, but it was the concentration of Negroes in the naval
barracks at Guam, Granger concluded, along with the lack of black
shore patrols, that intensified racial isolation, induced a suspicion
of racial policies, and aggravated resentment.

At every naval installation Granger heard vigorous complaints over the
contrast between black and white ratings and promotions. Discrepancies
could be explained partly by the fact that, since the general service
had been opened to Negroes fairly late in the war, many white men had
more than two years seniority over any black. But Granger found
evidence that whites were transferred into units to receive promotions
and ratings due eligible black members. In many cases, he found
"indisputable racial discrimination" by commanding officers, with the
result that training was wasted, trained men were prevented from
acquiring essential experience and its rewards, and resentment
smoldered.

Evidence of overt prejudice aside, Granger stressed again and again
that the primary cause of the Navy's racial problems was segregation.
Segregation was "impractical and inefficient," he pointed out, because
racial isolation bred suspicion, which in turn inflamed resentment,
and finally provoked insubordination. The best way to integrate
Negroes, Granger felt, was to take the most natural course, that is,
eliminate all special provisions, conditions, or cautions regarding
their employment. "There should be no exceptional approach to problems
involving Negroes," he counseled, "for the racial factor in naval
service will disappear only when problems involving Negroes are
accepted as part of the Navy's general program for insuring efficient
performance and first-class discipline."

Despite his earlier insistence on a fair percentage of Negroes in the
postwar Regular Navy, Granger conceded that the number and proportion
would probably decrease during peacetime. It was hardly likely, he
added, that black enlistment would exceed 5 percent of the total
strength, a manageable proportion. He even saw some advantages in
smaller numbers, since, as the educational standards for all enlistees
rose, the integration of relatively few but better qualified Negroes
would "undoubtedly make for greater racial harmony and improved naval
performance."

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