Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

M >> Morris J. MacGregor Jr. >> Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940 1965

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Although the enlistment of black marines began on 1 June 1942, the
corps placed the reservists on inactive status until a training-size
unit could be enlisted and segregated facilities built at Montford
Point on the vast training reservation at Marine Barracks, New River
(later renamed Camp Lejeune), North Carolina.[4-12] On 26 August the
first contingent of Negroes began recruit training as the 51st
Composite Defense Battalion at Montford Point under the command of
Col. Samuel A. Woods, Jr. The corps had wanted to avoid having to
train men as typists, truck drivers, and the like--specialist skills
needed in the black composite unit. Instead, the commandant
established black quotas for three of the four recruiting divisions,
specifying that more than half the recruits qualify in the needed
skills.[4-13]

[Footnote 4-12: Memo, CMC for District Cmdrs, All
Reserve Districts Except 10th, 14th, 15th, and
16th, 25 May 42, sub: Enlistment of Colored
Personnel in the Marine Corps, Historical and
Museum Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
(hereafter Hist Div, HQMC). For further discussion
of the training of black marines and other matters
pertaining to Negroes in the Marine Corps, see Shaw
and Donnelly, _Blacks in the Marine Corps_. This
volume by the corps' chief historian and the former
chief of its history division's reference branch is
the official account.]

[Footnote 4-13: Memo, CMC for Off in Charge, Eastern,
Central, and Southern Recruiting Divs, 15 May 42,
sub: Enlistment of Colored Personnel in the Marine
Corps, AP-54 (1535), MC files. The country was
divided into four recruiting divisions, but black
enlistment was not opened in the west coast
division on the theory that there would be few
volunteers and sending them to North Carolina would
be unjustifiably expensive. Only white marines were
trained in California. This circumstance brought
complaints from civil rights groups. See, for
example, Telg, Walter White to SecNav, 14 Jul 42,
AP-361, MC files.]

[Illustration: MARINES OF THE 51ST DEFENSE BATTALION _await turn on
rifle range, Montford Point, 1942_.]

The enlistment process proved difficult. The commandant reported (p. 102)
that despite predictions of black educators to the contrary the corps
had netted only sixty-three black recruits capable of passing the
entrance examinations during the first three weeks of recruitment.[4-14]
As late as 29 October the Director of Plans and Policies was reporting
that only 647 of the scheduled 1,200 men (the final strength figure
decided upon for the all-black unit) had been enlisted. He blamed the
occupational qualifications for the delay, adding that it was doubtful
"if even white recruits" could be procured under such strictures. The
commandant approved his plan for enlisting Negroes without specific
qualifications and instituting a modified form of specialist training.
Black marines would not be sent to specialist schools "unless there is
a colored school available," but instead Marine instructors would be
sent to teach in the black camp.[4-15] In the end many of these first
black specialists received their training in nearby Army
installations.

[Footnote 4-14: Memo, CMC for SecNav, 23 Jun 42,
AP-54 (1535-110), MC files.]

[Footnote 4-15: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 29 Oct 42, sub: Enlistment of Colored
Personnel in the Marine Corps Reserve, AO-320, MC
files.]

Segregation was the common practice in all the services in 1942, (p. 103)
as indeed it was throughout much of American society. If this practice
appeared somehow more restrictive in the Marine Corps than it did in
the other services, it was because of the corps' size and traditions.
The illusion of equal treatment and opportunity could be kept alive in
the massive Army and Navy with their myriad units and military
occupations; it was much more difficult to preserve in the small and
specialized Marine Corps. Given segregation, the Marine Corps was
obliged to put its few black marines in its few black units, whose
small size limited the variety of occupations and training
opportunities.

Yet the size of the corps would undergo considerable change, and on
balance it was the Marine Corps' tradition of an all-white service,
not its restrictive size, that proved to be the most significant
factor influencing racial policy. Again unlike the Army and Navy, the
Marine Corps lacked the practical experience with black recruits that
might have countered many of the alarums and prejudices concerning
Negroes that circulated within the corps during the war. The
importance of this experience factor comes out in the reminiscences of
a senior official in the Division of Plans and Policies who looked
back on his 1942 experiences:

It just scared us to death when the colored were put on it. I
went over to Selective Service and saw Gen. Hershey, and he
turned me over to a lieutenant colonel [Campbell C.
Johnson]--that was in April--and he was one grand person. I told
him, "Eleanor [Mrs. Roosevelt] says we gotta take in Negroes, and
we are just scared to death, we've never had any in, we don't
know how to handle them, we are afraid of them." He said, "I'll
do my best to help you get good ones. I'll get the word around
that if you want to die young, join the Marines. So anybody that
joins is got to be pretty good!" And it was the truth. We got
some awfully good Negroes.[4-16]

[Footnote 4-16: USMC Oral History Interview, General
Ray A. Robinson (USMC Ret.), 18-19 Mar 68, p. 136,
Hist Div, HQMC.]

Unfortunately for the peace of mind of the Marine Corps' personnel
planner, the conception of a carefully limited and isolated black
contingent was quickly overtaken by events. The President's decision
to abolish volunteer enlistments for the armed forces in December 1942
and the subsequent establishment of a black quota for each component
of the naval establishment meant that in the next year some 15,400
more Negroes, 10 percent of all Marine Corps inductees, would be added
to the corps.[4-17] As it turned out the monthly draft calls were never
completely filled, and by December 1943 only 9,916 of the scheduled
black inductions had been completed, but by the time the corps stopped
drafting men in 1946 it had received over 16,000 Negroes through the
Selective Service. Including the 3,129 black volunteers, the number of
Negroes in the Marine Corps during World War II totaled 19,168,
approximately 4 percent of the corps' enlisted men.

[Footnote 4-17: Memo, CMC for Chief, NavPers, 1 Apr
43, sub: Negro Registrants To Be Inducted Into the
Marine Corps, AO-320-2350-60, MC files.]

The immediate problem of what to do with this sudden influx of Negroes
was complicated by the fact that many of the draftees, the product of
vastly inferior schooling, were incompetent. Where black volunteers
had to pass the corps' rigid entrance requirements, draftees had (p. 104)
only to meet the lowest selective service standards. An exact
breakdown of black Marine Corps draftees by General Classification
Test category is unavailable for the war period. A breakdown of some
15,000 black enlisted men, however, was compiled ten weeks after V-J
day and included many of those drafted during the war. Category I
represents the most gifted men:[4-18]

Category: I II III IV V
Percentage: 0.11 5.14 24.08 59.63 11.04

[Footnote 4-18: Memo, Dir, Pers, for Dir, Div of
Plans and Policies, 21 Jul 48, sub: GCT Percentile
Equivalents for Colored Enlisted Marines in
November 1945 and in March 1948, sub file: Negro
Marines--Test and Testing, Ref Br, Hist Div, HQMC.]

If these figures are used as a base, slightly more than 70 percent of
all black enlisted men, more than 11,000, scored in the two lowest
categories, a meaningless racial statistic in terms of actual numbers
because the smaller percentage of the much larger group of white
draftees in these categories gave the corps more whites than blacks in
groups IV and V. Yet the statistic was important because low-scoring
Negroes, unlike the low-scoring whites who could be scattered
throughout the corps' units, had to be concentrated in a small number
of segregated units to the detriment of those units. Conversely, the
corps had thousands of Negroes with the mental aptitude to serve in
regular combat units and a small but significant number capable of
becoming officers. Yet these men were denied the opportunity to serve
in combat or as officers because the segregation policy dictated that
Negroes could not be assigned to a regular combat unit unless all the
billets in that unit as well as all replacements were black--a
practical impossibility during World War II.

Segregation, not the draft, forced the Marine Corps to devise new jobs
and units to absorb the black inductees. A plan circulated in the
Division of Plans and Policies called for more defense battalions, a
branch for messmen, and the assignment of large black units to local
bases to serve as chauffeurs, messengers, clerks, and janitors.
Referring to the janitor assignment, one division official admitted
that "I don't think we can get away with this type duty."[4-19] In the
end the Negroes were not used as chauffeurs, messengers, clerks, and
janitors. Instead the corps placed a "maximum practical number" in
defense battalions. The number of these units, however, was limited,
as Maj. Gen. Harry Schmidt, the acting commandant, explained in March
1943, by the number of black noncommissioned officers available. Black
noncommissioned officers were necessary, he continued, because in the
Army's experience "in nearly all cases to intermingle colored and
white enlisted personnel in the same organization" led to "trouble and
disorder."[4-20] Demonstrating his own and the Marine Corps' lack of
experience with black troops, the acting commandant went on to provide
his commanders with some rather dubious advice based on what he
perceived as the Army's experience: black units should be commanded by
men "who thoroughly knew their [Negroes'] individual and racial (p. 105)
characteristics and temperaments," and Negroes should be assigned to
work they preferred.

[Footnote 4-19: Unsigned Memo for Dir, Plans and
Policies Div, 26 Dec 42, sub: Colored Personnel,
with attached handwritten note, AO-320, MC files.]

[Footnote 4-20: Ltr, Actg CMC to Major Cmdrs, 20 Mar
43, sub: Colored Personnel, AP-361, MC files.]

[Illustration: SHORE PARTY IN TRAINING, CAMP LEJEUNE, 1942.]

The points emphasized in General Schmidt's letter to Marine
commanders--a rigid insistence on racial separation and a willingness
to work for equal treatment of black troops--along with an
acknowledgement of the Marine Corps' lack of experience with racial
problems were reflected in Commandant Holcomb's basic instruction on
the subject of Negroes two months later: "All Marines are entitled to
the same rights and privileges under Navy Regulations," and black
marines could be expected "to conduct themselves with propriety and
become a credit to the Marine Corps." General Holcomb was aware of the
adverse effect of white noncommissioned officers on black morale, and
he wanted them removed from black units as soon as possible. Since the
employment of black marines was in itself a "new departure," he wanted
to be informed periodically on how Negroes adapted to Marine Corps
life, what their off-duty experience was with recreational facilities,
and what their attitude was toward other marines.[4-21]

[Footnote 4-21: Ltr of Instruction No. 421, CMC to
All CO's, 14 May 43, sub: Colored Personnel, MC
files.]

[Illustration: D-DAY ON PELELIU. _Support troops participate in the
landing of 1st Marine Division._]

These were generally progressive sentiments, evidence of the
commandant's desire to provide for the peaceful assimilation and
advancement of Negroes in the corps. Unfortunately for his reputation
among the civil rights advocates, General Holcomb seemed overly
concerned with certain social implications of rank and color. (p. 106)
Undeterred by a lack of personal experience with interracial command,
he was led in the name of racial harmony to an unpopular conclusion.
"It is essential," he told his commanders, "that in no case shall
there be colored noncommissioned officers senior to white men in the
same unit, and desirable that few, if any be of the same rank."[4-22]
He was particularly concerned with the period when white instructors
and noncommissioned officers were being phased out of black units. He
wanted Negroes up for promotion to corporal transferred, before
promotion, out of any unit that contained white corporals.

[Footnote 4-22: Ibid. The subject of widespread
public complaint when its existence became known
after the war, the instruction was rescinded. See
Memo, J. A. Stuart, Div of Plans and Policies, for
CMC, 14 Feb 46, sub: Ltr of Inst #421 Revocation
of, AO-1, copy in Ref Br, Hist Div, HQMC.]

[Illustration: MEDICAL ATTENDANTS AT REST, PELELIU, OCTOBER, 1944.]

The Division of Plans and Policies tried to follow these strictures as
it set about organizing the new black units. Job preference had
already figured in the organization of the new Messman's Branch
established in January 1943. At that time Secretary Knox had approved
the reconstitution of the corps' all-white Mess Branch as the
Commissary Branch and the organization of an all-black Messman's
Branch along the lines of the Navy's Steward's Branch.[4-23] In (p. 107)
authorizing the new branch, which was quickly redesignated the
Steward's Branch to conform to the Navy model, Secretary Knox
specified that the members must volunteer for such duty. Yet the
corps, under pressure to produce large numbers of stewards in the
early months of the war, showed so little faith in the volunteer
system that Marine recruiters were urged to induce half of all black
recruits to sign on as stewards.[4-24] Original plans called for the
assignment of one steward for every six officers, but the lack of
volunteers and the needs of the corps quickly caused this estimate to
be scaled down.[4-25] By 5 July 1944 the Steward's Branch numbered (p. 108)
1,442 men, roughly 14 percent of the total black strength of the
Marine Corps.[4-26] It remained approximately this size for the rest
of the war.

[Footnote 4-23: Memo, CMC for SecNav, 30 Dec 42, sub:
Change of Present Mess Branch in the Marine Corps
to Commissary Branch and Establishment of a
Messman's Branch and Ranks Therein, with SecNav
approval indicated, AO-363-311. See also Memo, CMC
for Chief, NavPers, 30 Dec 42, sub: Request for
Allotment to MC..., A-363; Memo, Dir, Div of Plans
and Policies, for CMC, 23 Nov 42, sub: Organization
of Mess Branch (Colored), AO-283. All in MC files.]

[Footnote 4-24: Memo, Dir of Recruiting for Off in
Charge, Eastern Recruiting Div et al., 25 Feb 42,
sub: Messman Branch, AP-361-1390; Memo, CMC for
SecNav, 3 Apr 43, sub: Change in Designation...,
AO-340-1930. Both in MC files.]

[Footnote 4-25: Memo, Dir, Plans and Policies, for
CMC, 18 May 43, sub: Assignment of Steward's Branch
Personnel, AO-371, MC files.]

[Footnote 4-26: Memo, H. E. Dunkelberger, M-1 Sec,
Div of Plans and Policies, for Asst CMC, 5 Jul 44,
sub: Steward's Branch Personnel, AO-660, MC files.]

The admonition to employ black marines to the maximum extent practical
in defense battalions was based on the mobilization planners' belief
that each of these battalions, with its varied artillery, infantry,
and armor units, would provide close to a thousand black marines with
varied assignments in a self-contained, segregated unit. But the
realities of the Pacific war and the draft quickly rendered these
plans obsolete. As the United States gained the ascendancy, the need
for defense battalions rapidly declined, just as the need for special
logistical units to move supplies in the forward areas increased. The
corps had originally depended on its replacement battalions to move
the mountains of supply involved in amphibious assaults, but the
constant flow of replacements to battlefield units and the need for
men with special logistical skill had led in the middle of the war to
the organization of pioneer battalions. To supplement the work of
these shore party units and to absorb the rapidly growing number of
black draftees, the Division of Plans and Policies eventually created
fifty-one separate depot companies and twelve separate ammunition
companies manned by Negroes. The majority of these new units served in
base and service depots, handling ammunition and hauling supplies, but
a significant number of them also served as part of the shore parties
attached to the divisional assault units. These units often worked
under enemy fire and on occasion joined in the battle as they moved
supplies, evacuated the wounded, and secured the operation's supply
dumps.[4-27] Nearly 8,000 men, about 40 percent of the corps' black
enlistment, served in this sometimes hazardous combat support duty.
The experience of these depot and ammunition companies provided the
Marine Corps with an interesting irony. In contrast to Negroes in the
other services, black marines trained for combat were never so used.
Those trained for the humdrum labor tasks, however, found themselves
in the thick of the fighting on Saipan, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and
elsewhere, suffering combat casualties and winning combat citations
for their units.

[Footnote 4-27: Shaw and Donnelly, _Blacks in the
Marine Corps_, pp. 29-46. See also, HQMC Div of
Public Information, "The Negro Marine, 1942-1945,"
Ref Br, Hist Div, HQMC.]

The increased allotment of black troops entering the corps and the
commandant's call for replacing all white noncommissioned officers
with blacks as quickly as they could be sufficiently trained caused
problems for the black combat units. The 51st Defense Battalion in
particular suffered many vicissitudes in its training and deployment.
The 51st was the first black unit in the Marine Corps, a doubtful
advantage considering the frequent reorganization and rapid troop
turnover that proved its lot. At first the reception and training of
all black inductees fell to the battalion, but in March 1943 a
separate Headquarters Company, Recruit Depot Battalion, was organized
at Montford Point.[4-28] Its cadre was drawn from the 51st, as (p. 109)
were the noncommissioned officers and key personnel of the newly
organized ammunition and depot companies and the black security
detachments organized at Montford Point and assigned to the Naval
Ammunition Depot, McAlester, Oklahoma, and the Philadelphia Depot of
Supplies.

[Footnote 4-28: Memo, CO, 51st Def Bn, for Dir, Plans
and Policies, 29 Jan 43, sub: Colored Personnel,
Ref Br, Hist Div, HQMC.]

In effect, the 51st served as a specialist training school for the
black combat units. When the second black defense battalion, the 52d,
was organized in December 1943 its cadre, too, was drawn from the
51st. By the time the 51st was actually deployed, it had been
reorganized several times and many of its best men had been siphoned
off as leaders for new units. To compound these losses of experienced
men, the battalion was constantly receiving large influxes of
inexperienced and educationally deficient draftees and sometimes there
was infighting among its officers.[4-29]

[Footnote 4-29: For charges and countercharges on the
part of the 51st's commanders, see Hq, 51st Defense
Bn, "Record of Proceedings of an Investigation," 27
Jun 44; Memo, Lt Col Floyd A. Stephenson for CMC,
30 May 44, sub: Fifty-First Defense Battalion,
Fleet Marine Force, with indorsements and
attachments; Memo, CO, 51st Def Bn, for CMC, 20 Jul
44, sub: Combat Efficiency, Fifty-First Defense
Battalion. All in Ref Br, Hist Div, HQMC.]

Training for black units only emphasized the rigid segregation
enforced in the Marine Corps. After their segregated eight-week
recruit training, the men were formed into companies at Montford
Point; those assigned to the defense battalions were sent for
specialist training in the weapons and equipment employed in such
units, including radar, motor transport, communications, and artillery
fire direction. Each of the ammunition companies sent sixty of its men
to special ammunition and camouflage schools where they would be
promoted to corporal when they completed the course. In contrast to
the depot companies and elements of the defense battalions, the
ammunition units would have white staff sergeants as ordnance
specialists throughout the war. This exception to the rule of black
noncommissioned officers for black units was later justified on the
grounds that such units required experienced supervisors to emphasize
and enforce safety regulations.[4-30] On the whole specialist training
was segregated; whenever possible even the white instructors were
rapidly replaced by blacks.

[Footnote 4-30: Shaw and Donnelly, _Blacks in the
Marine Corps_, p. 31.]

Before being sent overseas, black units underwent segregated field
training, although the length of this training varied considerably
according to the type of unit. Depot companies, for example, were
labor units pure and simple, organized to perform simple tasks, and
many of them were sent to the Pacific less than two weeks after
activation. In contrast, the 51st Defense Battalion spent two months
in hard field training, scarcely enough considering the number of raw
recruits, totally unfamiliar with gunnery, that were being fed
regularly into what was essentially an artillery battalion.

[Illustration: GUN CREW OF THE 52D DEFENSE BATTALION _on duty, Central
Pacific, 1945_.]

The experience of the two defense battalions demonstrates that racial
consideration governed their eventual deployment just as it had
decided their organization. With no further strategic need for defense
battalions, the Marine Corps began to dismantle them in 1944, just as
the two black units became operational and were about to be sent to
the Central and South Pacific. The eighteen white defense (p. 110)
battalions were subsequently reorganized as antiaircraft artillery
battalions for use with amphibious groups in the forward areas. While
the two black units were similarly reorganized, only they and one of
the white units retained the title of defense battalion. Their
deployment was also different. The policy of self-contained,
segregated service was, in the case of a large combat unit, best
followed in the rear areas, and the two black battalions were assigned
to routine garrison duties in the backwaters of the theater, the 51st
at Eniwetok in the Marshalls, the 52d at Guam. The latter unit saw
nearly half its combat-trained men detailed to work as stevedores. It
was not surprising that the morale in both units suffered.[4-31]

[Footnote 4-31: For a discussion of black morale in
the combat-trained units, see USMC Oral History
Interview, Obie Hall, 16 Aug 72, Ref Br, and John
H. Griffin, "My Life in the Marine Corps," Personal
Papers Collection, Museums Br. Both in Hist Div,
HQMC.]

Even more explicitly racial was the warning of a senior combat
commander to the effect that the deployment of black depot units to
the Polynesian areas of the Pacific should be avoided. The Polynesians,
he explained, were delightful people, and their "primitively romantic"
women shared their intimate favors with one and all. Mixture with the
white race had produced "a very high-class half-caste," mixture with
the Chinese a "very desirable type," but the union of black and
"Melanesian types ... produces a very undesirable citizen." The (p. 111)
Marine Corps, Maj. Gen. Charles F. B. Price continued, had a special
moral obligation and a selfish interest in protecting the population
of American Samoa, especially, from intimacy with Negroes; he strongly
urged therefore that any black units deployed to the Pacific should be
sent to Micronesia where they "can do no racial harm."[4-32]