The Complete Prose Works of Martin Farquhar Tupper

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5. It is impossible to elude the discussion of topics, which in their
direct tendencies, or remoter inferences, may, to the author at least,
prove dangerous or disputable ground. If a "great door and effectual" is
opened to him, doubtless he will raise or meet with many adversaries.
Besides mere haters of his creed, despisers of his arguments, and
protestors, loud and fierce against his errors; he may possibly fall
foul of divers unintended heresies; he may stumble unwittingly on the
relics of exploded schisms; he may exhume controversies in metaphysical
or scholastical polemics, long and worthily extinct. If this be so, he
can only plead, _Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa_. But it is
open to him also to protest against the common critical folly of making
an offender for a word: of driving analogies on all four feet, and
straining thoughts beyond their due proportions. Above all, never let a
reader stir one inch beyond, far less against, his own judgment: if
there seem to be sufficient reasons, well: if otherwise, let me walk
uncompanied. The first step especially is felt to be a very difficult
one; perhaps very debatable: for aught I know, it may be merely a vain
insect caught in the cobweb of metaphysics, soon to be destroyed, and
easily to be discussed at leisure by some Aranean logician. However, it
seemed to my midnight musings a probable mode of arriving at truth,
though somewhat unsatisfactorily told from poverty of thought and
language. Moreover, it would have been, in such _a priori_ argument,
ridiculous to have commenced by announcing a posterior conclusion: for
this cause did I do my humble best to work it out anew: and however
supererogatory it may seem at first sight to the majority of readers,
those keener minds whom I mainly address, and whose interests I wish to
serve, will recognise the attempt as at least consistent: and will be
ready to admit that if the arduous effort prove anteriorly a First Great
Cause, and His attributes, be futile (which, however, I do not admit),
it was an attempt unneeded on the score of its own merits; albeit, with
an obvious somewhat of justice, pure reason may desire to begin at the
beginning. No one, who thinks at all upon religion, however
misbelieving, can entertain any mental prejudice against the existence
of a Deity, or against the received character of His attributes. Such a
man would be merely in a savage state, irrational: whilst his own mind,
so speculating, would stand itself proof positive of an Intellectual
Father; either immediately, as in the first man's case, or mediately, as
in our own, it must have sprung out of that Being, who is emphatically
the Good One--God. But if, as is possible, a mind, capable of thinking,
and keen to think on other themes, from any cause, educational or moral,
has neglected this great track of mediation, has "forgotten God," and
"had him _not_ in all his thoughts," such an one I invite to walk with
me; and, in spite of all incompleteness and insufficiency, uncaptious of
much that may haply be fanciful or false, briefly and in outline to test
with me sundry probabilities of the Christian scheme, considered
antecedently to its elucidation.

A GOD: AND HIS ATTRIBUTES.

I will commence with a noble, and, as I believe, an inspired sentence:
than which no truth uttered by philosophers ever was more clearly or
more sublimely expressed. "In the beginning was the Word: and the Word
was with God; and the Word was God." In its due course, we will consider
especially the difference between the Word and God; likewise the seeming
contradiction, but true concord, of being simultaneously God, and with
God. At present, and previously to the true commencement of our _a
priori_ thoughts, let us, by a word or two, paraphrase that brief but
comprehensive sentence, "In the beginning was the Word." Eternity has no
beginning, as it has no end: the clock of Time is futile there: it
might as well attempt to go in vacuo. Nevertheless, in respect to
finite intelligences like ourselves, seeing that eternity is an idea
totally inconceivable, it is wise, nay it is only possible, to be
presented to the mind piecemeal. Even our deepest mathematicians do not
scruple to speak of points "infinitely remote;" as if in that phrase
there existed no contradiction of terms. So, also, we pretend in our
emptiness to talk of eternity past, time present, and eternity to come;
the fact being that, muse as a man may, he can entertain no idea of an
existence which is not measurable by time: any more than he can conceive
of a colour unconnected with the rainbow, or of a musical note beyond
the seven sounds. The plain intention of the words is this: place the
starting-post of human thought as far back into eternity as you will, be
it what man counts a thousand ages, or ten thousand times ten thousand,
or be these myriads multiplied again by millions, still, in any such
Beginning, and in the beginning of all beginnings (for so must creatures
talk)--then was God. He Was: the scholar knows full well the force of
the original term, the philological distinctions between [Greek: eimi]
and [Greek: gignomai]: well pleased, he reads as of the Divinity [Greek:
en], He self-existed; and equally well pleased he reads of the humanity
[Greek: egennethe], he was born. The thought and phrase [Greek: en]
sympathizes, if it has not an identity, with the Hebrew's unutterable
Name. HE then, whose title, amongst all others likewise denoting
excellence supreme and glory underivative, is essentially "I am;" HE
who, relatively to us as to all creation else, has a new name wisely
chosen in "the Word,"--the great expression of the idea of God; this
mighty Intelligence is found in any such beginning self-existent. That
teaching is a mere fact, known posteriorly from the proof of all things
created, as well as by many wonderful signs, and the clear voice of
revelation. We do not attempt to prove it; that were easy and obvious:
but our more difficult endeavour at present is to show how antecedently
probable it was that God should be: and that so being, He should be
invested with the reasonable attributes, wherewithal we know His
glorious Nature to be clothed.

Take then our beginning where we will, there must have existed in that
"originally" either Something, or Nothing. It is a clear matter to
prove, _a posteriori_, that Something did exist; because something
exists now: every matter and every derived spirit must have had a
Father; _ex nihilo nihil fit_, is not more a truth, than that creation
must have had a Creator. However, leaving this plain path (which I only
point at by the way for obvious mental uses), let us now try to get at
the great antecedent probability that in the beginning Something should
have been, rather than Nothing.

The term, Nothing, is a fallacious one: it does not denote an existence,
as Something does, but the end of an existence. It is in fact a
negation, which must presuppose a matter once in being and possible to
be denied; it is an abstraction, which cannot happen unless there be
somewhat to be taken away; the idea of vacuity must be posterior to that
of fullness; the idea of no tree is incompetent to be conceived without
the previous idea of _a_ tree; the idea of nonentity suggests, _ex vi
termini_, a pre-existent entity; the idea of Nothing, of necessity,
presupposes Something. And a Something once having been, it would still
and for ever continue to be, unless sufficient cause be found for its
removal; that cause itself, you will observe, being a Something. The
chances are forcibly in favour of continuance, that is of perpetuity;
and the likelihoods proclaim loudly that there should be an Existence.
It was thus, then, antecedently more probable, than in any imaginable
beginning from which reason can start, Something should be found
existent, rather than Nothing. This is the first probability.

Next; of what nature and extent is this Something, this Being, likely to
be?--There will be either one such being, or many: if many, the many
either sprang from the one, or the mass are all self-existent; in the
former case, there would be a creation and a God: in the latter, there
would be many Gods. Is the latter antecedently more probable?--let us
see. First, it is evident that if many are probable, few are more
probable, and one most probable of all. The more possible gods you take
away, the more do impediments diminish; until, that is to say, you
arrive at that One Being, whom we have already proved probable.
Moreover, many must be absolutely united as one; in which case the many
is a gratuitous difficulty, because they may as well be regarded for all
purposes of worship or argument as one God: or the many must have been
in essence more or less disunited; in which case, as a state of any
thing short of pure concord carries in itself the seeds of dissolution,
needs must that one or other of the many (long before any possible
beginnings, as we count beginnings, looking down the past vista of
eternity), would have taken opportunity by such disturbing causes to
become absolute monarch: whether by peaceful persuasion, or hostile
compulsion, or other mode of absorbing disunions, would be indifferent;
if they were not all improbable, as unworthy of the God. Perpetuity of
discord is a thing impossible; every thing short of unity tends to
decomposition. Any how then, given the element of eternity to work in,
a one great Supreme Being was, in the created beginning, an _a priori_
probability. That all other assumptions than that of His true and
eternal Oneness are as false in themselves as they are derogatory to the
rational views of deity, we all now see and believe; but the direct
proofs of this are more strictly matters of revelation than of reason:
albeit reason too can discern their probabilities. Wise heathens, such
as Socrates and Cicero, who had not our light, arrived nevertheless at
some of this perception; and thus, through conscience and intelligence,
became a law unto themselves: because that, to them, as now to any one
of us who may not yet have seen the light, the anterior likelihood
existed for only one God, rather than more; a likelihood which prepares
the mind to take as a fundamental truth, "The Lord our God is one
Jehovah."

Next; Self-existence combined with unity must include the probable
attribute, or character, Ubiquity; as I now proceed to show. On the same
principle as that by which we have seen Something to be likelier than
Nothing, we conclude that the same Something is more probable to be
every where, than the same Nothing (if the phrase were not absurd), to
be any where: we may, so to speak, divide infinity into spaces, and
prove the position in each instance: moreover, as that Something is
essentially--not a unit as of many, but--unity involving all, it follows
as most probable that this Whole Being should be ubiquitous; in other
parlance, that the one God should be every where at once: also, there
being no limit to what we call Space, nor any imaginable hostile power
to place a constraint upon the One Great Being, this Whole Being must be
ubiquitous to a degree strictly infinite: "HE is in every place,
beholding the evil and the good."

Such a consideration (and it is a perfectly true one) renders necessary
the next point, to wit, that God is a Spirit. No possible substance can
be every where at once: essence may, but not substance. Corporeity in
any shape must be local; local is finite; and we have just proved the
anterior probability of a One great Existence being (notwithstanding
unity of essence) infinite. Illocal and infinite are convertible terms:
spirit is illocal; and, as God is infinite--that is, illocal--it is
clear that "God is a Spirit."

We have thus (not attempting to build up faith by such slight tools, but
only using them to cut away prejudice) arrived at the high probability
of a God invested with His natural qualities or attributes;
Self-existence, Unity, the faculty of being every where at once and that
every where Infinitude; and essentially of a Spiritual nature, not
material. His moral, or accidental attributes (so to speak), were,
antecedently to their expression, equally easy of being proved
probable. First, with respect to Power: given no disturbing cause--(we
shall soon consider the question of permitted evil, and its origin; but
this, however disturbing to creatures, will be found not only none to
God, but, as it were, only a ray of His glory suffered to be broken for
prismatic beauty's sake, a flash of the direction of His energies
suffered to be diverted for the superior triumph of good in that day
when it shall be shown that "God hath made all things for himself, yea,
even the wicked for the time of visitation")--with the _datum_ then of
no disturbing cause obstructing or opposing, an infinite being must be
able to do all things within the sphere of such infinity: in other
phrase, He must be all-powerful. Just so, an impetus in vacuity suffers
no check, but ever sails along among the fleet of worlds; and the innate
Impulse of the Deity must expand and energize throughout that
infinitude, Himself. For a like reason of ubiquity, God must know all
things: it is impossible to escape from the strong likelihood that any
intelligent being must be conversant of what is going on under his very
eye. Again; in the case both of Power and Knowledge, alike with the
coming attributes of Goodness and Wisdom--(wisdom considered as morally
distinct from mere knowledge or awaredness; it being quite possible to
conceive a cold eye seeing all things heedlessly, and a clear mind
knowing all things heartlessly)--in the case, I say, of all these
accidental attributes, there recurs for argument, one analogous to that
by which we showed the anterior probability of a self-existence. Things
positive must precede things negative. Sight must have been, before
blindness is possible; and before we can arrive at a just idea of no
sight. Power must be precursor to an abstraction from power, or
weakness. The minor-existence of ignorance is an impossibility, unless
you preallow the major-existence of wisdom; for it amounts to a debasing
or a diminution of wisdom. Sin is well defined to be, the transgression
of law; for without law, there can be no sin. So, also, without wisdom,
there can be no ignorance; without power, there can be no weakness;
without goodness, there can be no evil.

Furthermore. An affirmative--such as wisdom, power, goodness--can exist
absolutely; it is in the nature of a Something: but a negative--such as
ignorance, weakness, evil--can only exist relatively; and it would,
indeed, be a Nothing, were it not for the previous and now simultaneous
existence of its wiser, stronger, and better origin. Abstract evil is as
demonstrably an impossibility as abstract ignorance, or abstract
weakness. If evil could have self-existed, it would in the moment of its
eternal birth have demolished itself. Virtue's intrinsic concord tends
to perpetual being: vice's innate discord struggles always with a force
towards dissolution. Goodness, wisdom, power have existences, and have
had existences from all eternity, though gulphed within the Godhead; and
that, whether evidenced in act or not: but their corruptions have had no
such original existence, but are only the same entities perverted. Love
would be love still, though there were no existent object for its
exercise: Beauty would be beauty still, though there were no created
thing to illustrate its fairness: Power would be power still, though
there be no foe to combat, no difficulty to be overcome. Hatred,
ill-favour, weakness, are only perversions or diminutions of these.
Power exists independently of muscles or swords or screws or levers;
love, independently of kind thoughts, words, and actions; beauty,
independently of colours, shapes, and adaptations. Just so is Wisdom
philosophically spoken of by a truly royal and noble author:

"I, wisdom, dwell with prudence, and find out the knowledge of clever
inventions. Counsel is mine, and sound wisdom; I am understanding; I
have strength. The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before
his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or
ever the earth was. When there were no depths, I was brought forth;
before the mountains were fixed, or the hills were made. When He
prepared the heavens, I was there; when he set a compass upon the face
of the depth; when he established the clouds above; when he strengthened
the foundations of the deep: Then was I by him, as one brought up with
him: and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him; rejoicing
in the habitable parts of his earth; and my delights were with the sons
of men."

King Solomon well knew of Whom he wrote thus nobly. Eternal wisdom,
power, and goodness, all prospectively thus yearning upon man, and
incorporate in One, whose name, among his many names, is Wisdom. Wisdom,
as a quality, existed with God; and, constituting full pervasion of his
essence, was God.

But to return, and bind to a conclusion our ravelled thoughts. As,
originally, the self-existent being, unbounded, all-knowing, might take
up, so to speak, if He willed, these eternal affirmative excellences of
wisdom, power, and goodness; and as these, to every rational
apprehension, are highly worthy of his choice, whereas their derivative
and inferior corruptions would have been most derogatory to any
reasonable estimate of His character; how much more likely was it that
He should prefer the higher rather than the lower, should take the
affirmative before the negative, should "choose the good, and refuse the
evil,"--than endure to be endowed with such garbled, demoralizing,
finite attributes as those wherewith the heathen painted the Pantheon.
What high antecedent probability was there, that if a God should be (and
this we have proved highly probable too)--He should be One, ubiquitous,
self-existent, spiritual: that He should be all-mighty, all-wise, and
all-good?

THE TRIUNITY.

Another deep and inscrutable topic is now to engage our thoughts--the
mystery of a probable Triunity. While we touch on such high themes, the
Christian's presumption ever is, that he himself approaches them with
reverence and prayer; and that, in the case of an unbeliever, any such
mind will be courteous enough to his friendly opponent, and wise enough
respecting his own interest and safety lest these things be true, to
enter upon all such subjects with the seriousness befitting their
importance, and with the restraining thought that in fact they may be
sacred.

Let us then consider, antecedently to all experience, with what sort of
deity pure reason would have been satisfied. It has already arrived at
Unity, and the foregoing attributes. But what kind of Unity is probable?
Unity of Person, or unity of Essence? A sterile solitariness, easily
understandable, and presumably incommunicative? or an absolute oneness,
which yet relatively involves several mysterious phases of its own
expansive love? Will you think it a foregone conclusion, if I assert the
superior likelihoods of the latter, and not of the former? Let us come
then to a few of many reasons. First: it was by no means probable to be
supposed anteriorly, that the God should be clearly comprehensible: yet
he must be one: and oneness is the idea most easily apprehended of all
possible ideas. The meanest of intellectual creatures could comprehend
his Maker, and in so far top his heights, if God, being truly one in one
view, were yet only one in every view: if, that is to say, there existed
no mystery incidental to his nature: nay, if that mystery did not
amount to the difficulty of a seeming contradiction. I judge it likely,
and with confidence, that Reason would prerequire for his God, a Being,
at once infinitely easy to be apprehended by the lowest of His spiritual
children, and infinitely difficult to be comprehended by the highest of
His seraphim. Now, there can be guessed only two ways of compassing such
a prerequirement: one, a moral way; such as inventing a deity who could
be at once just and unjust, every where and no where, good and evil,
powerful and weak; this is the heathen phase of Numen's character, and
is obviously most objectionable in every point of view: the other would
be a physical way; such as requiring a God who should be at once
material and immaterial, abstraction and concretion; or, for a still
more confounding paradox to Reason (considered as antagonist to Faith,
in lieu of being strictly its ally), an arithmetical contradiction, an
algebraic mystery, such as would be included in the idea of Composite
Unity; one involving many, and many collapsed into one. Some such enigma
was probable in Reason's guess at the nature of his God. It is the
Christian way; and one entirely unobjectionable: because it is the only
insuperable difficulty as to His Nature which does not debase the notion
of Divinity. But there are also other considerations.

For, secondly. The self-existent One is endowed, as we found probable,
with abundant loving-kindness, goodness overflowing and perpetual. Is it
reasonable to conceive that such a character could for a moment be
satisfied with absolute solitariness? that infinite benevolence should,
in any possible beginning, be discovered existent in a sort of selfish
only-oneness? Such a supposition is, to the eye of even unenlightened
Reason, so clearly a _reductio ad absurdum_, that men in all countries
and ages have been driven to invent a plurality of Gods, for very
society sake: and I know not but that they are anteriorly wiser and more
rational than the man who believes in a Benevolent Existence eternally
one, and no otherwise than one. Let me not be mistaken to imply that
there was any likelihood of many coeexistent gods: that was a reasonable
improbability, as we have already seen, perhaps a spiritual
impossibility: but the anterior likelihood of which I speak goes to
show, that in One God there should be more than one coeexistence: each,
by arithmetical mystery, but not absurdity, pervading all, coeequals,
each being God, and yet not three Gods, but one God. That there should
be a rational difficulty here--or, rather, an irrational one--I have
shown to be Reason's prerequirement: and if such a one as I, or any
other creature, could now and here (ay, or any when or any where, in
the heights of highest heaven, and the far-stretching distance of
eternity) solve such intrinsic difficulty, it would demonstrably be one
not worthy of its source, the wise design of God: it would prove that
riddle read, which uncreate omniscience propounded for the baffling of
the creature mind. No. It is far more reasonable, as well as far more
reverent, to acquiesce in Mystery, as another attribute inseparable from
the nature of the Godhead; than to quibble about numerical puzzles, and
indulge unwisely in objections which it is the happy state of nobler
intelligences than man on earth is, to look into with desire, and to
exercise withal their keen and lofty minds.

But we have not yet done. Some further thoughts remain to be thrown out
in the third place, as to the preconceivable fitness or propriety of
that Holy Union, which we call the trinity of Persons who constitute the
Self-existent One. If God, being one in one sense, is yet likely to
appear, humanly speaking, more than one in another sense; we have to
inquire anteriorly of the probable nature of such other intimate Being
or Beings: as also, whether such addition to essential oneness is likely
itself to be more than one or only one. As to the former of these
questions: if, according to the presumption of reason (and according
also to what we have since learned from revelation; but there may be
good policy in not dotting this book with chapter and verse)--if the
Deity thus loved to multiply Himself; then He, to whom there can exist
no beginning, must have so loved, so determined, and so done from all
eternity. Now, any conceivable creation, however originated, must have
had a beginning, place it as far back as you will. In any succession of
numbers, however infinitely they may stretch, the commencement at least
is a fixed point, one. But, this multiplication of

Deity, this complex simplicity, this intricate easiness, this obvious
paradox, this sub-division and con-addition of a One, must have taken
place, so soon as ever eternal benevolence found itself alone; that is,
in eternity, and not in any imaginable time. So then, the Being or
Beings would probably not have been creative, but of the essence of
Deity. Take also for an additional argument, that it is an idea which
detracts from every just estimate of the infinite and all-wise God to
suppose He should take creatures into his eternal counsels, or consort,
so to speak, familiarly with other than the united sub-divisions,
persons, and coeequals of Himself. It was reasonable to prejudge that the
everlasting companions of Benevolent God, should also be God. And thus,
it appears antecedently probable that (what from the poverty of
language we must call) the multiplication of the one God should not have
been created beings; that is, should have been divine; a term, which
includes, as of right, the attribution to each such Holy Person, of all
the wondrous characteristics of the Godhead.