Memoir of the Life of John Quincy Adams.

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Each of these candidates possessed great personal and local popularity,
spirit and power adapted to success, and adherents watchful and
efficient. To cope with all these rival influences, Mr. Adams had
talents, integrity, fidelity to his country, and devotion to the
fulfilment of official duty, in which he had no superior. Having been
absent eight years in foreign countries in public service, he had no
Southern or Western current in his favor; and that which set from the
North, though generally favorable, being divided, was comparatively
feeble, and rather acquiescent in his elevation than active in promoting
it.

On his appointment as Secretary of State, Mr. Adams remarked: "Whether
it is for my own good is known only to God. As yet I have far more
reason to lament than rejoice at the event; yet I feel not less my
obligation to Mr. Monroe for his confidence in me, and the duty of
personal devotion to the success of his administration which it
imposes." Before the lapse of a year that administration was assailed
in Congress and in the newspapers, and the attacks were concentrated
on Mr. Adams. The calumnies by which his father's administration had
been prostrated five-and-twenty years before were revived, and poured
out with renewed malignity. Duane, in his _Aurora_, published in
Philadelphia, and his coaedjutors in other parts of the Union,
represented him as "a royalist," "an enemy to the rights of man;" as
a "friend of oligarchy;" as a "misanthrope, educated in contempt of
his fellow-men;" as "unfit to be the minister of a free and virtuous
people." Privately, and through the press, Mr. Monroe was warned that
he "was full of duplicity;" "an incubus on his prospects for the next
presidency, and on his popularity." When these calumnies were uttered,
as some of them were, in the House of Representatives, they naturally
excited the indignation of Mr. Adams, and the anxiety of his friends.
Being asked by one of them whether it would not be advisable to expose
the conduct and motives of rival statesmen, in the newspapers, he
answered explicitly in the negative, saying: "The execution of my
duties is the only answer I can give to censure. I will do absolutely
nothing to promote any pretensions my friends may think I have to the
presidency." On being told that his rivals would not be so scrupulous,
and that he would not stand on an equal footing with them, he replied:
"That is not my fault. My business is to serve the public to the best
of my abilities in the station assigned to me, and not to intrigue for
my own advancement. I never, by the most distant hint to any one,
expressed a wish for any public office, and I shall not now begin to
ask for that which, of all others, ought to be most freely and
spontaneously bestowed."

Among the difficulties incident to the office of Secretary of State,
that of making appointments was the most annoying and thankless. They
were sought with a bold and rabid pertinacity. Success was attributed to
the favor of the President; ill success, to the influence of the
Secretary. When the applicant was a relative his patronage was naturally
expected; but, with every expression of good-will, he avoided all
recommendation in such cases, saying that such claims must be presented
through other channels.

The attention of the government was early drawn to the proceedings of
the Seminole Indians, who had commenced hostilities with circumstances
of great barbarity. Orders were sent to General Jackson to repair to the
seat of war with such troops as he could collect, and the Georgia
militia, and to reduce the Indians by force, pursuing them into Florida,
if they should retreat for refuge there.

About this time the republic of Buenos Ayres sent an agent urging an
acknowledgment of their independence. Their claim was in unison with the
popular feeling in the South; but elsewhere throughout the nation public
opinion was divided, as were also the members of the President's
cabinet. Mr. Adams declared himself against such recognition, as it
would interfere with a negotiation with Spain for the purchase of the
Floridas. He urged, also, that McGregor, the adventurer, who, under a
pretence of authority from Buenos Ayres, had taken possession of Amelia
Island, should be compelled to withdraw his troops by a naval force sent
for that purpose. On this measure, also, both the nation and the cabinet
were divided. Mr. Clay, in the House of Representatives, took ground in
opposition to the policy of the administration, avowing openly his
intention of bringing forward a motion in favor of recognizing the
independence of Buenos Ayres. To control or overthrow the executive by
the weight of the House of Representatives, was apparently his object.[1]

[1] A committee appointed by the House of Representatives, on
McGregor's possession of Amelia Island, waited on Mr. Adams, and
inquired concerning the proposed proceedings of the executive,
and his powers in that respect. Mr. Adams took occasion to state
and explain to them the effects of "the _secret laws_, as they
were called, and which," he said, "were singular anomalies of our
system, having grown out of that error in our constitution which
confers upon the legislative assemblies the power of declaring
war, which, in the theory of government, according to Montesquieu
and Rousseau, is strictly an executive act. But, as we have made
it legislative, whenever secrecy is necessary for an operation
of the executive involving the question of peace and war, Congress
must pass a _secret_ law to give the President power. Now, secrecy
is contrary to one of the first principles of legislation, but the
absurdity flows from having given to Congress, instead of the
executive, the power of declaring war. Of these secret laws there
are four, and one resolution; and one of the laws, that of the 28th
of June, 1812, is so secret, that to this day it cannot be found
among the rolls of the department. Another consequence has followed
from this clumsy political machinery. The injunction of secrecy was
removed on the 6th of July, 1812, from the laws previously passed
by a vote of the House of Representatives, and yet the laws have
never been published."

In January, 1818, McGregor and his freebooters having been driven, by
the authority of the executive, from Amelia Island by the United States
troops, a question arose whether they should be withdrawn, or possession
of the island retained, subject to future negotiations with Spain. Mr.
Adams and Mr. Calhoun advocated the latter opinion. The President, Mr.
Crowninshield, and Mr. Wirt, were in favor of withdrawing the troops.
After discussion of a message proposed to be sent to Congress avowing
the intention to restore the island to Spain, the subject was left
undetermined, the President being embarrassed concerning the policy to
be pursued, by the division of his constitutional advisers. On which Mr.
Adams remarked: "These cabinet councils open upon me a new scene, and
new views of the political world. Here is a play of passions, opinions,
and characters, different from those in which I have been accustomed
heretofore to move."

About this time the President received information that the Spanish
government were discouraged, and that Onis, the Spanish minister, had
received authority to dispose of the Floridas to the United States on
the best terms possible. This intelligence Mr. Monroe communicated to
Mr. Adams, and requested him to see the Spanish minister, and inquire
what Spain would take for all her possessions east of the Mississippi.
When Mr. Adams obtained an interview with Onis, he waived any direct
answer to the question, and asked what were the intentions of the United
States relative to the occupation of Amelia Island. Mr. Adams replied,
that this was a mere measure of self-defence, and asked what guarantee
Onis could give that the freebooters would not again take possession, to
the annoyance of lawful commerce, if the troops of the United States
were removed. Onis said he could give none, except a promise to write to
the Governor of Havana for troops; but he admitted that, if sufficient
force could there be obtained, six or seven months might elapse before
they could be sent to Amelia Island. A continuance of the present
occupation by the United States was thus rendered unavoidable. The
consideration of the question of restoring it to Spain was postponed in
the cabinet, and the message of the President to Congress was so
modified as to state his intention of keeping possession of it for the
present.

During the remainder of this session Mr. Clay took opposition ground on
all the cardinal points maintained by the President, especially on the
constitutional question concerning internal improvements, and upon South
American affairs. His course was so obviously marked with the design of
rising on the ruins of Mr. Monroe's administration, that one of his own
papers in Kentucky publicly stated that "he had broken ground within
battering distance of the President's message." In a speech made on the
24th of March, 1817, on the general appropriation bill, he moved an
appropriation of eighteen thousand dollars as one year's salary and an
outfit for a minister to the government of Buenos Ayres. This was only a
mode of proposing a formal acknowledgment of that government. The motion
was soon after rejected in the House of Representatives by a great
majority, and his attempt to make manifest the unpopularity of the
administration proved a failure.

In July, 1818, news came that General Jackson had taken Pensacola by
storm,--a measure which excited universal surprise. But one opinion
appeared at first to prevail in the nation,--that Jackson had not only
acted without, but against, his instructions; that he had commenced war
upon Spain, which could not be justified, and in which, if not disavowed
by the administration, they would be abandoned by the country. Every
member of the cabinet, the President included, concurred in these
sentiments, with the exception of Mr. Adams. He maintained that there
was no real, though an apparent violation of his instructions; that his
proceedings were justified by the necessity of the case, and the
misconduct of the Spanish commandant in Florida. Mr. Adams admitted that
the question was embarrassing and complicated, as involving not merely
an actual war with Spain, but also the power of the executive to
authorize hostilities without a declaration of war by Congress. He
averred that there was no doubt that _defensive_ acts of hostility
might be authorized by the executive, and on this ground Jackson had
been authorized to cross the Spanish frontier in pursuit of the Indian
enemy. His argument was, that the question of the constitutional
authority of the executive was in its nature defensive; that all the
rest, even to the taking the fort of Barancas by storm, was incidental,
deriving its character from the object, which was not hostility to
Spain, but the termination of the Indian war. This was the justification
offered by Jackson himself, who alleged that an imaginary air-line of
the thirty-first degree of latitude could not afford protection to our
frontier, while the Indians had a safe refuge in Florida; and that all
his operations had been founded on that consideration.

This state of things embarrassed the negotiation with the Spanish
minister, who was afraid, under these circumstances, to proceed without
receiving instructions. Mr. Adams endeavored, however, to satisfy Onis,
by assuring him that Pensacola had been taken without orders; but he
also stated that no blame would be attached to Jackson, on account of
the strong charges he brought against the Governor of Pensacola, who had
threatened to drive him out of the province by force, if he did not
withdraw. In support of these views, Mr. Adams adduced the opinions of
writers on national law. To the members of the cabinet he admitted that
it was requisite to carry the reasoning on his principles to the utmost
extent they would bear, to come to this conclusion; yet he maintained
that, if the question were dubious, it was better to err on the side of
vigor than of weakness, of our own officer than of our enemy. There was
a large portion of the public who coincided in opinion with Jackson, and
if he were disavowed, his friends would assert that he had been
sacrificed because he was an obnoxious man; that, after having had the
benefit of his services, he was abandoned for the sake of conciliating
the enemies of his country, and his case would be compared to that of
Sir Walter Raleigh.

Mr. Monroe listened with candor to the debates of the cabinet, without
varying from his original opinion. They resulted in a disclaimer of
power in the President to have authorized General Jackson to take
possession of Pensacola. On this determination, Mr. Adams finally gave
up his opposition, and acquiesced in the opinion of every other member
of the cabinet, remarking on this result: "The administration are
placed in a dilemma, from which it is impossible for them to escape
censure by some, and factious crimination by many. If they avow and
approve Jackson's conduct, they incur the double responsibility of
having made a war against Spain, in violation of the constitution,
without the authority of Congress. If they disavow him, they must give
offence to his friends, encounter the shock of his popularity, and have
the appearance of truckling to Spain. For all this I should be
prepared; but the mischief of this determination lies deeper. 1. It is
weakness, and confession of weakness. 2. The disclaimer of power in the
executive is of dangerous example, and of evil consequences. 3. There
is injustice to the officer in disavowing him, when in principle he is
strictly justifiable. These charges will be urged with great vehemence
on one side, while those who would have censured the other course will
not support or defend the administration for taking this. I believe the
other would have been a safer and a bolder course." A wish having been
expressed that it should be stated publicly that the opinion of the
members of the cabinet had been _unanimous_, Mr. Adams said that he had
acquiesced in the ultimate determination, and would cheerfully bear his
share of the responsibility; but that he could not in truth say it had
been conformable to his opinion, for that had been to approve and
justify the conduct of Jackson, whereas it was disavowed, and the place
he had taken was to be unconditionally restored.

At this time Mr. Adams was laboriously collecting evidence in support of
these views, and preparing letters of instruction to George Erving,
dated the 19th of November, in which Jackson's conduct is fully stated,
and the execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister and the taking of Pensacola
defended. Mr. Jefferson wrote to President Monroe expressing in the
highest terms his approbation of these letters, and the hope that those
of the 12th of March and the 28th of November to Erving, with, also,
those of Mr. Adams to Onis, would be translated into French, and
communicated to every court in Europe, as a thorough vindication of the
conduct and policy of the American government. Writing about the affairs
of Florida at this time, Mr. Adams observed: "With these concerns,
political, personal, and electioneering intrigues are mingling
themselves, with increasing heat and violence. This government is
assuming daily, more and more, a character of cabal and preparation, not
for the next presidential election, but for the one after, that is
working and counterworking, with many of the worst features of elective
monarchies. Jackson has made for himself a multitude of friends, and
still more enemies."

In the latter part of December, 1818, when General Jackson visited
Washington, a strong party manifested itself disposed to bring him
forward as a candidate for the next Presidency. "His services during the
last campaign," said Mr. Adams, "would have given him great strength,
had he not counteracted these dispositions by several of his actions in
Florida. The partisans of Crawford and De Witt Clinton took the alarm,
and began their attacks upon Jackson for the purpose of running him
down. His conduct is beginning to be arraigned with extreme violence in
every quarter of the Union, and, as I am his official defender against
Spain and England, I shall come in for my share of the obloquy so
liberally bestowed upon him."

Mr. Adams had the satisfaction of receiving from Hyde de Neuville, the
French minister, an assurance of his coincidence of opinion with him,
and that he had written to his own government that the proceedings of
General Jackson had been right, particularly in respect of the two
Englishmen. Although there was a difference of opinion on the subject
among the members of the diplomatic body, he declared that his own was
that such incendiaries and instigators of savage barbarities should be
put to death.

On one occasion, the President expressed to Mr. Adams his astonishment
at the malignancy of the reports which some newspapers were circulating
concerning him, and asked in what motives they could have originated.
Mr. Adams replied, that the motives did not lie very deep; that there
had been a spirit at work, ever since he came to Washington, very
anxious to find or make occasions of censure upon him. That spirit he
could not lay. His only resource was to pursue his course according to
his own sense of right, and abide by the consequences. To which the
President fully assented.

While these events were agitating the political world, Mr. Adams was
called to lament the death of his mother, dear to his heart by every tie
of affection and gratitude. His feelings burst forth, on the occasion,
in eloquent and touching tributes to her memory. "This is one of the
severest afflictions," he exclaimed, "to which human existence is
liable. The silver cord is broken,--the tenderest of natural ties is
dissolved,--life is no longer to me what it was,--my home is no longer
the abode of my mother. While she lived, whenever I returned to the
paternal roof, I felt as if the joys and charms of childhood returned to
make me happy; all was kindness and affection. At once silent and active
as the movement of the orbs of heaven, one of the links which connected
me with former ages is no more. May a merciful Providence spare for many
future years my only remaining parent!"

The policy of the friends and enemies of Mr. Monroe's administration was
developed by the debates in the House of Representatives on the Seminole
war, and the spirit of intrigue began to operate with great publicity.
Some of the Western friends of Mr. Adams proposed to him measures of
counteraction, on which he remarked: "These overtures afford
opportunities and temptations to intrigue, of which there is much in
this government, and without which the prospects of a public man are
desperate. Caballing with members of Congress for future contingency has
become so interwoven with the practical course of our government, and so
inevitably flows from the practice of canvassing by the members to fix
on candidates for President and Vice-President, that to decline it is to
pass a sentence of total exclusion. Be it so! Whatever talents I
possess, that of intrigue is not among them. And instead of toiling for
a future election, as I am recommended to do, my only wisdom is to
prepare myself for voluntary, or unwilling, retirement." On the same
topic, in February, 1819, he thus expressed himself: "The practice which
has grown up under the constitution, but contrary to its spirit, by
which members of Congress meet in caucus and determine by a majority the
candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency to be supported by the
whole meeting, places the President in a state of undue subserviency to
the members of the legislature; which, connected with the other practice
of reelecting only once the same President, leads to a thousand corrupt
cabals between the members of Congress and heads of departments, who are
thus made, almost necessarily, rival pretenders to the succession. The
only possible chance for a head of a department to attain the Presidency
is by ingratiating himself with the members of Congress; and as many of
them have objects of their own to obtain, the temptation is immense to
corrupt coalitions, and tends to make all the public offices objects of
bargain and sale."

The treaty with Spain, by which the United States acquired the Floridas,
was signed by Onis and Adams on the 22d of December, 1819. To effect
this treaty, so full of difficulty and responsibility, Mr. Adams had
labored ever since he had become Secretary of State. His success was to
him a subject of intense gratification; especially the acknowledgment of
the right of the United States to a definite line of boundary to the
South Sea. This right was not among our claims by the treaty of peace
with Great Britain, nor among our pretensions under the purchase of
Louisiana, for that gave the United States only the range of the
Mississippi and its waters. Mr. Adams regarded the attainment of it as
his own; as he had first proposed it on his own responsibility, and
introduced it in his discussions with Onis and De Neuville. Its final
attainment, under such circumstances, was a just subject of exultation,
which was increased by the change of relations which the treaty produced
with Spain, from the highest state of exasperation and imminent war, to
a fair prospect of tranquillity and secure peace. The treaty was
ratified by the President, with the unanimous advice of the Senate.

In 1819 a committee of the Colonization Society applied to the
President for the purchase of a territory on the coast of Africa, to
which the slaves rescued under the act of Congress, then recently
passed, against piracy and the slave-trade, might be sent. The subject
being referred to Mr. Adams, he stated in reply that it was impossible
that Congress could have intended to authorize the purchase of
territory by that act, for they had only appropriated for its object
_one hundred thousand dollars_, which was a sum utterly inadequate for
the purchase of a territory on the coast of Africa. He declared also
that he had no opinion of the practicability or usefulness of the
objects proposed by the Colonization Society, of establishing in Africa
a colony composed of the free blacks sent from the United States. "The
project," said he, "is professedly formed, 1st, without making use of
any compulsion on the free people of color to go to Africa. 2d. To
encourage the emancipation of slaves by their masters. 3d. To promote
the entire abolition of slavery; and yet, 4th, without in the slightest
degree affecting what they call 'a certain species of property in
slaves.' There are men of all sorts and descriptions concerned in this
Colonization Society: some exceedingly humane, weak-minded men, who
really have no other than the professed objects in view, and who
honestly believe them both useful and attainable; some speculators in
official profits and honors, which a colonial establishment would of
course produce; some speculators in political popularity, who think to
please the abolitionists by their zeal for emancipation, and the
slaveholders by the flattering hope of ridding them of the free colored
people at the public expense; lastly, some cunning slaveholders, who
see that the plan may be carried far enough to produce the effect of
raising the market price of their slaves. But, of all its other
difficulties, the most objectionable is that it obviously includes the
engrafting a colonial establishment upon the constitution of the United
States, and thereby an accession of power to the national government
transcending all its other powers."

The friends of the measure urged in its favor that it had been
recommended by the Legislature of Virginia. They enlarged on the happy
condition of slaves in that state, on the kindness with which they were
treated, and on the attachment subsisting between them and their
masters. They stated that the feeling against slavery was so strong that
shortly after the close of the Revolution many persons had voluntarily
emancipated their slaves. This had introduced a class of very dangerous
people,--the free blacks,--who lived by pilfering, corrupted the slaves,
and produced such pernicious consequences that the Legislature was
obliged to prohibit their further emancipation by law. The important
object now was to remove the free blacks, and provide a place to which
the emancipated slaves might go; in which case, the legal obstacles to
emancipation being withdrawn, Virginia, at least, might in time be
relieved from her black population.

A committee from the Colonial Society also waited on Mr. Adams,
repeating the same topics, and maintaining that the slave-trade act
contained a clear authority to settle a colony in Africa; and that the
purchase of Louisiana, and the settlement at the mouth of Columbia
River, placed beyond all question the right of acquiring territory as
existing in the government of the United States. Mr. Adams, in reply,
successfully maintained that the slave-trade act had no reference to the
settlement of a colony on the coast of Africa; and that the acquisition
of Louisiana, and the settlement at the mouth of Columbia River, being
in territories contiguous to and in continuance of our own, could by no
reason warrant the purchase of countries beyond seas, or the
establishment of a colonial system of government subordinate to and
dependent upon that of the United States.

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