Twenty Years of Congress, Volume 2 (of 2)

J >> James Gillespie Blaine >> Twenty Years of Congress, Volume 2 (of 2)

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The financial achievement of the National Government herein reviewed,
for the four years following the war, may be briefly summarized. The
National debt was reduced by the sum of nearly $300,000,000, while at
the same time the Government reduced its revenue to the amount of
$140,000,000 per annum by the repeal of a long series of internal
taxes. During this period more than $35,000,000 had been paid from the
Treasury towards the construction of the Union and Central Pacific
Railroads, and $7,200,000 was paid to the Russian Government on account
of the purchase of the Territory of Alaska. It is also to be noted
that within this period were embraced all the expenses incident to the
disbandment of the Union army, and also a very large addition to the
pension-list. Notwithstanding all these enormous expenditures the
business interests of the country continued prosperous, and the fact
that so large a reduction had been made in internal taxes gave promise
that within a comparatively short period the Government would be able
to remove all levies that were in any degree oppressive or even
vexatious to private interests.

By reason of his official and personal connection with the President,
Mr. McCulloch had failed to secure cordial support from Congress, and
had moreover given offense by his obvious sympathy with the free-traders,
who were already beginning to assault the protective tariff
which the necessities of war had led the country to adopt. The
Secretary had also gone far beyond the popular wish and the best
business judgment of the country in regard to the rapid contraction of
the currency. But while his politics and his policies were not
acceptable to Congress or to the people, he is entitled to high
credit for his direct, honest, intelligent administration of the
Treasury Department. In the peculiar embarrassments to the
administration of the Government, caused by the course of President
Johnson, it was a matter of sincere congratulation that a Secretary
of the Treasury, so competent and trustworthy as Mr. McCulloch had
approved himself, was firmly in place before the serious political
disturbances began--a congratulation in which his most ardent
Republican opponents were ready to join, knowing how fatal it might
prove if President Johnson had the opportunity to nominate his
successor.

Throughout the more difficult period of his administration of the
department, Mr. McCulloch was aided by two most intelligent and
efficient officers. Mr. William E. Chandler, though only twenty-nine
years of age, was appointed First Assistant Secretary in March, 1865,
and exhibited great aptitude, discrimination, and ability in his
position. He developed an admirable talent for details, a quick
insight into the most difficult problems that came before the
Department, and at all times an honorable devotion to public duty. The
Bureau of Internal Revenue, the most important of the Treasury
Department, was under the direction of another citizen of New
Hampshire, Edward Ashton Rollins. The Bureau for a time collected more
than half the revenue of the United States, and required in its
Commissioner integrity, administrative talent, and singular skill in
providing against every form of fraud. No department of the Government
had to contend against so many corrupt combinations to rob the
Government, and the slightest relaxation of vigilance on the part of
the Commissioner might involve at any time a loss of millions to the
National Treasury. In the complex and difficult duties of this
station, Mr. Rollins proved himself equal to every requirement.

The purchase of Alaska was completed by the Act of July 27, 1868, which
appropriated the amount agreed upon in the treaty of March 30, 1867,--
negotiated by Mr. Seward on behalf of the United States, and by Baron
Stoeckl representing the Emperor of all the Russias. The Russian
Government had initiated the matter, and desired to sell much more
earnestly than the United States desired to buy. There is little doubt
that a like offer from any other European government would have been
rejected. The pressure of our financial troubles, the fact that gold
was still at a high premium, suggested the absolute necessity of
economy in every form in which it could be exercised; and in the
general judgment of the people the last thing we needed was additional
territory. There was, however, a feeling of marked kindliness towards
Russia; and this, no doubt, had great weight with Mr. Seward when he
assented to the obvious wishes of that government. But while there was
no special difficulty in securing the ratification of the treaty by the
Senate, a more serious question arose when the House was asked to
appropriate the necessary amount to fulfill the obligation. Seven
million two hundred thousand dollars in gold represented at that time
more than ten million dollars in the currency of the Government; and
many Republicans felt, on the eve, or rather in the midst, of a
Presidential canvass, that it was a hazardous political step (deeply
in debt as the Government was, and with its paper still at a heavy
discount) to embark in the speculation of acquiring a vast area of
"rocks and ice," as Alaska was termed in the popular and derisive
description of Mr. Seward's purchase.

When the bill came before the House, General Banks, as Chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, urged the appropriation with great
earnestness, not merely because of the obligation imposed upon the
Government by the treaty, which he ably presented; not merely by reason
of the intrinsic value of the territory, which he abundantly
demonstrated; but especially on account of the fact that Russia was
the other party to the treaty, and had for nearly a century shown a
most cordial disposition towards the United States. General Banks
maintained that at every step of our history, from 1786 to the moment
when he was speaking, Russia had been our friend. "In the darkest hour
of our peril," said he, "during the Rebellion, when we were enacting
a history which no man yet thoroughly comprehends, when France and
England were contemplating the recognition of the Confederacy, the
whole world was thrilled by the appearance in San Francisco of a fleet
of Russian war vessels, and nearly at the same time, whether by
accident or design, a second Russian fleet appeared in the harbor of
New York. Who knew how many more there were on their voyage here?
From that hour France, on the one hand, and England on the other,
receded, and the American Government regained its position and its
power. . . . Now, shall we flout the Russian Government in every court
in Europe for her friendship? Whoever of the representatives of the
American people in this House, on this question, turns his back, not
only upon his duty, but upon the friends of his country, upon the
Constitution of his Government, and the honor of his generation,
cannot long remain in power."

Mr. Cadwalader C. Washburn answered the speech of General Banks on the
succeeding day (July 1, 1868). He assumed the leadership of the
opposition to the treaty. He proposed to demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the House five distinct propositions: "_First_, that
at the time the treaty for Alaska was negotiated, not a soul in the
whole United States asked for it; _second_, that it was secretly
negotiated, and in a manner to prevent the representatives of the
people from being heard; _third_, that by existing treaties we possess
every right that is of any value to us, without the responsibility and
never-ending expense of governing a nation of savages; _fourth_, that
the country ceded is absolutely without value; _fifth_, that it is the
right and duty of the House to inquire into the treaty, and to vote or
not vote the money, according to its best judgment." Mr. Washburn made
an able speech in support of his radical propositions.

General Butler sustained Mr. Washburn's position in a characteristic
speech, especially answering General Banks's argument that we should
pay this amount from a spirit of friendship for Russia. "If," said
General Butler, "we are to pay this price as usury on the friendship
of Russia, we are paying for it very dear indeed. If we are to pay
for her friendship, I desire to give her the seven million two hundred
thousand dollars in cash, and let her keep Alaska, because I think it
may be a small sum to give for the friendship if we could only get
rid of the land, or rather the ice, which we are to get by paying for
it." He maintained that it was in evidence before the House
officially, "that for ten years the entire product of the whole country
of Alaska did not exceed three million dollars."

--Mr. Peters of Maine pronounced the territory "intrinsically
valueless; the conclusive proof of which is found in the fact that
Russia is willing to sell it." He criticised the action of the Senate
in negotiating the treaty. "If the treaty-making power can buy, they
can sell. If they can buy land with money, they can buy money with
land. If they can buy a part of a country, they can buy the whole of
a country. If they can sell a part of our country, they can sell the
whole of it!"

--Mr. Spalding of Ohio, on the other hand, maintained that
"notwithstanding all the sneers that have been cast on Alaska, if it
could be sold again, individuals would take it off our hand and pay us
two or three millions for the bargain."

--General Schenck thought the purchase in itself highly objectionable,
but was "willing to vote the money because the treaty has been made
with a friendly power; one of those that stood by us,--almost the only
one that stood by us when all the rest of the powers of the world
seemed to be turning away from us in our recent troubles."

--Mr. Stevens supported the measure on the ground that it was a
valuable acquisition to the wealth and power of the country. He
argued also in favor of the right of the Senate to make the treaty.

--Mr. Leonard Myers was sure that if we did not acquire Alaska it
would be transferred to Great Britain. "The nation," said he, "which
struggled so hard for Vancouver and her present Pacific boundary,
and which still insists on having the little island of San Juan, will
never let such an opportunity slip. Canada, as matters now stand,
would become ours some day could her people learn to be Americans;
but never, if England secures Alaska."

--Mr. Higby of California answered the objections relating to climate.
"I do not know," said he, "whether the people of the East yet believe
what has been so often declared, that our winters on the Pacific are
nearly as mild as our summers, and yet such is the fact. In my own
little village, situated over fourteen hundred feet above the level
of the ocean, I have seen a plant growing in the earth green through
all the months from October to April."

--Mr. Shellabarger opposed the purchase. He said those nation which
had been compact and solid had been the most enduring, while those
which had the most extended territory lasted the least space of time.

--Mr. Price of Iowa thought that it was "far better to expend the
$7,200,000 in improving the Mississippi River, in order that
bread-stuffs may be transported cheaply from the West to the seaboard."
He had no faith in the value of the territory proposed to be purchased.

--Mr. McCarthy of New York rejected the plea that we should purchase
Alaska because Russia is a friendly power. "I ask this House," said
he, "whence this friendship comes. It comes from self-interest. She
is the absorbing power of the Eastern continent, and she recognizes
us as the absorbing power of the western continent; and through
friendship for us she desires to override and overbalance the
governments of Europe which are between her and us."

--General Butler moved a proviso, that "the payment of $500,000 of said
appropriation be withheld until the Imperial Government of Russia shall
signify its willingness to refer to an impartial tribunal all such
claims by American citizens against the Imperial Government as have
been investigated by the State Department of the United States and
declared to be just, and the amounts so awarded to be paid from said
$500,000 so withheld."

--General Garfield, presiding at the time over the Committee of the
Whole, ruled it out of order, and on an appeal being taken the decision
was sustained by _ayes_ 93, _noes_ 27. After dilatory motions and the
offer of various amendments, which were rejected, the bill was passed
by _ayes_ 113, _noes_ 43.

--The House prefaced the bill by a preamble, asserting in effect that
"the subjects embraced in the treaty are among those which by the
Constitution are submitted to the power of Congress, and over which
Congress has jurisdiction; and for these reasons, it is necessary that
the consent of Congress should be given to the said stipulations before
the same can have full force and effect." There was no mention of the
Senate's ratification, merely a reference to the fact that "the
President has entered into a treaty with the Emperor of Russia, and
has agreed to pay him the sum of seven million two hundred thousand
dollars in coin." The House by this preamble evidently claimed that
its consent to the treaty was just as essential as the consent of the
Senate,--that it was, in short, a subject for the consideration of
Congress.

The Senate was unwilling to admit such a pretension, especially when
put forth by the House in this bald form, and therefore rejected it
unanimously. The matter was sent to a conference, and by changing the
preamble a compromise was promptly effected, which preserved the rank
and dignity of both branches. It declared that "whereas the President
had entered into a treaty with the Emperor of Russia, and _the Senate
thereafter gave its advice and consent to said treaty, . . . and
whereas said stipulations cannot be carried into full force and effect,
except by legislation to which the consent of both Houses of Congress
is necessary;_ therefore be it enacted that there be appropriated the
sum of $7,200,000" for the purpose named. With this compromise the
bill was readily passed, and became a law by the President's approval
July 27, 1868.

The preamble finally agreed upon, though falling far short of the one
first adopted by the House, was yet regarded as a victory for that
branch. The issue between the Senate and the House, now adjusted by a
compromise, is an old one, agitated at different periods ever since
the controversy over the Jay treaty in 1794-95. It is simply whether
the House is bound to vote for an appropriation to carry out a treaty
Constitutionally made by the President and the Senate, without judging
for itself whether, on the merits of the treaty, the appropriation
should be made. After the appropriation required under the Jay treaty
had been voted by the House, that body declared in a resolution which
was adopted by _ayes_ 57, _noes_ 35, "that it is the Constitutional
right and duty of the House of Representatives, in all such cases, to
deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of carrying such treaty
into effect, and to determine and act thereon as in their judgment
may be most conducive to the public good." But that was the
declaration of the House only; whereas the preamble agreed to in the
appropriation of money for the purchase of Alaska contained the assent
of both branches.

Though the Constitutional principle involved may not be considered as
one settled beyond a fair difference of opinion, there has
undoubtedly been a great advance, since the controversy between the
two branches in 1794, in favor of the rights of the House when an
appropriation of money is asked to carry out a treaty. The change
has been so great indeed that the House would not now in any case
consider itself under a Constitutional obligation to appropriate money
in support of a treaty, the provisions of which it did not approve. It
is therefore practically true that all such treaties must pass under
the judgment of the House as well as under that of the Senate and the
President. Judge McLean of the Supreme Court delivered an opinion
which is often referred to as embodying the doctrine upon which the
House rests its claim of power.* "A treaty," said the learned Justice,
"is the supreme law of the land only when the treaty-making power can
carry it into effect. A treaty which stipulates for the payment of
money undertakes to do that _which the treaty-making power cannot do;
therefore the treaty is not the supreme law of the land_. To give it
effect the action of Congress is necessary, and in this action the
representatives and senators act on their own judgment and
responsibility and not on the judgment and responsibility of the
treaty-making power. _A foreign government may be presumed to know
that the power of appropriating money belongs to Congress_. No act of
any part of the Government can be held to be a law which has not all
the sanctions to make it law."(2)

The territory which we thus acquired is of vast extent, exceeding in
its entire area a half million square miles. Its extreme length is
about eleven hundred miles; its extreme width about eight hundred.
It stretches nearly to the seventy-second degree of north latitude,
three hundred and fifty miles beyond Behring's Straits; and borders
upon the Arctic Ocean for more than a thousand miles. The adjacent
islands of the Aleutian group are included in the transfer, and reach
two-thirds of the way across the North Pacific in the latitude of
60 degrees,--the westernmost island being within six hundred miles of
the coast of Kamtchatka. The resources of the forests of Alaska are
very great,--the trees growing to a good height on the mountain sides
as far as two thousand feet above the tide level. The timber is of
the character generally found in Northern climates: yellow cedar of
durable quality, spruce, larch, fir of great size, and hemlock. In
the world's rapid and wasteful consumption of wood, the forests of
Alaska will prove not merely a substantial resource for the interests
of the future, but a treasure-house in point of pecuniary value. To
this source of wealth on land that of the water must be added, in the
seal and food fish which are found in immeasurable quantities along
the coast of the mainland and the islands.

From the time of the acquisition of Louisiana until the purchase of
Alaska, the additions of territory to the United States had all been
in the interest of slavery. Louisiana, stretching across the entire
country from South to North, was of equal value to each section; but
the acquisition of Florida, the annexation of Texas, the territory
acquired from Mexico by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, with the
addition of Arizona under the Gadsden treaty, were all made under the
lead of Southern statesmen to strengthen the political power and the
material resources of the South. Meanwhile, by the inexcusable errors
of the Democratic party, and especially of Democratic diplomacy, we
lost that vast tract on the north known as British Columbia, the
possession of which, after the acquisition of Alaska, would have given
to the United States the continuous frontage on the Pacific Ocean from
the south line of California to Behring's Straits. Looking northward
for territory, instead of southward, was a radical change of policy in
the conduct of the Government,--a policy which, happily and
appropriately, it was the good fortune of Mr. Seward to initiate under
impressive and significant circumstances.

[(1) Turner _vs_. The American Baptist Missionary Union, 5 McLean, 544.]

[(2) Mr. Jefferson, more promptly than other great statesmen of his
generation, appreciated the degree of power residing in the House of
Representatives. In a private letter discussing the subject he
expressed views in harmony with Justice McLean's opinion, long before
that opinion was delivered. He wrote to Mr. Monroe: "We conceive
the Constitutional doctrine to be, that though the President and Senate
have the general power of making treaties, yet whenever they include
in a treaty matters confided by the Constitution to the three branches
of the Legislature, an act of legislation will be necessary to confirm
these articles, and that the House of Representatives, as one branch of
the Legislature, are perfectly free to pass the act or to refuse it,
governing themselves by their own judgment whether it is for the good
of their constituents to let the treaty go into effect or not. On
this depends whether the powers of legislation shall be transferred
from the President, Senate, and House of Representatives, to the
President, Senate, and Piamingo, or any other Indian, Algerine, or
other chief."]

CHAPTER XIV.

As the result of the great victory over the President in the political
contest of 1866, and of his stubborn maintenance of a hostile attitude,
the ardent and extreme men of the Republican party began, in the autumn
of that year, to discuss the propriety of ending the whole struggle by
impeaching Mr. Johnson and removing him from office. They believed
that his contumacious and obstinate course constituted a high crime
and misdemeanor, and the idea of Impeachment, as soon as suggested,
took deep root in minds of a certain type. When Congress came together
in December the agitation increased; and on the 7th of January (1867),
directly after the holidays, two Missouri representatives (Loan and
Kelso) attempted in turn to introduce resolutions in the House
proposing an Impeachment, but each was prevented by some parliamentary
obstruction. At a later hour of the same day Mr. James M. Ashley of
Ohio rose to a question of privilege and formally impeached the
President of high crimes and misdemeanors. "I charge him," said Mr.
Ashley, "with an usurpation of power and violation of the law: in
that he has corruptly used the appointing power; in that he has
corruptly used the pardoning power; in that he had corruptly used the
veto power; in that he has corruptly interfered in elections and
committed acts which in contemplation of the Constitution are high
crimes and misdemeanors."

Mr. Ashley's charges were very grave, but they created slight
impression upon the House and did not alarm the country. Every one
present felt that they were gross exaggerations and distortions of
fact, and could not be sustained by legal evidence or indeed by
reputable testimony of any kind. They were however referred in due
form to the Judiciary Committee, with full power to send for persons
and papers, to administer the customary oath to witnesses, and to make
in all respects a thorough investigation. Nothing was heard from the
committee until the 2d of March, when on the eve of the expiration of
Congress they reported that many documents had been collected, a large
number of witnesses examined, and every practicable thing done to
reach a conclusion of the case; but that not having fully examined all
the charges preferred against the President, they did not deem it
expedient to submit any conclusion beyond the statement that sufficient
testimony had been brought to the committee's notice to justify and
demand a further prosecution of the investigation. They therefore
passed the testimony they had taken into the custody of the Clerk of
the House, as a notification to the succeeding Congress that inquiry
into the matter should be pursued. The report was made by Mr. James
F. Wilson of Iowa, chairman of the committee, and concurred in by all
the Republican members. Mr. Rogers, a Democratic member from New
Jersey, made a minority report, stating that he had carefully examined
all the testimony in the case; that there was not one particle of
evidence to sustain any of the charges which had been made; that the
case was entirely void of proof; and that most of the testimony taken
was of a secondary character, such as could not be admitted in any
court of justice. He objected to continuing the subject and thereby
keeping the country in a feverish state. No action was taken by the
House except to lay both reports upon the table.

There was on the part of conservative Republicans a sincere hope that
nothing more would be heard of the Impeachment question. If a
committee industriously at work for sixty days could find nothing on
which to found charges against the President, they thought that
wisdom suggested the abandonment of the investigation. But Mr. Ashley,
with his well-known persistency, was determined to pursue it; and on
the 7th of March, the third day after the new Congress was organized,
he introduced a resolution directing the Judicial Committee to continue
the investigation under the same instructions as in the preceding
Congress, with the additional power to sit during the recess. Mr.
Ashley expressed the hope that "this Congress will not hesitate to do
its duty because the timid in our own ranks hesitate, but will
proceed to the discharge of the high and important trust imposed upon
it, uninfluenced by passion and unawed by fear." He was answered
with indignation by Mr. Brooks and Mr. Fernando Wood of New York, and
the question becoming a party issue Mr. Ashley's resolution was
carried without a division after an ineffectual attempt to lay it on
the table,--a motion which was sustained by only thirty-two votes.
The committee proceeded in their work during the recess of Congress,
and reported the testimony on the 25th of the ensuing November (1867).