Twenty Years of Congress, Volume 2 (of 2)

J >> James Gillespie Blaine >> Twenty Years of Congress, Volume 2 (of 2)

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Two eminent judges of the Supreme Court who died after the close of the
war are entitled to the admiration and gratitude of the loyal citizens
of the United States. When Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated there were
three judges on the Supreme Bench from the States which afterwards
formed the Confederacy,--James M. Wayne of Georgia, John Catron of
Tennessee, and John A. Campbell of Alabama. The last-named was placed
upon the bench in 1853, and was undoubtedly the choice of Jefferson
Davis, who as the leading Southern member of President Pierce's Cabinet
exerted large influence, if not absolute control, over appointments
from the slave-holding States. The personal and political associations
of Judge Campbell led him to resign his position on the Supreme Bench,
and to give the weight of his name and his learning to the Confederate
cause.

Judge Wayne was appointed by President Jackson in 1835, and Judge
Catron by President Van Buren immediately after his inauguration in
1837, under a bill enlarging the Court, which had been approved by
General Jackson. Judge Catron had long been a favorite of General
Jackson in Tennessee, and it was understood that in appointing him
to the Bench Mr. Van Buren was carrying out the expressed wishes of his
predecessor. Both judges came from that earlier and better school of
Southern Democracy which resisted the injurious heresies of State-rights
and Nullification, sustained the Force Bill under President Jackson,
and stood loyally by the Union of the States. They were allied
to the South by birth, by education, and by the associations of
a lifetime. Their friends, their kindred, even members of their own
families, joined in the Rebellion. But these patriotic men, one of
whom was born during the Revolutionary war and the other during the
first term of Washington's Presidency, maintained their judicial
positions and were unshaken in their loyalty to the Union. Their
example was followed by few officials from the states that seceded,
but the steadfastness of their faith was a striking illustration of the
difference between the South of Jefferson and Jackson and the South of
Calhoun and Davis. They sat on the Bench throughout the entire civil
struggle,--Judge Catron dying in May, 1865, in the eighty-seventh year
of his age, and Judge Wayne in July, 1867, in his seventy-eighth year.

The conduct of these venerable judges is all the more to be praised
because they did not personally sympathize in any degree with the
Republican leaders. They did not believe in the creed or the policies
of the party, and feared the result of its administration of the
National Government. Their views in regard to the Constitutional
rights of the slave-holders were the same as those held by the
Confederate chieftains. They had both concurred with Chief Justice
Taney in the Dred Scott decision. But it was enough for them now to
know that Mr. Lincoln had been Constitutionally chosen President of the
United States, and had been Constitutionally installed in his great
office. It was not for them as Justices of the Supreme Court to know
any thing of his Executive acts, except as they might properly come
for review before their high tribunal. They illustrated the honorable
line of duty for a Judge under the Government of the United States.
Off the Bench, his right to political opinions is no more to be
questioned than that of any other citizen. On the Bench, he falls
short of the full measure of his exalted duty if by any way or any
expression he discloses his sympathy with one political party or his
prejudice against another.

It is a tribute of honor to the Supreme Court that through all the
mutations of its existence only a single Justice has proved unfaithful
to the Union of the States; and prior to the war three-fifths of all
the Justices were appointed from the South. Southern men in all other
departments of the Public Service--those eminent in our Congressional
annals, in the Army, in the Navy, in the field of Diplomacy, and even
one who had occupied the Presidential chair--followed the lead of their
States in rebellion against the Union; or rather it may with truth be
said, they led their States into rebellion against the Union. Judge
Campbell, in furnishing the sole exception to the record of judicial
loyalty, did not yield without a struggle. He was surrounded with
peculiar embarrassments, and was not strong enough to overcome them.
He realized his position, and did what he could to avert war; but when
war was inevitable, he upheld the Confederate cause and became one of
its directing minds. In contrast with the fall from his high estate
and over against all the evil influences which forced Judge Campbell
to his fate, the names of Catron and Wayne will shine in history as
examples of the just judge and the incorruptible patriot.

[(1) The President's personal hostility to some of the officers thus
assigned was well known, and surprise was expressed that he did not
countermand or qualify the order of General Grant when first issued.
He was especially unfriendly to General Sheridan, and late in the
summer of 1867 relieved him from his command. General Hancock was
gazetted as Sheridan's successor, but he did not reach his post until
late in November, the district meanwhile being under the command,
first, of General Charles Griffin, and, second, of General Joseph A.
Mower. General Hancock's order assuming command, issued on the 29th
of November, had a certain political significance. He expressed
gratification "that peace and quiet reign in the Department," and that
in his purpose to preserve this condition of things, he regarded "the
maintenance of the civil authorities in the faithful execution of the
laws as the most efficient under existing circumstances." He said
that when insurrectionary force had been overthrown and peace
established, "the military power should cease to lead, and the civil
administration resume its natural and rightful dominion." "Solemnly
impressed with these views," the General announced that "the great
principles of American liberty are still the lawful inheritance of
the people and ever should be. The right of trial by jury, the
_habeas corpus_, the liberty of the press, the freedom of speech, the
natural rights of persons, and the rights of property, must be
preserved."

General Sheridan had issued an order defining the qualifications of
those who might sit on juries during the period of Reconstruction. One
of the first acts of General Hancock was to annul this order. He
declared "that the determination of who shall and who shall not be
jurors appertains to the legislative power," and he indicated his
intention of carrying out the existing law of Louisiana in regard to
the selection of juries. General Sheridan had distributed certain
memoranda of disqualification, together with questions to be proposed,
for the registrars. Their effect in substance was to disqualify all
persons who, having acted, prior to January 26, 1861, as _United-States
senators and representatives, electors, officers of the Army and Navy,
civil officers of the United States_, and State officers provided for
by the Constitution of the State, had afterwards engaged in the
Rebellion; and also all those who in 1862 and 1864 claimed the
protection of foreign powers. General Hancock set aside this action,
declaring that he dissented from the construction given to the
Reconstruction laws therein, and ordered the registrars to be guided
by their own interpretation of the laws and of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It was the popular understanding that General Hancock, in
these successive steps, was acting in full sympathy with the wishes
and designs of the Administration, in all of which he readily concurred
as a Democrat.

The appointment of General Pope for the District of Georgia, Alabama,
and Florida, had not been agreeable to the President. General Pope's
political convictions were of a very positive character, and they were
not at all in sympathy with the National Administration. He
administered the Reconstruction laws, therefore, in their full spirit
and with an entire belief in their justice and equity. He insisted on
fair dealing, and suppressed all interference with voters by violence
or threats of violence on the part of the late rebels. He would not
permit the menace of military organizations, and expressly refused to
allow any parading of armed men, except of United-States troops. It
was General Pope's opinion that the South had seen quite enough of
men in arms within the past four years, and he believed that safety
and order would be best maintained by having no uniform worn except
that of the Army of the United States, and no other flag shown than
the flag of the Union. Holding these pronounced views, aggressively
loyal in every thought and action, General Pope was naturally in
antagonism with the policy of the President. Towards the close of the
year he was relieved of his command and General Meade ordered to take
his place.

General Sickles, of the District of North Carolina and South Carolina,
was relieved of his command early in September (1867), and General
E. R. S. Canby appointed as his successor. General Sickles had been
very energetic in the administration of affairs in his department, and
had shown remarkable aptitude and efficiency in the discharge of his
peculiar duties,--exhibiting in his administration the very qualities
most likely to prove offensive to the President. He had perhaps the
most difficult command of any of the generals on duty in the South,
as the State of South Carolina had from the beginning of the Rebellion
presented certain phases of disobedience to Federal authority peculiar
to her population and naturally arising from her antecedent history.
General Sickles had some trouble with Attorney-General Stanbery, and
asked for a court of inquiry, that he might vindicate himself from the
accusations of that official.

General Schofield and General Ord alone of the original commanders in
the Southern military districts were left to carry through the work of
Reconstruction. They both discharged their duties with intelligence
and fidelity. Nor was the work of Reconstruction essentially hindered
by the changed in other departments. It is the trained habit of the
officers of the United-States Army to carry out their orders with
implicit faith, and there is seldom a conflict as to the line of duty
to be followed. If there was any exception, it was in regard to
the course pursued by General Hancock. His conduct became a subject
of controversy, and the popular division respecting its merits was on
the political line. The National Administration and the Democratic
party, both North and South, applauded every thing which General
Hancock said and did in Louisiana. The Republican party throughout
the country, and the General commanding the army, who was about to be
nominated for the Presidency, united in strong disapproval of his
course. But General Hancock's construction of the laws under which he
was acting was the same as that held by the Attorney-General of the
United States, and he thus felt abundantly justified and fortified in
his position. He disobeyed no specific order of the General
commanding the army, and, even if there had been a difference between
them, General Hancock was sure of the sympathy and support of their
common superior--the President of the United States.

It was however the subsequent opinion of General Grant that much of the
disorder and bloodshed in the State of Louisiana during the national
election of 1868 had resulted from the military government of General
Hancock. It was not his belief that General Hancock had the slightest
desire or design to produce such results, but that they were the
outgrowth of the encouragement which the rebels of Louisiana received
from the changes which General Hancock inaugurated in the manner of
administering the Reconstruction Laws. Aside however from the conduct
of General Hancock, the removal of General Sheridan from the Louisiana
District was unqualifiedly offensive to General Grant in a personal
sense, and contrary to his best judgment on ground of public policy
and safety. His attachment to Sheridan was very strong, and a wrong
against the latter was sooner or later sure to be resented by General
Grant. His feelings of the question were promptly and significantly
shown when he became President. Inaugurated on the 4th of March, he
caused an army order to be issued on the morning of the 5th, restoring
General Sheridan to his former command in Louisiana, and ordering
General Hancock to the remote and peaceful Department of Dakota.]

CHAPTER XIII.

The financial experience of the Government of the United States in the
years following the war is without precedent among nations. When
Congress first met after the close of hostilities (December, 1865), it
was as a ship sailing into dangerous and unknown seas without chart
of possible channels. The Reconstruction problem before the country
seemed at the time to be less difficult than the financial problem.
Other nations had incurred great expenditures for war purposes, but had
always left them in chief part as a heritage for the future. Great
Britain will probably never pay the total principal of her public debt.
France will be burdened perhaps as long as her nationality endures by
the debts heaped upon her through the ambition of her sovereigns, and
in her own struggles to enlarge the liberty of her people. But in this
country the purpose was early formed, not simply to provide for the
interest upon the debt incurred in the war for the Union, but to begin
its payment at once, and to arrange for its rapid liquidation. In view
of the magnitude of the sum involved this was a new undertaking in the
administration of Government finances.

The difficulties of the situation were undoubtedly aggravated and
complicated by the questions which arose from the condition of the
Southern States. Could Congress expect at once that the populations in
those States would begin to contribute to the revenue, would cease to
require large expenditures for the maintenance of the National
authority, would again add to the volume of our exports, to our
commerce, and our general prosperity? Serious re-action had in other
lands followed the financial expansion created by great wars, even
without complications similar to those which the disturbed condition
of the South seemed to render unavoidable. Ought Congress to accept
such a re-action as the necessary condition of the restoration of our
currency, of return to a normal situation, of adjustment of expenditure
to revenue on a peace footing? Could the possibility be entertained of
such a return and such an adjustment, without panic, without paralysis
of industry, without temporary interruption and prostration of
commerce? Grave apprehensions were felt as to the possible effect upon
production and trade of the legislation required to maintain the
National credit. These apprehensions derived force and peculiar
seriousness from the growing conflict between President Johnson and
Congress upon measures of Reconstruction and upon removals from office.

In spite however of all suggested fears and doubts, a feeling of
confidence pervaded the country, and was fully shared by Congress, that
the power which had saved the Union could re-establish its credit
without panic and without dangerous and prolonged depression. Faith
in the resources which had equipped and supported the National armies,
now embraced the plainer and less exciting duties of funding and paying
the debt and of protecting the notes of the United States. The loans
had been placed, the money borrowed, under the excitement of
war,--sometimes under the pressure of defeat, sometimes in the
exaltation of victory. Without this pressure, without this exaltation,
could money be secured at a rate adequate to build up a National credit
worthy to be compared with that of the older and richer nations beyond
the Atlantic?

The intrepidity with which Congress met its task will always compel the
admiration of the student of American history. While the war lasted,
the contributions by taxes and by loans had been on a munificent scale.
The measures adopted at the close of the Thirty-eighth Congress, after
four years of desperate struggle and on the very eve on National
victory, showed as great readiness to make sacrifices, as little
disposition to count the cost of saving the Union, as had marked
previous legislation. Less than six weeks before the surrender of Lee
the internal taxes were increased, the duties on imports were
adjusted to that increase, and a new Loan Bill was enacted. The bill
provided for borrowing, in addition to the authority given by previous
Acts, any sum not exceeding $600,000,000 in bonds, or treasury notes
convertible into bonds, at six per cent interest in coin or seven and
three-tenths per cent interest in currency. This provision was found
to be so comprehensive that it not only provided a strong
instrumentality for meeting the immense demands incident to the
disbanding of the armies and the final settlement of claims connected
with that momentous change in our affairs, but also laid the foundation
for the policy of funding the debt at a reduced rate of interest.
These results testify to the magnificent proportions of the financial
legislation during the period of hostilities.

When the Thirty-ninth Congress met in December, 1865, gold stood at
147-7/8 @ 148-1/2. A month later, on the 1st of January, 1866, the
legal-tender notes and fractional currency amounted to $452,231,810;
notes bearing 7-3/10 per cent interest, to $830,549,041; compound-interest
notes payable three years from date (a considerable proportion
of which time had elapsed), to $188,549,041; certificates of
indebtedness, payable at various dates within the current year, to
$50,667,000; and the temporary loan, practically payable on demand,
had reached the large sum of $97,257,194. These might all be called
floating and pressing obligations, and their grand aggregate was
$1,618,705,045. At the same time the amount represented by bonds
(6's of 1861, 5-20's, and 10-40's) was $1,120,786,700,--showing a
total National debt on New-Year's Day, 1866, of $2,739,491,745. If
the National credit was to be maintained these sixteen hundred millions
of floating obligations must be promptly placed on a basis that would
give time to the Government to provide means for their ultimate
redemption. President Johnson, in his message at the opening of the
session, spoke of the debt not as a public blessing, but as a heavy
burden on the industry of the country, to be discharged without
unnecessary delay. This was the popular sentiment in all sections of
the country, although in financial circles arguments were frequently
heard in favor of creating interminable obligations and of adjusting
the debt on a basis of permanency, after the European fashion. The
reduction had indeed already begun, since the maximum of debt had
been attained in the preceding August.

The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Hugh McCulloch, estimated that for
the fiscal year ending with June, 1867 (for which Congress was about
to provide), the revenue would exceed the expenditures by $111,682,818,
and that the whole of our vast debt could be liquidated by annual
payments within thirty years. Mr. McCulloch's plans were to take from
the compound-interest notes their legal-tender quality, from the date
of their maturity, and to sell six per cent bonds, redeemable at the
pleasure of the Government, for the purpose of retiring both the
compound-interest notes and the plain legal-tenders. He believed that
the entire debt might be funded at five per cent, while the average of
the annual interest now stood at 6-62/100 per cent. He pointed to
harmony between the different parts of the Union and to the settlement
of the relations of labor in the Southern States, as essential
conditions to the best management of the National obligations.

The leading feature of Mr. McCulloch's financial policy was the
immediate and persistent contraction of the currency. His argument in
support of the policy, as given in his annual report, was not accepted
by the country or by Congress without serious reservation; but his
belief in the theory was strong and determined, and so far as the laws
permitted he went on reducing the volume of paper in circulation until
on the 12th of April, 1866, the sum of legal-tenders was brought down
to $421,907,103. Financiers of the Eastern cities favored the policy
of contraction, although the logical plea was urged against them that
the country would grow up to the volume of currency if not harried and
disturbed by new legislation. Manufacturers and the holders of their
products, and many who had incurred pecuniary obligations in the
expanded currency, took alarm at the rapidity with which the Treasury
notes were withdrawn. The argument was urged that the heavy taxes
could not be met if the withdrawal were so rapid, and that industry
and trade would in consequence be paralyzed by the enforced fall in
prices.

These opinions and apprehensions were developed in the debate which led
to the passage of the Act of April 12, 1866. The subject was first
introduced by Mr. Alley of Massachusetts. On the 18th of December
(1865) he offered a resolution concurring in the views of the
Secretary of the Treasury, in relation to the necessity for a
contraction of the currency, with a view to as early a resumption of
specie payment as the business interests of the country would permit.
Under a suspension of the rules, without debate, 144 voted for the
resolution, 6 against it, and 32 were not recorded. Two months later,
on the 21st of February, 1866, Mr. Morrill, from the Committee on Ways
and Means, reported a bill which, as he explained, would expand the
authority provided by the Act of March 3, 1865, for funding
interest-bearing obligations, so as to include non-interest-bearing
obligations. The measure authorized the Secretary to exchange the bonds
prescribed by the Act for notes or certificates, and power was given to
negotiate them and make them payable either in the United States or
elsewhere, but if beyond the sea at not over five per cent interest.

--Mr. Thaddeus Stevens declared that the bill put over _sixteen hundred
millions_ of Government paper under the absolute and uncontrolled
discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. "This is a tremendous
bill," said he. "It proposes to confer more power upon Mr. McCulloch
than was ever before conferred upon any one man in a government
claiming to have a constitution."

--Mr. Hooper of Massachusetts magnified the financial achievements of
the Government, urged the policy embodied in the bill, and insisted
on the importance of restoring the currency to a sound condition at
the earliest practicable moment. He controverted the suggestion which
had been made to increase United-States notes to $1,000,000,000, on the
ground that the value of that dollar would be constantly fluctuating.
A minority of the commissioners appointed by the preceding Congress to
inquire into the state of trade and commerce had presented a specious
argument in favor of debasing the coinage, but Mr. Hooper dismissed
the proposition summarily and argued strongly for a contraction of
legal-tender notes.

--Mr. Hulburd of New York maintained that taxation could not be
increased to meet the existing and maturing obligations of the
Government. He held that under the Acts of June, 1864, and March,
1865, the Secretary had power to sell at home or abroad six per cent
coin bonds in any amount to meet short obligations of the Government.
"Under the proposed measure," he said, "authority is specifically
asked to withdraw the fractional currency and legal-tender notes, in
whole or in part, and to substitute bonds for them. The like power
was never asked for Neckar or for Pitt. As a principle the proposition
is dangerous." He protested vigorously against making any part of
the public debt payable in foreign countries.

--Mr. John Wentworth of Illinois argued in favor of contraction,
maintaining that the purpose of the pending bill was to make the
Secretary of the Treasury master of the situation. "If we expect him
to compete successfully with the most desperate body of men in the
world we must confer upon him the necessary powers. The real question
is, Shall our Government pay its pensions and all its employees and
creditors in depreciated paper, when by borrowing a little money at
six per cent it can bring its paper to par?" He charged that an
immense lobby against the bill had thronged the hall, and was surprised
to find importers among them. "But the importers have found," said he,
"that a bloated currency bloats the fashions." He earnestly indorsed
Mr. McCulloch as a cautious man, who would not be precipitate, no
matter what power might be conferred upon him: "If we adopt his policy
we shall wake up some morning and find the paper of our country at par."