Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws

J >> James Buchanan >> Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws

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The only plausible part of his Historical Survey, and that which, in our
apprehension, is the most likely to make some transient impression on
the popular mind, is his elaborate attempt to show, with regard to each
branch of Science, in detail, that it was enveloped during its infancy
in a cloud of superstition; and that just in proportion as the light
shone more clearly, or was more distinctly discerned, the cloud was
gradually dissipated and dispersed, until, one after another, they were
all emancipated from their supposed connection with supernatural causes,
and reduced under fixed natural laws. Confounding Theology with
Superstition, or failing, at least, to discriminate duly between the
two, M. Comte draws a vivid picture of the successive inroads which
Science has made on the consecrated domain of Religion, and represents
the one as receding just in proportion as the other advances. For as the
darkness disappears before the rising sun, whose earliest rays gild only
the loftier mountain peaks, but whose growing brightness spreads over
the lowly valleys and penetrates the deepest recesses of nature, so
Theology gradually retires before the advance of Science, which first
conquers and brings under the rule of natural law the simplest and
least complicated branches, such as Mechanics and Astronomy; then
attacks the more complex, such as Chemistry and Physiology; and, last of
all, advances to the assault of the most difficult, such as Ethics and
Sociology; until, having emancipated each of them successively from
their previous connection with supernatural beliefs, it effects the
entire elimination of Theology, first from the philosophic, and
afterwards from the popular creed of mankind. M. Comte conceives that
the religious spirit has been steadily decreasing throughout the whole
course of human development, from the time when it was universal, in the
form of Fetishism, till it reached its most abstract, but least
influential form in Monotheism; and that now the period of its decline
and fall has arrived, when it is subjected to the powerful solvent of a
Metaphysical and Skeptical Philosophy, and when its ultimate extinction
is certain under the action of Positive Science.

We deem this by far the most dangerous, because it is the most plausible
part of his speculations; so plausible that, even where his reasonings
in support of it may fail to carry the full conviction of the
understanding, they may yet leave behind them a certain impression
unfavorable to faith in Divine things, since they appeal to many
palpable facts in the history of Science, too well attested to be
doubted, and too important to be overlooked. The theory itself--whatever
may be thought of the peculiar form which it has assumed in the hands of
M. Comte--cannot be regarded, in its main and essential features, as one
of his original discoveries; for the general idea on which it rests had
been announced with equal brevity and precision by the celebrated LA
PLACE: "Let us survey the history of the progress of the human mind and
of its errors; we shall there see _final causes constantly pushed back
to the boundaries of its knowledge_. These causes, which Newton pushed
back to the limits of the solar system, were, even in his time, placed
in the atmosphere to explain meteoric appearances. They are nothing
else, therefore, in the eyes of a philosopher, than _the expression of
our ignorance of the true causes_." Supposing this to be a correct
account of the fact, the inference which M. Comte deduces from it might
seem to follow very much as a matter of course,--the inference, viz.,
that in proportion as Science advances and succeeds in subjecting one
department of Nature after another to fixed and invariable laws,
Theology, or the doctrine of Final Causes, must necessarily recede
before it, and, at length, disappear altogether, when human knowledge
has reached its highest ultimate perfection. But is it a correct account
of the fact? Is it true that the doctrine of Final Causes is less
generally admitted, or more dubiously maintained, in regard to those
sciences which have already reached their maturity, than in regard to
those other sciences which are still comparatively in their infancy? Or
is it true that it has lost instead of gaining ground by the progress of
scientific discovery, so as to occupy a narrower space and to hold a
more precarious footing, _now_, than it did in the earlier ages of
ignorance and superstition? Did Final Causes disappear from the view of
Newton when he discovered the law which regulates the movements of the
heavenly bodies? Did Galen or did Paley discard them when they surveyed
the human frame in the light of scientific anatomy? or Harvey, when,
impelled and guided by this doctrine as his governing principle, he
discovered the circulation of the blood? In what departments of Nature,
and in what branches of Science, does the Theistic philosopher or the
Christian divine find the clearest and strongest proofs of order,
adaptation, and adjustment? Is it not in those very departments of
Nature whose laws have been most fully ascertained? in those very
branches of Science which have been most thoroughly matured? Did we
believe Comte and La Place, we should expect to find that the doctrine
of Final Causes and the science of Theology could now find no footing in
the domain of Astronomy, of Physics, or of Chemistry, since in these
departments the phenomena have been reduced, by many successive
discoveries, to rigorous general laws; and that they could only survive
for a brief time by taking refuge in the yet unconquered territory of
Meteorology, Biology, and Social Science. But is it so? Examine the
Series of Bridgewater Treatises, or any other recent philosophical
exposition of the Evidence of Natural Theology, and it will be apparent,
on the most cursory review, that in point of fact the arguments and
illustrations are derived almost entirely from _the more advanced
sciences_; and that, so far from receding or threatening to disappear,
Final Causes have only become more prominent and more striking in
proportion as inquiring men have succeeded in removing the vail from any
department of Nature.

It were easy, indeed, to cull from the records of the past many facts
which might seem to give a plausible aspect to the theory of M. Comte.
We might be told of the early history of Astronomy, when the astrologer
gazed upon the heavens with a superstitious eye, and spoke of the mystic
influence of the planets, and constructed the horoscope for the
calculation of nativities and the prediction of future events. We might
be told of the early history of Anatomy, when, from the entrails of
birds and animals, the _haruspex_ prognosticated the fate of empires and
the fortunes of battle. We might be told of the early history of
Chemistry, when alchemists sought in their concoctions a panacea for all
human evils, and in their crucibles an alkalest or universal menstruum.
We might be told of the early history of Zooelogy, when the augur watched
the flight, the singing, the feeding of birds, and applied them to the
purposes of divination. We might be told of Aeromancy as the earliest
form of Meteorology, and of Geomancy as the earliest form of
Geology.[75] And we might be told of the popular superstitions which
lingered, till a very recent period, among the peasantry of our own
country, and which are now gradually disappearing in proportion as the
light of Religion and Science is diffused.[76] These facts, which appear
on the surface of human history, do unquestionably prove that _there has
been a process of gradual advancement_, by which each of the sciences
has been, in succession, purged of its earlier errors, and placed on a
more solid and enduring basis. But they prove nothing more than this:
they do _not_ prove that these sciences must ultimately supersede
Theology, or that they have a necessary tendency towards Atheism. On the
contrary, we hold that they afford a valid presumption from analogy on
the other side. For suppose, even, that Religion, following the same law
of development which determines the progress of every other branch of
human knowledge, had become incorporated, in its earlier stages, with
many fond and foolish superstitions, the analogy of the other sciences
would lead us to conclude that, just as the reveries of Astrology had
passed away and given place to a solid system of Astronomy,--and as the
vain speculations of Alchemy had been superseded by the useful
discoveries of Chemistry,--and as the arts of Augury and Divination had
finally issued in the inductive science of true Natural History,--so
Theology might also purge itself from the fond conceits which had been
for a time incorporated with it, and still survive, after all
superstition had passed away, as a sound and fruitful branch of the tree
of knowledge.

This is not the precise light, however, in which M. Comte regards
Theology, He does not speak of it as _a distinct and independent
science_, but rather as _a method of Philosophy_, which has been applied
to the explanation of _all_ the departments of Nature; and, viewed in
this light, he objects to it on the ground that Positive Science
peremptorily demands the elimination of all causes, efficient and final,
and, consequently, the exclusion of all reference to God, or to any
supernatural power, in connection with the laws either of the material
or moral world. This is the fundamental basis of his theory. It is
assumed that the recognition of natural laws is incompatible with the
belief in supernatural powers, and that these laws must be invariable
and independent of any superior will. Hence the supposed antagonism
between Theology and Physical Science, which is strongly affirmed by M.
Comte[77]; as if the laws of Nature could not exist unless they were
independent of the Divine will, or as if the arts of industry could not
be pursued, on the supposition of a Providence, without sacrilegious
presumption. The laws for which he contends must have had no author to
establish, and can have no superior will to control them; they had no
beginning, and can have no end; they cannot be reversed, suspended, or
interfered with; they are necessary, immutable, and eternal, not
subordinate to God, but independent of Him; they are, in short, nothing
less than Destiny or Fate, the same that Cudworth describes as the
Democritic, Physiological, or Atheistic Fate, which consists in "the
material necessity of all things without a God."[78] Now, we have no
jealousy of natural laws. We believe in their existence; we believe,
also, in their regular operation in the ordinary course of Nature; but
we deny that they must needs be _independent_ of a supreme will, and
affirm that, being subordinate to that will, they are not necessarily
_invariable_. They are expressly recognized and cordially maintained by
divines, not less than by men of science; but in such a sense as to be
perfectly compatible both with the doctrine of a primitive creation, and
also with the possibility of a subsequent miraculous interposition. The
Westminster Divines explicitly declare that "God, the First Cause, by
His providence, ordereth all things to fall out _according to the nature
of second causes_, either necessarily, freely, or contingently;" and
that "in His ordinary providence, He maketh use of means, but is free to
act without, above, and against them at His pleasure."[79] But M. Comte
will have no laws, however regular, unless they be also invariable, and
independent of any superior will. And, doubtless, if this were the sense
in which Science has established the doctrine of natural laws, it would
be at direct variance with Theology, both Natural and Revealed; and the
antagonism between the two might afford some ground for the belief that,
sooner or later, Theology must quit the field. But it is not the
existence of these natural laws, nor even their regular operation in the
common course of Providence, that is hostile to our religious
beliefs,--it is only the supposition that they are unoriginated,
independent, and invariable; and to assume this without proof, as if it
were a self-evident or axiomatic truth, or to apply it in a process of
historical deduction respecting either the past development or the
future prospects of the race, is such a shameless begging of the whole
question,--that we know of no parallel to it except in the kindred
speculations of Strauss, who assumes the same radical principle, and
gravely tells us that whatever is supernatural must needs be
unhistorical.[80]

There is absolutely no evidence, properly historical, that there is any
necessary tendency in the recognition of established natural laws to
supersede Theology, or to introduce an era of universal Atheism. Some
such tendency might exist were these laws conceived of as necessary,
independent, and invariable. But this hypothesis, equally
unphilosophical and irreligious, is not and never has been maintained
by the great body of Inductive inquirers, who see no contradiction
either between the established order of Nature and the supposition of
its Divine origin, or between the operation of natural laws and the
recognition of a supreme, superintending Providence. Nor should it be
forgotten, in this connection, that the evidence in favor of Theism
depends not so much on _the mere laws_ as on _the dispositions and
adjustments_ that are observable in Nature.[81] There is, therefore, no
historical proof to establish the supposed law of human development, and
no rational ground to expect that the progress of Inductive Science will
ever supplant or supersede Theology. It is true that Theology, although
a distinct and independent science, is so comprehensive in its range
that it gathers its proofs and illustrations from _every_ department of
Nature, and that, were it excluded from any one of these, it might, for
the same reason, be excluded from all the rest; but it is not true that
there is any real or necessary antagonism between the laws of Nature and
the prerogatives of God. On the contrary, let our knowledge advance
until _all_ the phenomena both of the Material and Moral worlds shall be
reduced under so many general laws, even then Superstition might
disappear, but Theology would remain, and would only receive fresh
accessions of evidence and strength, in proportion as the wise order of
Nature is more fully unfolded, and its most hidden mysteries disclosed.

We scarcely know whether it is needful to advert at all to the argument
in favor of his theory which M. Comte founds on _the analogy of
individual experience_. It is a transparent fallacy. He tells us that
the race is, like an individual man, Religious in infancy, Metaphysical
in youth, and Positive--that is, Scientific, without being Religious--in
mature manhood.[82] Now, this analogical argument, to have any
legitimate weight, must proceed on the assumption of two facts. The
first is, that the law of individual development commences, in the case,
at least, of all who belong to the _elite_ of humanity, with Theology,
and terminates in Atheism; and the second is, that the individual is, in
this respect, the type or pattern of his race, and that the experience
of the one is only an outline in miniature of the history of the other.
It would be difficult, we think, to establish the truth of either of
these positions by evidence that could be satisfactory to any reflecting
mind. We cannot doubt, indeed, for experience amply attests, that the
religious sensibilities of childhood have often been sadly impaired in
the progress from youth to manhood, and that, after the tumultuous
excitements, whether of speculation or of passion, not a few have sought
a refuge from their fears in the cold negations of Atheism. But is this
the law of development and progress? Is it a law that is uniform and
invariable in its operation? Are there no instances of an opposite kind?
Are there no instances of men whose early religious culture had been
neglected, and who passed through youth without one serious thought of
God and their relation to Him, but who, as they advanced in years, began
to reflect and inquire, and ultimately attained to a firm religious
faith? If such diversities of individual experience are known to exist,
then clearly the result is not determined by any necessary or invariable
law of intellectual development; but must be ascribed to other causes,
chiefly of a moral and practical kind, which exert a powerful influence,
for good or evil, on every human mind. Montaigne speaks of an error
maintained by Plato, "that children and old people were most susceptible
of Religion, as if it sprung and derived its credit from our
weakness."[83] And we find M. Comte himself complaining, somewhat
bitterly, that his _quondam_ friend, the celebrated St. Simon, had
exhibited, as he advanced in years (_cette tendance banale vers une
vague religiosite_), a tendency towards something like Religion.[84]
Cases of this kind are utterly fatal to his supposed law of individual
development, and they must be equally fatal to his theory of the
progress of the human race.

Hitherto we have considered merely the reasons which M. Comte urges in
support of his theory, and have endeavored to show that they are utterly
incapable of establishing it as a valid scientific doctrine. It may be
useful, however, to advert, in conclusion, to some considerations which
afford decisive objections against it, arising from the testimony of
authentic history and the plainest principles of reason.

In so far as the testimony of history and tradition is concerned,
nothing can be more certain than that the progress of the race has
followed a very different course from that which M. Comte has traced out
for it by his grand fundamental law. The theory of a primitive state of
ignorance and barbarism, in which a rude Theology existed, in the form
of Fetishism, is opposed not more to the authority of Scripture, the
earliest record of our race, than to the unanimous voice of antiquity,
which attests the general belief of mankind in a primeval state of light
and innocence. There is a sad but striking contrast between the views
which are generally held by the Christian Theist, and those which are
avowed by M. Comte on this subject. The Christian Theist admits the
doctrine of a primeval Revelation and a pristine state of purity and
peace; M. Comte maintains the doctrine of a primitive barbarism and a
natural aboriginal Superstition. The Christian Theist believes in a fall
subsequent to the creation of man, and ascribes the ignorance and error,
the superstition and idolatry which ensued, to the perversion and abuse
of his intellectual and moral powers; M. Comte affirms that man did not
_fall_, that he did actually _rise_ by a process of slow but
progressive self-elevation, and that, in _advancing_ from Fetishism to
Polytheism, and from Polytheism to Monotheism, and from Monotheism to
Atheism, he has all along been determined by the law of his normal
development. In the view of the Christian Theist, Revelation was the sun
which shed its cheering rays on the first fathers of mankind, and which,
after having been obscured, for a time, by the clouds and darkness of
Superstition, shines out again, clear and strong, under the dispensation
of the Gospel; in the view of M. Comte, Science is the only sun that is
destined to enlighten the world,--a sun which has not yet fully risen,
but which has sent before, as the harbingers of its speedy advent, a few
scattered rays to gild the lofty mountain peaks, while all beneath is
still buried in Cimmerian darkness. The Christian Theist anticipates the
time when the true light which now shineth shall cover the whole earth;
M. Comte predicts its utter and final extinction, when Positive Science
shall have risen into the ascendant. His theory is contradicted by the
history of the past; let us hope that the events of the future will
equally belie his prediction. For Christianity is the only hope of the
world. The prospects of man would be dark indeed on the supposition of
its being abolished. "There might remain among a few of the more
enlightened some occasional glimpses of religious truth, as we find to
have been the case in the Pagan world; but the degradation of the great
mass of the people to that ignorance, and idolatry, and superstition,
out of which the Gospel had emancipated them, would be certain and
complete. This retrograde movement might be retarded by the advantages
which we have derived from that system, whose influence we should
continue to feel long after we had ceased to acknowledge the divinity of
its source. But these advantages would by degrees lose their efficacy,
even as mere matters of speculation, and give place to the workings of
fancy, and credulity, and corruption. A radiance might still glow on
the high places of the earth after the sun of Revelation had gone down;
and the brighter and the longer it had shone, the more gradual would be
the decay of that light and warmth which it had left behind it. But
every where there would be the sad tokens of a departed glory and of a
coming night. Twilight might be protracted through the course of many
generations, and still our unhappy race might be able to read, though
dimly, many of the wonders of the eternal Godhead, and to wind a dubious
way through the perils of the wilderness. But it would be twilight
still; shade would thicken after shade; every succeeding age would come
wrapped in a deeper and a deeper gloom; till, at last, that flood of
glory which the Gospel is now pouring upon the world would be lost and
buried in impenetrable darkness."[85]

M. Comte's theory is liable to another objection, the force of which he
seems, in some measure, although inadequately, to have felt and
acknowledged. The three states or stages, which he describes as
necessarily _successive_, are, in point of fact, _simultaneous_. They do
not mark so many different eras in the course of human progress,--they
denote the natural products of man's intelligence, the constituent
elements of his knowledge in _all_ states of society. The Theological,
the Metaphysical, and the Scientific elements have always coexisted.
Diverse as they may be in other respects, they resemble each other in
this,--they are all the natural and spontaneous products of man's
intelligent activity. That they were, to a certain extent,
_simultaneous_ at first, and that they are _simultaneous_ still, is
actually admitted by M. Comte, while he conceives, nevertheless, that
they are radically incompatible with each other;[86] and their
coexistence hitherto is felt by him to be a serious objection to his
fundamental law, which represents them not only as _necessarily
successive_, but also as _mutually exclusive_. The fact is admitted, and
that fact is fatal to his whole theory. For if the three methods have
coexisted hitherto, why may they not equally coexist hereafter? And what
ground is left for the reckless prediction that Theology is doomed, and
_must_ fall before the onward march of Positive Science? If man was able
from the beginning to observe, to compare, to abstract, and to
generalize, and if the fundamental laws of human thought have been ever
the same, it follows that there must have been a tendency, coeval with
the origin of the race, towards Theological, Metaphysical, and Inductive
Speculation, and that the same tendency must continue as long as his
powers remain unchanged. It can only, therefore, be a _preponderance_,
more or less complete, of one of the three methods over the other two,
that we should be warranted in expecting, _even under the operation of
M. Comte's favorite law_; and yet he boldly proclaims the utter
exclusion of Metaphysics, and the entire and everlasting elimination of
Theology, as branches of human knowledge!

M. Comte's theory is still more vulnerable at another point. The
fundamental assumption on which it is based is utterly groundless. It
amounts to this, that all knowledge of causes, whether efficient or
final, is interdicted to man, and incapable of being reached by any
exertion of his faculties.[87] He tells us that Theology is impossible,
for this reason, that, in the view of the Positive Philosophy, all
knowledge of causes is absolutely excluded; nay, he admits that Theology
is inevitable if we inquire into causes at all. We know of no simpler or
more effectual method of dealing with his specious sophistry on this
subject, than by showing that, if his general principle be conclusive
against the knowledge of God, it is equally conclusive against the
knowledge of any other being or cause; just as Sir James Mackintosh
dealt with the skeptical philosophy of Hume, when, with admirable
practical sagacity, he said: "As those dictates of experience which
regulate conduct must be the objects of belief, all objections which
attack them, in common with the principles of reasoning, must be utterly
ineffectual. Whatever attacks every principle of belief, can destroy
none. As long as the foundations of knowledge are allowed to remain on
the same level with the maxims of life, the whole system of human
conviction must continue undisturbed.... Skepticism has practical
consequences of a very mischievous nature. This is because its
_universality_ is not steadily kept in view and constantly borne in
mind. If it were, the above short and plain remark would be an effectual
antidote to the poison. But, in practice, it is an armory from which
weapons are taken to be employed against _some_ opinions, while it is
hidden from notice that the same weapons would equally cut down _every
other_ conviction. It is thus that Mr. Hume's _theory of causation_ is
used as an answer to arguments for the existence of the Deity, without
warning the reader that it would equally lead him to expect--that _the
sun will not rise to-morrow_."[88]

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