Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws

J >> James Buchanan >> Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws

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But suppose, even, that the _Acarus Crossii_ were admitted to be a real
product of Galvanic action on the silicate of potash, and an undeniable
instance of "a non-generative origin of life," how would the
illustrative example accord with the author's general theory? It might
afford a specimen of aboriginal production; but how would it fit in with
his favorite doctrine of _a gradual and progressive advancement_ from
the lower to the higher forms of organization? The _Acarus_, at first
supposed to be a new and hitherto unknown creature, is now acknowledged
to be one of a very familiar species,--a species which may have
deposited its ova, and propagated its kind, since the commencement of
the present order of things, and whose eggs might very well resist the
action even of nitrate of copper, since the creature itself could live
in that poisonous mixture. Moreover, it belongs, in point of
organization, to one of the highest orders of organisms; not to the
_radiata_, not to the _mollusca_, but to the highest type of the
_articulata_, the nearest to the _vertebrata_. Had it been a monad,--a
mere living cell,--which Galvanism evolved from the solution, and had
this primary product developed itself afterwards in various forms,
according to the ascending scale of a progressively improving
organization, it might have accorded admirably with the twofold doctrine
of spontaneous generation and transmutation of species; but,
unfortunately, the first process is so perfect, in the present instance,
as to leave little room for the second, and we are almost tempted to
hope that perhaps the clumsy and troublesome expedient of a
transmutation of species may yet be superseded by the discovery of some
method,--we know not what,--whereby not only the _articulata_, but the
_vertebrata_, and even Man himself, may be immediately produced by some
new combination of Nature's elemental laws![47]

We have given prominence, in the first instance, to the doctrine of
"spontaneous" or "aboriginal" production, because it constitutes an
indispensable part of the Theory of Development, and because we believe
that, were this clearly understood, that theory would soon sink into
general discredit or total oblivion, like the kindred speculations of
Anaximander and Anaxagoras, of the old Ionic School. The experiments of
Ehrenberg, instituted with the view of testing the doctrine of
spontaneous generation, may be said to have decided the whole question.
They did not succeed, indeed, in explaining every apparently exceptional
case, for some of the facts are still obscure, and will probably
continue to be so, notwithstanding every extension of microscopic power,
just as, in the analogous case of the Nebulae, the increase of telescopic
power has enabled us to resolve not a few of them into clusters of
stars, while it has served to bring others yet unresolved within the
range of our vision. But they were sufficient, at least, to show that,
as far as our clear knowledge extends, the one uniform law, "_Omne vivum
ex ovo_," universally prevails, and that the whole analogy of Nature, in
so far as its constitution has been ascertained, is adverse to the
doctrine of spontaneous generation. Ehrenberg detected the minute germs
of vegetable mould, and the ova of some of the smallest animalcules; and
when it is considered that these germs and ova are so tenacious of
vitality that certain prolific seeds have come down to us from the age
of the Pharaohs in the wrappings of the Egyptian mummies,--that they are
widely diffused in the air and the waters, insomuch that no sooner does
a coral reef appear above the level of the sea than it is forthwith
covered with herbage by means of seeds wafted by the winds or deposited
by the waves,--and that it is almost impossible to exclude them by any
artificial expedient, since they are capable of resisting the action of
boiling water and even of alcohol itself,--it cannot, we think, be
denied that the few cases which still remain obscure or unexplained may
be, at least, _probably_ accounted for in accordance with the same
natural law which is found to be invariably established in every
department to which our clear knowledge extends.

In regard, again, to the supposed "transmutation of species," we are
equally warranted in affirming that it is destitute of all experimental
evidence, and unsupported even by any natural analogy. As the doctrine
of spontaneous generation stands opposed to the maxim that _organic life
can be produced only by organic life_, so the doctrine of a
transmutation of species stands opposed to the equally certain maxim
that _like produces like, both in the vegetable and animal kingdoms_.
Cuvier has demonstrated, with reference to the birds and reptiles
preserved in Egypt, an entire fixity and uniformity of species, in
every, even the least, particular, for at least three thousand
years.[48] In the actual course of Nature we see no tendency to change;
nay, a barrier seems to have been erected in the constitution of Nature
itself to prevent the possible confusion of races by promiscuous
intercourse, through that provision which renders the mule incapable of
reproduction. No plant has ever been found in a state of transition from
a lower to a higher form; no instance has ever been produced of one of
the algae being transmuted into the lowest form of terrestrial
vegetation; nor of a small gelatinous body developing itself into a
fish, a bird, or a beast; nor of an ourang-outang rising into a man.[49]
It is true, indeed, that "there is a capacity in all species to
accommodate themselves, to a certain extent, to a change of external
circumstances, this extent varying greatly according to the species.
There may thus arise changes of appearance or structure, and some of
these changes are transmissible to the offspring; but the mutations thus
superinduced are _governed by constant laws and confined within certain
limits_. Indefinite divergence from the original type is not possible,
and the extreme limit of possible variation may usually be reached in a
short period of time; in short, species have a real existence in Nature,
and a transformation from one to another does not exist."[50]

The whole science of Natural History is based on the existence of
distinct species, capable of being discriminated from each other by
certain characteristic marks; and the whole art of the agriculturist and
the stockbreeder proceeds on the assumption of a law, invariable in its
operation, whereby "like produces like in the vegetable and animal
worlds." The instances to which the author of "The Vestiges" refers in
support of his theory are utterly frivolous when opposed to the copious
inductions to which they are opposed; and they may all be explained
consistently with the _law of variation within definite limits_, as
stated by Dr. Whewell, or by our ignorance of all the conditions
involved in each particular case. Nor is his argument founded on the
limited range of our observation, even with its singular illustration
derived from Mr. Babbage's calculating engine, fitted to diminish, in
the slightest degree, our confidence in the general results of these
inductions; for, not to mention that it amounts to nothing more than an
appeal from what we do know to what we do not know, from knowledge to
ignorance, from the certainties of science to the mere possibilities of
conjecture, it has been well shown by Mr. Miller, that our range of
observation is not so limited as the author of "The Vestiges" would have
us to believe, since "_extent of space_ is, in a matter of this kind,
equivalent to _duration of time_. For, although no man has lived five
hundred years, so as to observe the gradual development of the oak from
the acorn in its various stages of progress, yet every man who can
survey five hundred yards of an English forest, can see the oak in every
stage of its growth, and need have no doubt as to the law of its
progressive development. And so, had there really been such a
transmutation of species as is contended for, we might expect to find,
somewhere on the vastly extended sea coasts of our islands and
continents, some specimens of plants or animals in a state of transition
from the lower to the higher forms."

We are told, indeed, in answer to this argument, that Mr. Babbage's
engine produces numbers according to a certain law up to a particular
point, and then, most unexpectedly, perhaps even unaccountably, the law
of the series is changed, and the next term exhibits a striking
departure from the order previously followed; and so, it is argued, it
may be in nature. Each organism may propagate after its kind for immense
periods, so as to give the impression of this being an invariable law;
but at a certain stage the order may change, and the next term in the
series may differ from all that went before it. The argument--if it can
be called an argument--amounts to this: Mr. Babbage's machine produces a
_series of numbers, and of numbers only_, but according to different
laws of succession; _ergo_, Nature may produce in the same way, and with
similar variations, _different races of plants and animals_. The
argument would have been perfect if the engine had produced _something
else than numbers_; if, as Professor Dod supposes, "while watching Mr.
Babbage's machine, presenting to us successive numbers by the revolution
of its plates, we should suddenly see one of those plates resolving
itself into types, and these types arranging themselves in the order of
a page of 'Paradise Lost,' or even of 'The Vestiges of Creation;'--in
such a case, there might have been something in the argument; but even
then, the withering question remains, Is there any man in his senses who
would not immediately conclude that _some new cause was now at work_?"

In short, in so far as the _facts of the case_ are concerned, there is
not only no known instance either of "spontaneous generation" or of
"transmutation of species," but there is not even any natural analogy
that can give the theory the slightest aspect of verisimilitude. The
author of "The Vestiges" thinks that a presumption in its favor may be
derived from "the analogy of the inorganic world,"--in other words, from
the supposed conversion of nebulae into planets and astral systems by the
operation of natural causes; but this analogy has been conclusively set
aside by disproving the hypothesis on which it depends. He further
thinks that a favorable presumption may be derived from "the analogy of
the organic world,"--in other words, from the process of propagation by
which the races of plants and animals are perpetuated; but the
presumption thence derived, so far from being favorable, is directly
opposed to his theory, since all the facts which come under our
cognizance in every department of Nature serve only to establish the two
great maxims of Natural History,--that _organic life can spring only
from organic life_, and that _like produces like, both in the vegetable
and animal world_.

If we have succeeded in disposing of _the facts of the case_, we shall
have little difficulty in exposing _the fallacy of the principles_ which
are involved in the author's speculations on this subject. It is of
fundamental importance, in this inquiry, to form a clear and correct
conception of the precise point at issue, and of the two alternatives
between which we are called to make our choice. It has been well said
that "the great antagonist points in the array of the opposite lines are
simply the LAW of Development _versus_ the MIRACLE of Creation."[51] And
the author of "The Vestiges" virtually acknowledges this to be the real
state of the question, when he says that "if we can see no _natural_
origin for species, a _miraculous_ one must be admitted."[52] Now, the
grand alternative being Creation by Miracle or Creation by Law, that is,
Creation by a Natural or by a Supernatural cause, we affirm that it is
utterly presumptuous and unphilosophical to represent the one as less
worthy of God, or more derogatory to His infinite perfections, than the
other. Yet the author does not hesitate to say that the _natural_ ought
to be preferred to the _miraculous_ method of accounting for the origin
both of planets and of their inhabitants, for this among other reasons,
that the latter would be derogatory to the wisdom and power of the Most
High. His words are remarkable: "The Eternal Sovereign arranges a solar
or an astral system by dispositions imparted primordially to matter; He
causes, by the same majestic means, vast oceans to form and continents
to rise, and all the grand meteoric agencies to proceed in ceaseless
alternation, so as to fit the earth for a residence of organic beings.
But when, in the course of these operations, fuci and corals are to be
for the first time placed in those oceans, a particular interference of
the Divine power is required; and this special attention is needed
whenever a new family of organisms is to be introduced,--a new fiat for
fishes, another for reptiles, a third for birds; nay, taking up the
present views of Geologists as to species, such an event as the
commencement of a certain cephalopod, one with a few new nodulosites and
corrugations upon its shell, would, on this theory, require the
particular care of that same Almighty who willed at once the whole means
by which infinity was replenished with its worlds?" ... "Is it
conceivable, as a fitting mode of exercise for Creative Intelligence,
that it should be constantly paying a special attention to the creation
of species, as they may be required in each situation throughout those
worlds at particular times? Is such an idea accordant with our general
conception of the dignity, not to speak of the power, of the Great
Author?" ... "It would be distressing to be compelled to picture the
power of God as put forth _in any other manner_ than in those slow,
mysterious, universal laws which have so plainly an eternity to work
in."[53]

Such is the author's presumptuous decision on a matter which is far "too
high for him." We offer the following remarks upon it:

_First_ of all, let it be observed that, unless on the principle of
absolute Atheism, which he professes to repudiate, he cannot but
acknowledge that _once_, at least, the power of God must have been put
forth _in another manner_ than "in those slow, mysterious, universal
laws" of which he speaks; and that, even if he could succeed in
disproving "repeated interferences of creative power," he could in
nowise dispense with a primitive act of direct, immediate, supernatural
creation, since he does not profess to believe in the eternal existence
of matter and its laws. We find, indeed, that even in the subsequent
acts of a continuous, but mediate creation, he is compelled to
acknowledge a supernatural power as acting, in each individual case,
according to established natural laws; for he says expressly, "There
cannot be _an inherent intelligence in these laws_; the intelligence
appears _external to the laws_, something of which the laws are but as
the expression of the will and power. If this be admitted, the laws
cannot be regarded as primary or independent causes of the phenomena of
the physical world. We come, in short, to a being beyond Nature,--its
Author, its God." ... "When we speak of Natural Law, we only speak of
_the mode in which the Divine power is exercised_; it is but another
phrase for _the action of the ever-present and sustaining God_."[54] It
is admitted, then, _first_, that there must have been a primary act of
creation, in the highest and strictest sense, by a direct and immediate
interposition of Divine power, at the commencement of created existence;
and, _secondly_, that, even in the continuous work of creation, which is
supposed to have been subsequently carried on after the method of
development by established natural laws, Divine agency is still equally
real, although it is differently manifested, and is indispensably
necessary to account for the resulting products. Now, can it be
reasonably asserted that the direct and immediate creation of such a
being as Man would be more derogatory to the wisdom and power of God
than the primordial production of "a universal Fire-Mist," or even of
"electricity and albumen?" or, will it be pretended that immediate
creation of molluscs as molluscs, of fishes as fishes, of reptiles as
reptiles, would be less worthy of the great Author of Nature than the
establishment of a system which _must_ in due time give them birth, and
that, too, not without the concurrence and cooeperation of the Divine
will; for "natural law is but another phrase for _the action_ of the
ever-present and sustaining God?"

But, while we hold that there is no good ground for an affirmative
answer to these questions, we would carefully guard against rushing to
the opposite extreme, and affirming, either that the production of new
races by the method of natural law was, on _a priori_ grounds,
impossible, or that God might not have adopted that method, had He so
pleased, in perfect consistency with the manifestation of His wisdom and
power. We see that He has done so, under the actual constitution of
Nature, so far as the production of _individuals_ is concerned; we see
not why a similar provision might not have been made for the production
of _genera and species_. In either way His power and His wisdom might
have been displayed. But, when we are told that the one is derogatory to
the Divine Majesty, and the other alone consistent with the loftiest
views of His perfections, we denounce the whole speculation as one that
is alike presumptuous and unphilosophical, on the simple but conclusive
ground that we are in no degree competent judges of the best method
either of creating or of governing the world. Had we been asked to say
whether it was likely that, under the rule of infinite wisdom and
almighty power, certain insects, reptiles, and fishes, that are
unattractive to the eye, and loathsome to the fastidious taste of many,
could find a place at all among the works of God, we might have thought
it improbable that they should be created; but they exist
notwithstanding, and the fact of their existence is enough to silence
all our presumptive reasonings. And surely it is not less--it is much
more--presumptuous to affirm that, existing as they do, they could not
have been brought into being, without disparagement to Divine wisdom,
otherwise than by the action of established laws, or by a process of
natural development; as if it were unworthy of God to _produce_ that for
whose production He confessedly did make _provision_.

But, further, we see here very strikingly exemplified the tendency of
such speculations to _exclude God from all real, active, and direct
connection with His works_. The dominion of Natural Law, which, as we
shall afterwards see, is held by M. Comte and Mr. Combe to exclude the
doctrine of a special Providence and the efficacy of prayer, is here
extended, by the author of "The Vestiges," so as to be exclusive also of
any direct Divine interposition in the work of Creation itself, other
than what may have been implied in the aboriginal production of matter
and its laws, or in the subsequent concurrence of His will with the
action of these laws in the established order of Nature.

We have said that the Theory of Development, as expounded in "The
Vestiges," is not necessarily atheistic, partly because the author
professedly disclaims Atheism, and partly also because, in strict logic,
it might still be possible, even on the basis of that theory, considered
simply in itself and apart from the speculations with which it has been
associated, to construct, from the actual phenomena of Nature, a valid
proof for the being and attributes of God. And yet we have thought it
necessary to advert to it as one of the recent speculations of science,
because, whatever may be its _professed aim_, its _practical tendency_
is unquestionably hostile to the influence of religious truth. It will
be found, in the great majority of cases, and especially in the case of
ardent youthful minds, that this theory, when it is embraced as an
article of their philosophic creed, is, to all practical purposes,
tantamount to Atheism. For not to insist on the consideration, so
forcibly stated by others,[55] that the natural argument for the
Immortality of Man, or for the doctrine of a Future Life, as implying
distinct individuality and continued self-consciousness, must be
materially weakened, if not entirely neutralized, by a theory of
development which traces the human lineage up through the monkeys and
fishes to albumen impregnated by electricity, or, further still, to a
diffused Nebula or universal Fire-Mist,--we think that the Sensational
and Materialistic speculations with which the work abounds have a
tendency to weaken the evidence for a living, personal, spiritual God,
as the Creator and Moral Governor of the world, and to diminish that
reverence, confidence, and love, which these aspects of His character
alone can inspire. The system of Epicurus, although it contained a
formal recognition of a First Cause, has always been held to be
practically atheistic, simply because it removed God from the active
superintendence of the affairs of the world, and excluded the doctrine
of a special providence and of a moral government. It was held, in the
words of Cicero, "Epicurum verbis reliquisse Deos,--re sustulisse."[56]
And so, in "The Vestiges," Natural Law is substituted for Supernatural
Interposition, not only in the common course of Providence, but in the
stupendous work of Creation itself.

SECTION III.

THEORY OF _SOCIAL_ OR _HISTORICAL_ DEVELOPMENT.--AUGUSTE COMTE.

It might have been thought that the principle of Development had
exhausted its powers, and achieved its highest triumphs, when it had
been applied successively to account, first, for the creation of planets
and astral systems, and, secondly, for the production of vegetable and
animal life; and that little could remain for it to do after it had
succeeded in tracing the genealogy of MAN back, in a direct line through
many generations, to the nebulous matter or luminous Fire-Mist which was
diffused at the beginning of time throughout the Universe. But, on a
more careful study of its last and highest product,--MAN, with his
intellectual and moral nature, his religious beliefs, his social
history, and his immortal hopes,--it seemed as if there were still some
phenomena which remained to be accounted for, some facts of palpable
reality and great magnitude which had not yet been adequately explained.
The mental faculties and their operations, the moral laws that are
universally recognized and appealed to, the social institutions which
have been established, the religious beliefs and feelings which have
generally prevailed, and the rites of worship which have been observed
in all ages and climes, were so widely different from the phenomena of
mere vegetable or animal life, that they seemed to demand a distinct
account of their origin; and it might not be apparent, at first sight,
how they could be reduced under the same all-pervading law by which the
planets were formed, so as to exclude all idea of Divine supernatural
interposition. This Herculean task was fearlessly undertaken, however,
by M. AUGUSTE COMTE, and it has been elaborated with singular ability in
his ponderous work, the "Cours de Philosophie Positive."

M. Comte's Course of Positive Philosophy began to be delivered at Paris
in the winter of 1829-30, and was completed in its published form in
1842-43. It comprehends a general outline of all the branches of
Inductive Science, and of the relations which they bear to each other;
and they are expounded in a style singularly copious, clear, and
forcible. He has acquired, in consequence, a high reputation as a
philosophical thinker, and has already found, in our own country, some
able allies, and not a few enthusiastic admirers. The "System of Logic,"
by John Stuart Mill, and "The Biographical History of Philosophy," by
G. H. Lewes, are avowedly indebted to his speculations for some of their
most characteristic contents; while the outline of his theory has been
presented to the more popular class of readers in England through the
columns of "The Leader," and in Scotland through those of "The Glasgow
Mechanics' Journal."

It is not my intention, nor is it necessary for my present purpose, to
offer any remarks on the strictly scientific portion of his voluminous
work. I shall confine myself exclusively to those speculations which
bear, more or less directly, on the great cause of Natural and Revealed
Religion, selecting them from all the various parts of his work, and
exhibiting them, in one comprehensive view, as a compact theory of
absolute and avowed Atheism.

The fundamental idea of his system is a supposed "law of the development
of human thought," which regulates and determines the whole progress of
the species in the acquisition of knowledge. This law is announced with
the air of a man who has made a great discovery, and who is entitled, in
consequence, to be regarded both as an original thinker, and as a
benefactor to the world. "I believe," he says, "that I have discovered a
grand fundamental law,"--"the fundamental law of the development of the
human mind;" ... "the grand law which I have indicated in the first part
of my system of Positive Politics, ... where I have divulged, for the
first time, the discovery of this law."[57] Now, what, it may be asked,
is this marvellous discovery, which bids so fair both to immortalize its
author and to enlighten the world? It is stated briefly in the _first_,
and illustrated at greater length in the _fourth_ and following volumes
of his work. The general outline of his theory is thus sketched: "That
law consists in this,--that each one of our leading conceptions, every
branch of our knowledge, passes successively through _three different
theoretic states_: the state theological or fictitious, the state
metaphysical or abstract, and the state scientific or positive. In other
words, the human mind, by its nature, employs successively, in each of
its researches, three methods of philosophizing, whose character is
essentially different, and even _radically opposed_: first, the
Theological method; then, the Metaphysical; and, last of all, the
Positive. Hence three systems of Philosophies, which _mutually exclude
each other_. The first is the necessary starting-point of the human
mind; the third is its fixed, ultimate state; the second is purely
provisional, and destined merely to serve as an intermediate stage."[58]

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