Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws

J >> James Buchanan >> Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws

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"We should blush," says Bishop Warburton, "to be thought so uninstructed
in the nature of _prayer_, as to fancy that it can work any temporary
change in the dispositions of the Deity, who is 'the same yesterday,
to-day, and forever.' Yet we are not ashamed to maintain that God, _in
the chain of causes and effects_, which not only sustains each system,
but connects them all with one another, hath so wonderfully contrived,
that the temporary endeavors of pious men shall procure good and avert
evil, by means of that 'preestablished harmony' which He hath willed to
exist between _moral actions_ and _natural events_."

"But should some frigid skeptic, therefore, dare
To doubt the all-prevailing power of prayer;
As if 'twere ours, with impious zeal, to try
To shake the purposes of Deity;
Pause, cold philosopher, nor snatch away
The last, the best, the wretched's surest stay.
Look round on life, and trace its checkered plan,
The griefs, the joys, the hopes, the fears of man;
Tell me, if each deliverance, each success,
Each transient golden dream of happiness,
Each palm that genius in the race acquires,
Each thrilling rapture virtuous pride inspires,
Tell me, if each and all were not combined
In the great purpose of the Eternal Mind?

* * * * *

Thus while we humbly own the vast decree,
Formed in the bosom of Eternity,
And know all secondary causes tend
Each to contribute to one mighty end;
Yet while these causes firmly fixed remain--
Links quite unbroken in the endless chain,
So that could one be snapped, the whole must fail,
And wide confusion o'er the world prevail;
Why may not our petitions, which arise
In humble adoration to the skies,
Be foreordained the causes, whence shall flow
Our purest pleasures in this vale of woe?
Not that they move the purpose that hath stood
By time unchanged, immeasurably good,
_But that the event and prayer alike may be
United objects of the same decree._"[216]

On the whole, we feel ourselves warranted, and even constrained, to
conclude that the theory of "government by natural law" is defective in
so far as it excludes the superintendence and control of God over all
the events of human life, and that neither the existence of second
causes nor the operation of physical laws should diminish our confidence
in the care of Providence and the efficacy of Prayer.

FOOTNOTES:

[181] CICERO, "De Natura Deorum," lib. I. c. 44.

[182] HOWE, "Works," I. 104. CUDWORTH, "Intellectual System," I. 120,
144.

[183] M. COMTE, "Cours," VI. 149, 247, 295. SPINOZA, "Tractatus
Theol.-politicus," pp. 57, 102, 122, 144, 150, 319.

[184] DR. CHANNING, "Memoirs," II. 439. ROBT. BOYLE, "Free Inquiry into
the Notion of Nature," p. 7.

[185] PROFESSOR SEDGWICK, "Discourse," fifth edition, p. CLIII. MR.
COMBE, "Constitution of Man," p. 417.

[186] Proverbs 6: 27; Psalm 68: 2; 83: 14; James 3: 12; Matthew 7: 16;
Proverbs 8: 29; Job 38: 11, 33; Psalm 119: 90; Jeremiah 31: 35; 33: 25.

[187] DR. M'COSH, "On the Divine Government," pp. 126, 129, 149.

[188] "Westminster Confession," c. v., Sec. II., III.

[189] M. COMTE, "Cours," IV. 663, 669; V. 259, 277; VI. 702, 780. J. S.
MILL, "Logic," I. 397, 417, 422; II. 109, 471. LEWES, "Biographical
History," I. 14; III. 55; IV. 9, 42.

[190] DR. REID, "Essays," III. 44. DR. M'COSH, "Divine Government," 88,
91, 111, 114.

[191] SIR JOHN HERSCHELL, "Address to the British Association," 1845.

[192] DR. THOS. BROWN, "Essay on Cause and Effect," p. 86. DR. THOS.
REID, "Essays," I. 136. PIERRE POIRET, "De Deo, Anima, et Malo."

[193] DR. THOMAS BROWN, "Essay on Cause and Effect," pp. 74, 83, 93,
108, 191.

[194] GEORGE COMBE, ESQ.

[195] "Reasoner," XII. 21, 23.

[196] HOLYOAKE, "Grant and Holyoake's Discussion," p. 40.

[197] GEORGE COMBE, "Constitution of Man," pp. 150, 155, 163, 165, 234,
343, 358.

[198] MR. COMBE, "Constitution of Man," VI., IX., 25, 39, 41.

[199] MR. SCOTT, "Harmony of Phrenology with Scripture," pp. 82, 97.

[200] CITIZEN KENNEDY, "Nature and Revelation Harmonious," pp. 70, 122,
124, 131.

[201] MR. COMBE, "Constitution of Man," pp. 25, 53, 306, 364.

[202] F. B. BARTON, "The Reasoner," XI. 24, 373.

[203] VOLNEY, "La Loi Naturelle," which has been translated, and is
usually appended to his "Ruins of Empires."

[204] BUTLER'S "Analogy," p. 1. c. 7.

[205] WARBURTON'S "Works," X. p. 8.

[206] DR. PRICE'S "Dissertations," p. 198.

[207] DR. PRICE, "Dissertations," pp. 208, 219.

[208] Daniel 9: 2, 19.

[209] Ezekiel 36: 37.

[210] DR. CHALMERS, "Works," II. 286.

[211] Ibid., 325.

[212] HON. ROB. BOYLE, "Theolog. Works," II. 96, III. 230. PRESIDENT
EDWARDS, "Works," X. 1.

[213] EULER, "Letters to a German Princess," I. 271.

[214] DR. WOLLASTON, "Religion of Nature," p. 103.

[215] DR. ROBT. GORDON, "Sermons," p. 369.

[216] It is with melancholy pleasure that the author recalls and
reproduces, after an interval of thirty years, the lines of his early
college companion,--WILLIAM FRIEND DURANT,--a young man of high promise,
removed, like his distinguished fellow-student, ROBERT POLLOCK, by what
might seem a premature death, but for the prospect of immortality.

CHAPTER VI.

THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE.

When we survey the actual course of God's Providence, by which the
eternal purposes of the Divine Mind are carried into effect, we discern
immediately a marked difference between _two great classes of events_.
The one comprehends a multitude of events which are so regular, stable,
and constant, that we feel ourselves warranted in reckoning on their
invariable recurrence, in the same circumstances in which they have been
observed; they seem to be governed by an unchangeable, or at least an
established law. The other comprehends a different set of events, which
are so irregular and variable that they occur quite unexpectedly, and
cannot be reduced to any rule of rational computation; they
appear,--perhaps from our ignorance,--to be purely accidental or
fortuitous.

In exact accordance with this difference between the two great classes
of Providential events, there is a similar difference in our _internal
views or sentiments_ in regard to them. We are conscious of two totally
dissimilar feelings in contemplating them respectively. We have a
feeling of certainty, confidence, or assurance in regard to the one; and
a feeling of uncertainty, anxiety, and helplessness in regard to the
other; while for an intermediate class of events, there is also an
intermediate state of mind, equally removed from entire certainty and
absolute doubt, arising from the various degrees of _probability_ that
may seem to belong to them. These are at once natural and legitimate
sentiments in the circumstances in which we are placed; for
unquestionably there is much in these circumstances that is fitted to
produce and cherish them all; and when they are combined,--especially
when they are duly proportioned, in the case of any individual, they
induce a habit or frame of mind most favorable to the recognition of
God's Providence, and most conducive to our welfare, by impressing us
with a sense both of our _dependence_ on His supreme will, and of our
_duty to be diligent_ in the use of all appointed means. But when
_either_ of the two classes of events is exclusively considered, or the
sentiments appropriate to them inordinately cherished, there will be a
tendency, in the absence of an enlightened belief in Providence, towards
one or other of two opposite extremes:--the extreme, on the one hand, of
resolving all events into results of physical agencies and mechanical
laws, acting with the blind force of "destiny," and leaving no room for
the interposition of an intelligent Moral Ruler; and the extreme, on the
other hand, of ascribing all events to accidental or fortuitous
influences, equally exempt from His control. The _former_ is the theory
of "Fate," the _latter_ is the theory of "Chance;" and both are equally
opposed to the doctrine which affirms the eternal purpose and the actual
providence of an omniscient and all-controlling Mind.

It matters little, with reference to our present purpose, whether or not
every department of Nature be supposed to be equally subject to "natural
laws;" for even were it so, still if these laws were either in part
unknown and undiscoverable by us, or so related to each other that the
results of their manifold possible combinations could not be calculated
or reckoned on by human wisdom or foresight, ample room would be left
for the exercise of _diligence_ within the limits of our ascertained
knowledge, and yet for a sense of _dependence_ on a power which we feel
ourselves unable either to comprehend or control. On the ground of
analogy, we think it highly probable that every department of Nature
_is_ subject to regular and stable laws; and on the same ground we may
anticipate that, in the progressive advance of human knowledge, many new
fields will yet be conquered, and added to the domain of Science. But
suppose every law were discovered,--suppose, even, that every individual
event should be shown to depend on some natural cause, there would still
remain at least _two_ considerations which should remind us of our
_dependence_. The first is our ignorance of the whole combination of
causes which may at any time be brought into action, and of the results
which may flow from them in circumstances such as we can neither foresee
nor provide against. The second is our ignorance, equally unavoidable
and profound, of the intelligent and voluntary agencies which may be at
work, modifying, disposing, and directing that combination of causes, so
as to accomplish the purposes of the Omniscient Mind. Our want of
knowledge in either case is a reason for uncertainty; and our
uncertainty in regard to events in which we may be deeply concerned is
fitted to teach us our dependence on a higher Power. Let it not be
thought, however, that our argument for God's Providence is drawn merely
from man's _ignorance_, or that its strength must diminish in proportion
as his knowledge of Nature is extended; on the contrary, it rests on the
assumption that _man knows enough to be aware that he cannot know all_,
and that as long as he is not omniscient, he must be dependent on Him
who alone "knows the end from the beginning," and "who ruleth among the
armies of heaven" as well as "among the inhabitants of this earth."

It is in the invariable combination and marvellous mutual adjustment of
these two elements,--the regular and the variable, the constant and the
casual, the certain and the uncertain,--that we best discern the wisdom
of that vast scheme of Providence, which is designed at once to secure
our _diligence in the use of means_, and to impress us with a sense of
our _dependence on a higher Power_. And the same remark may be equally
applicable, _mutatis mutandis_, to the revealed constitution of things,
since Scripture itself exhibits certain definite truths surrounded with
a margin of mystery like "lights shining in a dark place;" and while it
prescribes and encourages diligence in the use of means, teaches us at
the same time our dependence on the Divine blessing which alone can
render our efforts effectual. Both elements, therefore, must be taken
into account and kept steadily in view, if we would form a comprehensive
conception of the method of the Divine government, or a correct estimate
of the wisdom with which it is adapted to the case of created and
dependent, but intelligent, active, and responsible beings. But when the
one is either dissevered from the other, or viewed apart and exclusively
by itself, when the mind dwells on either, to the neglect of what is
equally a part of the same comprehensive scheme, then we are in danger
of adopting a partial and one-sided view of Providence, and of lapsing
into one or other of the opposite extremes,--the theory of "Chance" or
the theory of "Fate."

A few remarks on each of these theories may be neither unseasonable nor
useless, if they serve to illustrate the different kinds of Atheism
which have sprung from them, and to place in a clear and strong light
the radical difference which subsists between both, and the doctrine of
Providence, as it is taught and exemplified in Scripture.

1. The theory of "Chance," which was once the stronghold of Atheism, is
now all but abandoned by speculative thinkers, and exists only, if at
all, in the vague beliefs of uneducated and unreflecting men. This
result has been brought about, not so much by the Metaphysical or even
the Theological considerations which were urged against the theory, as
by the steady advance of Science, and the slow but progressive growth of
a belief in "law" and "order" as existing in every department of
Nature. It has been undeniably the effect of scientific inquiry to
banish the idea of Chance, at least from as much of the domain as has
been successfully explored, and to afford a strong presumption that the
same result would follow were our researches extended beyond the limits
within which they are yet confined. To this extent there is truth in the
reasonings of M. Comte as applied to _Chance_, while they have no
validity or value as applied to _Providence_; and we deem it a noble
tribute to Science when it can be said of her with truth, that she has
been an effective auxiliary to Religion in overthrowing the once vaunted
empire of that blind power.

At one time some ascribed all the works both of Creation and Providence
to Chance, and spoke of a fortuitous concourse of _atoms_ in the one
case, and of a fortuitous concurrence of _events_ in the other. The
Atomic theory, which, as a mere physiological hypothesis, is far from
being necessarily Atheistic, and which has been adopted and defended by
such writers as Gassendus and Dr. Goode,[217] was applied by Epicurus
and Lucretius to account for the fortuitous origin of existing beings,
and also for the fortuitous course of human affairs. No one now, in the
present advanced state of science, would seriously propose to account
either for the creation of the world, or for the events of the world's
history, by ascribing them to the operation of Chance; the current is
flowing in another direction; it has set in, like a returning tide,
towards the universal recognition of "general laws" and "natural
causes," such as, from their invariable regularity and uniformity, are
utterly exclusive of everything like chance or accident in any
department of Nature. Instead of ascribing the creation of the world to
a fortuitous concourse of atoms, modern speculation would refer it to "a
law of development" such as is able of itself to insure the production
of astral systems in the firmament, and also of vegetable and animal
races on the earth, without any direct or immediate interposition of a
higher power; and instead of ascribing the events of history and the
"progress" of humanity to a fortuitous or accidental origin, modern
speculation would refer them to "a law of social or historical
development," such as makes every succeeding state the natural, and,
indeed, necessary product of a prior one, and places the whole order of
sequences--whether physical, moral, political, or religious--under the
government of "natural law," as contradistinguished from that of a
"supernatural will." There is thus a manifest tendency to resile from
the old theory of Chance, and to take refuge in the new asylum of Law,
Order, or Destiny. There is, apparently, a wide difference between the
two contrasted systems; and yet the difference may be, after all, more
seeming than real: for both the old doctrine of "chance" and the new
theory of "development" are compelled to assume certain conditions or
qualities as belonging to the primordial elements of matter, without
which it is felt that neither Chance nor Fate can afford a satisfactory
account of the works either of Creation or Providence. The one party
spoke more of "Chance," the other speaks more of "Law;" but both were
compelled to feel that neither Chance nor Law could _of themselves_
account for the established order of Nature, without presupposing
certain conditions, adjustments, and dispositions of matter, such as
could only be satisfactorily explained by ascribing them to a wise,
foreseeing, and designing Mind.

In the present state of philosophical speculation, which evinces so
strong a tendency to reduce everything to the dominion of "Law," it may
seem unnecessary to refer to the doctrine of "Chance" at all; but
believing as we do that there are, and ever must be, certain events in
the course of life, and certain facts in the complex experience of man,
which will irresistibly suggest the idea of it, even where the doctrine
is theoretically disowned, we think it right to lay down a distinct and
definite position on this subject, such as may serve, if duly
established, at once to neutralize whatever is false and noxious in the
doctrine of Chance, and at the same time to preserve whatever is true
and wholesome in it, as having a tendency to illustrate the actual
scheme of Divine Providence. And the position which we are disposed to
state and prepared to establish is this: That, with reference to God, as
an omniscient Being, there is, and there can be, no such thing as
"Chance;" while, with reference alike to men and angels, many events may
be fortuitous or accidental, not as being independent of causes, but as
depending on causes unknown, or on combinations of causes whose joint
operation may result in effects absolutely undiscoverable by our limited
intelligence.

This position consists of _two_ parts. It affirms that with reference to
God and His omniscient knowledge, there can be nothing that is
fortuitous, accidental, or unexpected. It affirms, with reference to man
and all created intelligences, that there may, or even must, be much
uncertainty in regard to the products of natural causes, especially when
they act in combination, and come into play in circumstances which we
cannot foresee or control. Many events may thus be casual, accidental,
or unexpected to men, which are not so to the supreme governing
Intelligence. The first part of the position is proved by the general
evidence which warrants us in ascribing omniscience, and especially an
unerring prescience, to the Divine Mind; and it cannot be denied,
without virtually ascribing _ignorance_ to God. The second part of the
position is established by some of the most familiar facts of
experience. We know and feel that however certain all events are to the
omniscient knowledge of the Most High, many of them are entirely beyond
the reach of our limited foresight; and this because they are either
dependent on individual causes which are unknown to us, or on a
combination of various causes, too complex to admit of any rational
computation in regard to their results.

The "calculation of chances" has been reduced to something like
scientific accuracy;[218] and it has been applied, with beneficial
effect, to the insurance of life and property on land and at sea. Even
the casual events of human history may be said, in a certain sense, to
be governed by fixed laws. The _aggregate result_ in such cases may be
tolerably certain, while the _individual cases_ are very much the
reverse; and hence human wisdom, proceeding on a well-ascertained body
of _statistics_, may construct a scheme for securing some against the
evils to which they would otherwise have been liable, by means of the
sacrifices of others, who would not have been in fact, although they
might have been, for ought they know, liable to the same. But what is
this, if it be not a practical acknowledgement of the uncertainty in
which all are placed in regard to some of the most important interests
of the present life? or how can it be said that chance or accident is
altogether, and in every sense, exploded, when large bodies of men are
found to combine, and that, too, at a considerable personal sacrifice,
for the express purpose of protecting themselves, so far as they can,
from the hazards to which they are individually exposed?

In the sense above explained, we cannot consent to discard "Chance"
altogether, either at the bidding of those who resolve everything into
"natural laws," or even in deference to the authority of others who
ascribe all events to Divine Providence. It may be true that all events,
however apparently casual or fortuitous, are governed by "natural laws;"
it may be equally true that all events are determined, directed, or
controlled by Divine Providence: but as long as some events depend on
causes which are certainly known, and other events on causes which are
not known, or on a combination of causes whose results cannot be
foreseen, so long will there be room for the distinction between the
_regular_ and the _accidental_ phenomena of human experience. This
distinction, indeed, is explicitly recognized in Scripture itself; for
while it speaks of all events as being infallibly known to God, it
speaks of some events that are _accidental_ with reference to man.[219]
The unknown, unforeseen, and unexpected incidents of life, which
constitute all that is apparently casual or accidental, may be, and we
believe they are, really subject both to natural laws and to God's
providential will; but they are removed far beyond our comprehension or
control; and being so, they are admirably fitted, as a part of the
complex scheme of His natural and moral government, to serve one of the
most important practical ends for which it is designed, by impressing us
with a sense of constant dependence on a higher Power, and of dutiful
subjection to a superior Will.

But while, in this sense and to this extent, the doctrine of "Chance" is
retained, it must be utterly rejected as a means of accounting either
for the creation or government of the world. For, on the supposition of
a Supreme Being, there can be no _chance_ with reference to Him; and
without such a supposition, we cannot account for the regularity which
prevails in the course of Nature, and which indicates a presiding
Intelligence and a controlling Will. . 2. But this very regularity of
Nature, when viewed apart from the cross accidents of life, is apt to
engender the opposite idea of "Fate" or "Destiny," as if all events were
determined by laws alike necessary and invariable, inherent in the
constitution of Nature, and independent of the concurrence or the
control of the Divine will. We are not sure, indeed, that the idea of
Fate or Destiny is suggested solely, or even mainly, by the regular
sequences of the natural world; we rather think that it is more
frequently derived from those unexpected and crushing calamities which
occur in spite of every precaution of human foresight and prudence, and
that thus it may be identified, in a great measure, with the doctrine of
Chance, or, at least, the one may run into and blend with the other. But
if any attempt were made to establish it by proof, recourse would be had
to the established order and regular sequences of Nature, as affording
its most plausible verification, although they afford no real sanction
to it, in so far as it differs from the Christian doctrine of
Providence.

Dr. Cudworth discusses this subject at great length, and makes mention
of _three_ distinct forms of Fatalism. The first, which is variously
designated as the Democritic, the Physiological, or the Atheistic Fate,
is that which teaches the material or physical necessity of all things,
and ascribes all natural phenomena to the mechanical laws of matter and
motion. The second, which is described as a species of Divine or
Theistic Fate, is that which admits the existence and agency of God, but
teaches that He both _decrees_ and _does_, _purposes_ and _performs_ all
things, whether good or evil, as if He were the only real agent in the
universe, or as if He had no moral character, and were, as Cudworth
graphically expresses it, "_mere arbitrary will omnipotent_:" this he
describes as a "Divine Fate immoral and violent." The third, which is
also designated as a species of Divine or Theistic Fate, is that which
recognizes both the existence of God, and the agency of other beings in
Nature, together with the radical distinction between moral good and
evil, but teaches that men are so far under necessity as to be incapable
of moral and responsible action, and unfit subjects of praise or blame,
of reward or punishment: this he describes as "Divine Fate moral and
natural." These _three_ are all justly held to be erroneous or defective
views of the Divine government, and, as such, they are strenuously and
successfully opposed.[220]

But there is room for a _fourth_ doctrine, which may be designated as
the Christian doctrine of Providence, and which combines in itself all
the great fundamental truths for which Dr. Cudworth contends, while it
leaves open, or, at least, does not necessarily determine, some of the
collateral questions on which he might have differed from many of its
defenders. This doctrine affirms, first, the existence and attributes of
God, as a holy and righteous Moral Governor; secondly, the real
existence and actual operation of "second causes," distinct from, but
not independent of, "the First Cause;" thirdly, the operation of these
causes according to their several natures, so that, under God's
Providence, events fall out "either necessarily, freely, or
contingently," according to the kind of intermediate agency by which
they are brought to pass; and, fourthly, that in the case of intelligent
and moral agents, ample room is left for responsible action, and for the
consequent sentence of praise or blame, reward or punishment,
notwithstanding the eternal decree of God, and the constant control
which He exercises over all His creatures and all their actions. These
four positions may be all harmoniously combined in one self-consistent
and comprehensive statement; and, in point of fact, they are all
included in the Christian doctrine of Providence, as that has been
usually explained and defended by the various sections of the Catholic
Church. Not one of them is omitted or denied.[221] They seem fairly to
meet, or rather fully to exhaust, the demands of Dr. Cudworth himself,
when he says: "These three things are, as we conceive, the fundamentals
or essentials of true religion, first, that all things in the world do
not float without a head or governor, but that there is a God, an
omnipotent understanding Being, presiding over all; secondly, that this
God being essentially good and just, there is something in its own
nature immutably and eternally just and unjust, and not by arbitrary
will, law, and command only; and lastly, that there is something [Greek:
eph' hemin], or that we are _so far forth_ principals or masters of our
own actions as to be _accountable_ to justice for them, or to make us
guilty or blameworthy for what we do amiss, and to deserve punishment
accordingly." All these fundamentals of true religion are explicitly
recognized in the Christian doctrine of Providence, which stands out,
therefore, in striking contrast with the Atheistic, and even Theistic,
theories of Fate which he condemns; and they are as zealously maintained
(whether with the same _consistency_ is a different question) by
Edwards, Chalmers, and Woods, on the one side, as they ever were by
Cudworth, Clarke, and Tappan, on the other.

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