Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws

J >> James Buchanan >> Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws

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These views are strikingly confirmed by the remarks of a writer in "The
Reasoner," who blames Mr. Combe for complicating his argument
unnecessarily and uselessly with some of the truths of Theism, and who
thinks that the doctrine of "natural laws" can only be consistently
maintained on the ground of Atheism. "If the system of Nature," he says,
"be viewed by itself, without any reference to a Divine Author or
all-perfect Creator,--merely as an isolated system of facts,--no
comparison could be made, no reconciliation would be necessary, and the
system of Nature would be regarded as the result of some unknown cause,
a combination of good and evil, and no more to be censured or wondered
at for being what it is, than any single substance or fact in Nature
excites censure or surprise on account of its peculiar constitution....
The assumption of a Supernatural Being as the author and director of the
laws of Nature appears to me to be attended with several mischievous
results. First, you make every infringement of the laws of Nature an
offence against the supposed Divine Legislator, which, to a pious and
conscientious mind, must give rise to distressing remorse.... Again,
under this view, the penalties incurred will often be very unjust,
oppressive, and cruel; as where persons are placed in circumstances that
compel them to violate the laws of Nature, as when they are obliged to
pursue some unwholesome employment which injures their health and
shortens their lives; or where the penalty is incurred by an accident,
as when a person breaks a leg or an arm, or is killed by a fall; or
where a person is materially or fatally injured in endeavoring to save
another person from injury or death. In such cases as these, to
represent the unavoidable pain or death incurred or undergone for an act
of beneficence, as a punishment inflicted for a transgression of the
laws of God the Divine Legislator, is to violate all our notions of
justice and right, to say nothing of goodness or mercy, and to represent
the Divine Being as grossly unjust and cruelly vindictive.... Again, if
all suffering, however unavoidably incurred, is to be regarded as a
punishment from the Divine Legislator, to attempt to alleviate or
remove the suffering thus incurred would be to fly in the face of the
Divine authority, by endeavoring to set aside the punishment it had
inflicted; just as it would be an opposition to the authority of human
laws to rescue a prisoner from custody, or deliver a culprit from
punishment."[202]

3. We deem it another radical defect in Mr. Combe's theory of "natural
laws," that he represents the _distinct existence and independent action
of these laws_ as "the key to the Divine government," as the one
principle which explains all apparent irregularities, and accounts
satisfactorily for the casualties and calamities of human life. We
cannot doubt, indeed, either the wisdom or the benevolence of that
constitution of things under which we live, nor dispute the value and
importance of those laws according to which the world is ordinarily
governed. We admit that the suspension of any one of these laws, except
perhaps on some signal occasion of miraculous interposition, would go
far to unsettle and derange the existing economy. But "natural
laws"--whether viewed individually or collectively, and whether
considered as acting independently of each other, or as mutually related
and interdependent--cannot afford of themselves any key to the Divine
government, or any solution of the difficulties of Providence. We must
rise to a far higher platform if we would survey the whole scheme of the
Divine administration: we must consider, not merely _the independent
operation_ of the several classes of "natural laws," but also their
_mutual relations_, as distinct but connected parts of one vast system,
in which the "physical and organic" laws are made subordinate and
subservient to the "moral," under the superintendence of that Supreme
Intelligence which makes the things that are "seen and temporal" to
minister to those things which are "unseen and eternal;" we must
carefully discriminate, as Bishop Butler has done, between the mere
"natural government" which is common to man with the inferior and
irresponsible creation, and the higher "moral government" which is
peculiar to intelligent and accountable agents; and we must seek to know
how far--the reality of both being admitted--the former is auxiliary or
subservient to the latter, and whether, on the whole, the system is
fitted to generate that frame of mind, and to inculcate those lessons of
truth, which are appropriate to the condition of man, as a subject of
moral discipline in a state of probation and trial. Nothing short of
this will suffice for the explanation of the Divine government, or for
the satisfaction of the human mind. It is felt to be a mere insult to
the understandings, and a bitter mockery to the feelings, of men, to
talk only of "natural laws," or even of their "independent action" in
such a case, to tell a weeping mother that her child died, and died too
as the transgressor of a wise and salutary "natural law" which
establishes a certain relation between opium and the nervous system:
for, grant that the law is wise and salutary, grant that evil would
result from its abolition, grant even that it acts independently of any
other law, physical or moral, still the profounder question remains,
whether such an event as the death of a tender child, through the
operation of a law of which that child was necessarily ignorant, can
properly be regarded as a punishment inflicted by Divine justice? and
whether a theory of this kind can afford "a key to the government of
God?"

Such are some of the radical and incurable defects of Mr. Combe's theory
of "natural laws." We ascribe it to him simply because he has been the
most recent and the most popular expounder of it. But it is not
original, nor in any sense peculiar to him alone. He acknowledges his
obligations in this respect to a manuscript work of Dr. Spurzheim,
entitled, "A Sketch of the Natural Laws of Man;" and he refers, somewhat
incidentally, to Volney's "Law of Nature," published originally as a
Catechism, and afterwards reprinted under the title, "La Loi Naturelle;
_ou, Principes Physiques de la Morale_." The same theory, in substance,
had been broached in the "Systeme de la Nature," and _there_ it was
applied in support of the atheistic conclusions of that remarkable
treatise. But it may be said to have been _methodized_ by Volney; and in
his treatise it is exhibited in a form adapted to popular
instruction.[203] There is a striking resemblance between his
speculations and those of Mr. Combe. He, too, acknowledges the existence
of God; but virtually supersedes His Providence by the substitution of
"natural laws." The "law of Nature" is defined as "the constant order by
which _God_ governs the world," and is represented as the most universal
"rule of action." That law is supposed to be a command or a prohibition
to act in certain cases, accompanied with the natural sanction of
_reward and punishment_. After giving several examples of "natural
laws," which are all merely _general facts_ or the generalized results
of experience, he describes man's relation to these laws almost in the
words of Mr. Combe. "Since all these, and similar facts," he says, "are
unchangeable, constant, and regular, there result for man as many true
laws to which he must conform, with the express clause of a _penalty
attached to their infraction_, or of a benefit attached to their
observance; so that if a man shall pretend to see well in the dark, if
he acts in opposition to the course of the seasons or the action of the
elements, if he pretends to live under water without being drowned, or
to touch fire without being burned, or to deprive himself of air without
being suffocated, or to drink poison without being destroyed, he
receives for each of these infractions of the 'natural laws' a corporeal
_punishment_, and one that is proportioned to his offence; while, on
the contrary, if he observes and obeys every one of these laws, in their
exact and regular relations to him, he will preserve his existence, and
make it as happy as it can be."

This code of "natural laws" is then described by Volney as possessing no
fewer than _ten_ peculiar characteristics, which give it a decided
preeminence over every other moral system, whether human or Divine,--as
being _primitive, immediate, universal, invariable, evident, reasonable,
just, peaceful, beneficial_, and alone _sufficient_. But it is so only
when viewed in connection with the miserably low and meagre system of
morals with which it is avowedly associated. For when morals are
described as a mere physical science, founded on man's organization, his
interests and passions,--when the treatise, according to its _second_
title, is professedly an attempt to expound the _physical principles of
morals_,--and when, in pursuance of this plan, all the principles of
Ethics are rigorously reduced to _one_, namely, the principle of
self-preservation, which is enforced, as a duty, by the only sanctions
of pleasure and pain,--it is not wonderful that, _for such an end_, the
"natural laws" might be held sufficient: but it is wonderful that any
mind capable of a moment's reflection should not have perceived that, in
such a system, the cardinal idea of _Deity_ is altogether omitted, or
left unaccounted for, in the case of Man, and that no attempt is made to
explain or to account for anything that is properly _moral_ in the
government of God.

* * * * *

On a review of these speculations, it is important to bear in mind that
the existence of natural laws is not necessarily exclusive of a
superintending Providence. Their operation, on the contrary, may afford
some of the strongest proofs of its reality. For, whether considered as
a scheme of _provision_ or as a system of _government_, Divine
Providence rests on a strong body of natural evidence. In the one
aspect, it upholds and preserves all things; in the other, it controls
and overrules all things for the accomplishment of the Divine will.
Considered as a scheme of government, it is either _natural_ or _moral_.
To the former, all created beings without exception are subject; to the
latter, only some orders of being,--such, namely, as are intelligent,
voluntary, and responsible agents. In the case of man, constituted as he
is, the Physical, Organic, Intellectual, and Moral laws are all
combined; and he is subject, therefore, both to a _natural_ government,
which is common to him with all other material and organized beings, and
also to a _moral_ government, which is peculiar to himself as a free and
accountable agent. The _natural_ government of God extends to all his
creatures, and includes man considered simply as one of them; and its
reality is proved, first, by the _laws_ to which all created things are
subject, and which they have no power to alter or resist; secondly, by
the _final causes_ or beneficial ends which are obviously contemplated
in the arrangements of Nature, and the great purposes which are actually
served by them; and, thirdly, by the _necessary dependence_ of all
created things on the will of Him to whom they owe alike the
commencement and the continuance of their being. But the natural
government of God, which extends to _all_ His creatures, does not
exhaust or complete the doctrine of His Providence: it includes also a
scheme of _moral_ government, adapted to the nature, and designed for
the regulation, of His intelligent, voluntary, and responsible subjects.
And the reality of a moral government may be proved, _first_, by the
_moral faculty_, which is a constituent part of human nature, and which
makes man "a law to himself;" _secondly_, by the _essential nature_ of
virtuous and vicious dispositions, as being inherently pleasant or
painful; _thirdly_, by the _natural consequences_ of our actions, which
indicate a sure connection between moral and physical evil; and,
_fourthly_, by the _moral atmosphere_ in which we are placed, as being
members of a community in which the distinction between right and wrong
is universally acknowledged, and applied in the way of approbation or
censure. By such proofs, the Providence of God may be shown to be a
scheme both of _natural_ and _moral_ government,--two aspects of the
same system which are _equally real_, yet _widely different_. But the
distinction between the two, although founded on a real and radical
difference, is not such as to imply that they have no relation to each
other, or no mutual influence, as distinct but connected parts of the
same comprehensive scheme. They are not isolated, but interpenetrating;
they come into contact at many points, and _the natural is made
subordinate and subservient to the moral_. For there is a beautiful
gradation in the order of the established laws of Nature. The physical
laws are made subordinate and subservient to the organic; both the
physical and organic are subservient to the intellectual; the physical,
organic, and intellectual are subservient to the moral; and the
intellectual and moral are subservient to our preparation for the
spiritual and eternal. In the words of Bishop Butler, "The natural and
moral constitution and government of the world are _so connected_ as to
make up together but _one scheme_; and it is highly probable that the
first is formed and carried on merely in _subserviency to the latter_,
as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized bodies for
minds."[204]

Every instance of pleasure or pain arising from the voluntary actions of
men, is a proof that a relation of some kind has been established
between all the distinct, but independent, provinces of Nature; and the
invariable connection between moral and physical evil shows how the
lower are made subservient to the higher departments of the Divine
government. Apart from a scheme of moral discipline, there is no reason
discernible, _a priori_, why pain should be the accompaniment or
consequent of one mode of action rather than another; and the relations
which have been established, in the natural constitution of things,
between sin and misery, affords a strong proof not only of the _reality_
of a moral government, but of the _subordination_ of physical and
organic agencies to its great designs.

This relation between the _natural_ and the _moral_ government of God is
admirably illustrated by Bishop Warburton: "The application of _natural
events_ to _moral government_, in the common course of Providence,
connects the character of Lord and Governor of the intellectual world
with that of Creator and Preserver of the material.... The doctrine of
the _preestablished harmony_,--the direction of natural events to moral
government,--obviates all irreligious suspicions, and not only satisfies
us that there is but _one_ governor of both systems, but that both
systems are conducted by _one_ scheme of Providence. To form the
constitution of Nature in such a manner that, without controlling or
suspending its laws, it should continue, throughout a long succession of
ages, to produce its physical revolutions as they best contribute to the
preservation and order of its own system, just at those precise periods
of time when their effects, whether salutary or hurtful to many, may
serve as instruments for the government of the moral world: for example,
that a foreign enemy, amidst our intestine broils, should desolate all
the flourishing works of rural industry,--that warring elements, in the
suited order of _natural_ government, should depopulate and tear in
pieces a highly-viced city, just in those very moments when _moral_
government required a warning and example to be held out to a careless
world,--is giving us the noblest as well as the most astonishing idea of
God's goodness and justice.... When He made the world, the free
determinations of the human will, and the necessary effects of laws
physical, were so fitted and accommodated to one another, that a sincere
repentance in the _moral_ world should be sure to avert an impending
desolation in the _natural_, not by any present alteration or suspension
of its established laws, but by originally adjusting all their
operations to all the foreseen circumstances of moral agency."[205]

Viewed in this light, the course of Providence is wonderfully adapted to
the constitution of human nature, since it affords as much _certainty_
in regard to some things as is sufficient to lay a foundation for
forethought, prudence, and diligence in the use of means, and yet leaves
so much remaining _uncertainty_ in regard to other things as should
impress us with a sense of constant _dependence_ on Him "in whom we
live, and move, and have our being." The constitution of Nature and the
course of Providence in the present state seem mainly intended to teach
these _two_ lessons,--first, of _diligence_ in the use of means, and,
secondly, of _dependence_ on a Higher Power: for there is sufficient
_regularity_ in the course of events to encourage human industry in
every department of labor; and yet there is as much _uncertainty_,
arising from the endless complication of causes and the limited range of
human knowledge, as should impress us with a sense of our utter
helplessness. The wisdom of God in the government of the world may be
equally manifested in the _regular order_ which He has established, and
which, within certain limits, man may be able to ascertain and reckon on
as a ground of hopeful activity; and in the _apparent casualty_ and
_inscrutable mystery_ of many things which can neither be divined by
human wisdom, nor controlled by human power. It matters not whether the
remaining uncertainty is supposed to arise from some classes of events
not being subject to regular laws, or from our ignorance of these laws,
and the variety of their manifold combinations. In either case, it is
certain that, in our actual experience, and, so far as we can judge, in
the experience of every creature not possessed of omniscient knowledge,
these two elements are and must be combined,--such a measure of
_certainty_ as should encourage industry in the use of means, and such
a measure of remaining _uncertainty_ as should keep them mindful that
they are not, and never can be, independent of God.

SECTION III.

THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER.

The doctrine of Providence lays a firm foundation for the duty of
Prayer. In the case of all intelligent, moral, and responsible beings,
the mere existence of a Divine government to which they are subject,
would seem to imply an obligation to own and acknowledge it; and this
obligation is best fulfilled by the exercise of prayer, which is a
practical testimony alike to man's _dependence_ and to God's _dominion_.

Prayer, in its widest sense, includes the whole homage which man is
capable of rendering to God as the sole object of religious worship; and
it implies the recognition of all His supreme perfections and
prerogatives as the Creator and Governor of the world. It is usually
described[206] as consisting, first, in "adoration,"--in which we
express our sense of His rightful supremacy and absolute perfection, and
do homage to Him for what He is in himself; secondly, in
"thanksgiving,"--in which we express our sense of gratitude for all His
kindness and care, and do homage to Him for the benefits which He has
bestowed; thirdly, in "confession,"--in which we express our sense of
sin in having transgressed His law, and do homage to Him as our moral
Governor and Judge; and, fourthly, in "petition,"--in which we express
our sense of dependence alike on His providence and grace, and do homage
to Him as the "Father of lights, from whom cometh down every good and
perfect gift." Of these, the _three first_ are so evidently reasonable
and becoming, so necessarily involved in the simplest idea which we can
form of our relations to God and of the obligations which result from
them, that few, if any, of those who admit the existence and providence
of the Supreme Being, will deny that the sentiments themselves are
appropriate to our condition, however they may doubt the necessity or
the duty of giving formal utterance to them in the language of religious
worship. But in regard to the _fourth_, which, if it be not the most
sublime or elevated, is yet the most urgent motive to the exercise of
devotion, many difficulties have been raised and many objections urged,
which do not apply, at least in the same measure, to the other parts of
Prayer, and which, in so far as they prevail with reflecting minds,
would soon lead to the practical neglect of _all_ religious worship. The
practice of offering up "petitions" either for ourselves or others, with
the view of thereby obtaining any benefit, whether of a temporal or
spiritual kind, has been denounced, and even ridiculed, as an
unphilosophical attempt to alter the established course of Nature, or
the preordained sequences of events. The supposition of its "efficacy"
has been represented as a flagrant instance of superstitious ignorance,
worthy only of the dark ages, and even as a presumptuous blasphemy,
derogatory to the unchangeable character of the Supreme. Some have held,
indeed, that while prayer can have no real efficacy either in averting
evil or procuring good, it may nevertheless be both legitimate and
useful, by reason of the wholesome _reflex influence_ which it is fitted
to exert on the mind of the worshipper; and they have recommended the
continuance of the practice on this ground, as if men, once convinced of
its utter inefficacy, _would_ or _could_ continue, with any fervency, to
offer up their requests to God, merely for the sake of impressing their
own minds through the medium of a sort of conscious hypocrisy! We are
told that David Hume, "after hearing a sermon preached by Dr. Leechman,
in which he dwelt on the power of prayer to render the wishes it
expressed more ardent and passionate, remarked with great justice, that
'we can make use of no expression, or even thought, in prayers and
entreaties, which does not imply that these prayers have an influence.'"
This intermediate ground, therefore, is plainly untenable, and we are
shut up to one or other of two alternatives: either there _is_ an
"efficacy" in prayer as a means of averting evil and procuring good,
such as may warrant, and should encourage, us in offering up our
requests unto God; or, there _is no_ such efficacy in it, and no reason
why it should be observed by any of God's intelligent creatures, whether
on earth or in heaven.

The principles which are applicable to the decision of this important
question may be best explained, after adverting briefly to some of the
particular objections which have been urged against the "efficacy of
prayer." Several of these objections evidently proceed on an erroneous
view of the nature and object of prayer. When it is said, for example,
that God, being omniscient, does not need to be informed either of the
wants or the wishes of any of His creatures, the objection involves a
great and important truth,--a truth which was explicitly recognized by
our Lord when He said, "Your heavenly Father knoweth what things ye have
need of before ye ask Him;" but that truth is grievously misapplied when
it is directed to prove that prayer is either superfluous or
ineffectual, since the objection virtually assumes that the object of
prayer is _to inform God of what He did not know before_, and that His
omniscience is of itself sufficient to show that prayer from men or
angels must needs be unavailing. When it is said, _again_, that God
being immutable, His will cannot be affected or altered by the
"petitions" of His creatures, this objection, like the former one,
involves a great and important truth,--a truth which is also explicitly
recognized in Scripture when it is said that "He is without variableness
or the least shadow of turning;" but this truth, too, is grievously
misapplied when it is directed to prove that there can be no efficacy in
prayer, since it might as well be said that the Divine dispensations
must be invariably the same whatever may be the conduct of His creatures
_in other respects_, as that they must be the same whether men do or do
not pray; or, that His procedure as a Moral Governor has no reference
whatever either to the character or conduct of his subjects. But, in the
words of Dr. Price, "God's unchangeableness, when considered in relation
to the exertion of His attributes in the government of the world,
consists, not in always acting in the same manner however cases and
circumstances alter, but in always doing what is right, and varying His
conduct according to the various actions, characters and dispositions of
beings. If, then, prayer makes an alteration in the case of the
suppliant, as being the discharge of an indispensable duty, what would
in truth infer _changeableness_ in Him would be, not His regarding and
answering it, but His _not_ doing this."[207] When it is said, _again_,
that there can be no "efficacy in prayer," because there is an
established constitution and regular course of Nature, by which all
events, whether prosperous or adverse, are invariably determined, and
which cannot be altered or modified without _a miracle_, this objection,
like each of the two former, involves an important truth,--a truth which
is also explicitly recognized in Scripture when it speaks of "the
ordinances of the heavens and the earth," and of the peculiar laws and
properties of all created things; but this truth is also grievously
misapplied when it is directed to prove that God's will has no efficient
control over natural events, or that He has no agencies at His disposal
by which he can accomplish the desires of them that seek Him. In all
these objections there is an apparent truth, but there is also a latent
error; and the false conclusion is founded on an erroneous supposition
in regard to the nature and object of prayer.

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