Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws

J >> James Buchanan >> Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws

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But while the existence of "natural laws" and the operation of "second
causes" are equally admitted, and yet duly discriminated, large room is
still left for diversities of opinion or of statement in regard to _the
precise relation which God sustains to His works_, and especially in
regard to _the nature and method of His agency in connection with the
use of "second causes_." Hence have arisen the various theories which
have appeared successively in the history of Philosophy, and which have
had for their avowed object the explanation of the _connection between
God and Nature_, or the conciliation of Theology with Science.[192]
Hence, first of all, the theory of "occasional causes," as taught by
Father Malebranche, with the laudable, but, as we think, mistaken,
design of vindicating the Divine agency in Providence by virtually
superseding every other power in Nature;--a theory which represents
physical agencies as the mere _occasions_, and God as the sole _cause_
of all changes, which teaches that a healthy eye, with the presence of
light, is not the cause of vision, but the occasion only of that Divine
interposition by which alone we are enabled to see, and that a man's
desire or volition to walk is not the cause of his walking, but the
occasion merely of that Divine interposition which alone puts the proper
muscles in motion. Hence, secondly, the theory of "preestablished
harmony" as taught by Leibnitz;--a theory which was mainly designed to
explain the relation subsisting between the soul and the body, but which
involves principles bearing on the general doctrine of cause and effect,
and applicable to the relation subsisting between God and His works.
This theory teaches that mind and body, although closely united, have no
real influence on each other, that each of them acts by its own
properties and powers, and that their respective operations exactly
correspond to each other by virtue of a "preestablished harmony" between
the two, just as one clock may be so adjusted as to keep time with
another, although each has its own moving power, and neither receives
any part of its motions from the other. This theory, therefore, denies
everything like causal action between mind and matter; and when it is
extended, as it may legitimately be, to the relation between God and the
world, it would seem to imply the coequal existence and independence of
both, and the impossibility of any causal relation between the two. The
manifest defects of these theories have given rise to a _third_, which,
in one of its forms, has been generally adopted by Divines,--the theory
of "instrumental causes."

This theory has assumed two distinct and very different forms. In the
first, all natural effects are ascribed to powers _imparted_ to created
beings, and _inherent_ in them; that is, to powers which are supposed to
have been conferred at the era of Creation, and to be still sustained by
God's will in Providence, subject, however, to be suspended or revoked
according to His pleasure. In the second, which resembles in some
respects the doctrine of "occasional causes," all natural effects are
ascribed to powers not _imparted_, but _impressed_, not belonging to the
natural agent, but communicated by impulse _ab extra_; and God's will is
represented as the only efficient cause in Nature. In both forms of the
theory, the agency of God and the instrumentality of natural means are,
in a certain sense, acknowledged; but in the _former_, second causes are
apt to be regarded as if they were self-existent and independent of God;
in the _latter_, second causes are apt to be virtually annulled, and all
events to be regarded as the immediate effects of Divine volition. Both
extremes are dangerous. For, on the one hand, the operation of second
causes cannot be regarded as necessary and independent, without severing
the tie which connects the created universe with the will of the
Supreme; and, on the other hand, the operation of second causes cannot
be excluded or denied, without virtually making God's will _the only
efficient cause_, and thereby charging directly and immediately on Him,
not only all the physical changes which occur in Nature, but also all
the volitions and actions of His creatures. In order to guard against
these opposite and equally dangerous extremes, we must hold the real
existence and actual operation of "second causes;" while we are careful,
at the same time, to show both that whatever powers belong to any
created being were originally conferred by God, and also that they are
still preserved and perpetuated by Him, subject to his control, and
liable to be suspended or revoked, according to the pleasure of His
will. We would thus have _one First_, and MANY SECOND CAUSES; the former
_supreme_, the latter _subordinate_; really distinct, but not equally
independent, since "second causes" are, from their very nature, subject
to the dominion and control of that Omniscient Mind which called them
into being, and which knows how to overrule them all for the
accomplishment of His great designs.

We are aware that some are unwilling to acknowledge the _efficiency_ of
any "second causes," and seek to resolve all events, even such as are
brought about by the volitions of men, into the will of God, as the only
Agent in Nature. Others, again, admitting the existence of created
spirits, and their operation as real causes, are unwilling to
acknowledge any active powers in _matter_, and are anxious to show that
_mind_, and _mind only_, can be an efficient cause. We see no reason for
this extreme jealousy of "second causes" either in the mental or the
material world. In the mental world, they cannot be denied, as distinct,
although subordinate and dependent, agencies, without virtually making
God's will _the only cause_ in Nature, and thereby representing Him as
the _cause of sin_, if sin, indeed, could exist on that supposition, or
without destroying the distinct individuality and personal
responsibility of man. Man must be regarded as a distinct, though
dependent, _agent_, and, as such, a real, though subordinate, _cause_;
otherwise every action, whether good or evil, must be ascribed directly
and immediately to the efficiency of the Divine will, and _to that
alone_. And in the material world, "second causes" can as little be
dispensed with; for every theory, even the most meagre, must acknowledge
the existence of _some_ power or property in matter, were it only the
passive power or _vis inertiae_ on which all the laws of motion depend.
And if _this_ can be admitted as a power inherent in matter and
inseparable from it, we cannot see why the existence of _other_ powers,
not incompatible with this, should be deemed a whit more derogatory to
the dominion and providence of God. In a certain sense, indeed, God's
will may be said to be the First, the Supreme Cause of all, since
nothing can happen without His permission or appointment: but, in this
sense, the existence of "natural laws" and the operation of "second
causes" are by no means excluded; they are only held to have been
originated at first, and ever afterwards sustained by the Divine Will,
the latter being _supreme_, the former _subordinate_. It may also be
said, in a certain sense, that Mind only is active:[193] for all the
properties and powers of matter are the results of the Divine volition,
and their mode of action is regulated and determined by "laws" which God
has imposed; but it were unphilosophical, as well as unscriptural, to
infer from this that He is the only Agent in the Universe; it is enough
to say that He created the system of Nature, and that He still upholds
and governs it by His Providence.

It must be evident that the speculations to which we have referred have
a close connection with the argument, founded on natural evidence, for
the being, perfections, and providence of God. That argument, in so far
as it depends on the mutual adaptations between natural objects and the
nice adjustments of natural laws, might be seriously impaired by
supposing that there is really only one cause in Nature; whereas the
ascription of certain properties and powers to created beings, whether
mental or material, can have no effect in diminishing its force, since
the evidence depends not so much on the phenomena of _physical_, as on
those of _moral_ causation.

On the whole, we conclude that the existence of "natural laws" and the
operation of "second causes" are recognized alike by the sacred writers
and by sound philosophy; and that neither the one nor the other ought to
be regarded as adverse to any doctrine which, as Christian Theists, we
are concerned to defend.

SECTION II.

THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN CONSIDERED IN ITS RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF
GOD.

"The Constitution of Man considered in Relation to External
Objects,"[194]--such is the title of a popular, and, in some respects,
instructive work, which has obtained, partly through the aid of an
endowment, extensive circulation among the reading class of artisans and
tradesmen. Written in a lucid style, and illustrated by numerous facts
in Natural History and Philosophy, it is skilfully adapted to the
capacities and tastes of common readers, and it is not wonderful that it
should have exerted considerable influence on the public mind. The
character of that influence, and its tendency to induce a religious or
irreligious frame of spirit, has been made a matter of controversial
discussion. On the one hand, Mr. Combe tells us that "'The Constitution
of Man' not only admits the existence of God, but is throughout devoted
to the object of expounding and proving that He exercises a real,
practical, and intelligible government of this world, rewarding virtue
with physical and moral well-being, and punishing vice with want and
suffering." On the other hand, it is manifest, beyond the possibility of
doubt or denial, that if his professed Theism has subjected him to the
charge of being an inconsequent thinker in some of the organs of avowed
Atheism,[195] his favorite arguments in support of "government by
natural law" have been applied by himself, and eagerly welcomed by
others, as conclusive objections to the doctrine of a special Providence
and the efficacy of Prayer.

We do not object to the limitation of his inquiry to the one point of
the relation subsisting between "the Constitution of Man and External
Objects,"--that is a perfectly legitimate, and might be a highly
instructive field of investigation; but we do object to his utter
forgetfulness of that limitation in the progress of his work, and to his
attempt to introduce a variety of other topics which are manifestly
alien from his professed design. If he meant to discuss merely the
relation between the constitution of man and external objects, he had
nothing whatever to do with the far higher and more comprehensive
doctrine respecting the relation between the constitution of man and the
government of God, and, least of all, with the _revealed_ doctrines of a
special Providence, of a fall into a state of sin, of death as its
wages, and of "spiritual influences" by which the ruin occasioned by the
fall may be redressed; and yet these topics, foreign as they are to the
professed design of his work, are all introduced, and treated, too, in a
way that is fitted, if not designed, to shake the confidence of his
readers in what have hitherto been regarded as important articles of the
Christian faith. It has received this significant testimony, "'Combe's
Constitution of Man' would be worth a hundred New Testaments on the
banks of the Ganges."[196]

There are _two points_, especially, on which he comes more directly into
collision with our present argument:

1. He speaks as if God governed the universe _only_ by "natural laws,"
so as to exclude any other dispensation of Providence.

2. He speaks as if the "physical and organic" laws of Nature possessed
the same authority and imposed the same obligation as the "moral" laws
of Conscience and Revelation; and as if the breach or neglect of the
former were _punishable_ in the same sense, and for the same reason, as
the transgression of the latter.

Next to the omission of all reference to a future state, and the total
exclusion of the connection which subsists between the temporal and the
eternal under the Divine government, we hold these _two_ to be the
capital defects of his treatise; and it may be useful, in the present
state of public opinion, to offer a few remarks upon each of them.

In regard to the _first_, we need not repeat what we have already
explicitly declared, that God does govern the world _in part_ by means
of "natural laws" and "second causes;" but, not content with this
concession, Mr. Combe speaks as if He governed the world _only_ by these
means, to the exclusion of everything like a "special Providence," or
"Divine influences." It is not so much in his dogmatic statements as in
his illustrative examples that the real tendency of his theory becomes
apparent. Thus he speaks of "the most pious and benevolent missionaries
sailing to civilize and Christianize the heathen, but, embarking in an
unsound ship, they are drowned by their disobeying a physical law,
without their destruction being averted by their morality;" and, on the
other hand, of "the greatest monsters of iniquity" embarking in a
staunch and strong ship, and escaping drowning "in circumstances exactly
similar to those which would send the missionaries to the bottom." Thus,
again, he speaks of plague, fever, and ague, as resulting from the
neglect of "organic laws," and as resulting from it so necessarily that
they could be averted neither by Providence nor by Prayer; and he
illustrates his views by the mental distress of the wife of Ebenezer
Erskine, and the recorded experience of Mrs. Hannah More.[197] It cannot
be doubted, we think, that in all these cases he speaks as if God
governed the world _only_ by natural laws; and that he does not
recognize any special Providence or any answer to Prayer, but resolves
all events into the operation of these "laws."

Now, there are evidently _two_ suppositions that may be entertained on
this subject: either, that God orders _all_ events to fall out according
to "natural laws" and by means of "second causes;" or, that while He
_generally_ makes use of means in the ordinary course of His Providence,
He reserves the liberty and the power of interposing directly and
immediately, when He sees cause, for the accomplishment of His sovereign
will. These two suppositions seem to exhaust the only possible
alternatives in a question of this kind; and, strange as it may at first
sight appear to be, it is nevertheless true that neither the one nor the
other is necessarily adverse to the doctrine for which we now contend.
Even on the first supposition,--that God orders _all_ events to fall out
according to "natural laws" and by means of "second causes,"--there
might still be room, not, indeed, for miraculous interposition, but for
the exercise of a special Providence and even for an answer to prayer;
for it should never be forgotten that, among the "second causes" created
and governed by the Supreme Will, there are other agencies besides those
that are purely physical,--there are intelligent beings, belonging both
to the visible and invisible worlds, who may be employed, for ought we
know to the contrary, as "ministers in fulfilling His will," and whose
agency may, without any miraculous interference with the established
order of Nature, bring about important practical results, just as man's
own agency is admitted to have the power of arranging, modifying, and
directing the elements of Nature, while it has no power to suspend or
reverse any "natural law." And if God is ordinarily pleased to make use
of means, why should it be thought incredible that He may make use of
the ministry of intelligent beings, whether they be men or angels, for
the accomplishment of His designs? But on the second supposition,--that
while He generally makes use of means in the ordinary course of His
Providence, He reserves the liberty and the power of interposing
directly and immediately when He sees cause,--the doctrine of a special
Providence, including every interposition, natural or supernatural, is
at once established; and we cannot see how Mr. Combe, as a professed
believer in Revelation, which must of course be regarded as a
supernatural effect of "Divine influence," can consistently deny God's
direct and immediate agency in Providence, since he is compelled to
admit it at least on _two_ great occasions, namely, the Creation of the
world, and the promulgation of His revealed will.

In regard, again, to the second capital defect or error of his system,
it may be conclusively shown that he confounds, or fails at least duly
to discriminate, two things which are radically different, when he
speaks as if the "physical and organic laws" of Nature had the same
_authority_, and imposed the same obligations, as the "moral laws" of
Conscience and Revelation, and as if the breach or neglect of the former
were _punishable_, in the same sense, and for the same reason, as the
transgression of the latter.

The declared object of his treatise is twofold: first, to illustrate the
relation subsisting between the "natural laws" and the "constitution of
man;" and, secondly, to prove the _independent operation_ of these laws,
as _a key to the explanation of the Divine government_. In illustrating
the relation between the "natural laws" and the "constitution of man,"
he attempts to show that the natural laws require obedience not less
than the moral, and that they inflict punishment on disobedience: "The
peculiarity of the new doctrine is that these (the physical, organic,
and moral laws) operate independently of each other; that each requires
obedience to itself; that each, in its own specific way, rewards
obedience and punishes disobedience; and that human beings are happy in
proportion to the extent to which they place themselves in accordance
with _all_ of these Divine institutions." In regard to these "natural
laws,"--including the physical, the organic, the intellectual, and the
moral,--_four_ positions are laid down: first, that they are independent
of each other; secondly, that obedience or disobedience to each of them
is followed by reward or punishment; thirdly, that they are universal
and invariable; and, fourthly, that they are in harmony with the
"constitution of man."[198]

Now, in this theory of "natural laws," especially as it is applied to
the doctrines of Providence and Prayer, there seem to be _three_ radical
defects:

1. Mr. Combe speaks of _obedience_ and _disobedience_ to the "physical
and organic" laws, as if they _could_ be obeyed or disobeyed in the same
sense and in the same way as the "moral" laws, and as if they imposed an
obligation on man which it would be sinful to disregard. He has not duly
considered that the moral law differs from the physical and organic laws
of Nature in two important respects: first, that while the former _may_,
the latter _cannot_, be broken or violated by man; and secondly, that
while the former does impose an imperative obligation which is felt by
every conscience, the latter have either no relation to the conscience
at all, or, if they have, it is collateral and indirect only, and arises
not from the mere existence of such laws, but from the felt obligation
of a _moral law belonging to our own nature_, which prescribes
_prudence_ as a duty with reference to our personal conduct in the
circumstances in which we are placed.

That the "physical and organic" laws cannot be broken or violated in the
same sense in which the "moral law" may be transgressed, is evident from
the simple consideration that the violation of a natural law, were it
possible, _would be not a sin, but a miracle_! And that these laws
impose no real obligation on the conscience is further manifest, because
we hold it to be perfectly lawful to counteract, so far as we can, the
operation of one physical or organic law by employing the agency of
another, as in the appliances of Mechanics, the experiments of
Chemistry, and the art of Navigation. When the aeronaut inflates his
balloon with a gas specifically lighter than atmospheric air, or the
ship-builder constructs vessels of wood or iron, so that when filled
with air they shall be lighter than water, and float with their cargo on
its surface, each is attempting to counteract the law of gravitation by
the application of certain other related laws: but no one ever dreams of
their _disobeying_ God in thus availing themselves of one physical agent
to counterpoise another. The "moral law," however, cannot be treated in
the same way, and that simply because it is generically different.

It is true, that _indirectly_ the laws of Nature, when known, may and
ought to regulate our practical conduct; not, however, by virtue of any
obligation imposed _by them_ on our conscience, but solely by virtue of
that law of _moral prudence_ which springs from conscience itself, and
which teaches us that we _ought_ so to act with reference to outward
objects as to secure, so far as we can, our own safety and happiness,
and the welfare of our fellow-men. But there can be no greater blunder
than to confound _the laws of natural objects_ with _the law of human
conduct_; and into this deplorable blunder Mr. Combe has allowed himself
to fall. Throughout the whole of his statements respecting the "natural
laws," there are two things included under one name, which are perfectly
distinct and separate from each other. In the first place, there are the
laws which belong to the constitution of natural objects, and which
regulate their mutual action on one another: in the second place, there
are, in the words of a late sagacious layman, "_rules_ which the
intellect of man is able to deduce for the regulation of his own
conduct, by means of his knowledge of those laws which govern the
phenomena of Nature. These last are perfectly distinct from the former;
and it is a monstrous confusion of ideas to mix them up together....
The true state of the case is this,--it is for our interest to study
these natural arrangements, and to accommodate our conduct to them, as
far as we know them; and in doing so, we _obey_, not those laws of
Nature, physical and organic, but the laws of _prudence and good sense_,
arising from a due use of our moral and intellectual faculties."[199]
Another acute writer,[200] who states the substance of the argument in
very few words, has shown that the theory of "natural laws," as taught
by Mr. Combe, is true in one sense and false in another: "It is _true_,
first, that the Creator has bestowed constitutions on physical objects;
in other words, the constitutions which physical objects possess were
_given_ them, given during His pleasure; secondly, that the
constitutions of physical objects are _definite_,--that is, they are
distinct, individual, and incapable of transmutation _by natural
causes_; thirdly, that no power but the power of the Creator can vary
their constitutions. But it is _not true_, first, that any mode of
action of a physical object is otherwise inherent in it, than as it is
the will of God that that object should _now_ present that mode of
action. Nor is it true, secondly, that it is beyond the power of God to
vary, when He pleases, either temporarily or permanently, the
constitution of physical objects." He further shows that, on Mr. Combe's
principle of "natural laws" being all equally Divine institutions which
must be _obeyed_, "human obedience is a very complicated and perplexing
affair, so complicated and so perplexing as to involve positive
contradictions;" that "the very same act is required by one law, and
forbidden by another, both laws being equally Divine;" and that "we
sometimes cannot obey both the 'organic' and the 'moral' laws." He
concludes that "physical laws ought not to be confounded with laws of
human conduct;" that "these we always must obey, and those we may
often, without deserving blame, boldly disregard;" and that "by
commingling distinct classes of 'natural laws,' Mr. Combe introduces
into his system dangerous error and gross absurdity."

2. Another radical defect in this theory of "natural laws" consists in
its representing the consequences of our ignorance or neglect of them as
_punishments_ in the same sense in which moral delinquencies are said to
be followed by penal inflictions. There is something here which is
totally at variance with the instinctive feelings and moral convictions
of mankind. Mr. Combe affirms that each of the three great classes of
"natural laws" requires _obedience_ to itself, and that each, in its own
specific way, rewards obedience and punishes disobedience. And he gives,
as one example, the case of the most pious and benevolent missionaries
sailing to civilize and Christianize the heathen, but embarking in an
unsound ship, and being drowned _by disobeying a "natural law;"_ as
another, the case of "a child or an aged person, stumbling into the
fire, through mere lack of physical strength to keep out of it;" as
another, the case of "an ignorant child, groping about for something to
eat and drink, and stumbling on a phial of laudanum, drinking it and
dying;" and as another, the case of "a slater slipping from the roof of
a high building, in consequence of a stone of the ridge having given way
as he walked upright along it."[201] In all these cases, the accident or
misfortune which befalls the individual is represented as the
_punishment_ connected with the neglect or transgression of a "natural
law," just as remorse, shame, conviction, and condemnation may be the
punishment for a moral offence. In other words, a child who ignorantly
drinks laudanum is _punished with death_, in the same sense, and for the
same reason, that the murderer is punished with death for shedding the
blood of a fellow-creature; and the poor slater who misses his foot,
and falls, most unwillingly, from a roof or parapet, is _punished with
death_, just as a man would be who threw himself over _with the
intention_ of committing suicide! Surely there is some grave error
here,--an error opposed to the surest dictates of our moral nature, and
one that cannot be glossed over by any apologue, however ingeniously
constructed, to show the evil effects which would follow from a
suspension of the general laws of Nature. For, in the words of Mr.
Scott, it is only where "the law is previously known"--and not only so,
but where the "circumstances which determine the effect might be
foreseen"--that "the pleasures or pains annexed to actions can properly
be termed _rewards and punishments_;" for "these have reference to the
state of mind of the party who is to be rewarded or punished; it is the
intention or disposition of the mind, and not the mere act of the body,
that is ever considered as obedience or disobedience, or thought worthy,
in a moral sense, of either reward or punishment." And as the theory is
thus subversive of all our ideas of moral retribution, so it demands of
man a kind of obedience which it is _impossible_ for him to render,
since _all_ the laws of Nature, and _all_ the states of particular
things at a given time, cannot possibly be known by the ignorant many,
nor even by the philosophic few. The philosopher, not less than the
peasant, may perish through the explosion of a steam engine, or the
unsoundness of a ship, or the casual ignition of his dwelling; and that,
too, without blame or punishment being involved in either case. On Mr.
Combe's theory, it would seem to be necessary that every one should be a
man of science, if he would avoid _sin_ and _punishment_; and yet,
unfortunately, the ablest man of science is not exempt, in the present
state of his knowledge, from the same calamities which befall his less
enlightened, but not less virtuous, neighbors.

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