Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws

J >> James Buchanan >> Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws

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Now, we submit that this method of constructing a philosophy of Nature
is radically vicious, and diametrically opposed to the only legitimate,
the only possible way of attaining to sound knowledge. He is not content
to tell us _what is_ the order of things; he aspires, forsooth, to show
what the order of things _must be_. We have no wish to disparage
Metaphysical Science; it has a natural root in human reason, and a
legitimate domain in the ample territory of human thought; but we
protest against any attempt to extend it beyond its proper boundaries,
or to apply it to subjects which belong to the province of experience
and observation. The schemes which have been recently broached in
Germany, and imitated in France, for constructing, at one time, a
deductive Psychology, at another a deductive Physics, at a third a
deductive Ethics, at a fourth a deductive Theory of Progress, at a
fifth a deductive History of Religion, afford more than sufficient
evidence that hitherto the spirit of the Baconian philosophy has been
little understood, and still less appreciated, by our continental
neighbors; and that the efforts of the highest genius have been sadly
frustrated, in attempting the impracticable task of extracting from mere
reason that knowledge which can only be acquired in the school of
experience. This is our _second_ objection.

3. The system of Spinoza is vicious, because it applies a mere
abstraction of the human mind to account for whatever is real and
concrete in the universe. We have no sympathy with those who rail at all
abstract ideas, as if they were imaginary essences or mere illusions; we
recognize the faculty of abstraction as one of the wisest provisions of
Nature, and one of the most useful powers belonging to the mind of
man,--a power which comes into action with the first dawn of infant
intelligence, and is only matured as reason rises into manhood, till it
becomes the internal spring of all Philosophy and Science. Nor do we
hold that an abstract idea is necessarily an unreality, or a mere
negation; for, without reviving the controversy between the Nominalists
and Realists, or pronouncing any decision on the intricate questions
which that controversy involved, we may say, in general terms, that the
idea of a circle, of a square, or of a triangle, is neither unreal nor
negative, but a very positive, and, withal, intelligible thing. It is
the idea of that which is essential to the nature of each of these
figures respectively, and common to all possible figures of the same
class, whatever may be their accidental varieties, whether in point of
dimension or form. And so the idea of Being or Substance, although it be
highly abstract, is not necessarily unreal or negative; it is the idea
of _existence_, or of that which is common to everything that _is_,
abstraction being made of every diversity by which one being is
distinguished from another. Conscious that we ourselves exist, and
observing that other beings exist around us, we strike off the
peculiarities which belong to individuals, and form the general idea
which includes nothing but what is common to all, and yet contains a
positive element, which is the object of one of the strongest
convictions of the human mind.[125] The conception of Infinite Being
contains the positive element of _being_, abstraction being made of all
_limitation_ or _bounds_. That this is a real, legitimate, and useful
conception, we have no disposition to deny; we cannot divest ourselves
of it; it springs up spontaneously from the innermost fountain of
thought. But we cannot accept the account which Spinoza has given of its
nature and origin, and still less can we assent to the application which
he has made of it. He describes it as the idea of absolute, necessary,
self-existent, eternal Being; and he traces its origin, not to the
combined influence of experience and abstraction, acting under the great
primitive law of _causality_, but to an immediate perception, or direct
_intuition, of reason_. Now, we submit that the concept of _being_, and
the concept of absolute _self-existent being_, are perfectly distinct
from each other, and that they spring from different laws of thought.
The concept of _being_ applies to everything that exists, without
reference to the cause or manner of its existence; and this springs
simply from experience and abstraction. The concept of _self-existent
being_, which is equally suggested by the laws of our mental
constitution, does not apply to everything that exists, but only to that
whose existence is not originated or determined by any other being; and
this concept springs also from experience and abstraction, combined,
however, with the law or principle of _causality_, which teaches us that
no change can occur in Nature, and that nothing can ever come into
being, _without a cause_, and prompts us to infer from _the fact of
existence now_, the conclusion that _something must have existed from
all eternity_. The origin of each of these concepts may thus be
naturally accounted for by the known laws of our mental constitution,
without having recourse to any faculty of _intellectual intuition_ such
as Spinoza describes,--a faculty independent of experience, and superior
to it,--a faculty which gazes direct on Absolute Being, and penetrates,
without the aid of any intermediate sign or manifestation, into the very
essence of God. Spinoza has not discriminated aright between these two
concepts, in respect either of their nature or their origin. He has not
overlooked, indeed, the distinction, between _abstract ideas_ and the
_intellectual intuitions_, of which he speaks; but he confounds the
concept of _being_ with the concept of _self-existent being_, as if the
two were identical, or as if _being_ could not be predicated of
anything, otherwise than as it is a "mode" or affection of the one only
"substance." A sounder Psychology has taught us that our conception of
existence arises, in the first instance, from our own conscious
experience; and that, when this conception subsequently expands into the
idea of Absolute Being, and results in the belief of a necessary,
self-existent, and eternal Cause, the new element which is thus added to
it may be accounted for by the _principle of causality_, which
constitutes one of the fundamental laws of human thought, and which, if
it may be said to resemble _intuition_ in the rapidity and clearness
with which it enables us to discern the truth, differs essentially from
that _immediate intuition_ of which Spinoza speaks, since it is
dependent on experience, and, instead of gazing direct on Absolute
Being, makes use of intermediate signs and manifestations, by which it
rises to the knowledge of "the unseen and eternal."

We submit, further, that a system which rests on the mere idea of Being
as its sole support, cannot afford any satisfactory explanation of real
and concrete existences. The idea of Being is one of our most abstract
conceptions; it is associated, indeed, with an invincible belief in the
reality of Being,--a belief which springs up spontaneously, along with
the idea itself, from our own conscious experience. It is even
associated with an invincible belief in necessary, self-existent, and
eternal Being,--a belief which springs from _the principle of
causality_, or that law of thought whereby, from the fact that something
exists now, we instinctively conclude that something _must_ have existed
from all eternity. But neither the simple concept of Being, which is
derived from experience and framed by abstraction, nor the additional
concept of self-existent Being, which springs from the action of our
rational faculties on the data furnished by experience, can afford any
explanation of the nature and origin of the real, concrete existences in
the universe. These must be studied in the light of their own
appropriate evidence; they must be interpreted, and not divined; they
cannot be inferred deductively from any, even the highest and most
abstract, conception of the human mind. Yet the philosophy of Spinoza
attempts to explain all the phenomena of the universe by the idea of
Absolute Being; it accounts for the concrete by the abstract; it
represents all individual beings as mere modes or affections of one
universal substance; in other words, it _realises_ the abstract idea of
thought and extension, but _denies the existence_ of bodies and souls,
otherwise than as manifestations of these eternal essences.

4. The system of Spinoza is vicious, because his whole reasoning on the
subject of Creation is pervaded by a transparent fallacy. He affirms the
impossibility of Creation, and attempts to demonstrate his position. But
how? By proving that a "substance" cannot be produced. And why may not
"a substance" be produced? Because, _by the definition_, "a substance"
is that which is "self-existent." In other words, a self-existent
substance cannot be created,--a truism which scarcely required the
apparatus of a geometrical proof by means of propositions, scholia, and
corollaries, or, as Professor Saisset says, with laconic naivete, "_ce
qui a a peine besoin d'etre demontre_." But, while the only proof that
is offered extends no further than to self-existent or uncreated
substance, it is afterwards applied to everything that exists, so as to
exclude the creation even of that which is _not_ self-existent; and this
on the convenient assumption that whatever exists must be either a
"substance," or an "attribute," or a "mode." And thus, partly by an
ambiguity of language, partly by an arbitrary and gratuitous assumption,
he excludes the possibility of Creation altogether. Surely it might have
occurred to him that by proving the necessary existence of an uncreated
Being--a doctrine held by every Christian Theist--he did not advance one
step towards the disproof of the possibility of creation, nor even
towards the establishment of his favorite theory of _unisubstancisme_;
for, grant that there is an uncreated and self-existent Being; grant,
even, that there can be no more than _one_,--would it follow that there
can be no created and dependent beings, or that they can only exist as
"modes" or "affections" of that absolute Essence? Might they not exist
as _creatures_, as _products_, as _effects_, without partaking of the
nature of their cause?[126] Yet, if there be one idea more than another
which Spinoza is anxious to extirpate, it is that of creation, and he
summons the whole strength, both of his logic and sarcasm, when he has
to deal with the argument from "final causes." And no marvel; for the
doctrine of a creation would cut up his system by the roots. The radical
difference, in fact, between Theism and Pantheism mainly consists in
this: that the former regards creation as distinct from the Creator, as
the product of His omnipotent and free will, as the object of His
constant providential care, as the subject of His supreme control and
government; whereas the latter represents it as a necessary _emanation_
from the Divine substance, as an eternal _development_ of the uncreated
Essence; the finite, in all its forms, being a "mode" of the infinite,
and the temporary phases of nature so many transient but ever-renewed
manifestations of the unchangeable and eternal. These two conceptions
are diametrically opposed; they cannot admit of conciliation or
compromise; and hence the daring attempt of Spinoza to prove the
impossibility of creation, even when he admits the existence of an
Infinite and Eternal Being.

5. The system of Spinoza is vicious, because it involves erroneous
conclusions respecting both the _body_ and the _soul_. He denies that
they are "substances." And why? Because, _by the definition_, "a
substance" is that which is self-existent, and may be conceived without
reference to any other being. Be it so. What does this argument amount
to? Why, simply to this, that they are not gods. What, then, are they?
Created beings? No. And why? Because creation is impossible, and, also,
because whatever exists must be either a "substance," or an "attribute,"
or a "mode." What then? Clearly not an "attribute," for the only
attributes known to us are extension and thought, and these attributes
are as infinite as "the substance" to which they belong; they must
therefore be "modes" or "affections" of that "substance." But in what
sense? In the sense of being created, and therefore dependent,
existences, whose nature and origin cannot be conceived of or accounted
for without reference to the Being who produced them at first, and still
continues to maintain them? No; for in that sense all Theists admit the
derivation and dependence of every finite being; but they must be
"modes" or "affections" of the one uncreated essence, mere phenomenal
manifestations of it. The soul, whose essence is thought, is a mere
succession of ideas. The body is a mere "mode" of the Divine "attribute"
of extension; and neither the one nor the other can be described as a
_distinct being_. They are affections, and nothing more, of the one
infinite "substance."

It is important to remark that, according to this theory, _the distinct
personality of man_ is excluded, not less than _the distinct personality
of God_. It is not easy, indeed, to explain this part of Spinoza's
theory; for he has a subtle disquisition on the relation subsisting
between the soul and the body, by means of which he attempts to explain
the phenomena of self-consciousness, and to show that individual
personality is not necessarily inconsistent with the doctrine which
represents man as a mere "mode" of the Divine "substance." But one thing
is clear: there is no room in the system of Spinoza for the distinct
personality of man, in the ordinary acceptation of that expression. The
unity, especially of the human soul, its individuality, its
self-consciousness, its identity, as a being, dependent, indeed, on God,
but really distinct from Him, must be sacrificed, if the system is to be
saved; and no other being can be recognized but the absolute
"substance," with its infinite "attributes" and its finite "modes." This
consideration appears to us to be fatal to the whole theory. For it
shows that the Pantheistic speculations, which are directed against _the
personality of God_, are equally conclusive, if they be conclusive at
all, against _the personality of Man_; that they run counter to the
intuitive knowledge of the human mind; and that they cannot be embraced
without doing violence to some of our clearest and surest convictions.
For what clearer or surer conviction can there be than that of my own
personal existence, as a distinct, self-conscious, intelligent, active,
and responsible being? And yet the existence of our own bodies and souls
is denied, except in so far as they are mere "modes" or affections of
the one uncreated "substance," which is known, not by experience or
observation, but by a transcendental faculty of intuition.

And, _finally_, the system of Spinoza is vicious, because the
exposition of it is replete with the most manifest and glaring
self-contradictions. His logical power has been so much admired, and his
rigorous geometrical method so highly extolled, that his Philosophy has
acquired a certain _prestige_, which commends it to many ardent,
speculative minds. Yet there are few philosophical writers who have made
a larger number of gratuitous assumptions, or who have abounded more in
contradictory statements. The "Antinomies" of Spinoza might make the
subject of an amusing, and even instructive, dissertation. Thus, by way
of specimen, take the following:

God is extended; but, nevertheless, incorporeal.

God thinks; but, nevertheless, has no intelligence.

God is active; but, nevertheless, has no will.

The soul is a "mode" of the Divine thought; but, nevertheless, there is
no analogy between God's thought and man's thought.

The love of God is the supreme law of man; but, nevertheless, it is
equally lawful for man to live according to appetite or to reason.

The will of man, is, in no sense, free; but, nevertheless, there is a
science of human ethics.

Man is under no natural obligation to obey God; but, nevertheless, God
is his highest good.

God is neither a Lawgiver nor a Governor; but, nevertheless, a future
state is necessary, that every man may have his due.

Might is Right, and Government has power to restrain "the liberty of
Prophesying;" but, nevertheless, has no power to restrain "the liberty
of Philosophizing."

These are only a few specimens of the gratuitous assumptions and
flagrant contradictions with which his writings abound; but they afford
a sufficient proof of the reckless character of his genius, and of the
utter fallacy of the system which he promulgated as a rival, or as a
substitute, for Natural and Revealed Religion.

On a review of what has been advanced, it must be manifest that the
Pantheistic system of Spinoza is founded on principles assumed without
proof, and embodied in his "definitions;" that it is constructed
according to a philosophical method which is radically vicious; that it
abounds in self-contradictory statements; and that it is opposed, at
many points, to some of the clearest lessons of experience, and to some
of the surest convictions of reason. It is a system which is not
demonstrated, but merely developed. The germ of it exists in the
"definitions;" deny these, and you destroy his whole philosophy. It
cannot, therefore, be held sufficient to foreclose the question
respecting the existence of a living, personal God, distinct from Nature
and independent of it; nor can Pantheism, in this form, become the
successful rival of Christian Theism, until the human mind has lost the
power of discriminating between the different kinds of evidence to which
they respectively appeal.

SECTION II.

MATERIAL OR HYLOZOIC PANTHEISM.

In the system of Spinoza, the two "attributes of _extension_ and
_thought_" and the corresponding "modes" of _body_ and _soul_, were
equally recognized, and were employed jointly, in connection with his
favorite doctrine of Unisubstancisme. They constituted the opposite
poles of his theory, but were both essential to its completeness. But
most of his followers, influenced by an excessive desire for
simplification, have attempted to blend the two into one; and have
either merged the spiritual in the corporeal, or virtually annihilated
the material by resolving it into the mental. Hence two distinct, and
even opposite forms of Pantheism,--the _material_ or _hylozoic_, and the
_ideal_ or _spiritual_.

The former was the first in the order of historical development, so far
as modern Europe is concerned. It was most in accordance with the
Sensational Philosophy which prevailed in the school of Condillac,[127]
and which continued to maintain its ascendancy until it was assailed by
the reviving spirit of Idealism. It was the characteristic feature of
the Atheism of the last century, and was fully exhibited in the "Systeme
de la Nature." The recent revival of Idealism has done much to check its
progress, but it has not effected its destruction; on the contrary, the
theory of Material or Hylozoic Pantheism is an error as inveterate as it
is ancient, and it is continually reappearing even in the light of the
intellectual and spiritual Psychology of the nineteenth century.

This theory, although it has been propounded as a religious creed, rests
mainly on a philosophical dogma. It is based ultimately on the
supposition that nothing exists in the universe except _matter_ and its
laws; that _mind_ is the product of material organization; and that all
the phenomena of thought, of feeling, of conscience, and even of
religion, may be accounted for by ascribing them to certain powers
inherent in matter, and evolved by certain peculiarities of cerebral
structure. This fundamental assumption, on which the whole theory of
Hylozoic Pantheism ultimately rests, will be subjected to examination in
the sequel. We think that it may be best discussed separately and apart,
for this among other reasons, that it stands equally related to the old
mechanical Atheism and the new material Pantheism, and that, in point of
fact, it has been applied indifferently to the support of both. Our
remarks at present, therefore, will be directed, not to the refutation
of Materialism, but to the exposition and exposure of the Pantheism
which has been founded upon it.

It is not easy--perhaps it might be found, on trial, to be
impossible--to show that there is any real difference, except in name,
between mechanical Atheism and material Pantheism. Both equally affirm
the self-existence and eternity of the Universe; both equally deny the
fact of creation, and the doctrine of a living, personal God, distinct
from nature, and superior to it. The only apparent difference between
the two consists in this,--that the former speaks more of the rude
materials, and the cold, hard, unbending laws, which exist in Nature;
the latter speaks more of the vital powers, the subtle and ethereal
forces, which are at work in her bosom, and which may seem to impart
warmth and animation to a system that would otherwise be felt to be
cold, inert, and deathlike. But the mechanical Atheist never denied the
vital powers of Nature, he only attempted to account for them without an
intelligent first Cause; and the material Pantheist has little, if any,
advantage over him, except in this, that he has combined Chemistry with
Mechanics in attempting to account for the phenomena of the universe,
and has drawn his analogies from the laboratory and the crucible, the
process of vegetation, and the laws of reproduction and growth, not less
than from the formulae of Physical Science.

The theory of Material Pantheism runs insensibly into one or other of
the forms of naked Atheism to which we have already referred. Ignoring
the existence of mind, or of any spiritual Power distinct from Nature
and superior to it, it must necessarily hold the eternal existence of
matter; and, in this respect, it coincides entirely with the Atheistic
hypothesis. It may, or it may not, hold also the eternal existence of
the present _order of Nature_, including all the varieties of vegetable
and animal life. In the one case, it harmonizes with the ancient theory
of Atheism, as maintained by Ocellus Lucanus; in the other, it must run
into the modern theory of Development, if it makes any attempt to
account for the origin of new races, as made known by the researches of
Geologists. In either case, it is equivalent to Atheism, and dependent
on one or other of the various theories which have been applied to the
defence of the Atheist's creed.

It is worthy of remark, in this connection, how frequently those who are
the most daring and decided advocates of Atheism or Pantheism do
nevertheless ascribe to Nature many of the attributes which belong to
God only. This fact is admirably illustrated by the distinguished
founder of the Boyle Lectureship;[128] and it is abundantly confirmed by
examples which have been furnished by more recent times. The author of
the "System of Nature," which appeared before the first French
Revolution, was an avowed and most reckless Atheist;[129] yet he
ascribes to Nature most of the attributes which are usually supposed to
belong to God, such as self-existence, eternity, immutability,
infinitude, and unity; and if the _intellectual_ and _moral_ attributes
may seem to be omitted, as they must be, to some extent, in any system
of Atheism, yet _thought_, _design_, and _will_, are expressly ascribed
to Nature.[130] And the only difference between the Theist and the
Atheist is said to be, that the latter ascribes all the phenomena of
Nature "to material, natural, sensible, and known causes," while the
former ascribes them to "spiritual, supernatural, unintelligible, and
unknown causes;" or, in other words, "to an _occult cause_."[131] It is
manifestly a matter of indifference whether this method of accounting
for the phenomena of Nature be called Atheism or Pantheism; in either
aspect it is essentially the same.

The more recent advocates of Atheism or Pantheism have often made use of
similar language. M. Crousse affirms that "all nature is _animated_ by
an internal force which moves it;" that this is the true _spontaneity_,
the _causality_, which is the origin of all sensible manifestations, for
"_mens agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet_;" that "matter, the most
cold and indifferent, is full of life, capable of engendering thought,
and containing mind in it, at least _potentially_;" and that, to every
man who has true insight, "the world feels, moves, speaks, and
thinks."[132] The author of "The Purpose of Existence" makes it his
grand object to show that "the evolvement of mind out of matter" is the
primary law and final cause of the universe; that "this process
commences with vegetation, extracting from matter the spirit of
vitality;" that "this spirit is preserved amid the decay of vegetables,
and transfused into animals, thus establishing the great
working-principle of Nature, that spirit is extracted from matter by
organized bodies, and survives their dissolution."[133] Of course, if
matter have the power of evolving intelligent and even immortal minds by
its own inherent properties and established laws, it will not be
difficult to find in Nature a sufficient substitute for God.

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