Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws

J >> James Buchanan >> Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws

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From this rapid survey of the history of the past, it is clear that
Pantheism is one of the oldest and most inveterate forms of error; that
in its twofold character, as at once _a philosophy_ and _a faith_, it
possesses peculiar attractions for that class of minds which delight to
luxuriate in mystic speculation; and that, in the existing state of
society, it may be reasonably regarded as the most formidable rival to
Natural and Revealed Religion. We are far from thinking, indeed, that
the old mechanical and materialistic Atheism is so completely worn out
or so utterly exploded as some recent writers would have us to
believe;[117] for M. Comte and his school still avow that wretched
creed, while they profess to despise Pantheism, as a system of empty
abstractions. We do think, however, that the grand ultimate struggle
between Christianity and Atheism will resolve itself into a contest
between Christianity and Pantheism. For, in the Christian sense,
Pantheism is itself Atheistic, since it denies the Divine personality,
and ascribes to the universe those attributes which belong only to the
living God; but then it is a distinct and very peculiar form of Atheism,
much more plausible in its pretensions, more fascinating to the
imagination, and less revolting to the reason, than those colder and
coarser theories which ascribed the origin of the world to a fortuitous
concourse of atoms, or to the mere mechanical laws of matter and motion.
It admits much which the Atheism of a former age would have denied; it
recognizes the principle of causality, and gives a reason, such as it
is, for the existing order of Nature; it adopts the very language of
Theism, and speaks of the Infinite, the Eternal, the Unchangeable One;
it may even generate a certain mystic piety, in which elevation of
thought may be blended with sensibility of emotion, springing from a
warm admiration of Nature; and it admits of being embellished with the
charms of a seductive eloquence, and the graces of a sentimental poetry.
It may be regarded, therefore, not indeed as the only, but as the most
formidable rival of Christian Theism at the present day.

We have sometimes thought that the recent discoveries of Chemical
Science might have a tendency, at least in the case of superficial
minds, to create a prepossession in favor of Pantheism; for what does
modern Chemistry exhibit, but the spectacle of Nature passing through a
series of successive transmutations?--the same substance appearing in
different forms, and assuming in every change different properties, but
never annihilated, never destroyed; now existing in the form of solid
matter, again in the form of a yielding fluid, again in the form of an
elastic gas; now nourishing a plant, and entering into its very
substance; now incorporated with an animal, and forming its sinews or
its bones; now reduced again to dust and ashes, but only to appear anew,
and enter once more into other combinations. The facts are certain, and
they are sufficiently striking to suggest the question, May not Nature
itself be the one Being whose endless transformations constitute the
history of the universe? This question may be naturally suggested, and
it may even be lawfully entertained; but it cannot be satisfactorily
determined by any theory which leaves the evident marks of Intelligence
and Design in the whole constitution and course of Nature unaccounted
for or unexplained.

Influenced by these and similar considerations, many thoughtful men have
recently avowed their belief that the two grand alternatives in modern
times are, Christianity and Pantheism. The Abbe Maret and Amand Saintes
differ only in this: that by Christianity the former means Catholicism,
the latter means the Gospel, or the religion of the primitive church;
but both agree that Pantheism is the only other alternative. Schlegel
contrasts the same alternatives in the following impressive terms: "Here
is the decisive point; two distinct, opposite, or diverging paths lie
before us, and man must choose between them. The clear-seeing spirit,
which, in its sentiments, thoughts, and views of life, would be in
accordance with itself, and would act consistently with them, must, in
any case, take one or the other. Either there is a living God, full of
love, even such a One as love seeks and yearns after, to whom faith
clings, and in whom all our hopes are centred (and such is the personal
God of Revelation),--and on this hypothesis the world is not God, but is
distinct from Him, having had a beginning, and being created out of
nothing,--or there is only one supreme form of existence, and the world
is eternal, and not distinct from God; there is absolutely but One, and
this eternal One comprehends all, and is itself all in all; so that
there is no where any real and essential distinction, and even that
which is alleged to exist between evil and good is only a delusion of a
narrow-minded system of Ethics.... Now, the necessity of this choice and
determination _presses urgently upon our own time_, which stands midway
between two worlds. Generally, it is between _these two paths alone_
that the decision is to be made."[118]

We have made the preceding remarks on purpose to show that the
distinctive doctrines of Pantheism, as a system different, in some
respects, from the colder forms of Atheism, demand the careful study of
the Divines and the Philosophers of the present age; and that any
statement of the evidence in favor of the being and perfections of God,
which overlooks the prevalence of these doctrines, or makes only a
cursory reference to them, must be alike defective in itself, and ill
adapted to the real exigencies of European society. Let this be our
apology for attempting, as we now propose, to exhibit an outline of the
Pantheistic system, to resolve it into its constituent elements and
ultimate grounds, to examine the validity of the reasons on which it
rests, and to contrast it with the doctrine of Christian Theism, which
speaks of a living, personal God, and of a distinct but dependent
Creation, the product of His supreme wisdom and almighty power. The task
is one of considerable difficulty,--difficulty arising not so much from
the nature of the subject, as from the metaphysical and abstruse manner
in which it has been treated. We must follow Spinoza through the
labyrinth of his Theological Politics and his Geometrical Ethics; we
must follow Schelling and Hegel into the still darker recesses of their
Transcendental Philosophy; for a philosophy of one kind can only be met
and neutralized by a higher and a better, and the first firm step
towards the refutation of error is a thorough comprehension of it. But
having an assured faith in those stable laws of thought which are
inwoven with the very texture of the human mind, and in the validity and
force of that natural evidence to which Theology appeals, we have no
fear of the profoundest Metaphysics that can be brought to bear on the
question at issue, provided only they be not altogether unintelligible.

Pantheism has appeared in several different forms; and it may conduce
both to the fullness and the clearness of our exposition if we offer, in
the first instance, a comprehensive outline of the theory of Spinoza,
with a brief criticism on its leading principles, and thereafter advance
to the consideration of the twofold development of Pantheism in the
hands of Materialists and Idealists, respectively.

SECTION I.

THE SYSTEM OF SPINOZA.

The Pantheistic speculations which have been revived in modern times can
scarcely be understood, and still less accounted for or answered,
without reference to the system of Spinoza. That system met with little
favor from any, and with vigorous opposition from not a few, of the
divines and philosophers of the times immediately subsequent to its
publication. It was denounced and refuted by Musaeus, a judicious and
learned professor of divinity at Jena; by Mansvelt, a young but
promising professor of philosophy at Utrecht; by Cuyper of Rotterdam; by
Wittichius of Leyden; by Pierre Poiret of Reinsburg; by Fenelon,
Archbishop of Cambray; by Huet, Bishop of Avranches; by John Howe, and
Dr. Samuel Clarke, as well as by many others,[119] whose writings
served for a time to preserve the Church from the infection of his most
dangerous errors. But gradually these views became an object of
speculative interest to Metaphysical inquirers, and found favor even
with a growing class of Philosophical Divines;[120] partly by reason of
the strong intellectual energy with which they were conceived and
announced, and partly, also, there is reason to fear, on account of a
prevailing tendency to lower the authority of Scripture, and to exalt
the prerogatives of reason, in matters of faith. The system of Spinoza,
as developed in his "Tractatus Theologico-politicus," and, still more,
in his "Ethica,"--a posthumous publication,--may be said to contain the
germs of the whole system both of Theological and Philosophical
Rationalism which was subsequently unfolded,--in the Church, by Paulus,
Wegscheider, and Strauss,--and, in the Schools, by Fichte, Schelling,
and Hegel.

Theological Rationalism consists in making Reason the sole arbiter and
the supreme judge in matters of faith; in setting aside or undermining
the authority of Revelation, partly by denying or questioning the
plenary inspiration of Scripture, partly by explaining or accounting for
miracles on natural principles, partly by assuming, as Strauss assumes,
that whatever is supernatural must necessarily be unhistorical; in
reducing every article of the creed, by a new method of critical
exegesis, to a mere statement of some natural fact or some moral
doctrine, embellished, in the one case, by mythical legends, and
accommodated, in the other, to local and temporary prejudices, but
amounting substantially to nothing more than a natural development of
human thought. The prolific germs of this Neologian method of the
interpretation of Scripture are to be found every where in the writings
of Spinoza.

Philosophical Rationalism, again, although often, or rather generally,
blended with the Theological, is yet, in some respects, distinct from
it. The one has been developed in the Church, the other in the Schools.
The former, cultivated by divines who acknowledged more or less
explicitly the authority of Scripture, has directed its efforts mainly
to the establishment of a new method of Biblical exegesis and criticism,
by which all that is peculiar to Revelation, as a supernatural scheme,
might be enervated or explained away. The latter cultivated by
Philosophic speculators who were not bound by any authority, nor
fettered by any subscription to articles of faith, has sought, without
reference to Revelation, to solve the great problems relating to God,
Man, and the Universe, on purely natural principles; and, after many
fruitless efforts, has taken refuge, at last, in the Faith of Pantheism
and the Philosophy of the Absolute. The prolific germs of this method of
the interpretation of Nature are also to be found in the writings of
Spinoza.

The circumstance, indeed, which, more than any other, seems to have
commended his system to some of the most inquisitive minds in Europe, is
_its apparent completeness_. It is not a mere theory of Pantheism, nor a
mere method of Exegesis, nor a mere code of Ethics, nor a mere scheme of
Politics, although all these are comprehended under it; but it is a
system founded on a few radical principles, which are exhibited in the
shape of axioms and definitions, and unfolded, by rigorous logical
deduction, in a series of propositions, with occasional scholia and
corollaries, after the method of Geometry; a system which undertakes to
explain the rationale of _every_ part of human knowledge, to interpret
alike the Book of Nature and the Book of Revelation, to determine the
character of prophetic inspiration, and to account for apparent miracles
on natural principles, to establish the real foundations of moral duty,
and the ultimate grounds of state policy; and all this on the strength
of a few simple definitions, and a series of necessary deductions from
them. It is important to mark this characteristic feature of his system;
for while we have directly nothing to do with by far the larger part of
his speculations, which relate to questions foreign to our present
inquiry, yet the fact that his ethical and political conclusions are
deduced from the same principles on which his Pantheistic theory is
founded, serves at once to account for the extensive influence which his
writings have exerted on every department of modern speculation, and
also to show that, in opposing that system, we are entitled to found on
the conclusions which he has himself deduced from it, for the purpose of
disproving the fundamental principles on which it rests. For if, on the
one hand, the principles which he assumes in his definitions and axioms
do necessarily involve the conclusions which are propounded in his
Ethics and Politics; and if, on the other hand, these conclusions are
found to be at variance with the highest views of Morality and
Government, then the more logical the process by which they have been
deduced, the more certain will it be that there is some fundamental flaw
in the basis on which the whole superstructure is reared. In other
cases, it might be doubtful how far the consequences that may seem to be
deducible from a theory could be legitimately urged in argument,
especially when these consequences are disavowed by the author of it;
but, in the present case, the consequences are explicitly declared, not
less than the principles,--they are even exhibited as corollaries
rigorously deduced from them; and thus the very comprehensiveness of the
system, which gives it so much of the aspect of completeness, and which
has fascinated the minds of speculative men, always fond of bold and
sweeping generalizations, may be found to afford the most conclusive
proof of its inherent weakness, and to show that it comes into fatal
collision, at all points, not only with the doctrines of Natural and
Revealed Religion, but also with the practical duties and political
rights of mankind.

We may present, in brief compass, a comprehensive summary of the
doctrine of Spinoza. The fundamental principle of his whole theory is
contained in the assumption with which he sets out,--that the entire
system of Being consists only of _three_ elements, "Substance,
Attributes, and Modes," and in the _definitions_ which are given of
these terms respectively. With him, Substance is Being; not this or that
particular being, nor even being in general, considered in the abstract,
but absolute Being,--Being in its plentitude, which comprehends all
existences that can be conceived without requiring the concept of any
other thing, and without which no other thing can either exist or be
conceived.[121] By an "Attribute" he means, not substance, but a
manifestation of substance, yet such a manifestation as belongs to its
very essence; and, by a "Mode," he means an affection of substance, or
that which exists in another thing, and is conceived by means of that
thing. These are the three fundamental ideas of his system.[122]

The "Substance" of which he speaks is God, the infinite, self-existent,
eternal Being, whose essential nature is defined in terms which might
seem to be expressive of a great truth, for he says: "I understand by
God an absolutely infinite Being, that is to say, a Substance
constituted by an infinity of Attributes, each of which expresses an
eternal and infinite essence." But, on closer inspection, we find that
the God of whom he speaks is not the Creator and Governor of the world,
not a living, personal Being, distinct from Nature and superior to it,
not the Holy One and the Just, possessing infinite moral perfections,
and exercising a supreme dominion over His works; but, simply, absolute
Being, the necessary self-existent Substance, whose known "Attributes"
are _extension_ and _thought_, and whose affections, or "Modes,"
comprehend all the varieties of finite existence; in short, it is Nature
that is God, for every possible existence may be included under the
twofold expression of _Natura naturans_ and _Natura naturata_.
Accordingly, the principle of _Unisubstancisme_ is broadly avowed, and
the very possibility of creation denied. He affirms, and, indeed,
according to his definition, he is entitled to affirm, that there is not
and cannot be more than _one substance_; for by "Substance" he means a
self-existent, necessary, and eternal Being. And, on the same ground, he
affirms that the creation of _such_ a substance is impossible; for,
having excluded every finite thing--everything that does not exist of
itself--from his definition of Substance, he is warranted in saying that
anything called into being by a creative act of Divine power could not
be a "substance," _in his sense of that term_. He sets himself to prove,
by a series of propositions whose logical correctness, as deductions
from his fundamental assumption, may be freely and most safely admitted,
that the production of a "substance" is absolutely impossible; that
between two "substances," having different "attributes," there is
nothing in common; that where two things have nothing in common, the one
cannot be the cause of the other; that two or more distinct things can
only be discriminated from each other by the difference of the
"attributes" or "affections" of their "substance;" and that, in the
nature of things, there cannot be two or more substances of the same
kind, or possessing the same attributes. He holds, of course, that
Nature is as necessary as God, or, rather, that God and Nature are one;
there being but one Substance, appearing only in different aspects, as
cause and effect, as substance and mode, as infinite and yet finite, as
one and yet many, as ever the same and yet infinitely variable.

It is only necessary to add, that the sole attributes of this Substance
which are capable of being known by our limited intelligence, and which
are discerned by an immediate "intuition of reason," are two, namely,
_extension_ and _thought_. We know nothing, and can know nothing, of God
beyond this: He has no will, or his will is mere intelligence or
thought; He has no law, or His law is merely His thought embodied in the
arrangements of nature; He has no moral properties that are cognizable
by the human faculties. It follows that God is not the creator of the
world, for creation implies an act of will, and God has no will; that He
is not the Lawgiver or Governor of the world, for there is no law
emanating from a superior, but such only as is created by _human compact
or agreement_, and there is "no natural obligation to obey God," no
invariable standard of right and wrong. The principles which are thus
assumed in regard to the nature of God are afterwards applied to many
important questions, relating, first, to the soul of man; secondly, to
the science of Ethics; thirdly, to the doctrine of political right and
liberty; and, fourthly, to the supposed claims of Revelation. And they
are carried out, with inexorable logic, into all their most revolting
results.

Such is a concise, but, as we believe, a correct outline of the leading
principles of the system of Spinoza. We shall now offer a few remarks
upon it, directed to the object of showing wherein consists the radical
fallacy on which it rests, and what are the considerations by which
thoughtful men may be most effectually secured against its pernicious
influence.

It has been well said by Professor Saisset, that the fallacy of this
system does not lie in any one proposition of the series, but that it is
a vicious circle throughout; that the paralogism is not in this or that
part of the "Ethics,"--it is everywhere; and that the germ of the whole
is contained in the _definitions_, which are assumed, but not
proved.[123] Our attention, therefore, must be given, in the first
instance, to the fundamental assumptions on which the whole
superstructure is built.

1. It is assumed, without proof, that the entire system of Being may be
ranked under the three categories of Substance, Attributes, and Modes.
It is assumed, equally without proof, that there can be no substance
which is not self-existent, necessary, and eternal, and that every being
which does not possess these properties must be only a "mode" or
affection of another being to whom they belong. It is further assumed,
also without proof, that _extension_ and _thought_ are necessary
"attributes" of the one self-existent "substance," each of the two
exhibiting only a different aspect of his eternal essence, while both
are equally essential and equally infinite. And, finally, it is assumed,
still without proof, that Nature comprehends a twofold series of
existences, distinct from each other, but developed, as it were, in
parallel lines,--Corporeal and Intellectual beings, which correspond
respectively to the Divine attributes of extension and thought,--which
partake of the essential nature of these attributes, but exhibit them in
finite and transient forms, as mere modes or manifestations of the one
infinite "substance." These are some of the fundamental assumptions on
which he proceeds; they are not proved, nor even attempted to be proved;
for, although several are stated in the form of distinct propositions,
and accompanied with a formal demonstration, the most cursory inspection
of the pretended proof is sufficient to show that it consists entirely
in a series of _deductions from principles previously assumed_, and that
its validity must ultimately rest on the _definitions_ in which these
principles are embodied.

Now, let any one examine these "definitions," and he will find that they
are wholly arbitrary, and that he is not bound by any law of his
intellectual nature to admit them, still less entitled, on any ground of
experience, to assume and found upon them, as if they were self-evident
or axiomatic truths. It is possible, and it may even be legitimate and
useful for the purposes of philosophical speculation, to classify the
various objects of human knowledge by ranging them under the categories
of Substance, Attributes, and Modes. But is it a self-evident truth,
that there can be no substance in nature excepting such as is
self-existent and eternal? Is it a self-evident truth that man, with his
distinct personality and individual consciousness, is a mere "mode" or
affection of another being? Is it a self-evident truth that the ape, the
lizard, and the worm are equally "modes" of the same substance with the
angel and the seraph? Is it a self-evident truth that _extension_ and
_thought_ are equally expressive of the uncreated Essence and necessary
"attributes" of the Eternal? Is it a self-evident truth that no being
can exist in nature otherwise than by _development out of the Divine
substance_, and that the _creation_ of a distinct but dependent being is
impossible? In regard to questions such as these, the appeal must lie to
that common sense, or those laws of thought, which are the heritage of
every thinking mind, and which cannot be cramped or fettered by the
arbitrary definitions of any philosophical system whatever. These
definitions must commend themselves _as true_, either by their own
self-evidencing light, or by their manifest conformity with experience,
before they can be assumed and founded on in any process of reasoning;
and we are very sure that those which have been specified cannot be
candidly examined without appearing to be, as they really are, the
grossest instances of a _petitio principii_ that have ever been offered
to the world. For these "definitions" constitute the foundation of the
whole superstructure; they contain the germ, which is subsequently
expanded and developed in a long series of propositions; and, as they
are assumed without proof, while they are far from being self-evident,
no amount of logical power and no effort of dialectic skill can possibly
extract from them any doctrinal results, whether theological, ethical,
or political, possessing greater evidence than what belongs to
themselves. This is our _first_ objection.

2. The philosophical method of Spinoza, as applied to our special
subject, is radically vicious. It is not the inductive or experimental
method; it is an argument _a priori_, a deductive process of reasoning.
Now, this method, suitable as it is to a certain class of subjects, such
as those of Geometry, in which clear and precise definitions are
attainable, is either utterly inapplicable to another class of subjects,
such as most of those of which Spinoza treats, or it is peculiarly
dangerous, especially in the hands of a daring speculator, since, in the
absence of adequate definitions, he may be tempted to have recourse to
such as are purely arbitrary. All the possible properties of a circle
may be deduced from the simple definition of it; but it will not follow
that all the possible forms of being in nature may be deduced from the
definition of "substance." The reason is clear; we cannot have such a
definition of substance as we may have of a circle. We do not object
merely to the _geometrical form_ of his reasoning,--that is a mere
accessory, and one which renders the "Ethica" much more dry and less
attractive than the "Tractatus," in which he gives free scope to his
subtle intellect, unfettered by any such artificial plan,--but we object
to the essential nature of his system, to the _a priori_ and deductive
method by which he attempts to solve some of the highest problems of
philosophy respecting God, Nature, and Man. Here, if anywhere, is a
field of inquiry which demands for its due cultivation an enlarged
experience and a patient spirit of induction. Yet, with him, the
starting-point of philosophy is the highest object of human thought. He
begins with the idea of self-existent Being, without which, as he
imagines, nothing else can be conceived; and then, following the line of
a descending series, he attempts to deduce from it the philosophy of
the whole system of the universe![124] His Metaphysics must borrow
nothing from experience; his very Psychology must be purely deductive.
From the intuitive idea of "substance" he deduces the nature and
existence of God; from the nature of God, the necessity of a Divine
development; from the necessity of a Divine development, the existence
of a universe comprising souls and bodies; and nowhere does he
condescend to take notice of the facts of experience, except in two of
his axioms, in which he assumes that "man thinks," and that "he feels
his body to be affected in various ways." His whole philosophy resolves
itself ultimately into an intellectual intuition, whose object is
Substance or Being, with its infinite attributes of extension and
thought,--an intuition which discerns its object directly and
immediately, in the light of its own self-evidence, without the aid of
any intermediate sign, and which is as superior, in a philosophical
point of view, to the intimations of sense, as its objects are superior
to the fleeting phenomena of Nature.

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