Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws

J >> James Buchanan >> Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33

Transcriber's Notes:

1. Several misprints (including Greek) were corrected. A full list
of corrections can be found at the end of the text.
Misspelling and inconsistencies in the French quotations, unless
otherwise noted, have been preserved.

2. Footnotes have been renumbered and moved to the end of chapters.

3. Footnote 138 had no footnote marker within the text; the reference
was added in a possible place.

4. Symbol of a hand pointing right has been replaced with a right
arrow: ==>.

MODERN ATHEISM

UNDER ITS FORMS OF

PANTHEISM, MATERIALISM, SECULARISM,
DEVELOPMENT, AND NATURAL LAWS.

BY

JAMES BUCHANAN, D. D., LL. D.,

DIVINITY PROFESSOR IN "THE NEW COLLEGE," EDINBURGH, AND AUTHOR
OF "THE OFFICE AND WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT," ETC.

BOSTON:
_GOULD AND LINCOLN_,
59 WASHINGTON STREET.
NEW YORK: SHELDON, BLAKEMAN & CO.,
CINCINNATI: GEORGE S. BLANCHARD.
1857.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1856, by

_GOULD AND LINCOLN_,

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of
Massachusetts.

Electro-Stereotyped by
_G. J. STILES & COMPANY_,
23 Congress Street, Boston.

PREFATORY NOTE.

The contents of this volume originally constituted about one half of a
work, entitled "Faith in God and Modern Atheism compared, in their
Essential Nature, Theoretic Grounds, and Practical Influence."
Simultaneously with the first issue of that work in Scotland, the five
principal chapters in this volume were published separately, accompanied
with the announcement that _each was complete in itself_. The hint thus
given by the author, has been acted upon by the present publishers. On
examining the whole work, it was found to be divided into four Sections.
Of these, the third was devoted exclusively to "_Modern Atheism_." It
embraced the five chapters already alluded to, together with a general
introduction and four shorter chapters. It appeared, in fact, to be a
complete treatise by itself; and it is now presented to the American
public in the conviction that such a work is peculiarly demanded by the
present state of religious opinion in this country.

The author is one of the most distinguished divines of the Free Church
of Scotland. In 1845, he was appointed Professor of Apologetic Theology
in the New College, Edinburgh; and, on the death of Dr. Chalmers, in
1847, he was translated to the Chair of Systematic Theology thus made
vacant. In the former position, it became his duty to prepare a complete
course of Lectures on Natural Religion. His work on "Faith in God," &c.,
contains, in an altered form, adapted to general readers, the substance
of those Lectures.

Respecting this work, the British press generally has spoken in the
highest terms. The distinguished geologist, Hugh Miller, says, in the
_Edinburgh Witness_: "It is one of, at once, the most readable and
solid which we have ever perused;" and the _News of the Churches_, the
organ of the Free Church, describes it as "a work of which nothing less
can be said than that, both in spirit and substance, style and argument,
it fixes irreversibly the name of its author as a leading classic in the
Christian literature of Britain." An American critic says: "His succinct
analysis of the doctrines held by the various schools of modern atheism
are admirable, and his criticisms on their doctrines original and
profound; while his arguments in defence of the Christian faith against
philosophical objectors are unsurpassed by those of any modern writer.
Clear, vigorous, logical, learned, and strong as a Titan, he fairly
vanquishes all antagonists by pure mental superiority; never
understating their views or evading their arguments, but meeting them in
all their force and _crushing_ them." Another critic says: "It is a
great argument for Theism and against Atheism, magnificent in its
strength, order, and beauty.... The style is lucid, grave, harmonious,
and every way commensurate with the dignity and importance of the
subject.... The chapter on Pantheism is admirable. Regarding it as 'the
most formidable rival of Christian Theism at the present day,' Dr.
Buchanan seems to have specially addressed himself to the task of
exposing and refuting this error. His statement of Spinoza's system is
beautifully clear."

The reader will find that there is no exaggeration in these encomiums.
Hugh Miller, always felicitous in his choice of words, has exactly
described the two leading characteristics of "Modern Atheism," by the
phrase "readable and solid." Every one who begins the book will find
himself drawn strongly onward to the end; and no one can rise from its
perusal without a conviction that it contains a weight of argument
against _all_ the forms of Atheism such as never before has been
combined in one book.

Should the reception of this volume by the public furnish sufficient
encouragement, it is the intention of the publishers to issue the
remainder of the work ("Faith in God," &c.), in uniform style.

BOSTON, _December_, 1856.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

INTRODUCTION, 9

CHAPTER I.
MODERN ATHEISM, 15

CHAPTER II.
THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT, 45

SECTION I.
THEORY OF COSMICAL DEVELOPMENT,--"THE VESTIGES," 47

SECTION II.
THEORY OF PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT,--"TELLIAMED,"
--PHYSIO-PHILOSOPHY, 61

SECTION III.
THEORY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT,--AUGUSTE COMTE, 84

SECTION IV.
THEORY OF ECCLESIASTICAL DEVELOPMENT,--J. H. NEWMAN, 116

CHAPTER III.
THEORIES OF PANTHEISM, 129

SECTION I.
THE SYSTEM OF SPINOZA, 142

SECTION II.
MATERIAL PANTHEISM, 161

SECTION III.
IDEAL PANTHEISM, 167

CHAPTER IV.
THEORIES OF MATERIALISM, 189

SECTION I.
DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM, 192

SECTION II.
PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM, 207

SECTION III.
RELATIONS OF MATERIALISM TO THEOLOGY, 235

CHAPTER V.
THEORY OF GOVERNMENT BY NATURAL LAWS,--VOLNEY,--COMBE, 249

SECTION I.
THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES, 252

SECTION II.
THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN IN ITS RELATION TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF GOD, 254

SECTION III.
THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER, 283

CHAPTER VI.
THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE, 303

CHAPTER VII.
THEORIES OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM, 323

CHAPTER VIII.
THEORIES OF CERTITUDE AND SKEPTICISM, 333

CHAPTER IX.
THEORY OF SECULARISM, 361

INTRODUCTION.

A Treatise on the Being and Perfections of God, as the Creator and
Governor of the world, can scarcely be adapted to the exigencies of
modern society, unless it be framed with express reference to the
existing forms of unbelief, and the prevailing tendencies both of
philosophical thought and of popular opinion. It is quite possible,
indeed, to construct a scheme of evidence on this subject out of the
ample materials which the storehouse of nature affords, without entering
into any discussion of the questions, whether Physical or Metaphysical,
which have been raised respecting it. But this method, although it might
be sufficient for many, perhaps for most, of our readers--for all,
indeed, who come to the study of the subject with reflective but
unsophisticated minds--could scarcely be expected to meet the case or to
satisfy the wants of those who stand most in need of instruction; the
men, and especially the young men, in all educated communities, who,
imbued with the spirit of philosophical speculation, and instructed,
more or less fully, in the principles of modern science, have been led,
under the influence of certain celebrated names, to adopt opinions which
prevent them from seriously considering any theological question, and to
regard the whole subject of religion with indifference or contempt, as
one that lies beyond the possible range of science,--the only
legitimate domain of human thought. In such cases (and they are neither
few nor unimportant), it may be useful and even necessary to neutralize
those adverse presumptions or "prejudicate opinions," which prevent them
from considering the evidence to which Theism appeals, and to review the
various theories from which they spring, so as to show that they afford
no valid reason for discarding the subject, and no ground for alleging
that it is not fit _to go to proof_. It is true that we must ultimately
rely, for the establishment of our main positions, on that body of
natural and historical evidence, which depends little, if at all, on any
of the Theories of Philosophical Speculation, or even on any of the
discoveries of Physical Science; but it is equally true that the
evidence, however conclusive in itself, cannot be expected to produce
conviction unless it be candidly examined and weighed; and if there be
anything in the existing state of public opinion which leads men to
regard the whole subject with indifference or suspicion, to conceive of
it as a problem insoluble by the human faculties, and to treat Theology
as a fond fancy or a waking dream, it were surely well to examine the
grounds of such opinions, to expose their fallacy so as to counteract
their influence, and to refute those theories which prevent men from
judging of the evidence as they would on any other topic of Inductive
Inquiry. In adopting this course, we are only following the footsteps of
the profound author of the "Analogy," who finding it, he knew not how,
"to be taken for granted, by many persons, that Christianity is not so
much as a subject of inquiry," set himself, in the first instance, to
prove "that it is not, however, so clear a case that there is nothing in
it;"--this preliminary proof being designed to neutralize objections,
and to disburden the subject of all adverse presumptions, so as to be
judged on its own proper and independent merits. We are imitating, too,
the example of another sagacious writer on a kindred theme, who thought
that "Apologists had paid too little attention to the _prejudices_ of
their opponents, and had been too confident of accomplishing their
object at once, by an overpowering statement of the direct evidence,
forgetting that the influence of prejudice renders the human mind very
nearly inaccessible to both evidence and argument."[1]

If this method was ever necessary or expedient, it is peculiarly so in
the present age. Opinions are afloat in society, and are even avowed by
men of high philosophical repute, which formally exclude Theology from
the domain of human thought, and represent it as utterly inaccessible to
the human faculties. They amount to a denial, not merely of its truth,
but of its very possibility. They place it among the dreams of the
past--with the fables of the Genii, or the follies of Alchemy, or the
phantoms of Astrology. They intimate, in no ambiguous terms, not only
that Catholicism is effete, and Christianity itself dead or dying, but
that Theology of every kind, even the simplest and purest form of
Theism, must speedily vanish from the earth. Admitting that the
religious element was necessarily developed in the infancy of the
species, and that its influence was alike inevitable and salutary during
the world's minority, when it was placed provisionally "under tutors and
governors," they proclaim that mankind have outgrown the vestments which
suited them in earlier times, and that now they must "put away childish
things." That such sentiments have been publicly avowed, that they have
been proclaimed as the scientific results of speculative thought, and
that they have been widely circulated in the vehicles both of
philosophic discussion and of popular literature, will be proved by
evidence, equally sad and conclusive, in the succeeding chapters; in the
meantime we refer to them merely for the purpose of showing that, in so
far as their influence prevails, they must necessarily tend, unless
they be counteracted by some effective antidote, to generate such a
prejudice against the whole scheme of Theology, whether Natural or
Revealed, as may be expected, especially in the case of young,
inexperienced, and ardent minds, to prevent them from entertaining the
subject at all, or examining, with serious and candid interest, any kind
or amount of evidence that might be adduced in regard to it. For this
reason, we propose to review the various Theories or Systems which may
be said to embody and exhibit these prevailing tendencies, to meet our
opponents on their own chosen ground, and to subject their favorite
speculations to a rigorous and sifting scrutiny; and this, not for the
purpose of proving our fundamental position, for that must rest on its
proper and independent evidence, but simply with the view of
neutralizing the adverse presumptions which prevent many from
considering its claims, and proving that it is a subject that demands
and deserves their serious and sustained attention.

Taking a comprehensive view of European Science and Literature during
the last half century, we may discern the great currents, or chief
tendencies, of speculative thought, in so far as it bears on the
evidences and doctrines of Religion, in several distinct but closely
related systems of opinion, which, whether considered severally or
collectively, must exert, in proportion to their prevalence, a powerful
influence on the side of Atheism. These systems may be divided generally
into _two_ great classes, according as they relate to the _substance_ or
to the _evidence_ of Theism, to the _truths_ which it involves, or the
_proofs_ to which it appeals. The interval between the first and second
French Revolutions may be regarded as the season during which the
theories to which we refer were progressively developed, and ultimately
consolidated in their existing forms. The germ of each of them may have
existed before, and traces of them may be detected in the literature of
the ancient world, and even in the writings of mediaeval times; nay, it
might not be too much to affirm that in the systems of Oriental
Superstition, and in the Schools of Grecian Skepticism, several of them
were more fully taught in early times than they have yet been in Modern
Europe, and that the recent attempts to reconstruct and reproduce them
in a shape adapted to the present stage of civilization, have been poor
and meagre in comparison with those more ancient efforts of
unenlightened reason. What modern system of Skepticism can rival that of
Sextus Empiricus? What code of Pantheism, French or German, can be said
to equal the mystic dreams of the Vedanta School? What godless theory of
Natural Law can compete with the Epicurean philosophy, as illustrated in
the poetry of Lucretius? The errors of these ancient systems have been
revived even amidst the light of the nineteenth century, and prevail to
an extent that may seem to justify the apprehension, frequently
expressed on the Continent of late years, of the restoration of a sort
of Semi-Paganism in Modern Europe; and it is still necessary, therefore,
for the defence of a pure Theism, to reexamine those ancient forms of
error which have reaeppeared on the scene after it might have been
supposed that they had vanished for ever. For the very tenacity with
which they cleave to the human mind, and their perpetual recurrence at
intervals along the whole course of the world's history, show that there
must be something in the wants, or at least in the weaknesses of our
nature, which induces men to tolerate and even to embrace them. But the
chief danger, as we conceive, lies in those new, or at least newly
organized, theories that have only recently received their full
development in the Inductive and Scientific pursuits which constitute
the peculiar glory of modern times; and which, commencing with the era
of Bacon and Descartes, and gradually matured by Newton, Leibnitz, and
their successors, have at length issued in the construction of a solid
fabric of Science. To Theism there is no danger in Science, in so far as
it is true, for all truth is self-consistent and harmonious; but there
may be much danger in the use that is made of it, or in the spirit in
which it is applied. In the hands of Bacon, and Newton, and Boyle, the
doctrine of Natural Laws was treated as an ally, not as an antagonist,
to Theology; in the hands of Comte it becomes a plea for Atheism; and
even in the hands of Combe an argument against a special Providence and
the efficacy of prayer. Here the danger is the greater just by reason of
the acknowledged truth and practical value of the Inductive Philosophy;
for its certainty is so well ascertained, and its manifold uses so
generally appreciated, that if it shall come to be regarded as
incompatible with the recognition of God and Religion, Society will soon
find itself on the verge of universal Atheism. And this is the fearful
issue to which the more recent schools of speculation are manifestly
tending. The first French Revolution was brought about by the labors of
men who fought against Christianity, at least ostensibly, under the
banner of Deism or Natural Religion; the second Revolution was
consummated under the auspices, not of a Deistic, but of an Atheistic
philosophy. The school of Voltaire and Rousseau has given place to the
school of Comte and Leroux. The difference between the two indicates a
rapid and alarming advance. It may not be apparent at first sight, or on
a superficial survey; but it will become evident to any one who compares
the two French Encyclopaedias, which may be regarded as the exponents of
the reigning philosophy of the two great revolutionary eras. The first,
the Encyclopedie of D'Alembert, Voltaire, and Diderot, sought to malign
and extirpate Christianity, while it did frequent homage to Natural
Theology; the second, the "Nouvelle Encyclopedie" of Pierre Leroux and
his coadjutors, proclaims the deification of Humanity, and the
dethronement of God!

FOOTNOTES:

[1] BISHOP BUTLER, "Analogy," Preface, p. II.

DR. INGLIS, "Vindication of the Christian Faith," p. VI.

MODERN ATHEISM.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL VIEW OF ATHEISM.

Before entering on a detailed discussion of the theories to which it
appeals, it may be useful to offer some general reflections on ATHEISM
itself, its generic nature and specific varieties, its causes and
springs, whether permanent or occasional, and its moral and social
influence, as illustrated alike by individual experience and by public
history.

By Atheism we mean any system of opinion which leads men either to
_doubt_ or to _deny_ the Existence, Providence, and Government of a
living, personal, and holy God, as the Creator and Lord of the world. In
its practical aspect, it is that state of mind which leads them to
_forget_, _disown_, or _disobey_ Him.

We are met, however, at the outset, by a previous question, _Whether
Atheism be a real or even a possible thing?_ a question which was wont
to be discussed by divines under the head, _an dentur Athei?_[2] and
which has recently been revived by the strong protestations of some
philosophic writers, who deny not only the existence, but the very
possibility of Atheism. On this point the policy which infidels have
pursued has been widely different at different times. On some occasions,
they have sought to exaggerate the number of Atheists, claiming as their
own adherents or allies a large majority of the intellectual classes, as
well as whole tribes or nations of barbarians, in order to impress the
public mind with the conviction that belief in God is neither natural
nor universal; at other times, they have sought to allay the prejudice
which avowed Atheism seldom fails to awaken, by disclaiming much that
had been imputed to them, by professing a sort of mystic reverence for
the Spirit of Nature, and by denying that their speculations involve a
disbelief in God. In following these opposite courses at different
times, they have been actuated by a politic regard to the exigencies of
their wretched cause, and have alternately adopted the one or the other,
just as it might seem, in existing circumstances, to be more expedient
either to brave or to conciliate public opinion. It is incumbent,
therefore, on every enlightened advocate of Christian Theism to exercise
a prudent discretion in the treatment of this topic, and to guard
equally against the danger either of being led to exaggerate the extent,
or of being blinded to the existence of the evil. Nor is it difficult to
discover a safe middle path between the opposite extremes: it is only
necessary to define, in the first instance, what we mean when we speak
of Theism or Atheism respectively, and then to ascertain, in the second
place, whether any, and what, parties have avowed principles which
should fairly serve to connect them with the one system or with the
other. A clear conception of the radical principle or essential nature
of Atheism is indispensable; for without this, we shall be liable, on
the one hand, to the risk of imputing Atheism to many who are not justly
chargeable with it--a fault which should be most carefully avoided;[3]
and equally liable, on the other hand, to the danger of overlooking the
wide gulf which separates Religion from Irreligion, and Theism from
Atheism. There is much room for the exercise both of Christian candor
and of critical discrimination, in forming our estimate of the
characters of men from the opinions which they hold, when these
opinions relate not to the vital truths of religion, but to collateral
topics, more or less directly connected with them. It is eminently
necessary, in treating this subject, to discriminate aright between
systems which are essentially and avowedly atheistic, and those
particular opinions on cognate topics which have sometimes been applied
in support of Atheism, but which may, nevertheless, be held by some
_salva fide_, and without conscious, still less avowed, Infidelity. And
hence Buddaeus and other divines have carefully distinguished between the
radical principles or grounds of Atheism, and those opinions which are
often, but not invariably, associated with it.[4]

But it is equally or still more dangerous, on the other hand, to admit a
mere nominal recognition of God as a sufficient disproof of Atheism,
without inquiring what conception is entertained of His nature and
perfections; whether He be conceived of as different from, or identical
with, Nature; as a living, personal, and intelligent Being, distinct
from the universe, or as the mere sum of existing things; as a free
Creator and Moral Governor, or as a blind Destiny and inexorable Fate.
These are vital questions, and they cannot be evaded without serious
detriment to the cause of religion. A few examples will suffice to prove
our assertion. M. Cousin contends that _Atheism is impossible_, and
assigns no other reason for his conviction than this,--that the
existence of God is necessarily implied in every affirmation, and may be
logically deduced from the premises on which that affirmation
depends.[5] His reasoning may possibly be quite conclusive _in point of
logic_, in so far as it is an attempt to show that the existence of God
_ought_ to be deduced from the consciousness of thought; but it cannot
be held conclusive as to _the matter of fact_, that there is no Atheism
in the world, unless it can be further shown that all men know and
acknowledge His existence as a truth involved in, and deducible from,
their conscious experience. Yet he does not hesitate to affirm that
"every thought implies a spontaneous faith in God;" nay, he advances
further, and adds that even when the sage "denies the existence of God,
still his words imply the idea of God, and that belief in God remains
unconsciously at the bottom of his heart." Surely the denial or the
doubt of God's existence amounts to Atheism, however inconsistent that
Atheism may be with the natural laws of thought, or the legitimate
exercise of speech.

Yet the bold paradox of COUSIN was neither an original discovery nor an
unprecedented delusion. It was taught, in a different form, but with
equal confidence, by several writers belonging to the era of the first
French Revolution. Thus HELVETIUS, in his work on MAN, says expressly:
"There is no man of understanding who does not acknowledge _an active
power in Nature; there is, therefore, no Atheist_. He is not an Atheist
who says that _motion is God_; because, in fact, motion is
incomprehensible, as we have no clear idea of it, since it does not
manifest itself but by its effects, and because by it all things are
performed in the universe. He is not an Atheist who says, on the
contrary, that _motion is not God_, because motion is not a being, but a
mode of being. They are not Atheists who maintain that motion is
essential to matter, and regard it as the invisible and moving force
that spreads itself through all its parts," "as the universal soul of
matter, and the divinity that alone penetrates its substance. Are the
philosophers of this last opinion Atheists? No; they equally acknowledge
an unknown force in the universe. Are even those who have no ideas of
God Atheists? No; because then all men would be so, because no one has a
clear idea of the Divinity."[6]

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33