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Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

A Series of Letters In Defence of Divine Revelation

H >> Hosea Ballou >> A Series of Letters In Defence of Divine Revelation

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"But I am off from my main subject. I will now endeavour to call up
all my mental faculties, seriously to attend to a revelation from God.
The idea suggested in these words is beyond all expression awfully
sublime. Yea, not even the bursting of _Vesuvius_, not the
_aurora-borealis_, not the forked _lightning_, not the tremendous
_earthquake_, no, nor yet the greatest _phenomenon in nature_, of
which the human mind can conceive, can afford such ideas of the truly
sublime, as the _truth_, if it could be realized, of the above
proposition. Let me not hastily reject without serious reflection,
that, which of all truths, must be the most important. O help me, my
dear friend, help me also, O thou who art the only source of truth,
thoroughly to investigate this momentous subject! But let me not be
deceived. Let me not receive for truth, that which cannot be made
sufficiently clear to my understanding. There can be no more harm in
_doubting_, than in _believing_, where the evidence is not clear. All
that which appertains to eternal truth will remain, whether I now see
it or not; and that which does not appertain to it will never be
realized, although I may now be made to believe it. There can be no
harm, therefore, in investigating this subject in the same way and on
the same principles, as I would investigate all subjects. Although I
cannot expect to offer any thing very new, yet I am disposed to
examine the subject for myself, and that too, in my own way. I shall
quote no authors, for I have not read but few on this subject which
meet my approbation, and even them are not now by me. My own
understanding is the only author to which I shall appeal. If that can
be cleared of the difficulties which have fallen in its way, I am
willing, yea I wish, still to believe in divine revelation.

"Here let me close my preamble, which is already made too lengthy, and
come immediately to discourse 'ON DIVINE REVELATION.'

"In order to know the truth or falsity of any proposition, we must in
the first place understand the terms by which the proposition is made;
for without such previous knowledge, we cannot know what is meant
either to be affirmed or denied. By _divine revelation_, I understand
'a communication of sacred truth,' made directly from God to man. In
order for any man to know that a revelation has been made to him from
God, it must be made in such a way, that neither his perception, nor
his judgment or understanding, can possibly be mistaken. For, as man
by his reason alone, never could have foreseen that a revelation would
be made, therefore, unless it should have been made in such a way that
he could not have been deceived, a rational man would be more likely
to conclude that he was deceived, than that, which to him would seem
more unlikely, should be true. It seems, therefore, that a revelation
from God to all our conceptions of the fact, must be considered, if
existing at all, as something supernatural; otherwise it could be
nothing more than discovery, or a fortuitous event. Hence a revelation
from God, however true, and however clear, to the person or persons to
whom it was first communicated, must lose its evidence, in some
degree, when it comes to be communicated by him or them to others;
for, being communicated to others, although it is still revelation,
yet not being received immediately from God, it cannot be accompanied
with the same evidence which it was in the first place; therefore, to
say the most of it, it is nothing more than the _history_ of a
revelation. It is made no less true than it was before; but its truth
now rests upon very different testimony.

"The principles in nature all existed, before they were discovered by
man. Their being discovered, neither changed their nature, nor made
them any more true. What consternation a total eclipse of the sun, or
of the moon must have produced, before their cause was known? They are
now viewed, especially that of the latter, among the common
occurrences of nature. Yea, many of the operations of nature, which
are now perfectly understood by chemists, could they be viewed by the
common people, who know not their causes, they would be inclined to
believe they were supernatural. At least, it would not be difficult to
make them believe so, especially when this knowledge was confined to a
few, and those few were so disposed. These remarks are not designed to
do away the force of any arguments which may be founded on miracles;
for this is no proof that miracles may not exist; but then, how is a
miracle a revelation of any thing more than what is contained in the
miracle itself? This is what I cannot see, but I shall have occasion
to say more on this subject hereafter. It will be needless for me to
object to the inferences drawn from miracles until a miracle is
proven.

"If a man absolutely knows something of which I am ignorant, and
informs me of it, it makes no difference to me how he come by his
knowledge--it is revelation to me. It may not be divine revelation;
but supposing it is, or is not, in either case, how am I to believe?
Is it any thing that will admit of mathematical demonstration? If so,
I shall take up with nothing short of being convinced in this way. Is
it any thing which he has discovered? If so, he must give me evidence
of such a discovery. Is it something to which he was an eye witness?
Then the truth to me, depends for the present, entirely on his
credibility. I must be convinced in the first place that he was not
deceived himself, and secondly, that he has no motive in deceiving me.
And evidence equally conclusive must accompany the truth of divine
revelation, or it ought not, nay more, it cannot, rationally be
believed. But supposing that I am convinced of the truth, and
therefore believe; and I relate the same to a third person; is it
equally revelation to him as it was to me? Yes, it may be so
considered, in one sense, at least, for it informs him of something of
which he was before ignorant, as much so as it did me, but then the
truth of the fact does not rest with him on equal testimony, and
therefore he is more excusable if he does not believe. If, however, he
can believe all that I believe, and in addition to that, believe also
in _me_, then, and not till then, he will become a believer in the
same truth. But if he even suspects my veracity, it weakens in his
mind, all the other testimony; and though he may still believe in the
main proposition, yet he believes with less strength of evidence.

"Here a very important question arises in my mind. Is divine
revelation something that rests entirely on matters of _fact_; or is
the most essential part, which concerns us to know, a mere matter of
_opinion_? On a few moments of reflection, however, it appears that
this can hardly admit of a question. For all that relates to a future,
and an eternal state, must be a mere matter of opinion only; and the
facts recorded in the scriptures are supposed to corroborate and
substantiate those opinions. Now, as they respect matters of fact, I
believe the scriptures are substantially the same in all versions, and
in all languages into which they have been translated. And if so,
there is no need of learning the original languages in order to become
acquainted with the matters of fact recorded in the bible. We never
should have seen, nor even heard, of so much controversy and biblical
criticism, if the disputes had been wholly relative to matters of
fact. No, all the various readings, different translations, and
interpolations, have little or nothing to do with a dispute of this
kind. But if the facts can he disputed, they must be disputed upon
other grounds than that of biblical criticism.

"Take, for instance, the 'death and resurrection of the man Christ
Jesus,' which you have mentioned; can any one suppose that there ever
was, or ever will be, a translation which makes any thing more or less
in favour of this fact? This is not pretended. And if not, how does a
knowledge of the Greek language help me to believe this fact?

"This brings me again to my main subject; and now two very important
questions arise in my mind.

"1. In relation to the facts, as stated, respecting the life, death,
and resurrection of the 'man Christ Jesus;' are they positively and
absolutely true?

"2. Admitting the truth of the facts, does it necessarily follow, or
is there any thing which renders it certain, that, in regard to other
things, neither he, nor the apostles, so called, could be mistaken?
And that, in all their writings, they have stated nothing which is
incorrect? That is, what certain evidence have we that the writers of
the books, which being compiled, are called the New Testament, were
all honest men? That they could not have been mistaken relative to the
things which they have written? And that in every instance, they have
written the truth?

"Respecting the first proposition, I have already observed that the
truth of it does not, neither can it, depend on biblical criticism.
They are either facts, which are substantially correct, or they are
fabrications. The circumstantial differences between the original
copies themselves, as recorded by the four Evangelists, are much
greater than what can be found in all the different versions,
translations, &c. that have been collated. Hence no argument can be
brought against the truth of those facts from either a real or
supposed difference between the translation, and their respective
originals. For even if not only the original copies, but the language
also in which they were originally written, should be entirely lost,
it would not militate, as I can see, against the truth of the facts
therein recorded.

"The translation acknowledges and affirms itself to be a _translation_
out of the 'original Greek,' together with former translations
compared, &c. Now permit me to ask, is not this as good evidence of
the existence of the _original Greek_, as the original Greek is of the
_facts_ intended to be proved thereby? I should consider the
translation of any work, which was generally known at the time of its
translation, better evidence of the existence of such a work, though
the original should be entirely lost, than the work itself, even in
the original, could be of the existence of facts, which, if they
existed at all, were known at first to but very few.

"You have suggested, sir, that if the original of the scriptures were
entirely lost, future ages would not know but they had been 'imposed
upon.' I think, however, you will not insist on this point, lest you
should destroy an argument, which, hereafter, you may very much need.
I recall my words. For this seems to imply that we are already engaged
in a controversy; whereas, I trust we are both candidly in search of
truth. I suspect, however, there is too much truth in your suggestion;
but then its truth, instead of relieving, only increases my
difficulty.

"Every one must know that when the translation of the scriptures was
first made, the original not only existed, but it must have been known
to others, beside the translators, who were able to detect the
_fraud_, if there had been any, as to substantial matter of fact. And,
in a work of so great importance, this certainly would have been the
case. Hence you will at once perceive, that when the copies were few
in number, and before the art of printing was discovered, fabrications
and interpolations might find their way into the original scriptures
with much greater facility, than could any considerable variations by
an intentionally erroneous translation; especially after the work
become generally known, and so highly valued, as to require a
translation of it.

"As you admit that 'reason is the _eye_ by which we are to examine the
evidences' which stand in support of the 'resurrection of the man
Christ Jesus,' and of course, as I presume, by which we are to examine
the evidences in support of all other subjects, I shall say no more
upon this part of the subject until I hear your reasons for believing
in the resurrection of Jesus; for this fact, as I conceive, must be
considered the main hinge on which the whole Christian system rests,
if it can be supported by any fact, on which it will finally turn.

2. "But after all, my greatest difficulty is with my second
proposition. To relate facts substantially correct, which persons have
either seen or heard, requires no degree of uncommon skill, or
uncommon honesty; but to state things which will absolutely take
place, which are yet future, requires something more than common
skill; and to state things correctly, which will take place in
eternity, must, as I conceive, require nothing short of _divine
wisdom_. That the evangelists have stated nothing more than what is
_substantially_ correct, as it respects matters of fact, will be
admitted by all: for every one knows there is a _circumstantial_
difference in their writings, both as it respects the order of time,
and in several instances, as it respects matters of fact.

"If the account given us of Jesus be even substantially correct, I
think there can be no reasonable doubt but that he was capable of
telling his disciples every thing which it concerns us to know
relative to a future state of existence.--But I have been often struck
with astonishment, when reflecting on the subject, that Jesus said so
little in regard to a future state! Notwithstanding he was long with
his disciples, as we are told after his resurrection, and did eat and
drink with them; yet, how silent he was upon the subject of eternity,
and of a future and spiritual world! At the only time when we should
rationally suppose that he could be a competent witness in the case,
admitting his death and resurrection true, is the time when he is
entirely silent as to the final and eternal state of man! Should we
admit therefore that Jesus at this time was capable of declaring
eternal truths, yet, as he testified nothing on the subject, nothing
relative to the subject can be proved from his testimony.

"It may be said that Christ had plainly taught his disciples
respecting this subject, previous to his death, and therefore it was
not necessary for him to say any thing more respecting it. But a
confirmation of what he had before taught, if it had been repeated
after his resurrection, would have added great weight to his former
testimony. We need not dwell however, upon these niceties, as the main
question is not involved in them. Yet I am inclined to think that if
all the words of Christ, which have been handed down to us, should be
closely examined, they would be found to be much more silent on the
subject of a future state than many have supposed. But the main
question is, are we certain that he could not have been mistaken in
the things whereof he affirmed? This question may be thought
_blasphemous_: but I cannot see wherein the blasphemy consists; for I
cannot help making the inquiry, in my own understanding, and as my
object is to gain instruction, I put the inquiry on paper. You may say
that Jesus was endowed with _divine wisdom_, and therefore could not
err. That divine wisdom cannot err, I admit, but does divine wisdom
secure man at all times, and under all circumstances, from mistake? If
the man Christ Jesus was in fact _man_ (and that he was man, even
Trinitarians admit) notwithstanding he was endowed with divine wisdom,
why might he not without any dishonour to the Deity, be sometimes left
to exercise only the wisdom of _man_? And to say that the wisdom of
man cannot err, would be saying contrary to daily experience. I have
not contended that Jesus ever erred; but I contend that he must have
been liable to error, or else he was not man. And the supposition that
he did not err, not even in thought or opinion, ought not to be
admitted without the most conclusive testimony.

"But whatever may be the conclusion on this subject, as it respects
the 'man Christ Jesus--a man approved of God,' yet what shall we say
concerning the apostles? Were they also absolutely secured from error?
These men, according to the confession of one of them at least, not
only had been, but still were--_sinners_. Paul, notwithstanding his
apostleship, still acknowledges the plague of his own heart 'I am
carnal, sold under sin--when I would do good, evil is present with
me--O wretched man that I am!' &c. Are such men absolutely proof
against even the error of opinion? It appears to me there are too many
incidents of imperfection recorded in the lives of the apostles to
admit all this. Peter once rebuked his master, at another time denied
him. He once objected to the voice of the spirit, and was afterwards
accused by his brethren for obeying it. Paul accused Peter to his
face, and also disagreed with Barnabas. And other circumstances might
be named, proving them to be destitute of intuitive knowledge.
Considering, therefore, all these things, how do we know but that in
their zeal to do good, (for I do not consider the apostles bad men;
neither do I think any the worse of Paul for either acknowledging his
own faults, or detecting the dissimulation of Peter,) I say therefore,
in their zeal to do good, how do we know but that they stated things
relative to another world, which were only inferences, which, as they
supposed, were justly drawn from what they had either seen or heard,
or else what their own fruitful imagination dictated? If we are at
liberty to view the apostles in this light, however highly their
opinions are to be valued and respected, yet I see no occasion of
investigating their writings with the eye of biblical or grammatical
criticism; for after all, they are but the opinions of men like
ourselves.

"But if it can be demonstrated that the opinions of the writers of the
New Testament can be relied on, as containing eternal truth, without
any mixture of error, then it is very important for us to know the
meaning of all the words they used, not only as it respects their
general import, but also the exact and particular sense in which they
used them. This however cannot be done without a thorough
acquaintance, not only with the Greek, but also with the Hebrew
language, for they used many Hebraisms, which, with a knowledge of the
Greek only, we should not be likely fully to comprehend.

"Yours, &c.

A. KNEELAND."

* * * * *

LETTER II.

_Much esteemed friend_,--In replying to your second number, you will
excuse me if I begin by finding some fault, in which, however, I will
endeavour to be as sparing as the case will admit.

On the subject of the languages, after reading in your first number
the following in its connexion: "If I understand the above
proposition, it seems to be this; the only revelation of God to man,
which was ever recorded on vellum or paper, was written partly in
Greek and partly in Hebrew; hence the revealed will of God cannot be
known only through the medium of these languages. If the truth of all
this could be made to appear," &c. and after replying to your argument
on this subject, I can hardly account for the insinuation in your
second number, by which you suggest, that you had no particular
allusion to a revelation from God when you spoke of translating the
most valuable of ancient writings, &c. The subject of a revelation you
acknowledge to be your main object; if this be the case, you have this
object in view when you speak of the Greek and Hebrew, and also when
you speak of the arts and sciences.

You contend in your second number, that the translation of the
Scriptures out of the original languages is as good evidence of the
existence of the original, as the original could be of the facts they
relate, &c. And this I believe is the only acknowledgement you make in
favour of the original's having been any benefit. You seem not willing
to allow that the retaining of the original language is of any use in
proving to after generations that the translation was correct, which
seems not easy to account for. But I will give you no further trouble
on the subject of this nature; nor will I occupy my time in
investigating the question relative to the necessity of studying those
languages, which you acknowledge is off from your main subject, and
take some notice of your queries respecting a divine revelation.
Although I am unable to trace the connexion of many of your remarks
with which you call your main subject, yet I am not disposed to doubt
that you comprehend such connexion--I think I understand your
statements so as to be able to discern the following particulars, as
subjects of your inquiry.

"1st. Is it reasonable to suppose that God has ever made a special
revelation to man? 2d. Is the resurrection of Jesus capable of being
proved? And, 3d. If so, does it follow that this was designed by
divine wisdom to give us any hope respecting a future state?"

It is not pretended that you have stated these questions just in this
order, but these are the subjects which your second number suggests to
my mind.

I shall take a much nearer road to come to a solution of these
questions, than that which would lead me to follow you through all
your remarks, because you have furnished me with the means to do so.

1st. You acknowledge that a divine revelation "if real," is of "all
truths the most important." Here let the eye of reason examine. Why
should a revelation from God be more important than those discoveries
which our Creator has enabled us to make in the arts and sciences? Why
should such revelation be more important than the use of the mariner's
compass, or the art of printing? Even without contending that a divine
revelation is of any greater importance than the arts and sciences,
your allowing it any importance at all, is, in the eye of reason an
argument in its support. Had you taken the other road, and contended
that there was no necessity of a revelation, and had you been able to
make this appear, you would have proved to the eye of reason, that a
Being of infinite wisdom, who can never act without a just cause, had
never made a revelation. But if reason admits of its importance, as
long as this is the case, it will be looking not only with a fervent
desire, but with expectation till it makes the discovery. You will, no
doubt, allow that a divinely munificient Creator would not omit any
thing which is of importance to his intelligent creatures.

Perhaps you will, (though I do not see why you should) call up a
former query, which was answered in my first, which answer was not
receipted in your second, and ask why this revelation was not made in
every nation, in every language, and in every age? But you will be
sensible that the same questions might be stated respecting the
progress of science and the discovery of the arts useful to a refined
state of society.

You will not think it strange that I am some disappointed that you
took no notice of my remarks on the above query as I really attach
importance to that little piece of reasoning. If reason has no
reluctance in acknowledging that man is multiplied and continued here
by a law which was not able to bring him into existence at first, why
may not a revelation from God, be perpetuated by different means than
those which first made it, and thereby the great object be even better
secured than by a perpetual revelation, which would seem to render
research unnecessary, and leave the reasoning powers without employ?

But it is time for me to inform you that I feel myself under no
obligations to labour to prove what you and I and many thousands of
others have considered sufficiently proved from ancient prophesy with
which our heavenly Father has favoured so many ages and nations and
languages. And furthermore, permit me to tell you, that if you are
disposed to doubt and to disprove what you acknowledge to be of such
vast importance, it is your province to bring forward your strong
reasoning, if such you have, by which the prophesies of the old
testament, those delivered by Christ and his apostles shall be made to
appear either to have no just analogy with the events of which they
speak, or that they were contrived by impostors since the events took
place.

2d. You acknowledge the validity of the evidences in favor of the
resurrection of Jesus. You say; "That the evangelists have stated
nothing more than what is substantially correct, as it respects
matters of fact, will be admitted by all." Again; "I do not consider
the apostles bad men." Now the apostles are the deponents who solemnly
testify the fact of the resurrection of Jesus. Why should you wish me
to prove what you allow to be true? Why do you not take the other
hand, and say the apostles were impostors, they were the opponents of
the righteous rulers of the Jews who put their master to death? Why do
you not avail yourself of the story put into the mouths of the guard
who watched the sepulchre, and say that those timid disciples who all
fled and left Jesus when they saw him bound, not only went to the
sepulchre and stole the body of Jesus and hid it where no mortal could
ever find it, but then went to Jerusalem and boldly affirmed he was
alive, who was dead, and then had the boldness and audacity to accuse
the rulers of having "denied the holy one and the just, and desired a
murderer to be delivered unto them; and of having killed the prince of
life, whom God had raised from the dead?" The reason is obvious, you
see the impropriety of such argument.--But:

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