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Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

A Series of Letters In Defence of Divine Revelation

H >> Hosea Ballou >> A Series of Letters In Defence of Divine Revelation

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2d. Even allowing your supposition, your consequences would be very
unlikely to follow. You surely would not suppose that the apostles
could believe they saw Jesus when they did not, if they had the use of
their reason properly. We must suppose them to have been insane
then.--What then would have been the consequences? Would the authority
have put these mad-men to death? Would they have been persecuted at
all for their misfortune? But these mad-men preached Jesus and the
resurrection to the people, and so convinced them of the fact, that
multitudes believed them, and on this supposition we are now to
_suppose_ our religion was first established in the world! If we may
suppose such things, there are no absurdities that we may not suppose.
You must suppose it to be a very dangerous thing to try a man for his
life by a jury of twelve men, for if the man was innocent of the
murder for which he was indicted and no evidence was produced to
convict him on, these men might all be made to believe, some how, by
some circumstance, "no matter what," that they all saw the murder
committed by this very innocent person on trial.

5th. I thought of saying something on your suggestion of the necessity
of miracles in some future time to convince the Jews that Jesus is the
Messiah, but being a little more careful, than at first, I find you
seem to give up this matter. You say: "considering the prejudices of
the Jews, as a people, I cannot suppose that they will ever believe in
Jesus, as their promised Messias short of being convinced of its truth
by a miracle; and should they return to the land of Palestine, and
there rebuild their temple, at Jerusalem, it would be such a clear
fulfilment of the prophesy of Ezekiel, that it would be equal to a
miracle, and do as much towards corroborating the truth of all the
other prophecies." If the return of the Jews, etc. be equal to
miracles, then it may preclude their necessity. But as this particular
does not immediately concern our general subject it is dismissed.

6th. As none of the evangelists have been particular respecting the
meeting in Galilee, and as this was an appointment even before the
crucifixion, as well as afterward, it is fairly within the reach of
probable conjecture, that this meeting was sufficiently numerous to
justify St. Paul's words. He does not speak of this matter as of a
subject with which his acquaintance was small, for he says; "he was
seen of above five hundred brethren at once; of whom the greater part
remain unto this present, but some are fallen asleep." He no doubt,
had seen many of this great number and had been informed of the
circumstances of the occasion, and of the time when this multitude was
favoured with this sight.

To conclude; I heartily join with you in grateful acknowledgements, to
the Almighty disposer of events, for the manifestations of his
universal benevolence to his creatures, and especially unto man whom
he hath seen fit to induce with the attributes of his own nature, and
constituted him an heir of life and immortality. In view of this, I
can be thankful for any faithfulness discoverable in those who publish
the word of life, and endeavour to defend it in the spirit of meekness
and Christian love.

And I will further add, that I feel a peculiar pleasure in finding
your mind to be somewhat divested of its incumberances, and that your
doubts of the grounds of your precious faith, are dispersing more and
more from your mind, while the evidences of divine truth find a
sincere reception in your understanding.

Let us endeavour to cherish, not only the evidences of truth, but
truth itself in our afflictions, and in room of being idlers in the
markets, go early into our Lord's vineyard trusting the words of him
who saith; "whatsoever is right, ye shall receive."

Yours, &c.

H. BALLOU.

* * * * *

EXTRACTS No. X.

"_Dear sir and brother_--In remarking on your reply to my 8th number,
as in a former case I shall follow the arrangement which you have
made; taking up the articles in the same order.

"1st. I did not suppose but that the method which I proposed to
account for the absence of the body of Jesus would be liable to
serious objections; and these objections are increased by connecting
with them, circumstances which, if the resurrection be false, must be
considered equally false. Because, if the resurrection of Jesus was
not a truth, whatever was the truth on which that belief was founded,
must be now all mere conjecture.

"There might be persons, however, who thought that Jesus suffered
death very wrongfully although he never pretended literally to perform
those miracles. Yea I conceive it possible that when this language was
first adopted, i. e. of his feeding the hungry, opening the eyes of
the blind, raising the dead, &c. it was not understood, nor meant to
be understood literally. Therefore although the account at first might
have been _literally false_, though not so much so as what it grew to
be afterward, yet it might have been considered _spiritually true_;
and therefore not designed absolutely to deceive. The only difficulty,
i.e. the only irreconcilable difficulty, which I conceive in the case,
is in supposing that the first disciples could be made to believe in
the resurrection, by any evidence which could have existed, and yet
the resurrection not to be true. But we must suppose this, I think, in
order to raise a reasonable doubt of the truth of the resurrection.
For, if the disciples did not believe it, they could have had no
interest or motive, (or certainly no justifiable motive) in making
others believe it; and without this, it is difficult to account even
for the existence of such a report. I should not think it so strange,
however, that others, after the report was once in circulation, and
that even St. Paul himself should have been made to believe this,
merely by some visionary scene.

"I think therefore the question may be reduced to this point. Which of
the two is the most _incredible_, either that the first disciples
should absolutely believe in the resurrection, by any evidence which
did not grow out of this truth, or that the resurrection should have
been absolutely true?

"Here is where the two propositions, when reduced to their simplicity
must finally come. And I contend that when two propositions are thus
clearly placed before the mind or understanding, whether the judgment
be right or wrong, the mind or understanding must reject, yea it is
impossible to avoid rejecting, that which to the mind or
understanding, is the most incredible.

"But when we admit that the disciples did believe in the resurrection,
we are not obliged to admit that they had all or any of the evidences
of that fact which have come down to us. This we may suppose might
have been mostly or altogether fictitious; written by later hands, and
attributed to the apostles. And here we must not suppose that the
account was altogether made up at once, but grew gradually; and not to
come out in writing until the persons, who could either attest or deny
the literal truth of these facts, were taken off of the stage. Here as
it respects the records also, the same question again occurs. Which is
the most _incredible_ (not to _miraculous_, for one miracle is no more
miraculous, that I know of than another; I therefore say which is the
most _incredible_) that such histories should have been thus, or in
some other way got up, and be believed, altho' the various accounts,
so far as they relate to miracles, and other circumstances necessary
to be taken into the account only for the sake of supporting the truth
of those miracles, should have been altogether fictitious, and such
parts only true as could be accounted for in a rational way, without
admitting the existence of miracles; or that all those miracles, or at
least the most essential of them, should have been literally and
absolutely true? The answer to these two propositions, i. e. the above
questions, will, and must, decide the whole controversy.

"Now, were it not for the internal evidences which the writings of the
New Testament do, and ever will, possess (the external evidences
falling so far short of being conclusive in my mind, as I shall show
more fully hereafter, when I come to speak of those evidences) I
should still be inclined, in my own understanding, to reject the
latter proposition in each of the above questions, and adhere to the
former.--Much of the external evidence, I am very ready to admit is
perfectly consistent with the supposed truth of the internal, but
after all, in my humble opinion, it does not quite come to the point.
But the internal evidence, I confess, I cannot withstand. The more I
investigate the subject, the more I discover its force, its clearness,
and its irresistibility; and although the truth it unfolds is so
august, so momentous, so astonishingly and inexpressibly sublime, that
it is with the profoundest and most reverential awe I speak, when I
acknowledge my faith in the divine origin of those testimonies; yet,
as I cannot resist their force, so I am obliged to acknowledge them
true. The illusion, however, if it be one, I know is happifying to the
mind; but this is no good reason, that I know of, why we should either
embrace it ourselves, or propagate it in the world. Although I have
endeavoured to calm my conscience, while meditating on my doubts, with
the consideration that I am not accountable for the truth or the
falsity of the scriptures; yet, I must confess, this did not fully
satisfy my mind; and therefore I come to a determination to be more
thoroughly persuaded of their truth, if possible, or else be more
thoroughly convinced of their fallacy. With this motive I entered on
the present controversy; and I feel very happy in its termination,
having been much strengthened in my faith thereby, and humbly pray,
that should it ever come before the public, it may be blest to the
benefit of others.

"2d. What you have said on the divine mission, &c. of the apostles is
satisfactory. For although it has not fully come to my question, yet
it has had the same good effect by convincing me that my question went
a little beyond the bounds of reason; for it was too much like asking
a blind man how it is that other men see! It is not reasonable to
suppose that the apostles themselves could have informed persons who
were uninspired to their understanding, how or by what means, they
were inspired. It was sufficient to demonstrate the fact by the works
which they were enabled to perform, (admitting the account true,) in
the name of JESUS.

"3d. My argument respecting a hope of future existence has been
extended rather beyond my design. Without taking up time to
recapitulate, I will only say I admit the truth of your argument on
this subject; neither do I see how it stands altogether in opposition
to mine. What I contend for is this. The idea of non-existence, i.e.
of existing only in God, without retaining our individual
consciousness of being, does not, like the idea of endless misery,
absolutely destroy our present comforts. It only cuts short, or else
prevents, future prospects. If it can be demonstrated, as I believe it
can, that God is good to the animal creation, in giving them
existence, on the supposition, that they have no future state, I
contend that man is equally, if not more abundantly blessed, even on
the same supposition.--But I never meant to contend that eternal life
would not be still infinitely better, according to our conceptions of
good, if true. To state a case, which will illustrate in some degree
my ideas of this subject, the following may come something nigh it;
viz. I should be pleased with the idea of living, say, ten years, in
reference only to the blessing of this life, although I might know I
should die at that time, provided that, during the ten years, I should
enjoy the common blessings of life. This does not prevent my desiring
to live longer; neither does a certain knowledge that I shall not
prevent me from desiring to live, nor from being pleased with the idea
of living, till that time. But let me know for a certainty, or, which
would be the same thing to me, let me absolutely believe that I should
live fifty years, and that although the ten first would be attended
with all the common blessings of life, as usual, yet that the
remaining forty years, which would be the remaining whole of my
natural life, I should be placed in the most distressed and aggravated
circumstances, of which I could possibly conceive; now, in reference
to the whole fifty years, could I desire to live? No! I say, I rather
choose instant death!

"When I look around on the circumstances and condition of men, I am so
fully convinced that the aggregate of happiness so far overbalances
the aggregate of misery, that I am firmly of opinion, yea, I do not
entertain the least possible doubt of its truth, and therefore think I
ever shall contend, that this life is a blessing, and we have abundant
reason to be very thankful for it, without the least reference to a
future state. But, nevertheless, I am very ready to admit, that, when
futurity and immortality are taken into the account, and are connected
with the same view of the character of the Deity, these blessings are
all extended and magnified to infinity.

"But on the supposition that truth is any where connected with
_endless misery_, the scene is wholly changed. On this supposition I
am not reconciled to truth at all; I can find nothing in my moral
nature, which I call good, but what stands directly opposed to it;
Hence, the very brightest and most brilliant part of the picture is
deformed by the awful idea; it takes away all the pleasure of
investigation, and if this be truth, my only desire and prayer to God,
is that I might be permitted to remain eternally ignorant of it! It is
my confidence therefore in the goodness of the truth, and this only,
which has reconciled my mind to it. You may contend that I have not
obtained this confidence without the knowledge of divine revelation.
Be that as it may; on this supposition only I am reconciled, and
something must destroy this confidence before I can become
unreconciled to truth. I think now I must be fully understood, and
will therefore add no more on this subject.

"4th. What you say under the fourth article is satisfactory. Errors,
no doubt, may be, and often are committed by applying instructions
'differently from their primary design.'

"5th. Your remarks under the sixth article are very judicious. Much
injury no doubt is often done to the truth of divine revelation by
contending so tenaciously as some do for things, which, if true, are
not essential to its support.--It is often the case that, by trying to
prove too much, we weaken the evidence, in the minds of many,
respecting the main thing we wish to establish. Hence, the opposer,
not being able, or else not disposed, to make proper distinction,
considers it all of one piece; and not being able to see the propriety
of many things, which are contended for with equal zeal, sets the
whole down as a fallacy.

"6th. It is true, I thought you strained the argument a little too far
in supposing that the apostles could not have been convinced of the
truth of the resurrection by any evidence which could be
counterbalanced. This induced me to state that supposed absurdity in
still more glaring colors, with a hope that you would thereby be
induced to take a review of your argument, and not without some
expectation, that you would be able to see some defects in it. But in
this I have been disappointed. You still hold on upon your argument,
and turn the error wholly on your friend.

"But, as this is the turning point, I shall not blame you for
straining every nerve, and holding on upon every fibre which gives you
the least possible support.

"It would not do for you to give up the idea that the apostles could
not have been convinced of the truth of the resurrection by any
evidence which could have existed short of the fact's being true;
(which, by the way, was what I meant by the first member of my
criticism, though not exactly so expressed;) for the moment this is
admitted, doubt and unbelief will soon contend that they were so
convinced. Imagination may soon call up such evidence in the mind,
without supposing any thing miraculous, and all the rest of the
account may be supposed to be fictitious. I did not mean to insinuate,
however, that you have contended that the apostles must have seen
Jesus rise in order to be convinced of the fact. I suppose their
seeing him after he was risen was as full a demonstration to them as
though they had seen him rise. And if they could not have been
convinced of its truth by any thing short of this, then they could not
be convinced by any thing short of the fact; i.e. what was the same to
them as the fact. The second member of my criticism, viz. 'If the fact
did exist there is no evidence which can counterbalance it,' does not,
as I conceive, suppose that you contend 'that the fact of the
resurrection could not exist without proving itself to the apostles in
such a way that no evidence could counterbalance it;' but it supposes
that if the fact did exist, no evidence could prove that it did not
exist, as it is always difficult to prove a negative, and utterly
impossible when the positive is true.--Hence my conclusion; viz. As
the apostles were convinced of the truth of the resurrection, which
they could not have been only by evidence which could not have existed
had not the fact been true, the fact did exist. How far does this
criticism fall short of my other? (for it is exactly what I meant by
my other.) Or how far does it go beyond your argument?

"Finally, I cannot conceive of any evidence that could sufficiently
support the fact that Jesus who was crucified, did actually rise from
the dead, if nothing could be brought to counterbalance it, that could
possibly admit of being counterbalanced; and again: 'Thus we are
brought to the suggestion, that any evidence which could be sufficient
to prove such a fact, if no evidence appeared against it, must be such
as admits, of no refutation.'

"Unless it may be reasonably supposed that the apostles were not
absolutely so guarded against an error of this kind as this argument
suggests, I know of no way to withstand its force. And I am sure I
feel no disposition to withstand it, even against probability. It is
the improbability of the fact it goes to prove, i. e. in my mind, that
ever induced me to oppose it.

"I shall now take notice of the external evidence in support of the
truth of divine revelation, which you have quoted from Paley in his
view of the evidences of christianity.

"In your reply to my seventh number, you mentioned a quotation from
the epistle of Barnabas, St. Paul's companion, in the following words,
'Let us therefore, beware lest it come upon us, _as it is written_,
there are many called, few chosen.' The object of this quotation is to
prove that the gospel of Matthew (from which here is a quotation) was
written before this epistle, and here appealed to as to a book of
divine authority. And although it is perfectly consistent with such a
supposition, yet there is great room to doubt whether such was the
fact. Or, at least, there is room to conjecture that the gospel of
Matthew might have been written before this epistle, and yet not
written till after the destruction of Jerusalem.

"Speaking of the writers of this period, Dr. Priestly observes[7] 'The
oldest work of the age, if it had been genuine, is that which goes by
the name of _The epistle of Barnabas_. Whoever was the author of this
epistle, it was probably written soon after the destruction of
Jerusalem.--It abounds with interpretations of the Old Testament which
discover more of imagination, than judgement.' By this you will
perceive that the authority of this epistle is doubtful. I should also
have gathered the same idea, from what Paley himself says, whose work
I have examined, on this subject, since I wrote my last number. It
might have been written at a much later period than what is supposed
and palmed upon Barnabas; and therefore does not, as was supposed,
absolutely prove that the gospel of Matthew was written prior to the
destruction of Jerusalem. It seems that christians of a later period
were in the habit of palming works upon their predecessors; or in
other words, writing in their name. After speaking of the epistle of
Clemens, Priestly observes (p. 301) there is extant another epistle
ascribed to this Clemens, but it is evidently spurious, and was
probably written in the middle of the third century. Several other
writings were palmed upon him also, especially the _Apostolical
Constitution_ and the _Clementine homilies_. The epistle of Barnabas,
it seems, is first quoted by Clement of Alexandria, A.D. 194. This
certainly gives room for my conjecture for aught which appears to the
contrary, it might have been written a whole century after the days of
the apostles.

[Footnote 7: Ch. Hist. vol. i. p. 200.]

"The next which Paley mentions is an epistle written by Clement,
bishop of Rome. This is the same which Priestly calls _Clemens_. 'This
epistle,' he says, 'was held in the highest esteem by all christians,
and, like the scriptures, was publicly read in many churches.' In this
epistle of _Clement_, you say, 'he quotes Matt. v. 7. xviii. 6.' But
how does he quote those passages? Not as the writing of Matthew, but
as the words of 'our Lord.' Although this therefore, as I have before
suggested, is perfectly consistent with the supposed truth, it falls
far short, in my mind, of proving that the gospel of Matthew, was
written before this epistle. Clement or Clemens might have written
this by tradition even if he had never seen the gospel of Matthew, or
any other. It only proves that these words in the gospel and those in
the epistle were indebted to the same original source, viz. the words
of Jesus. I am not disposed to dispute, however, the genuineness of
this epistle. 'It is an earnest dissuasive,' says Priestly, 'from the
spirit of faction, which appeared in the church of Corinth, and which,
indeed, was sufficiently conspicuous when Paul wrote his epistles.'

"'Another work of doubtful authority,' says Priestly, 'is _the
Shepherd of Hermes_, by some thought to be that Hermes who is
mentioned by Paul in his epistle to the Romans; but by others supposed
to be either spurious, or to have been written by a later Hermes, or
rather Hermes, brother of Pius, bishop of Rome, about the year 140.
Whoever was the author of this work (and though it was so much
esteemed by many christians, as to be publicly read in their churches)
it is certainly a very poor performance.' If this work therefore be of
so late a date, as, according to this account, it may be, and, from
all which appears to the contrary, we may presume it is, as the first
quotation of it is by Irenaeus, A. D. 178, it falls short of the proof
we want.

"The same observations will apply to the allusions to the gospels in
the epistles of _Ignatius_, as was mentioned in regard to the epistle
of _Clement_. They are not literal quotations, and therefore might
have been only traditions. I consider them no certain proof that the
gospels were written previous to this time, though it is very natural
to suppose _that_ to have been the fact. The same will apply to the
epistle of _Polycarp_, as we know not exactly what was meant at that
time by the scriptures; neither do allusions to certain passages in
the scriptures, especially such as the words of Jesus, prove the
existence of those scriptures at that time.

"In the time of Eusebius there were extant _five books of Papias,
bishop of_ Hierapolis in Syria, of _the interpretation of the divine
oracles_. 'Papias,' says Priestly, 'was a great collector of the
sayings of the apostles; and one of the traditions preserved by him
was that, after the resurrection, Christ would reign upon earth a
thousand years, an opinion which, from his authority, was long
respected by many.'[8] Papias, it seems, is the first who speaks of
the gospels by name, and he mentions only Matthew and Mark. That all
the gospels, however, existed in his day, and also bore the names
which they now do, I should not be disposed to dispute; neither is
there any thing to contradict the idea of their being written by the
persons reputed to be the authors of them.

[Footnote 8: Ch. Hist. vol. i. p. 203 Euseb. Hist. Lib. iii. Cap. 39
p. 135.]

"But, supposing a few of these first bishops had taken it into ther
heads, having succeeded so well, during a little respite from
persecution, in consequence of those troublesome times at the
destruction of Jerusalem, as to get appointed to their respective
offices, and thinking it would lead greatly to their future success, I
say, supposing they had taken it into their heads to write the four
gospels and the acts of the apostles themselves, embracing all the
traditions, which they knew, of the apostles, dressed up in the
figurative style in which those things, even from the first, had been
reported, together with many fictions of their own. And that they did
write these books in the name of the apostles; who would be likely, or
would be able, to contradict them? Or supposing, without any previous
concert, some one should have written the gospel of Matthew; another,
after having seen it, should write one in the name of Mark; a third,
who had seen them both, should write that of Luke, and the acts of the
apostles; and a fourth should write that of John.--These, of course,
would make their first appearance at different times, and in different
parts of the country; or, in other words, in different countries. Some
story or other might have been got up, in regard to their first
discovery, which should go currently with the common people, and
which, after the works were received as canonical, would of course be
done away.

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