A Series of Letters In Defence of Divine Revelation

H >> Hosea Ballou >> A Series of Letters In Defence of Divine Revelation

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6. "That commentaries were written upon them, harmonies formed out of
them, different copies carefully collected, and versions of them made
into different languages.

7. "That they were received by Christians of different sects, by many
heretics as well as catholics, and usually appealed to by both sides
in the controversies which arose in those days.

8. "That the four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, thirteen epistles
of St. Paul, the first epistle of John, and the first of Peter, were
received without doubt, by those who doubted concerning the other
books which are inclosed in our present canon.

9. "That the gospels were attacked by the early adversaries of
Christianity, as books containing the accounts upon which the religion
was founded.

10. "That formal catalogues of authentic scriptures were published, in
all which our present sacred histories were recorded.

11. "That these propositions cannot be affirmed of any other books,
claiming to be books of scripture; by which I mean those books which
are commonly called Apochryphal."

The first evidence adduced by this celebrated author to prove his
first proposition, proves that the gospel of St. Matthew, which
contains a very particular account of the prophecy of Jesus concerning
the destruction of Jerusalem, was written before the event took place.
This evidence is a quotation from the epistle of Barnabas, St. Paul's
companion, in the following words: "Let us therefore, beware lest it
come upon us, _as it is written_, there are many called, few chosen."
St. Matthew's gospel is the only book in which these words are found;
and you will perceive by the expression, "as it is written," that
Barnabas quoted the passage from an author of authority. Barnabas
wrote his epistle during the troubles which ended in the destruction
of the Jews and their city. This epistle of Barnabas is quoted by
Clement of Alexandria, A.D. 194: by Origen, A.D. 230. It is mentioned
by Eusebius, A. D. 315, and by Jerome, A. D. 392. (Paley's evidences,
p. 106.)

Your insinuations that the origin of the christian scriptures is
involved in fable and mystery, should have been accompanied with a
clear refutation of the arguments used by Lardner, Paley, and others,
who have with much learning and labour traced the stream to its
fountain.

I must say something on the subject which you introduce concerning
man, as a species of being, or you may think me inexcusable for the
neglect. There seem to be two main questions suggested on this
subject; the first inquires what man was farther back than history
reaches; and the other directs the mind to a "line of demarcation"
between the human and the brute.

We have no account that I know of when the use of fire was not known.
We read Gen. iv. 22, that Tubal-cain was an instructor of every
artificer in brass and iron, and if reason has any thing to do in this
case, we may suppose that the use of fire was known to these
mechanics. The date to which this reading belongs, is 3875 years
before Christ; but there can be no reasonable doubt but that the use
of fire was known long before, and that it was used in the offerings
which were made by Cain and Abel.

That the discovery of arts and the progress of science have changed
man from what he originally was, is no more reasonable, than to
suppose that the education which a child acquires by degrees, by the
same degrees changes him in respect to his nature. That the arts and
sciences serve to improve and extend the human intellects is
reasonable enough, but that they add any thing to the natural
principles or faculties of man is not conceivable.

In fixing the "line of demarcation" between the human nature and the
brutal, I will suggest two characteristics which you have noticed by
which the distinction may be ascertained.

The first is the power or faculty of improving from generation to
generation his condition by means of art, and knowing how to advance
from one degree of science to another. This I will suppose belongs to
man and is peculiar to our race of being. We know of no other animal
on earth that has ever improved his condition by the discovery of the
arts or an increase of science.

The other characteristic is one of your propositions, on which you
build your system of doubting, viz. _Superstition_. This is found in
no creature but such as is susceptible of religion. Man is the only
religious animal, if I may be allowed this form of expression, found
on the earth.

The progress which man has made in arts and sciences, and the progress
he has made in divine or religious knowledge distinguish him from the
brutal creation. As in the former he has run into thousands of errors,
so in the latter he has wandered in darkness, with now and then a
blessed ray of light which improved his mind. When the knowledge of
the arts became generally defused by means of the extension of the
Roman government, it pleased our blessed Creator to cause the sun of
divine light to rise on the Jew and Gentile world. And gave him a
covenant of the people, a light to lighten the Gentiles, and the glory
of his people Israel.

Your opinion that men are seldom made unhappy in consequence of
doubting a future existence, may be true in a comparative sense, for I
believe there are few in comparison with the whole, who do doubt on
this subject. Generally speaking, it is the few, who like the
philosopher that rendered himself blind by endeavouring to find out
what the sun was composed of, thought there was no sun nor any light,
that so far give up a hope of futurity as to be miserable in their
belief.

That the idea of endless torment, such as our clergy have represented,
and with which they have most horribly terrified thousands and driven
them into black despair, is more horrible than no existence at all
will be allowed by every candid mind. But in contemplating an infinite
source of divine benevolence, and his means of giving and perpetuating
existence, and of rendering existence a blessing, the mind is not
driven to the necessity of selecting between these two evils. No, sir,
the mind thus employed has sweeter themes and brighter prospects--in
belief of that invaluable treasure, that divine testimony of the
inspired apostle: "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be
made alive;" which sentence you nor I ever heard a preacher of endless
punishment recite in a sermon in our lives, the soul rises by faith
into sublime regions of future peace and everlasting enjoyment, when
death shall be swallowed up of life.

I need not tell you, my brother, that it has been through many trials,
afflictions, doubts, and temptations, that your feeble humble servant
has found the way to this rock; you cannot be altogether ignorant of
this travail of mind. Permit me then to call to remembrance the
bondage we have escaped, the sea through which we have passed, the
sweet songs of deliverance and salvation which we have chanted to our
Redeemer in the faith of our Lord and Saviour JESUS CHRIST. And here
permit me to request your assistance in giving me support, and in
strengthening my hands in the work of the Lord.

Yours, &c.

H. BALLOU.

* * * * *

EXTRACTS No. VIII.

"In regard to the story reported among the Jews, respecting the body
of Jesus, I admit there is a greater probability of there being such a
report, especially if the body could not be found, and the apostles
affirmed that he was risen from the dead, than there is that the
resurrection, should be actually true: hence, perhaps, I was not so
much on my guard in the expression as I ought to have been. What I
particularly had in my mind was, that I might find it difficult to
prove even the existence of such a story, i. e. in the days of the
apostles; and still more difficult to prove, even on the ground that
there was no resurrection, that this story was true; and therefore
there could be no use in urging the truth of this story in order to
invalidate the truth of the resurrection. I do not conceive, however,
that because I doubt the _fact_, I am under obligations to account for
the _fallacy_. It always belongs to the advocates of the truth of any
story, to bring forward sufficient evidence to prove the same. I can
think of a solution, however, that would appear to my understanding
much more probable, than to suppose, as mentioned in your seventh
article, the 'account written long since the apostles' day;' yet it
may, perhaps, be attended with equal or greater difficulties, viz.
that the body was not stolen by the apostles, but was taken away by
other persons, who were willing that Jesus should be _deified_,
according to the then common acceptation of that word among the
Greeks, and who studied this stratagem with an express design to
deceive the Jews, as a punishment to them for so cruelly putting him
to death, and also to deceive his disciples, in order to inhance the
honour of the name of Jesus.

"This might have been done, as I conceive, by persons who never became
his open followers, so far as to suffer death on his account, but were
contented in having gained their object; to do which, it was only
necessary in the first instance to frighten the soldiers. It may be
difficult after all, as I have observed concerning the human species,
to say where the truth of the account ends, or where the fallacy
begins; but that some such thing should have taken place is more
probable to my understanding than that the literal resurrection of
Jesus should have been true. But I perceive that my expression,
concerning the report among the Jews, was a little too strong; and
carried rather more in it than what I was aware. For even on my
hypothesis, as well as on every other which admits the absence of the
body, such a report would appear very probable.

"It must be granted, as you have suggested, that there was such a
report among the Jews at the time when that record was made, or else
that record would not appear at all to 'advantage' in support of the
truth of christianity.

"That 'reason is candid,' I also admit; and if I am blundering in
making mistakes, I believe you will have the goodness to acknowledge
that I am candid in retracting them again when they are so pointed out
to me that I can see them.

"Respecting divine revelation, it is true, I understood you to mean
something more than barely what is predicated on the resurrection of
Jesus; yet in the second proposition of the three which you made, viz.
'Is the resurrection of Jesus capable of being proved,' I understand
you to state one single fact, on which you are willing to rest the
final issue of the argument. This being the most important fact,
relative to the truth of christianity, and which, probably, is as
difficult of proof as any, I do not perceive any disingenuousness in
confining you _now_ to this proposition till it is either proved or
admitted. Neither do I perceive how this can embarrass your argument,
as you have proposed to consider them 'true, disjunctively,' as well
as conjunctively. When therefore you have proved the three
propositions _disjunctively_; particularly the second, above named,
then I shall be willing you should avail yourself of their
_union_.--You may say, perhaps, I have proposed to admit the truth of
your three propositions; but you will also perceive, it was only for
the sake of introducing a fourth proposition, which it will not be
necessary for you to consider until the three first are proved true.

"I conceive that reason has no more to do in this case than to judge
of the evidences of facts; and then, if the facts are supported,
reason can judge of their relation one to the other; but to assume, in
the first place, the truth of revelation, and then infer from _that_
the probability of the truth of the resurrection of Jesus, appears to
me to be unreasonable. Therefore, if you attempt to prove the truth of
revelation, I conceive you must in the first place prove,
'disjunctively,' the truth of the resurrection. If, therefore, you
have considered yourself excused from proving the facts on which the
truth of revelation seems to rest, because I have granted them for the
sake of the argument, you have misapprehended my meaning. I grant
_nothing_, respecting the main question, until it is _proved_.

"Notwithstanding what you have said about 'the known facts,' and
'facts which you grant, for the sake of the argument,' &c. you will
perceive by my seventh number, that I do not consider the 'miracles of
Jesus, his resurrection, and the miracles wrought by the apostles,'
either granted or proved, i. e. in relation to the main question; and
hence, whatever weight your argument may have, when you have succeeded
in that (if you should succeed at all) at present they seem to be
hardly conclusive. I know it would save you much time, if you could
draw from me an acknowledgement of the truth of the facts on which you
rely; and you seem to argue, if I understand you, as though that was
already the case; but whatever you may have understood, I must
distinctly disavow any such acknowledgement; and I shall still expect
(unless it is done in answer to my seventh number) when you come to
reply to this, that you will state distinctly, and together, the
evidences and arguments on which you mostly rely.

"If, however, you have meant nothing more by all this than to point
out the use you shall make of the miracles, &c. (which have been
granted for the sake of the argument) when those miracles, &c. shall
have been either proven, or else acknowledged true, in relation to the
main question, then I have no fault to find; but otherwise, your
argument in this place seems to be a little premature.

"You say, 'the known facts, such as the miracles, &c. I used as proof
of the divine mission of the servants of God. This divine mission
being proved gives the ground on which I contend for the merit of
their testimony, concerning a future state.'

"Here you will perceive, sir, that, according to your own statement,
to prove this divine mission, you must first prove the certainty of
those miracles, &c. on which the truth of the divine mission is
predicated. And these are things about the truth of which, as I
indicated all along, there may be serious doubts.

"I am at a loss also to understand, what you mean by a 'divine
mission.' You inform me that I misapprehended you 'in supposing that'
you 'mean to contend, that what the apostles have said respecting a
future state, was spoken by way of _conclusions_ from certain known
facts.' Here, I must confess, I am really at a loss to understand you:
how that either Jesus, or his apostles, could understand a divine
mission, even if they had received one, unless it were by
_conclusions_ from _certain known facts_, that is, facts well known to
them, I cannot conceive; and therefore must have some further
explanation on this subject before I can fully answer you. For I must
be better informed than I am at present, what you mean by a _divine
mission_, before I can see the necessity of 'denying the reality of
those miracles--or of granting the authority of their (Christ and his
apostles) testimony;' that is, in regard to a future state. But even
if I should be made to see this, it would be of no use for the
present; because as it respects the final issue of the argument, I
have not, neither do I now admit the reality of those miracles: as you
must have seen by my seventh number.

"The next particular which demands notice is the quoted passage which
I pronounced _Most excellent_!

"Here a serious query suggests itself to my mind. I ask myself: am I,
or am I not, as capable of writing my sentiments, so as to be
understood by a rational man, as those plain illiterate men who wrote
the gospels? And yet if my words are so wrested by logical
_twisticisms_ (if I may be allowed to use that expression) so as to
mean what never entered my heart, and all this with apparent serious
candor too, what may have been the fate of the writings of the
evangelists? Now this is something in which I cannot be deceived, i.
e. as it respects myself; for any man of common sense does know his
own meaning, whether his words fully express his meaning or not, or
whether they may be made to mean something else or not.

"Permit me therefore once more to explain. The expression, _Most
excellent_! was not so much intended to have been applied to the
sentence preceding it, as to the author of that sentence, whose
goodness, in stating so explicitly what he understands by the
christian faith, I commended. And you must excuse me for not being
able to see any inconsistency, absurdity, or contradiction in my words
which follow that expression. Suppose a case. You have a good and
faithful servant, who feels happy in your service, and is perfectly
contented with his fare. You promise him with some favours which you
had never before made known to him. He is elated with the idea of your
goodness, which he has never doubted, but did not know till now that
it was to be manifested in this particular way. You tell him that a
knowledge of this, with his former knowledge, 'is as much as his
present welfare requires.' He very readily assents to the truth of the
proposition; and further adds, it is even 'more than is necessary for
his present welfare,' for he was contented and happy before. Would any
rational man say that your servant talked unreasonably? Would he say
that such reasoning was absurd? I think not. Your servant does not
despise either your goodness or your bounty; he considers that his
master knows best, what is best for his servant; and he receives with
gratitude whatever is bestowed. Your argument would have appeared to
me more just, if, after fully understanding me, which I perceive, by
the use you have made of the quotation from my sixth number, you now
do, you had proved from well known facts, or from conclusive argument,
the absolute necessity of the hope of a christian in order for the
'present welfare' of mankind. In doing this you would have ingenuously
refuted the proposition which I say would have been _exactly right_.

"You do not seem, sir, yet to have fully understood me as to my object
in searching for truth. You ask, saying, 'Do you not appear to be
solicitous to have your doubts removed, without expecting the least
advantage by it?' You must know, sir, that this is only on
supposition, that my doubts are founded in error; in which case I
should reap the advantage, as my object is truth. You will recollect
that my first object was to search for _moral truth_; without being at
all solicitous where, or on what ground it shall be found. Truth
_only_ is my object. In this _only_ I feel at all interested in this
argument. Hence I shall be just as much obliged to you to _confirm_ me
in my doubts, admitting they are founded in truth, as I shall to
_remove_ them, admitting they are founded in error.

"I once thought just as you, viz. that the idea and contemplation of
enjoying future life was absolutely necessary to present enjoyment;
but I am now fully convinced, yea, more, it is absolutely known to be
a fact, that the idea is altogether visionary and illusive. I admit
that a knowledge of the truth, so far as the truth may be known, is
perfectly _congenial_ with the present happiness of mankind: though it
is often the case that a partial knowledge of the truth, in relation
to any particular subject, produces distress and misery rather than
enjoyment. I now am very happy in knowing some things, which, once,
only the idea of their being true would have given me pain. I am
inclined to think that the idea of _now_ enjoying the pleasures, or
_now_ enduring the pains of a future life is altogether chimerical. I
can enjoy the life or lives of others in a future tense just as well
as I can _now_ enjoy my own future life. I have as much reason to
believe that rational intelligence always did exist, as I have to
believe it always will; yea, one idea is just as certain to me as the
other, and no more so. And as I cannot reflect on the idea of eternity
past, only with a kind of reverential _awe_ mingled with sublime
pleasure; so the idea of eternity to come produces in me the same
sensation; yea, feeling myself equally ignorant of both, (which must
be the case on the supposition that revelation is not true.) I can
perceive no difference. I feel anxious to know, however, every thing
which can be known on this subject; and yet, at the same time, I am
inclined to think I should _doubt_ of every revelation of which I can
have any conception, unless it should be so made that I could see its
truth, (or at least the evidences of its truth) over and over again,
and that they should still remain by me at all times, so that I could
examine them, and re-examine them, the same as I now look at the stars
in the firmament.

"Thus I have opened my mind to you, more fully than I have ever done
before, on this subject; and notwithstanding your writings may be very
beneficial to others (as well as mine, for some may stand in need of
one, and some of the other) yet, here comes up my doubts again, if I
am benefited by them, I expect it will be in a different way than that
of being any more persuaded of the truth of divine revelation.
Nevertheless, I am no less anxious to continue the correspondence on
this account.

"Your address to TRUTH, which you are pleased to put into the mouth of
my argument, is closed with an idea which does not grow out of my
hypothesis. 'The joyous expectation of soon losing sight of thee (i.
e. truth) forever in the ellysium of non existence!' _Non-existence_,
sir, does not _exist_! Neither does the term convey an idea to my
understanding of any thing. I know of no existence, neither can I
conceive of any, except that which I believe to be eternal in its
nature. And the idea of _something_ being formed or made out of
_nothing_, or of something's returning to nothing again, I have long
since exploded. Every thing, however, excepting first principles, is
liable to _change_. Hence arises the various modes, states,
circumstances, conditions and situations in beings and things: also
their different properties, relations and dependences.

"I know not whether consciousness is a being, or whether it be only a
mode of being. If it be the former, it always did, and always will
exist, in some state or other; if the latter, the state of the being
may be so changed that although identity exists, yet consciousness is
not there. And there is no more absurdity in this idea than there is
in supposing that the same matter which forms a _cube_, may become a
_globe_. I can as well conceive of a conscious being to day, becoming
unconscious to-morrow, as I can conceive of a person in a sound sleep.
But _non-existence_ (strictly speaking) sounds to my understanding
something like the _falsity of truth_!

"I now come to your reply to my sixth number; and in my remarks, which
will be but few, I shall follow the arrangement which you have made.

"1st. The candid concessions which you have made, and the charity
which you have extended towards doubting Christians, or candid
unbelievers (for such I conceive there may be) is honourable both to
yourself and to the cause which you have espoused, and your writing,
of course gains a much more favourable reception than the writings of
those who appear to be filled with a spirit of acrimony, and are ready
at once to deal out anathemas against every thing of which they cannot
approve. But, sir, you will permit me to say, we ought to be cautious,
lest our personal attachment to an author, and his charitable feelings
towards us be such, as imperceptibly to blind us to correct reason,
and cause us to imbibe his errors, merely because they are his, and
mistake them for truth.

"I am well aware that I should find it difficult to prove that I now
believe what I do without a miracle, as you have suggested; for if
miracles have existed they may have, indirectly, more influence in my
mind than I am at present sensible of; and therefore I will not
undertake to say that I am not principally indebted to them for my
present views of the character of the supreme Being. I am disposed to
acknowledge in humble gratitude all the blessings which I have
received, and am made sensible of, let them come to me by what means,
or through what channel soever. But I do not see how you had a right
to expect that I should either _refute_, or else _acquiesce_ in your
opinion on this subject.--What! must I either prove that there have
been no such things as miracles, or else admit their truth! Must I
either refute your notion that they have had great influence on my
faith and practice, or else '_express my acquiescence_' that such is
the fact! Hard lines! I choose to take the easier course, and confess
that I am too ignorant to do either. I am willing, however, still to
be instructed.

"2d. I have nothing at present to say on the subject of prophecy; i.e.
to reconcile the pretensions to it with the honesty of the prophets,
without admitting divine inspiration, better than what I have written
in my seventh number. When I have received your answer to that I may
have something more to write. I would suggest, however, here, that as
you frequently make use of the expression 'divine inspiration,' I want
the expression more fully defined and explained. I have no distinct
idea, that I know of, of _divine inspiration_. I suppose you mean the
same by it which you did by the 'divine mission,' given to the
apostles, or at least something similar; but still I am ignorant of
the subject. You have sometimes spoken of divine revelation, as though
it was something distinct from this divine mission, and which was a
proof of it; but, you must excuse me, I am still all in the dark about
it. Do be so good as to inform me how you suppose the prophets, or
apostles, or even Jesus, could know for a certainty that they were
divinely inspired?

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