Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 2

G >> George S. Boutwell >> Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 2

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In the discussion of the committee there were serious differences of
opinion upon provisions of law. The minority of the committee,
consisting of James F. Wilson, who was chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, Frederick E. Woodbridge, S. S. Marshall, and Charles R.
Eldridge, maintained the doctrine that a civil officer under the
Constitution of the United States was not liable to impeachment except
for the commission of an indictable offence. This doctrine had very
large support in the legal profession, resting on remarks found in
Blackstone. On the other hand, Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries,
had given support to the doctrine that a civil officer was liable to
impeachment who misdemeaned himself in office. The provision of the
Constitution is in these words:

"The President, Vice-President, and all Civil Officers of the United
States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction
of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors."

The majority of the Judiciary Committee, in the controversy which
arose in the committee and in the House of Representatives, maintained
that the word "misdemeanors" was used in a political sense, and not in
the sense in which it is used in criminal law. In support of this
view attention was called to the fact that the party convicted was
liable only to removal from office, and therefore that the object of
the process of impeachment was the purification and preservation of the
civil service. In the opinion of the majority, it was the necessity of
the situation that the power of impeachment should extend to acts and
offences that were not indictable by statute nor at common law. The
report of the Judiciary Committee, made the twenty-fifth day of
November, was rejected by the House of Representatives.

The attempt of the President to remove Mr. Stanton from the office of
Secretary for the Department of War revived the question of
impeachment, and on Monday, the twenty-fourth day of February, 1868,
the House of Representatives "resolved to impeach Andrew Johnson,
President of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors." The
articles of impeachment were acted on by the House of Representatives
the second day of March, and on the fourth day of March they were
presented to the Senate through Mr. Bingham, chairman of the managers,
who was designated for that duty.

The articles were directed to the following points, namely: That the
President, by his speeches, had attempted "to set aside the rightful
authority and powers of Congress"; that he had attempted "to bring
into disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt, and reproach the Congress of
the United States and the several branches thereof"; and "that he had
attempted to incite the odium and resentment of all the good people of
the United States against Congress and the laws by them duly and
constitutionally enacted." Further, it was alleged that he had
declared in speeches that the "Thirty-ninth Congress of the United
States was not a Congress of the United States authorized by the
Constitution of the United States to exercise legislative power in the
same."

A further charge, and on which greater reliance was placed, was set
forth in these words: "That he had denied and intended to deny the
power of the Thirty-ninth Congress to propose amendments to the
Constitution of the United States." These articles were in substance
the articles that had been rejected by the House of Representatives in
1867. Finally, as the most important averment of all, the President
was charged with an "attempt to prevent the execution of the act
entitled 'An Act Regulating the Tenure of Certain Civil Offices,'
passed March 2, 1867, by unlawfully devising and contriving and
attempting to contrive means by which he could prevent Edwin M. Stanton
from forthwith resuming the function of the office of the Secretary for
the Department of War, notwithstanding the refusal of the Senate to
concur in the suspension theretofore made by said Andrew Johnson of the
said Edwin M. Stanton from said office of Secretary for the Department
of war." In various forms of language these several charges were set
forth in the different articles of impeachment--eleven in all. The
eleventh article, which was prepared by Mr. Stevens, embodied the
summary of all the charges mentioned. It is to be observed that in the
eleventh article there is no allegation that the President had
committed an offence that was indictable under any statute of the
United States or that would have been indictable at common law. It
may be assumed, I think, that for this country, at least, the question
that was raised at the beginning and argued with great force, and by
which possible the House of Representatives may have been influenced
in the year 1867, has been settled in accord with the report of the
majority of the Judiciary Committee. The House decided that the
President was impeachable for misdemeanors in office. With stronger
reason it may be said that every other civil officer is bound to
behave himself well in his office. He cannot do any act which impairs
his standing in the place which he holds, or which may bring discredit
upon the public, and especially he may not do any act in disregard of
his oath to obey the laws and to support the Constitution of the
country. The eleventh article was the chief article that was
submitted to a vote in the Senate. The question raised by that article
is this in substance: Is the President of the United States guilty in
manner and form as set forth in this article? On that question thirty-
five Senators voted that he was guilty, and nineteen Senators voted
that he was not guilty. Under the Constitution the President was found
not guilty of the offences charged, but the majority given may be
accepted, and probably will be accepted, as the judgment of the Senate
that the President of the United States is liable to impeachment and
removal from office for acts and conduct that do not subject him to the
process of indictment and trial in the criminal courts. At this point
I express the opinion that something has been gained, indeed that much
has been gained, by the decision of the House of Representatives,
supported by the opinions of a large majority in the Senate.

The answer of the respondent, considered in connection with the
arguments that were made by his counsel, sets forth the ground upon
which the Republican members of the Senate may have voted that the
President was not guilty of the two principal offences charged, viz:
that in his speeches he had denounced and brought into contempt,
intentionally, the Congress of the United States; and, second, that his
attempted removal of Edwin M. Stanton was a violation of the Tenure
of Office Act. In the President's answer to article ten, which
contained the allegation that in his speech at St. Louis, in the year
1866, he had used certain language in derogation of the authority of
the Congress of the United States, it was averred that the extracts did
not present his speech or address accurately. Further than that, it
was claimed that the allegation under that article was not "cognizable
by the court as a high misdemeanor in office." Finally, it was claimed
that proof should be made of the "actual" speech and address of the
President on that occasion. The managers were not able to meet the
demand for proof in a technical sense. The speech was reported in the
ordinary way, and the proof was limited to the good faith of the
reporters and the general accuracy of the printed report in the
newspapers. In this situation as to the charges and the answer, it is
not difficult to reach the conclusion that members of the Senate had
ground for the vote of not guilty upon the several charges in regard
to the speeches that were imputed to the President.

Judge Curtis, in his opening argument, furnished a technical answer to
the article in which the President was charged with the violation of
the Tenure of Office Act, in his attempt to remove Mr. Stanton from the
office of Secretary of the Department of War. Judge Curtis gave to the
proviso to that statute an interpretation corresponding to the
interpretation given to criminal statutes. Mr. Stanton was appointed
to the office in the first term of Mr. Lincoln's administration. The
proviso of the statute was in these words: "Provided that the
Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, etc., shall hold their
offices for and during the term of the President by whom they may have
been appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to their removal
by and with the advice of the Senate." The proviso contained
exceptions to the body of the statute, by which all civil officers who
held appointments by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
were secure in their places unless the Senate should assent to their
removal. It was the object of the proviso to relieve an incoming
President of Secretaries who had been appointed by his predecessor.
The construction of the proviso, as given by Judge Curtis, was fatal
to the position taken by the managers. It was claimed by the managers
that the sole object of the proviso was the relief of an incoming
President from the continuance of a Secretary in office beyond thirty
days after the commencement of his term, and that it had no reference
whatever to the right of the President to remove a Secretary during
his term.

There were incidents in the course of the proceedings that possess
historical value. By the Constitution the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court is made the presiding officer in the Senate when the
President is put upon trial on articles of impeachment. Chief Justice
Chase claimed that he was to be addressed as "Chief Justice." That
claim was recognized by the counsel for the President and by some
members of the Senate. The managers claimed that he was there as the
presiding officer, and not in his judiciary capacity. He was addressed
by the managers and some of the Senators as "Mr. President."

There was a difference of opinion in the Senate, and a difference
between the managers and the counsel for the respondent, as to the
right of the presiding officer to rule upon questions of law and
evidence arising in the course of the trial. Under the rule of the
Senate as adopted, the rulings of the President were to stand unless a
Senator should ask for the judgment of the Senate.

Other instances occurred which do not possess historical value, but
were incidents unusual in judicial proceedings. When the Judiciary
Committee of the House was entering upon the investigation of the
conduct of President Johnson, General Butler expressed the opinion that
upon the adoption of articles of impeachment by the House the President
would be suspended in his office until the verdict of the Senate. As
this view was not accepted by the committee, I made these remarks in
my opening speech to the House after a review of the arguments for and
against the proposition:

"I cannot doubt the soundness of the opinion that the President, even
when impeached by the House, is entitled to his office until he has
been convicted by the Senate."

This view was accepted.

At the first meeting of the managers I was elected chairman by the
votes of Mr. Stevens, General Logan, and General Butler. Mr. Bingham
received the votes of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Williams. Upon the
announcement of the vote, Mr. Bingham made remarks indicating serious
disappointment and a purpose to retire from the Board of Managers. I
accepted the election, and acted as chairman at the meeting. At the
next meeting, and without consultation with my associates, I resigned
the place and nominated Mr. Bingham. The nomination was not objected
to, and Mr. Bingham took the chair without comment by himself, nor was
there any comment by any other person. The gentlemen who had given
me their votes and support criticized my conduct with considerable
freedom, and were by no means reconciled by the statement which I made
to them. Having reference to the nature of the contest and the
condition of public sentiment, I thought it important that the
managers should avoid any controversy before the public, especially as
to a matter of premiership in the conduct of the trial. It seemed to
be important that the entire force of the House of Representatives
should be directed to one object, the conviction of the accused.
Beyond this, Mr. Bingham and Mr. Wilson had been opposed to the
impeachment of Mr. Johnson when the attempt was first made in the
House of Representatives. I thought it important to combine the
strength that they represented in support of the proceeding in which
we were then engaged. If Mr. Stevens had been in good health, he
would have received my support and the support of General Butler and
General Logan. At that time his health was much impaired, but his
intellectual faculties were free from any cloud.

Another incident occurred which does not require explanation, and which
may not be open to any explanation. After the report of the Judiciary
Committee, and its rejection by the House of Representatives, I was
surprised to receive an invitation from the President to dine with him
at what is known as a State dinner. I assumed that arrangements had
been made for a series of such dinners, and that the invitation had
been sent out by a clerk upon a prearranged plan as to the order of
invitations. When the matter had passed out of my mind, but before
the day named for the dinner, I received a call on the floor of the
House from Mr. Cooper, son-in-law of the President and secretary in
the Executive Mansion. He asked me if I had received an invitation to
dine with the President. I said I had. Next he said, "Have you
answered it?" I said, "No, I have not." That was followed by the
further question, "Will you answer it?" I said, "No, I shall not."
That ended the conversation.

After the decision in the Senate had been made, the managers proceeded
under the order of the House to investigate the truthfulness of rumors
that were afloat, that money and other valuable considerations had been
used to secure the acquittal of the President. That investigation
established the fact that money had been in the possession of persons
who had been engaged in efforts to secure the acquittal of the
President. Those persons, with perhaps a single exception, were
persons who had no official connection with the Government, and none
of them were connected with the Government at Washington. As to most
of them, it appeared that they had no reasons, indeed no good cause,
why they should have taken part either for the conviction of the
President or in behalf of his acquittal. The sources from which funds
were obtained did not appear, nor was there evidence indicating the
amount that had been used, nor the objects to which the money had
been applied. It should be said as to Senators, that there was no
evidence implicating them in the receipt of money or other valuable
considerations. One very important fact not then known to the managers
appeared afterwards in the report of the Treasury Department, showing
a very large loss by the Government during the last eighteen months of
Mr. Johnson's administration. In that period the total receipts from
the duties on spirits amounted to $41,678,684.34. During the first
eighteen months of General Grant's administration, when the rates of
duties and taxation remained the same, the total receipts of revenue
from spirits amounted to $82,417,419.85, showing a difference of
$40,738,735.51. It is not easy to explain in full this money loss in
one branch of the public service. Something may be attributed to the
fact that persons obtained nominations for office by representations to
the President that they were his friends and supporters, and would
continue to be so, under all circumstances. When their nominations
came to the Senate, they made representations of an opposite character.
When they had received their appointments, they very naturally allied
themselves with the President's policy, inasmuch as they could not be
easily removed except upon an initiative taken by him. This deficiency
occurred in the states and districts in which the money should have
been collected and through the agents employed there. It other words,
no part of the deficiency ever passed into the Treasury of the United
States.

It is not improbable that a majority of the people now entertain the
opinion that the action of the House of Representatives in the attempt
that was made to impeach President Johnson was an error.

It is not for me to engage in a discussion on that point. I end by
the expression of the opinion that the vote of the House and the vote
of the Senate, by which the doctrine was established that a civil
officer is liable to impeachment for misdemeanor in office, is a gain
to the public that is full compensation for the undertaking, and that
these proceedings against Mr. Johnson were free from any element or
quality of injustice.

Johnson's case ought to be borne in mind in all agitation for a longer
Presidential term. Whenever the country is engaged in a Presidential
contest there are complains by business men accompanied by a demand for
an extension of the term of office to six or in some instances to ten
years. The disturbance of business is due to the importance of the
election, and the importance of an election is due to the amount of
power that is to be secured by the successful party. An extension of
the term would add to the importance of the election, and a term of
six or ten years would intensify the contest and the injury to business
would be intensified, proportionately. It is doubtful whether in a
period of twenty or fifty years any appreciable relief to business
would be furnished by an extension of the term of the Presidential
office.

It is by no means certain that the total of business is not as great
as it would be in the same four years if the term were ten years
instead of four. The total of production and consumption cannot be
affected seriously by a political controversy that does not extend
usually, over a period of more than three months. If business is
diminished during those months there will be a corresponding gain in
the months that are to follow.

In a popular government there must be elections, and in all such
governments business interests must be subordinated to the general
welfare. The changes that have taken place since the Government was
organized would justify the shortening rather than the lengthening
of the Presidential term. The means of communication are such that
two years may give the mass of the people better means for judging
men and measures than could be had in four years at the opening of this
century.

There is no form of education that more fully justifies its cost than
the education that is gained in a Presidential canvass. The
newspapers, the magazines, and more than all the speakers--"stump
orators" as they are called--communicate information and stimulate
thought. The voters are converted into a great jury, and after full
allowance is made for weakness, corruption and coercion, they are
advanced at each quadrennial contest in their knowledge of men, in
their ability to deal with measures of policy, and in comprehension
of the principles of government. If the losses in business were as
great as is ever represented, the educational advantages of a
Presidential canvass are an adequate set-off. The people have an
opportunity to see and hear the men who are engaged in public affairs
and questions are discussed upon their intrinsic merits. In the sixty
years of my experience there has been a great advance in the quality
of the speeches to which the people have listened. The speeches of
1840 would not be tolerated in 1900.

When great questions are under debate appeals are made to the
principles of government and proportionately the education of the
people is of a higher grade.

A serious objection to a long term in the Presidential office is the
fact that a spirit of discontent, that always exists, will develop into
insubordination or even revolution. We have an example in the history
of the Republic of Hayti. The term is seven years and in many cases
the President has been superseded by the leader of a revolutionary
party. The most recent instance was the overthrow of President
Legitime and the instalment of Hyppolite. The peace and prosperity of
Hayti would be promoted by reducing the term of the Presidential office
to two years. The contests that are sure to arise among a mercurial
people would thus be transferred from the battle-field to the ballot-
box. Who could have answered for the peace of the United States in
1868 if President Johnson's term had been six years instead of eight
months?

[* This was a race riot, which occurred July 30, 1866, and in which
many negroes were killed.--EDITOR.]

XXXIII
THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT IN 1869

In March, 1869, I was appointed Secretary of the Treasury by President
Grant. Soon after my appointment Mr. McCulloch, the retiring
Secretary, said to me that I should find the department in excellent
order, and that in his opinion the financial difficulties of the
Government had been overcome. The first of these statements was true
in part, and in part it was very erroneous.

The accounting branch of the service was properly administered
practically, but there were about one hundred persons on the pay rolls
who had no desks in the department, and who performed but little work
at their homes, where some of them ostensibly were employed in
copying.

Several heads of bureaus were notoriously intemperate. This condition
of things was due in part to the war and to the exigencies of the
department consequent upon the war; and in part it was due to the
constitutional infirmities of Mr. Chase and Mr. McCulloch. In some
respects they resembled each other. They were phlegmatic in
temperament, lacking in versatility, and lacking in facility for labor
and business.

Mr. McCulloch was diligent, industrious and conscientiously devoted to
his duties. He had been crippled in his administration by the conflict
between Congress and the President. The head of the Treasury needs
the confidence of the President, and the confidence and the support of
Congress. The latter Mr. McCulloch did not enjoy, and there were
indications that in some respects he differed with the President. He
was hampered by the fact that any change in the personnel of his
department would be followed by inquiries from one party or the other,
coupled oftentimes with complaints and criticisms.

Great evils existed in the revenue system. The controversy between
Congress and the President led to many removals of collectors of
customs and of internal revenue. Their places were supplied by persons
who could accommodate themselves to both parties. The President was
made to believe that the applicants were his friends, but that their
relations with Republican Senators were such that they could secure
confirmation. When nominated these men represented themselves as good
Republicans and friendly to the Congressional policy. From such
persons an honest performance of duty could not have been expected.
Hence gross frauds upon the revenue were perpetrated and in most
instances by the connivance of those in office.

The returns for the last year of Johnson's administration, and the
first years of Grant's administration, showed that the loss on whisky
in the first named period was not less than thirty million dollars.

That there were other great losses was proved by the facts that the
payments on the public debt were less than thirty million dollars
during the last year of Johnson's administration and that the payments
were one hundred million dollars during the first year of Grant's
administration, and that without any additional sources of revenue.

If Mr. McCulloch's first statement had been true in the most important
particulars, his second claim would not have been open to debate. It
was true that the department had passed the point where there was any
exigency for money. The Government was no longer a borrower. Payments
on the public debt had been made, but otherwise nothing had been done
to relieve the country of the interest account, nor was the credit of
the Government such that any practicable movement in that direction
could have been made.

The six per cent bonds were worth only 83 or 84, and no step had been
taken to redeem the pledge of the Government in regard to the Sinking
Fund made in the act of February 25, 1862. The interest account
exceeded two hundred and thirty-three million dollars.

Mr. S. M. Clark was the chief of the Bureau of Printing and Engraving
and everything was confided to him. It is to be said after the lapse
of thirty years for examination, that not a tittle of evidence has
been found warranting any imputation upon his integrity. It is true
that in one instance a dishonest plate printer took an impression of
a bond upon a sheet of lead for use in counterfeiting. The possibility
of such an act was due to a lack of system and not to any want of
fidelity in Mr. Clark. One of my first acts was to remove Mr. Clark,
and then to open a new set of books. The printing of the old issues
was suspended permanently, and new plates were prepared. Mr. Clark had
had control of the manufacture of the paper, the control of the
engravers, the control of the plates, the control of the printers, of
the counters, and he had had the custody of the red seal. The postal
currency was printed under his direction. The pieces were not
numbered, they were due bills only. At the end of twenty years the
books showed an issue of about fifteen million dollars in excess of the
redemptions.

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