Grace S. Richmond - "On Christmas Day in the Morning"

Various - "Chambers's Edinburgh Journal, No. 445"

G. A. Henty - "At the Point of the Bayonet"

Lafcadio Hearn - "Glimpses of an Unfamiliar Japan"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 2

G >> George S. Boutwell >> Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 2




The full report of the testimony of General Lee should appear in any
complete biography of the man. It reveals his character, explains the
leading influences to which he was subjected, and it sheds light upon
the state of public opinion in the South at the end of the contest in
arms.

General Scott and General George H. Thomas were Virginians, but they
acted in defiance of the State-Rights doctrines of the South. In
April, 1861, General Scott gave me an account of the efforts that had
been made to induce him to follow the fortunes of Virginia, and he
spoke with a voice of emotion of his veneration for the flag, and of
his attachment to the Union.

GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Of the soldiers of the Northern army in the war of the Rebellion,
General George H. Thomas takes rank next after the first three--Grant,
Sherman and Sheridan. When Grant became President and Sherman was
general of the army the President was unwilling to appear to neglect
either Sheridan or Thomas. With high appreciation of Thomas as a
soldier, the President gave higher rank to Sheridan. He said to me
that he placed Sheridan above every other officer of the war. He gave
Sheridan credit for two supreme qualities--great care in his plans and
great vigor in execution.

Yet, although the President acted upon a sound basis of opinion, the
choice left a painful impression upon his memory.

General Thomas and General Lee were alike in personal appearance, and
they resembled each other in their mental characteristics. In one
important particular they differed--General Thomas had no respect for
State-Rights doctrines. He was a native of Virginia, but there was no
indication in his testimony, nor were there rumors, that he had ever
hesitated in his course when the rebellion opened.

General Thomas was examined by the Committee on Reconstruction January
29, and February 2, 1866. He was then in command of the Military
Division of the Tennessee which included the States of Kentucky,
Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi. It was the main object of
the committee to obtain information as to the public sentiment touching
the treatment of the negroes and the re-establishment of civil
government in the States that had been in rebellion. The Union
sentiment was stronger in Tennessee than in any other State of the
Confederacy. The inhabitants of the mountainous districts of eastern
and middle Tennessee had been loyal from the opening of the contest in
1860 and 1860. Yet in 1866 General Thomas advised the committee that
it would "not be safe to remove the national troops from Tennessee, or
to withdraw martial law; or to restore the writ of habeas corpus to
its full extent." At that time the peace of eastern Tennessee was
disturbed by family feuds and personal quarrels, the outcome of
political differences. In west Tennessee and in portions of middle
Tennessee there was a deep seated hostility to Union men, and
especially to Southern men who had served in the Union army.

General Thomas said of them: "They are more unfriendly to Union men
natives of the State of Tennessee or of the South, who have been in
the Union army, than they are to men of Northern birth."

At that time the contract system of labor had been introduced, and the
contracts were regarded as binding both by whites and blacks.

General Thomas advised the admission of Tennessee into the Union as a
State, and his advice was acted upon favorably by its admission in the
summer of that year. His recommendations were based upon the facts
that Tennessee had "repudiated the rebel debt, had abolished slavery,
had adopted the Constitutional amendment upon that subject, had passed
a franchise law prohibiting from voting every man who had been
engaged in the rebellion" and had "passed a law allowing negroes to
testify."

His opinion of the four other States of his command was not as
favorable. "I have received communications from various persons in the
South that there was an understanding among the rebels and perhaps
organizations formed or forming, for the purpose of gaining as many
advantages for themselves as possible; and I have heard it also
intimated that these men are very anxious and would do all in their
power to involve the United States in a foreign war, so that if a
favorable opportunity should occur, they might then again turn against
the United States."

At the end of his first examination he gave this opinion as the result
of his experience:

Question: "In what could those advantages consist in breaking up the
government?"

Answer: "They would wish to be recognized as citizens of the United
States, with the same rights they had before the war."

Question: "How can they do that? By wishing us in a war with England
or France, in which they would take part against us?"

Answer: "In that event their desire is to establish the Southern
Confederacy. They have not yet given up their desire for a separate
government, and if they have an opportunity to strike for it again they
will do so."

When asked what he knew of secret organizations he said that he had
received several communications to that effect but the parties were
unwilling to have their names made public. He added: "The persons
communicating with me are reliable and truthful and I believe their
statements are correct in the main.

"The nature and object of the organizations," he said, "are the
embarrassment of the Government of the United States in the proper
administration of the affairs of the county, and if possible, to
repudiate the national debt, or to gain such an ascendency in Congress
as to make provision for the assumption by Congress of the debt
incurred by the rebel government; also, in case the United States
Government can be involved in a foreign war to watch their opportunity
and take advantage of the first that comes to strike for the
independence of the States lately in rebellion."

These extracts from the testimony of General Thomas are a fair
exposition of the condition of public sentiment in the Confederate
States with the exception in a degree of the border States. It is
apparent also that General Thomas had not the degree of confidence in
the good purposes of those who had been in the rebellion that was
entertained by Northern officers including Grant, Sherman and Sheridan.

As the loyal men of the South were greater sufferers from the war,
their hostility was more intense against those who were responsible
for the war.

If we cannot say that Thomas was a great soldier in the large use of
the phrase, it can be said that he was a good soldier and that without
qualifying words. He should live in history as a true patriot and a
man of the highest integrity.

SECRETARY STANTON

Of the men who occupied places in Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet, no one was
more free from just criticism affecting unfavorably the value of his
public services than Secretary Stanton.

Of those who were nearest to him, no one ever received the impression
from his acts or his conversation that he thought of the Presidency
as a possibility under any circumstances. Seward, Chase and Bates had
been candidates at Chicago in 1860, and whatever may have been the
fact in regard to Seward and Bates, it is quite certain that ambition
for the Presidency never lost its hold upon Mr. Chase, even when he
became Chief Justice of the United States.

Coupled with the absence of ambition, or perhaps in a degree incident
to the absence of ambition, Mr. Stanton was the possessor of courage
for all the emergencies of the place that he occupied--a courage that
was always available, whether in its exercise the wishes of individuals
or the fortunes of the country were involved.

It was understood by those who frequented the War Office in the gloomy
days of 1862 and '63 that a card signed "A. L." would not always
command full respect from Secretary Stanton. He was a believer in the
rigid principles of the army, and although he was a humane man he
smothered or subdued his sympathy for heart-broken mothers whose sons
had deserted the cause of the country, in his determination to save
the country through the strictest enforcement of the rules and
regulations of the army. Mr. Lincoln, in his abounding good nature,
could not resist the appeals of disconsolate wives and heart-stricken
mothers, and it was often Mr. Stanton's fortune to resist such appeals
even when supported by the President's card in the form of a request
which in ordinary times and upon ordinary men would be treated as an
order.

Hence there may have been a foundation for the report that an
unsuccessful user of one of the President's cards returned to the
President for a reinforcement of the order. The President insisted
upon a full report of the Secretary's answer. The applicant repeated
the Secretary's remark, which was not complimentary to the President's
good sense. The President hesitated, and then declined to renew the
order, saying: "Stanton is generally right."

Mr. Stanton's testimony was taken February 11, 1867, and on subsequent
days. The record of the text and the accompanying documents cover more
than two hundred printed pages. The evidence was taken by the
Committee on the Judiciary, and it had special reference to the charges
that had been made against President Johnson. At that time, the
separation between Mr. Stanton and the President had become
irreconcilable, but there are no indications of hostility in the
answers given by the Secretary. Indeed, he assumed, without reserve,
full responsibility for acts that had been charged on the President by
others.

During the war the railroads that fell within our lines were
appropriated to the use of the United States, and heavy outlays had
been made upon some of them for repairs and improvements. In many
cases expenses had been incurred, that in the hands of the corporation
would not have been chargeable to a construction account. In a
majority of cases, if not in all, the roads had been surrendered
without compensation, and the rolling stock had been transferred for
very slight consideration.

Mr. Stanton assumed the responsibility of the policy, upon the ground
that it was important to the South and to the country that the channels
of commerce should be made available without delay and that the army
could not be used wisely in commercial traffic. As the President was
interested in one of the railroads that received a large benefit by the
restoration of its property much improved, he was relieved of all
responsibility for a policy that had been much condemned.

Through the testimony of Secretary Stanton the committee was enabled
to find the origin and to trace with a degree of accuracy the history
of President Johnson's plan of reconstruction. At a time not many days
prior to Mr. Lincoln's death, Secretary Stanton prepared an order which
contained a _projet_ for the government of the States that had been in
rebellion. The paper was submitted to President Lincoln and it was
considered by him in a cabinet meeting that was held during the day
preceding the night of the assassination.

As this paper became the basis for the proclamations for the government
of the States that had been in rebellion, its history, as given by
Mr. Stanton, is worthy of exact report in his own words:

"On the last day of Mr. Lincoln's life, there was a Cabinet meeting, at
which General Grant, and all the members of the Cabinet, except Mr.
Seward, were present. General Grant at that time made a report of the
condition of the country, as he conceived it to be, and as it would be
on the surrender of Johnston's army, which was regarded as absolutely
certain. The subject of reconstruction was talked of at considerable
length. Shortly previous to that time I had myself, with a view of
putting into a practicable form the means of overcoming what seemed to
be a difficulty in the mind of Mr. Lincoln, as to the mode of
reconstruction, prepared a rough draft of a form or mode by which the
authority and laws of the United States should be re-established, and
governments reorganized in the rebel States under the Federal
authority, without any necessity whatever for the intervention of
rebel organizations or rebel aid.

In the course of that consultation Mr. Lincoln alluded to the paper,
went into his room, brought it out, and asked me to read it, which I
did, and explained my ideas in regard to it. There was one point which
I had left open; that was as to who should constitute the electors in
the respective States . . . I left a blank upon that subject to be
considered. There was at that time nothing adopted about it, and no
opinions expressed; it was only a _projet_."

At the request of Mr. Lincoln and the Cabinet, the order was printed
and a copy was given to each member, and a copy was given to Mr.
Johnson when he had become President.

The plan was further considered in Mr. Johnson's Cabinet, and some
alterations were made. The point of chief difference related to the
elective franchise--whether it should be extended to the negro race.

Mr. Stanton said: "There was a difference of opinion upon that
subject. The President expressed his views very clearly and
distinctly. I expressed my views, and other members of the Cabinet
expressed their views. The objection of the President to throwing
the franchise open to the colored people appeared to be fixed, and I
think every member of the Cabinet assented to the arrangement as it
was specified in the proclamation relative to North Carolina. After
that I do not remember that the subject was ever again discussed in
the Cabinet."

Thus from Mr. Stanton's testimony we gather the important facts as to
the origin of a measure which became the subject of bitter controversy
between President Johnson and the Republican Party. The framework of
the North Carolina proclamation was furnished by Mr. Stanton. When
alterations had been made the proclamation was agreed to by the
Cabinet but without a declaration or even an understanding upon the
point which, without much delay, became the vital point: was the
policy of government that was announced in the proclamation a permanent
policy or was it a temporary expedient, a substitute for military
government, and subject to the approval or disapproval of Congress?

General Grant was of the opinion that the organizations which the
President set up in the States were temporary and that they were
subject to the action of Congress.

Mr. Stanton's opinion is expressed carefully, in his own words: "My
opinion is, that the whole subject of reconstruction and the relation
of the State to the Federal Government is subject to the controlling
power of Congress; and while I believe that the President and his
Cabinet were not violating any law, but were faithfully performing
their duty in endeavoring to organize provisional governments in
those States, I supposed then, and still suppose, that the final
validity of such organizations would rest with the law-making power of
the government."

In an official letter, dated January 8, 1866, Secretary Stanton gave
his reasons for the payment of the salaries of the provisional
governors: "The payments were made from the appropriation of army
contingencies because the duties performed by the parties were regarded
of a temporary character ancillary to the withdrawal of military force,
and to take the place of the armed forces in the respective States."

On the other hand the President chose to treat the governments that had
been set up as permanent governments and beyond the control of
Congress. On this point, the contest between President Johnson and the
Republican Party was made up. It ended in an appeal to the people, who
rendered a judgment against _the President_ by a two-thirds majority.
The testimony of Secretary Seward, and official papers that were issued
by the Department of State in the year 1865, may warrant the conclusion
that President Johnson was not then prepared to treat the new state
organizations as final and binding upon Congress and the country.

Under date of July 8, 1865, Secretary Seward said, in an official
letter to Governor Holden of North Carolina: "It is understood here
that besides cotton which has been taken by the Secretary of the
Treasury under Act of Congress there were quantities of resin, and
other articles, as well as funds, lying about in different places in
the State and not reduced into possession by United States officers as
insurgent property. The President is of the opinion that you can
appropriate these for the inevitable and indispensable expenses of the
civil government of the State during the continuance of the provisional
government."

On the 14th day of November, 1865, Mr. McCulloch authorized Mr. Worth,
acting as treasurer in North Carolina, to use the fragments of rebel
property that might be gathered to defray the expenses of the
provisional government of the State.

In answer to a question put to Secretary Seward, he said: "I do not
remember that any provisional governor held a military office, except
Mr. Johnson."

In the further examination of Mr. Seward, May 16, 1867, he indicated
his concurrence with President Johnson in this remark: "The object was
to proceed with the work of the restoration of the Union as speedily
and effectively and wisely as possible, having no reference as to
whether Congress would be in session or not."

This question was put to Mr. Seward:

"Did not he (the President) urge these parties to be prepared to be at
the doors of Congress by the time of its next meeting?"

The answer was: "Very likely he did. I do not know of the fact. I
know that I was very anxious that these States should be represented
in Congress, and that he was equally so, that they should be provided
with representatives who could be admitted."

The policy of the administration, July 24, 1865, is set forth in a
despatch from Secretary Seward to Governor Sharkey, of Mississippi (he
is addressed as Provisional Governor): "The President sees no occasion
to interfere with General Slocum's proceedings. The government of the
State will be provisional only until the civil authorities shall be
restored with the approval of Congress."

Upon the united testimony of General Grant, Secretary Stanton and
Secretary Seward, it may be claimed fairly that the governments that
were set up under proclamations of the President were treated in the
beginning as provisional governments and subject to the final judgment
of Congress.

In 1866, when the rupture between Congress and the President had taken
form, the President with the support of Mr. Seward announced the
doctrine that the governments which had been set up were valid
governments, and that claimants for seats in Congress from those who
could prove their loyalty were entitled to admission.

Thus was a foundation laid for the impeachment of President Johnson by
the House of Representatives, and his trial by the Senate.


XXXII
IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON

The nomination of Andrew Johnson to the Vice-Presidency in 1864, by the
Republican Party, was a repetition of the error committed by the Whig
Party in 1840, in the nomination of John Tyler for the same office.

In each case the nomination was due to an attempt to secure the support
of a body of men who were not in accord in all essential particulars
with the party making the nomination.

John Tyler was opposed to the administration of Mr. Van Buren, but he
was opposed also to a national bank, which was then an accepted idea
and an assured public policy of the Whig Party. Hence, it happened
that when Mr. Tyler came to the Presidency, he resisted the attempt of
Congress to establish a national bank, and by the exercise of the veto-
power, on two occasions, he defeated the measure. This controversy
caused the overthrow of the Whig Party, and it ended the contest in
behalf of a United States bank.

In the case of John Tyler and in the case of Andrew Johnson there was
an application, in dangerous excess, of a policy that prevails in all
national conventions. When the nomination of a candidate for the
Presidency has been secured, the dominant wing of the party turns to
the minority with a tender of the Vice-Presidency. In 1880, when the
nomination of General Garfield had been made, the selection of a
candidate for the Vice-Presidency was tendered to the supporters of
General Grant, and it was declined by more than one person.

Mr. Johnson never identified himself with the Republican Party; and
neither in June, 1864, nor at any other period of his life, had the
Republican Party a right to treat him as an associate member. He was,
in fact, what he often proclaimed himself to be--a Jacksonian Democrat.
He was a Southern Union Democrat. He was an opponent, and a bitter
opponent, of the project for the dissolution of the Union, and a
vindictive enemy of those who threatened its destruction.

His speeches in the Senate in the Thirty-sixth and the Thirty-seventh
Congress were read and much approved throughout the North, and they
prepared the way for the acceptance of his nomination as a candidate
of the Republican Party in 1864.

Mr. Johnson was an earnest supporter of the Crittenden Compromise.
That measure originated in the House of Representatives. It was
defeated in the Senate by seven votes and six votes of the seven came
from the South. The provisions of the bill were far away from the
ideals of Republicans generally, although the measure was sustained
by members of the party. By that scheme the Fugitive Slave Law was
made less offensive in two particulars, but the United States was to
pay for fugitives from slavery whenever a marshal failed to perform his
duty. As an important limitation of the powers of Congress, the
abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia was to be dependent
upon the consent of the States of Maryland and Virginia.

Mr. Johnson gave voice to his indignation when he spoke of the Southern
men whose votes contributed to the defeat of the Crittenden Compromise.
"Who, then," said he, "has brought these evils upon the country? Whose
fault is it? Who is responsible for it? With the help we had from the
other side of the chamber, if all those on this side had been true to
the Constitution and faithful to their constituents, and had acted with
fidelity to the country, the amendment of the Senator from New
Hampshire could have been voted down. Whose fault was it? Who did it?
Southern traitors, as was said in the speech of the Senator from
California. They did it. They wanted no compromise."

These extracts show the style of speech in which Mr. Johnson indulged,
and they prove beyond question that in the winter of 1861 he had no
sympathy with the Republican Party of 1856 and 1860. These facts
explain, and in some measure they palliate, the peculiarities of his
career, which provoked criticism and an adverse popular judgment when
he came to the Presidency. Nor is there evidence within my knowledge
that he ever denied the right of secession. However that may have
been, he disapproved of the exercise of the right at all stages of the
contest.

In the Thirty-sixth Congress Mr. Johnson proposed amendments to the
Constitution which gave him consideration in the North. By his
proposition the Fugitive Slave Law was to be repealed, and in its place
the respective States were to return fugitives or to pay the value of
those that might be retained.

Slavery was to be abolished in the District of Columbia with the
consent of Maryland and upon payment of the full value of the slaves
emancipated. The Territories were to be divided between freedom and
slavery. His scheme contemplated other changes not connected
necessarily with the system of slavery. Of these I mention the
election of President, Vice-President, Senators, and Judges of the
Supreme Court by the people, coupled with a limitation of the terms of
judges to twelve years.

The Crittenden Resolution contained these declarations of facts and
policy:

1. The present deplorable war has been forced upon the country by the
disunionists of the Southern States.

2. Congress has no purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of
overthrowing or interfering with the established rights of those States.

Upon a motion to include disunionists in the North under the first
charge, Mr. Johnson voted in the negative with Sumner, Wilson, Wade,
and other Republicans.

This brief survey of Mr. Johnson's Congressional career at the opening
of the war may indicate the characteristics of his mind in controversy
and debate, and furnish means for comprehending his actions in the
troublous period of his administration.

Some conclusions are deducible from this survey. First of all it is
to be said that he never assumed to be a member of the Republican
Party. Next, I do not find evidence which will justify the statement
that he was a disbeliever in the right of a State to secede from the
Union. It is manifest that he was not an advocate of the doctrine of
political equality as it came to be taught by the leaders of the
Republican Party. When he became President, he was an opponent of
negro suffrage.

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