Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 2

G >> George S. Boutwell >> Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 2

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When President Johnson entered upon the work of reconstructing the
government of North Carolina it was claimed that he was giving form
and effect to the plan which President Lincoln had accepted as a wise
policy.

There was some foundation for the claim as appears from the testimony
of General Grant, Mr. Seward, Mr. Stanton, and others, but there is no
ground for the claim that Mr. Lincoln had matured a plan or had
accepted any scheme of reconstruction at the hands of any one. In an
exigency, as in the case of the resignation of General Hooker, he
could act immediately, but time and thought, and discussion with
others were accepted as valuable aids, whenever there was not a
pressure for instant action.

General Grant was examined in July, 1867, and the opening was conducted
by Mr. Eldridge of Wisconsin. It related to the parole granted to
General Lee and his army. The nature of the questions led General
Grant to make this remark: "I will state here, that I am not quite
certain whether I am being tried, or who is being tried, by the
questions asked."

General Grant may have thought that Mr. Eldridge was endeavoring to
secure from him an admission that he had exceeded his authority in the
terms of the parole granted to General lee. General Grant was able to
state the terms with exactness and within his powers as commander of
the conquering army. He claimed that General Lee surrendered his
army "in consideration of the fact that they were to be exempt from
trial so long as they conformed to the obligations which they had
taken." President Johnson claimed that the leaders should be tried.
This position he abandoned previous to July, 1867. Of an interview
with President Johnson, General Grant made this statement:

"He insisted on it that the leaders must be punished, and wanted to
know, when the time would come when those persons could be tried. I
told him when they violated their parole." In the opinion of General
Grant the terms of the parole did not include Jefferson Davis, as he
had been captured.

In the early part of the controversy President Johnson insisted that
General Lee should be tried for treason. That purpose on the part of
the President was resisted by General Grant. His position, in his own
language, was this:

"I insisted on it that General Lee would not have surrendered his army
and given up all their arms if he had supposed that after surrender, he
was going to be tried for treason and hanged. I thought we got a very
good equivalent for the lives of a few leaders in getting all those
arms and getting themselves under control bound by the oaths to obey
the laws. That was the consideration, which I insisted upon, we had
received."

General Grant added:

"Afterwards he got to agreeing with me on that subject."

On the question of political rights as involved in the surrender and in
the parole, General Grant said:

"I never claimed that the parole gave those prisoners any political
right whatever. I thought that that was a matter entirely with
Congress, over which I no control, that simply as general-in-chief
commanding the army, I had a right to stipulate for the surrender on
terms which protected their lives. The parole gave them protection and
exemption from punishment for all offences not in violation of the
rules of civilized warfare."

The point of difference between General Grant and President Johnson in
regard to the parole is very clear from General Grant's answers to
questions by Mr. Thomas and Mr. Eldridge.

"You have stated your opinion as to the rights and privileges of
General Lee and his soldiers; do you mean that to include any political
rights?"

"I have explained that I did not."

"Was there any difference of opinion on that point between yourself and
President Johnson at any time?"

"On that point there was no difference of opinion; but there was as to
whether the parole gave them any privileges or rights . . . He claiming
that the time must come when they would be tried and punished, and I
claiming that that time could not come except by a violation of their
parole."

Grant claimed also that the army that had surrendered to Sherman came
under the same rules.

These quotations give General Grant's standing as an interpreter of
public law and as a leader capable of applying the rules and principles
of public law to practical affairs. His training at West Point may
have given him a knowledge of principles and his good sense enabled him
to apply the principles in the terms that he dictated at Appomattox.

General Grant's natural qualities were such that with training he might
have succeeded in great causes involving principles, but he was not
adapted to the ordinary business of a county-court lawyer.

It is quite certain from the testimony of General Grant that Mr.
Lincoln had had in mind a scheme for the organization of the States
that had been in rebellion and that Mr. Johnson's proclamation for the
government of North Carolina was not a wide departure from that
scheme.

General Grant was present at two meetings of the Cabinet in Mr.
Lincoln's time, when a proclamation was read and considered. In the
language of General Grant, "after the assassination it continued right
along and I was there with Mr. Johnson." General Grant's interest was
directed to two points: First, that civil government should be set up
but subject to the final action of Congress, and second, that the
parole should not be infringed. He states his position thus:

"I was always ready to originate matters pertaining to the army, but I
was never willing to originate matters pertaining to the civil
government of the United States. When I was asked my opinion about
what had been done I was willing to give it. I originated no plans and
suggested no plans for civil government."

The examination by Mr. Eldridge was in the nature of cross-examination
and for the purpose of gaining an admission from General Grant that he
had advised or sanctioned President Johnson's plan of reconstruction.
Hence General Grant's declarations that his part was limited to the
military side of the measure and that in his view the entire plan was
subject to Congressional action.

General Grant's testimony is explicit upon these points: He advised
President Johnson to grant a pardon to General Lee and a pardon to
General Johnston. He was especially urgent in favor of a pardon to
General Johnston in consideration of his speech to his army at the time
of the surrender. He advised against the proclamation of amnesty upon
the ground that the act was then premature.

General Grant's testimony adds strength to the statement that President
Johnson contemplated the recognition of a Congress composed of
Democratic members from the North and of the representatives from the
States that had been organized under the President's proclamation.

"I have heard him say--and I think I have heard him say it twice in his
speeches--that if the North carried the election by members enough to
give them, with the Southern members, a majority why would they not be
the Congress of the United States?"

In answer to this question: "Have you heard him make a remark
kindred to that elsewhere?" General Grant said:

"Yes, I have heard him say that aside from his speeches, in
conversation. I cannot say just when."

The North Carolina proclamation was read at an informal meeting at
which only Grant and Stanton were with the President. General Grant
did not criticise the paper. He said of it: "It was a civil matter
and although I was anxious to have something done I did not intend to
dictate any plan. I looked upon it simply as a temporary measure to
establish a sort of government until Congress should meet and settle
the whole question and that it did not make much difference how it was
done so there was a form of government there. . . . I don't suppose
that there were any persons engaged in that consultation who thought
of what was being done at that time as being lasting--any longer than
Congress would meet and either ratify that or establish some other
form of government."

General Grant understood that the North Carolina proclamation was in
substance the paper which had been considered by Mr. Lincoln, but
General Grant said also, that Mr. Lincoln's plan was "temporary, to be
either confirmed, or a new government set up by Congress."

General Grant's testimony upon one point is supported by the testimony
of Mr. Seward and the testimony of Mr. Stanton. They agree that Mr.
Johnson's plan of reconstruction was in substance the plan that Mr.
Lincoln had had under consideration. Mr. Stanton regarded the plan as
temporary.

If President Johnson intended to enforce the plan upon the country he
concealed his purpose when the North Carolina proclamation was under
consideration.

In the month of October, 1866, the police commissioners of the city of
Baltimore were engaged in the work of registering voters for the
November elections, and the authorities were engaged in the work of
registering the voters in all parts of the State of Maryland. It was
claimed that many thousands who had been engaged in the rebellion and
who were excluded under a provision of the Constitution had been
registered by the connivance of the authorities and especially by the
police commissioners of Baltimore. There were rumors of secret,
hostile organizations, there were threats of disturbance, and Governor
Swann became alarmed.

President Johnson became alarmed also and under date of October 25 he
wrote a letter to General Grant in which these paragraphs may be found:

"From recent development serious troubles are apprehended from a
conflict of authority between the executive of the State of Maryland
and the police commissioners of the city of Baltimore." . . . "I
therefore request that you inform me of the number of Federal troops at
present stationed in the city of Baltimore and vicinity."

General Grant informed the President on the 27th, that the number of
available and efficient troops was 1,550. Thereupon, on the first day
of November the President issued the following instruction to Secretary
Stanton:

"In view of the prevalence in various portions of the country of a
revolutionary and turbulent disposition which might at any moment
assume insurrectionary proportions and lead to serious disorders, and
of the duty of the government to be at all times prepared to act with
decision and effect this force is not deemed adequate for the
protection and security of the seat of government."

Secretary Stanton referred the President's letter to General Grant with
instructions "to take such measures as in his judgment are proper and
within his power to carry into operation the within directions of the
President."

Under this order six or eight companies in New York and on the way to
join regiments in the South were detained at Fort McHenry, and a
regiment in Washington was under orders to be ready to move upon notice.

On the second day of November the President qualified his demands in a
letter to Secretary Stanton and limited the expression of anxiety to
the city of Baltimore. It is certain that General Grant and Secretary
Stanton did not share the President's apprehensions and the day of
election passed without serious disturbance.

In the Philadelphia _Ledger_ of October 12, 1866, there appeared a
series of questions which were accompanied by the statement or the
suggestion that the President had submitted them to the Attorney-
General for an official opinion. The questions related to the
constitutional validity of the Thirty-ninth Congress, and upon the
ground that all the States were not represented although hostilities
had ceased.

From the testimony of Henry M. Flint, a newspaper correspondent, it
appears that the President had no knowledge of the questions until
after the publications in the _Ledger_. Flint's account of the affair
may be thus summarized. For himself and without conference with the
President, he reached the conclusion that the Thirty-ninth Congress was
an illegal body and he had reached the conclusion also that the
President entertained the same opinion. Thereupon he assumed that the
President would take the opinion of the Attorney-General. Having
advanced thus far, he next proceeded to write the questions that he
imagined the President would prepare and submit to the Attorney-General.

These questions he transmitted to a brother correspondent in New York
--Mr. F. A. Abbott--under cover of a letter which was not produced.
Flint gave the substance of his letter to Abbott in these words:

"These questions are supposed or believed to have submitted by the
President to the Attorney-General." Speaking of Abbott, Flint said:
"I knew he was connected with several newspapers and I had no doubt
when I sent these questions that they would appear in some paper in
some shape. . . . The object I had in view in writing these questions
and in sending them to Mr. Abbott was that they might appear before the
public, and that the public mind might be directed to that point, and
that the newspapers particularly might be led to express their
sentiments upon the questions involved in it."

When the publication "had given rise to considerable discussion" in the
language of Flint, "I thought," he says, "I ought to go the President
and tell him what part of the despatch was mine and what connection I
had had with the publication of it."

Of his interview with the President, he gives this report: "He showed
me an article, which I think, appeared the day after the questions were
published, in the _Daily News_ of Philadelphia, which took pretty
nearly the same ground my questions would indicate. . . . He spoke of
it rather approvingly."

Flint adds: "I had remarked to him: 'Mr. Johnson, it seemed to me
that it would be by no means remarkable that you should prepare such
questions as bear upon a subject which I know must have occupied your
mind as it has the public mind.' I forget what reply he made; it was
a sort of affirmative response or assent."

Whatever may have been the origin of Flint's questions, their
appearance in the manner indicated is an instance of volunteer service
not often paralleled in the rough contests of life. Without any
effort on his own part the President gained knowledge of a public
sentiment upon the question of the legality of the Thirty-ninth
Congress--a question in which he had much interest in the autumn of
1866.

The project to increase the army around Washington and the project
to proclaim the Thirty-ninth Congress an illegal body may have had an
intimate connection with the project to send General Grant on a mission
to Mexico and to place General Sherman in command at Washington, a
project of which I have spoken in another place.

GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE

General Robert E. Lee was examined by the Committee on Reconstruction
the 17th day of February, 1866.

The inquiries related to the state of public sentiment in the South,
and especially in Virginia with regard to secession, to the treatment
of the negroes, to the public debts of the United States, and of the
Confederacy, and to the treatment of Northern soldiers in Southern
prisons.

General Lee was then in good health and in personal appearance he
commended himself without delay. He was large in frame, compactly
built, and he was furnished with all the flesh and muscle that could be
useful to a man who was passing the middle period of life. The
elasticity of spirits, the vigor of mind and body that are the wealth
of a successful man at sixty were wanting in General Lee. His
appearance commanded respect and it excited the sympathy even of those
who had condemned his abandonment of the Union in 1861.

The examination gave evidence of integrity and of entire freedom from
duplicity. Freedom from duplicity was a controlling feature in General
Grant's character and in that attribute of greatness Grant and Lee may
have been equals.

General Lee was free to disclose his own opinions, but he was cautious
in his statements when questioned as to the opinions and purposes of
the men and States that had been in the Rebellion. He was careful to
say at the beginning of the examination that he had no communication
with politicians and that he did not read the papers. What he said of
the South assumed that the people were in poverty and were so dejected
that they had no plans for the future, nor any hopes of restoration to
wealth, happiness and power in the affairs of the country. His
testimony as a whole might justify the opinion that there would be no
serious resistance to any form of government that might be set up. He
favored the governments which President Johnson had organized and he
expressed the opinion that they were acceptable to the people
generally. A comprehensive statement was this:

"I do not know of a single person who either feels or contemplates
any resistance to the government of the United States, or, indeed any
opposition to it." He gave this assurance to the committee: "The
people entirely acquiesce in the government of the United States and
are for co-operating with President Johnson in his policy."

The payment of the public debt had not been a topic of discussion in
his presence, but the people were disposed to pay such taxes as were
imposed and they were struggling to get money for that purpose.

He was of the opinion that the people made no distinction between the
Confederate debt and the debt of the United States--that they were
disposed to pay both debts, and would pay both if they had the power.
For himself, however, he had no expectation that the indebtedness of
the Confederacy would ever be paid.

General Lee manifested a kindly spirit for the freedmen, but he was
unwilling to accept them as citizens endowed with the right of
suffrage. Of the feeling in Virginia, General Lee said: "Every one
with whom I associate expresses kind feelings toward the freedmen.
They wish to see them get on in the world, and especially to take up
some occupation for a living."

He rejected the suggestion that there was anywhere within the State
any combinations having in view, "the disturbance of the peace, or any
improper or unlawful acts." He characterized the negroes as "an
amiable, social race, who look more to the present than to their
future condition."

In answer to the question whether the South would support the
government in case of a war with France or England, General Lee was
distinctly reserved: "I cannot speak with any certainty on that
point. I do not know how far they might be actuated by their feelings.
I have nothing whatever to base an opinion upon. So far as I know
they contemplate nothing of the kind now. What may happen in the
future I cannot say." He then added this remark: "Those people in
Virginia with whom I associate express a hope that the country may not
be led into war."

As to an alliance during the war he said that he knew nothing of the
policy of the Confederate government: "I had no hand or part of it,"
was his remark. It was his opinion during the war that an alliance
with a foreign country was desirable, and he had assumed that the
authorities were of the same opinion. His ideas were those of
General Grant, and he avoided responsibility for the measures of the
government on the civil side.

With kind feelings for the colored people of Virginia General Lee
favored the substitution of a white class of laborers, if an exchange
could be made, of which however, he had neither plan nor hope. Nor
could he give any assurance that Northern men would be received upon
terms of equality and friendship, if they avowed the opinions that
then prevailed generally in the North: "The manner in which they
would be received would depend entirely upon the individuals themselves
--they might make themselves obnoxious, as you can understand," was the
statement of General Lee. His testimony as a whole indicated an
opinion that it was more important to secure capital for business, than
it was to rid the State of the negro laborer. In his opinion, most of
the blacks were willing to work for their former masters, but they were
unwilling to make engagements for a year, a form of engagement which
the farmers and planters preferred, that they might be sure of help
when it would be most needed. The negroes may have been influenced by
one or both of two reasons. Their unthrifty habits--the outcome of
slavery--or an apprehension that a formal engagement for a years was a
kind of bondage that might lead to a renewal of the old system.

When General Lee was pressed by Senator Howard as to the feeling in the
South in regard to the National Government, he said: "I believe that
they will perform all the duties that they are required to perform. I
think that is the general feeling. . . . I do not know that there is
any deep-seated dislike. I think it is probable that there may be
some animosity still existing among some of the people of the South.
. . . They were disappointed at the result of the war."

General Lee was of the opinion that a Southern jury would not find an
accused guilty of treason for participation in the war. Indeed his
doctrine of State Rights excused the citizen and placed the sole
responsibility on the State. Of the common sentiment in the South he
said: "So far as I know, they will look upon the action of the State,
in withdrawing itself from the government of the United States, as
carrying the individuals of the State along with it; that the State
was responsible for the act, not the individual." This was the
framework of his own defence. Speaking of the advocates of secession,
he said: "The ordinance of secession, or those acts of a State which
recognized a condition of war between the State and the General
Government, stood as their justification for their bearing arms against
the Government of the United States. They considered the act of the
State as legitimate. That they were merely using the reserved right,
which they had a right to do."

From these views General Lee was led to a specific statement of his
own position:

Question: "State, if you please, what your own personal views on that
question were?"

Answer: "That was my view; that the act of Virginia in withdrawing
herself from the United States carried me along as a citizen of
Virginia, and that her laws and her acts were binding on me.'

Question: "And that you felt to be your justification in taking the
course you did?"

Answer: "Yes, sir."

In the course of the examination General Lee expressed the opinion that
the "trouble was brought about by the politicians of the country."

General Lee disclaimed all responsibility for the care and treatment of
prisoners of war. He had always favored a free exchange of prisoners,
knowing that the proper means for the care and comfort of prisoners
could not be furnished in the Confederacy. He thought that the
hardships and neglects had been exaggerated. As to himself, he had
never had any control over prisoners, except as they were captured on
the field of battle. He sent his prisoners to Richmond where they came
under the command of the provost-marshal-general. His orders to
surgeons on the field were to treat all the wounded alike.

In the examinations that were made by the committee I read a large
number of reports of surgeons connected with the prisons and hospitals
and I may say that in all cases they exhibited humanity and in many
cases specific means of relief for the sufferings of the soldiers were
recommended. Their reports were forwarded from officer to officer, but
in a large majority of cases the reports were neglected.

In a letter written by General Lee to his sister a few days before he
abandoned the service of the United States, he expressed the opinion
that there was no sufficient cause for the rebellion. This opinion, in
connection with his opinion that the rebellion was the work of
politicians demonstrates the power which the doctrine of State Rights
had obtained over a man of experience and of admitted ability. Upon
his own admission, he subordinated his conduct to the action of his
State, and in disregard of his personal obligation through his oath of
office. If he had followed his own judgment as to what was wise and
proper he would have remained in his place as an officer in the army of
the United States.

If in 1861 an officer of the army had entertained the opinion that the
North was in the wrong and that the South was in the right, it could be
claimed, fairly, that that officer might forswear his obligations to
the old Government and accept service in the Confederacy.

Moral obliquity is not to be assumed in the case of General Lee. His
pecuniary and professional interests must have invited him to remain
in the army. General Scott, a Virginian, was at the head of the army,
and General Scott was his friend. His promotion was certain, and
important commands were probable. His large estates in the vicinity of
the city of Washington were exposed to the ravages of war if not to
confiscation. These sacrifices, some certain, and others probable were
present when he left Washington and entered into the service of the
Confederacy under the superior authority of the State of Virginia in
disregard of his own opinion, and in disregard, not to say violation,
of his oath as a soldier who had sworn to support the Constitution of
the United States. General Lee was unable to say whether he had
taken an oath to support the Confederate States. He could not recall
the fact of taking the oath, but he said he should have taken the oath
if it had been tendered to him.

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