Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 2
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George S. Boutwell >> Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 2
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In many particulars his speech is an unequaled analysis of General
Grant's character and career, presented in a most attractive form. An
extract may be tolerated from a speech that can be read with interest
even by those who are ignorant of the doings, or it may be, by those
who have no knowledge of the existence, of the convention:
"Standing on the highest eminence of human distinction, modest, firm,
simple, and self-poised, having filled all lands with his renown, he
has seen not only the high-born and the titled, but the poor and the
lowly, in the uttermost ends of the earth, rise and uncover before him."
Mr. Conkling was the recognized leader of the three hundred and six who
constituted the compact body of the supporters of General Grant.
Suggestions were made that the substitution of Mr. Conkling's name for
General Grant's name would give the nomination to Mr. Conkling, and
there was a moment of time when General Garfield anticipated or
apprehended such a result. There was, however, never a moment of time
when such a result was possible. The three hundred and six would never
have consented to the use of any name in place of General Grant's name
unless General Grant's name were first withdrawn by his authority.
A firmer obstacle even would have been found in Mr. Conkling's sturdy
refusal to allow the use of his name under such circumstances. Among
the friends of General Grant the thought of such a proceeding was never
entertained, although the suggestion was made, but without authority,
probably, from those charged with the management of the organizations
engaged in the struggle.
After many years had passed, and the proceedings of the convention were
well-nigh forgotten, Mr. John Russell Young printed a letter in which he
made the charge that Conkling, Cameron, Boutwell, and Lincoln had
concealed the contents of a letter from General Grant in which he
directed them as his representatives to withdraw his name from the
convention. Mr. Young was in error in two particulars. Lincoln was not
named in the letter. General Logan was the fourth person to whom the
letter was addressed.
Young brought the letter from Galena, where Grant then was, and he
claims that the letter was addressed to himself. General Frederick D.
Grant, who was then at Chicago, claims that the letter was addressed to
him, and that, after reading it, he handed it to Mr. Conkling.
As late as the first half of the year 1897, Mr. Conkling's papers had
not been examined carefully. The contents of the letter are important,
and for the present the evidence is circumstantial; but to me it is
conclusive against Mr. Young's statement that Conkling, Cameron, Logan,
and Boutwell were directed by General Grant to withdraw his name from
the convention. I cannot now say that I read the letter, but of its
receipt and the contents I had full knowledge, and I referred to it
in these words in a letter to my daughter dated May 31, 1880:
"Grant sent for Young to visit him at Galena. Young returned to-day,
and says that Grant directed him to say to Cameron, Logan, Conkling,
and Boutwell that he should be satisfied with whatever they may do."
Without any special recollection upon the point, the conclusion of
reason is that my letter was written from a conversation with Young,
and before I had knowledge of the contents of Grant's letter. I may
add, however, that his letter produced no change in my opinion as to
our authority and duty in regard to Grant's candidacy. My mind never
departed for a moment from the idea that we were free, entirely free,
to continue the contest in behalf of General Grant upon our own judgment.
Upon the views and facts already presented and with even greater
certainty upon the correspondence with General Frederick D. Grant,
I submit as the necessary conclusion of the whole matter that the letter
of General Grant of May, 1880, did not contain any specific
instructions, and especially that it did not contain instructions for
the withdrawal of his name from the convention; in fine, that the
further conduct of the contest was left to the discretion and judgment
of the four men whom he had recognized as his representatives.
I annex the correspondence with General Frederick D. Grant:
BOSTON, MASS., _May_ 28, 1897.
COL. FRED. D. GRANT, NEW YORK, N. Y.
_Dear Sir:_ You will of course recall the fact that John Russell Young,
some months ago, made a public statement in which he declared that he
brought from Galena to Chicago, during the session of the Republican
Convention of 1880, a letter from General Grant in which he gave
specific directions to Conkling, Cameron, and Boutwell to withdraw his
name as a candidate from the convention. Some months ago I had some
correspondence with A. R. Conkling, and also with yourself, in regard
to the contents of the letter written by General Grant. Mr. A. R.
Conkling sent me a copy of a portion of a letter which, as he advised
me, he had received from you. A copy of that extract I herewith
enclose. As one of the friends of General Grant and as one of the
persons to whom bad faith was imputed by Mr. Young, it is my purpose to
place the matter before the public with such evidence as I can
command, for the purpose of showing the character of the letter.
I wish to obtain from you such a statement as you are willing to make,
with the understanding that whenever the case shall be presented to the
public your letter may be used.
Aside from actual evidence tending to show that Young's statement is
erroneous, I cannot believe that General Grant would have recognized
as a friend either one of the persons named, if his explicit
instructions for the withdrawal of his name had been made by him and
disregarded by them.
Yours very truly,
GEO S. BOUTWELL.
25 EAST 62D STREET,
NEW YORK, _May_ 30, 1897.
_My Dear Senator:_ I received yesterday your letter of May 28th, in
which you asked me what I remember about a letter which my father,
General Grant, wrote to his four leading friends during the session of
the Republican National Convention at Chicago in 1880.
With reference to this matter my recollection is, that Mr. John Russell
Young, who had been visiting father in Galena, brought from him a
large sealed envelope, which he delivered to me at my home in Chicago,
with directions from my father that I should read the letter contained
therein, and then see that it was received safely by his four friends,
Senators Conkling, Boutwell, Cameron, and Logan.
The substance of General Grant's letter was, that the personal feelings
of partisans of the leading candidates had grown to be so bitter, that
it might become advisable for the good of the Republican Party to
select as their candidate some one whose name had not yet been
prominently before the convention, and that he therefore wrote to say
to those who represented his interest in the convention, that it would
be quite satisfactory to him if they would confer with those who
represented the interests of Mr. Blaine and decided to have both his
name and Mr. Blaine's withdrawn from before the convention.
I delivered in person this letter from my father, to Senator Conkling--
I do not know what disposition he made of it.
With highest regards, my dear Senator, for your family and yourself,
believe me, as ever,
Faithfully yours,
FREDERICK D. GRANT.
Following the visit of General Grant and Mr. Conkling to Mentor in the
autumn of 1880, I was informed by Mr. Conkling that he had not been
alone one minute with General Garfield, intending by that care-taking
to avoid the suggestion that his visit was designed to afford an
opportunity for any personal or party arrangement. Further, it was the
wish of General Grant, as it was his wish, that the effort which they
were then making should be treated as a service due to the party and to
the country, and that General Garfield should be left free from any
obligation to them whatsoever.
After the election and after Mr. Blaine became Secretary of State, he
volunteered to speak of the situation of the party in New York and of
Mr. Conkling's standing in the State. Among other things, he said that
Mr. Conkling was the only man who had had three elections to the Senate,
and that Mr. Conkling and his friends would be considered fairly in
the appointments that might be made in that State.
When in a conversation with Conkling, I mentioned Blaine's remark, he
said, "Do you believe one word of that?"
I said, "Yes, I believe Mr. Blaine."
He said with emphasis, "I don't."
Subsequent events strengthened Mr. Conkling in his opinion, but those
events did not change my opinion of Mr. Blaine's integrity of purpose
in the conversations of which I have spoken.
My knowledge of the events, not important in themselves, but which
seem to have the relation of a prelude to the great tragedy, was
derived from three persons, Mr. Conkling, Mr. Blaine, and Mr. Marshall
Jewell. At the request of the President, Mr. Conkling called upon him
the Sunday preceding the day of catastrophe. The President gave Mr.
Conkling the names of persons that he was considering favorably for
certain places. To several of these Mr. Conkling made objections, and
in some cases other persons were named. As Mr. Conkling was leaving
he said, "Mr. President, what do you propose about the collectorship
of New York?" The President said, "We will leave that for another
time." These statements I received from Mr. Conkling.
From Mr. Jewell I received the following statement as coming from the
President: When the New York nominations were sent to the Senate, the
President was forthwith in the receipt of letters and despatches in
protest, coupled with the suggestion that everything had been
surrendered to Conkling. Without delay and without consultation with
any one, the President nominated Judge Robertson to the office of
collector of New York. Further, the President said, as reported by Mr.
Jewell, Mr. Blaine heard of the nomination, and he came in very pale
and much astonished.
From Mr. Blaine I received the specific statement that he had no
knowledge of the nomination of Judge Robertson until it had been made.
These statements are reconcilable with each other, and they place the
responsibility for the sudden and fatal rupture of the relations
between Mr. Conkling and the President upon the President. Mr. Conkling
could not fail to regard the nomination of Robertson as a wilful and
premeditated violation of the pledge given at the Sunday conference.
It was, however, only an instance of General Garfield's impulsive and
unreasoning submission to an expression of public opinion, without
waiting for evidence of the nature and value of that opinion. That
weakness had been observed by his associates in the House of
Representatives, and on that weakness his administration was wrecked.
Mr. Conkling was much misrepresented and of course he was much
misunderstood. As a Senator from New York he claimed a right to be
consulted in regard to the principal appointments in the State. His
recommendations were few and they were made with great care. He
confined himself to the chief appointments. It was quite difficult
to secure his name or his favorable word in behalf of applicants for
the subordinate places.
In my experience with him, which was considerable in the Internal
Revenue Office and in the Treasury, I found him ready to concede to
the opinions of the Executive Department. He was one of those who
held to the opinion that it was the duty of Representatives and Senators
to give advice in regard to appointments and to give it upon their
responsibility as members of the Government. Senators and
Representatives are not officers of the Government, they are members
of the Government, and the duty of giving aid to the administration
rests upon them.
When a man is chosen to represent a State or a district, a presumption
should arise that he will act for the good of the country to the best
of his ability. Advice in regard to appointments is a part of his
duty, and in the main the Senators and Representatives are worthy of
confidence. The present Civil Service system rests upon the theory that
they are not to be trusted and that three men without a constituency
are safer custodians of power.
Upon the death of Garfield and the accession of Arthur, Mr. Conkling
looked for one thing, and one thing only--the removal of Robertson.
When this was not done he separated from Arthur. I have no knowledge
of the reasons which governed the President, but I think his career
would have been more agreeable to himself if he had so far vindicated
his own course and the course of his friends as to have removed from
office the man who had contributed so largely to the defeat of the wing
of the Republican Party with which Mr. Arthur was identified.
When General Garfield died, the Republican Party was broken, and it
seemed to be without hope. President Arthur's conciliatory policy did
much to restore harmony of all the elements except the wing represented
by Mr. Conkling.
It is probable, however, that a better result might have been secured by
the early removal of Robertson. That course of action would have been
satisfactory to Conkling, and given strength to the party in New York,
where strength was most needed. With Mr. Conkling's aid in 1884, Mr.
Arthur might have been nominated, and if nominated it is probable that
he might have been elected with Mr. Conkling's aid. Arthur's error was
that he offended two important factions of the party. By retaining
Robertson he alienated Conkling, and by the removal of Blaine he
alienated him and his friends. Hence in 1884 two elements of the party
that were bitterly opposed to each other harmonized in their opposition
to Arthur.
XLI
FROM 1875 TO 1895
THE HAWAIIAN TREATY AND RECIPROCITY
In January, 1875, Mr. Fish negotiated a treaty with the representatives
of the Hawaiian Islands by which there was to be a free exchange of
specified products and manufactures.
By the fourth article the King agreed not to dispose of any port or
harbor in his dominions or create a lien thereon in favor of any other
government. When the treaty came to the Senate it had no original
friends, and it met with determined opposition, especially from Sherman
of Ohio, and Morrill and Edmunds of Vermont. The reciprocity feature
annoyed them, they fearing that it might be used as a precedent for
reciprocity with Canada.
I was early impressed with the importance of securing a foothold in the
islands and I considered the exclusion of other nations as a step in
the right direction. The trustworthy estimates showed that the
reciprocity feature would work a loss to the Treasury of the United
States of more than half a million dollars a year. This the supporters
of the treaty were compelled to admit, but after argument the requisite
majority ratified the treaty and upon the theory that the political,
naval and commercial advantages were an adequate compensation. Upon the
renewal of the treaty the King ceded Pearl River Harbor to the United
States. After the expiration of the fixed period of seven years during
which the two nations were bound mutually, there was a class of men who
were anxious to abrogate the treaty, and at each session of Congress
for several years a proposition was introduced for that purpose. By
something of argument and something of art, the scheme was defeated.
The opposition, led usually by Holman, of Indiana, consisted largely of
Democrats. Their reason was loss of revenue. That fact was always
admitted by the friends of the treaty. It was claimed also that there
was no advantage gained by the country from the introduction of rice
and sugar from the islands duty-free. It was asserted by the
combinations the prices were as high on the Pacific Coast as on the
Atlantic. On the other hand the Louisiana sugar planters opposed the
treaty on the ground that they were unfavorably affected. As the
importations from the islands never exceeded four per cent of the
consumption of the country, the treaty had no perceptible effect upon
prices. The sugar and rice interests were reinforced by the delegations
from Michigan, Ohio and Vermont, who opposed the treaty under an
apprehension that it would operate as a precedent for a revival of the
system of reciprocity with Canada.
The fact of the annexation of Canada to the United States, whether the
event shall occur in a time near or be postponed to a time remote,
depends probably on our action upon the subject of reciprocity.
Canada needs our markets and our facilities for ocean transportation,
and, as long as these advantages are denied to her, she can never attain
to a high degree of prosperity. England may furnish capital for
railways, but railways are profitable only where there is business and
production on the one hand, and markets on the other. The system of
qualified intercourse tends to make the Canadian farmer dissatisfied
with his condition, and as long as there are cheap lands in the United
States he will find relief in emigration.
The time, however, is not far distant, when the Canadian farmer will be
unable to sell his lands in the Dominion and with the proceeds purchase
a home in the States. When that time arrives he will favor annexation
as a means of raising his own possessions to a value corresponding to
the value of land in the States. The body of farmers, laborers, and
trading people will favor annexation, ultimately, should the policy of
non-intercourse be adhered to on our part, and they will outnumber the
office-holding class, and thus the union of the two countries will be
secured. It is apparent also that a policy of free intercourse would
postpone annexation for a long time, if not indefinitely. Give to the
Canadian farmer and fisherman free access to our markets and there will
remain only a political motive in favor of annexation. The English
government is pursuing a liberal policy in its dealings with the
Dominion, and there is no reason for anticipating a retrograde course
of conduct on the part of the home government.
THE MISSISSIPPI ELECTION OF 1875
In 1876 I was made chairman of a committee of the Senate charged with
the duty of investigating the election of 1875 in the State of
Mississippi. My associates were Cameron of Wisconsin, McMillan of
Missouri, Bayard of Delaware, and McDonald of Missouri.
By the election of 1875 the Republican Party had been overthrown and
the power of the Democratic Party established upon a basis which has
continued firm, until the present time. The question for investigation
was this: Was the election of 1875 an honest election? There was an
agreement of opinion that there were riots, shootings and massacres.
On the side of the Democrats it was contended that these outrages had
no political significance, that they were due to personal quarrels,
and to uprisings of negroes for the purpose of murdering the whites.
The testimony was of the same character and the conclusions of the two
branches of the committee followed the lead of these conflicting
theories and statements. For myself I had no doubt that the election
of 1875 was carried by the Democrats by a preconcerted plan of riots
and assassinations. To me the evidence seemed conclusive.
The town of Aberdeen was the scene of murderous intimidation on the
day of election, and at about eleven o'clock the Republicans left the
polling place and abandoned the contest.
One of the principal witnesses for the Democrats was General Reuben
Davis, a cousin of Jefferson Davis. He had been a member of the
Thirty-sixth Congress, and he had resigned his seat to take part in the
Rebellion. He was a Brigadier-General in the service, but without
distinction. He explained and excused all the transactions at
Aberdeen and with emphasis and adroitness he laid the responsibility
upon the Republicans. Of certain things there was uncontradicted
testimony. 1. That the Democrats placed a cannon near the voting-place
and trained it upon the window where the Republicans, mostly negroes,
were to vote, and that there was a caisson at the same place. 2. That
there was a company of mounted men and armed cavalry upon the ground.
3. That guns were discharged in the vicinity of the voting place.
4. That at about eleven o'clock the sheriff of the county, a white man
and a Republican, who had been a colonel in the rebel army, made a
brief address to the Republican voters in which he said that there could
be no election and advised them to go to their homes. This they did
without delay. The sheriff locked himself in the jail where he remained
until the events of the day were ended. General Davis insisted that
all these demonstrations of apparent hostility had no significance--
that the artillery men had no ammunition--that the cavalry men were
assembled for sport only--and that the discharge of muskets was made by
boys and lawless persons, but without malice.
In many parts of the State the canvass previous to the election was
characterized by assassinations and midnight murders. But all were
explained upon non-political grounds.
In 1878 General Davis offered himself to the electors as a Democratic
candidate for Congress. The convention nominated another person. He
then entered the field as an independent candidate. He was defeated,
or rather the Democrat was declared to have been elected. The
Republicans had voted for Davis, and when the contest was decided by
the returning board Davis published a letter in which he charged upon
the Democratic leaders the conduct which in 1876, he had explained and
defended. After the election of General Harrison in 1888, General Davis
appeared at Indianapolis as a Republican, and as such he had an
interview with the President-elect.
While I was conducting the investigation at Jackson, a stout negro from
the plantation sought an interview with me after he had been examined
by the committee. He was a mulatto of unusual sense, but he was under
a strong feeling in regard to the outrages that had been perpetrated
upon the negro race.
Finally he said: "Had we not better take off the leaders? We can do it
in a night."
I said: "No. It would end in the sacrifice of the black population.
It would be as wrong on your part as is their conduct towards you.
Moreover, we intend to protect you, and in the end you will be placed
on good ground."
There is, however, a lesson and a warning in what that negro said. If
the wrongs continue, some "John Brown" black or white, may appear in
Mississippi or South Carolina or in several states at once, and engage
in a vain attempt to regain the rights of the negro race by brutal
crimes. The negroes are seven million to-day, and they are increasing
in numbers and gaining in wealth and intelligence. The South, and
indeed the whole country were not more blind to impending perils in the
days of slavery than we now are to the perils of the usurpation in
which the South is engaged. With such examples as this country
furnishes and with the traditions under whose influence all classes are
living, there will always be peril as long as large bodies of citizens
are deprived of their legal rights.
Should such a contest arise, there will be wide spread sympathy in the
North, which might convert a servile or social war into a sectional
civil war.
COURTESY OF THE SENATE--SENATORIAL ELECTION OF 1887
One of my last acts as Secretary was to advise the President to nominate
a Mr. Hitchcock for collector of the port of San Diego, California.
Hitchcock was a lawyer by profession, a graduate of Harvard and a man of
good standing in San Diego. Mr. Houghton, the member for the San Diego
district, had recommended a man who was a saloon-keeper and a Democrat
in politics, but he had supported Houghton in the canvass. Houghton's
request was supported by Senator Sargent. Upon the facts as then
understood the President nominated Hitchcock and one of the first
questions of interest to me was the action of the Senate upon the
nomination of Hitchcock which I supported.
Sargent appealed to what was known as the courtesy of the Senate a rule
or custom which required Senators of the same party to follow the lead
of Senators in the matter of nominations from the respective States. To
this rule I objected. I refused to recognize it, and I said that I
would never appeal to the "courtesy" of the Senate in any matter
concerning the State of Massachusetts. Hitchcock was rejected. The
President nominated Houghton's candidate.
This action on my part was followed by consequences which may have
prevented my re-election to the Senate. When Judge Russell, who was
collector of the port of Boston, was about to resign, General Butler,
who had early knowledge of the purpose of Russell, secured from General
Grant the nomination of his friend William A. Simmons. Simmons had been
in the army, he had had experience in the Internal Revenue Service and
his record was good. He was, however, Butler's intimate friends, and
all the hostility in the State against Butler, which was large, was
directed against the confirmation. I was not personally opposed to
Simmons, but I thought that his appointment was unwise in the extreme,
and therefore I opposed his confirmation. There were fair offers of
compromise on men who were free from objections, all of which were
refused by Butler. The President declined to withdraw the nomination
unless it could be made to appear that Simmons was an unfit man. This
could not be done. I was upon the Committee on Commerce to which the
nomination was referred, and upon my motion the report was adverse to
the nomination. Butler came to my room and denounced my action,
saying that he would spend half a million dollars to defeat my re-
election. I said in reply:--
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