Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 2

G >> George S. Boutwell >> Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 2

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The same exigency compelled Congress to enact, and the country to
accept, a tariff system more protective in its provisions than any
scheme ever suggested by Mr. Clay. The necessities of the times
compelled free-traders, even, to accept the revenue system with its
protective features; but General Grant accepted it as a system in
harmony alike with his early impressions and with his matured opinions.

It has happened, by the force of events, that the policy of the old
Whig Party has been revived in the national banking system, while the
Independent Treasury, the leading measure of the old Democratic Party,
has been preserved in all its features as the guide of the Treasury
Department in its financial operations.

When General Grant became President, these three measures had been
incorporated into the policy of the Republican Party. Their full
acceptance by him did not require any change of opinion on his part.
It was true that he had voted for Mr. Buchanan in 1856; but his vote
was given in obedience to an impression that he had received touching
the qualifications of General Fremont. The fact that he had voted
for Mr. Buchanan excited suspicions in the minds of some Republicans,
and it engendered hopes in the bosoms of some Democrats that he might
act in harmony with the Democratic Party. The suspicions and the
hopes were alike groundless.

As early as the month of August, 1863, in a letter to Mr. E. B.
Washburne, he said: "It became patent to my mind early in the
rebellion that the North and South could never live at peace with
each other except as one nation, and that without slavery. As anxious
as I am to see peace established, I would not, therefore, be willing
to see any settlement until this question is forever settled."

Thus was General Grant, at an early moment, and upon his own judgment,
brought into full accord with the Republican Party upon the two
debatable and most earnestly debated questions during Mr. Lincoln's
administration--the prosecution of the war and the abolition of
slavery.

And thus it is apparent that in 1868 he was in a condition, as to all
matters of opinion, to accept a nomination at the hands of the
Republican Party; and it is equally apparent that he was separated
from the Democratic Party by a chasm wide, deep, and impassable. It
is, however, true that General Grant's feelings were not intense, and
in the expression of his opinions his tone was mild and his manner
gentle. It often happened, also, that he did not undertake to
controvert opinions and expressions with which he had no sympathy.
This peculiarity may at times have led to a misunderstanding, or to
a misinterpretation of his views. Upon this basis of his early
impressions, and matured opinions his administrative policy was
constructed.

When he became President, there was a body of American citizens, not
inconsiderable in numbers, who doubted the ability of the Government
to pay the war debt; there were others who advocated payment in
greenbacks, or the substitution of a note not bearing interest for a
bond that bore interest; and there were yet others who denied the
validity of the existing obligations. All these classes, whether they
were dishonest or only misled, were alike rebuked in his inaugural
address. These were his words: "A great debt has been contracted
in securing to us and to our posterity the Union. The payment of this
debt, principal and interest, as well as the return to a specie basis,
as soon as it can be accomplished without material detriment to the
debtor class, or to the country at large, must be provided for. . . .
To protect the national honor, every dollar of Government indebtedness
should be paid in gold, unless otherwise expressly stipulated in the
contract. . . .

"Let it be understood that no repudiator of one farthing of our public
debt will be trusted in public place, and it will go far toward
strengthening a credit which ought to be the best in the world, and
will ultimately enable us to replace the debt with bonds bearing less
interest than we now pay."

In the same address he asserted the ability of the country to pay the
debt within the period of twenty-five years, and he also declared his
purpose to secure a faithful collection of the public revenues. At
the close of his administration of eight years one fifth part of the
public debt had been paid, and if the system of taxation that existed
in 1869 had been continued the debt would have been extinguished in
less than a quarter of a century from the year 1869. In his
administration, however, the crisis was passed. The ability and the
disposition of the country were made so conspicuous that all honest
doubts were removed, and the repudiators were shamed into silence.
The redemption of the debt by the purchase of bonds in the open market
strengthened the public credit, and laid a foundation for the
resumption of specie payments.

General Grant's inaugural address was followed by the passage of the
act of March 18, 1869, entitled "An act to strengthen the public
credit." This act was a pledge to the world that the debts of the
United States, unless there were in the obligations express
stipulations to the contrary, would be paid in coin.

In accordance with the report of the Secretary of the Treasury,
President Grant, in his annual message of December, 1869, recommended
the passage of an act authorizing the funding of the public debt at a
lower rate of interest.

Following this recommendation, the bill for refunding the public debt,
prepared by the Secretary of the Treasury, was enacted and approved
July 14, 1870.

By this act the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to issue bonds
to the amount of $200,000,000 bearing interest at the rate of 5 per
cent, $300,000,000 bearing interest at the rate of 4 1/2 per cent, and
$1,000,000,000 bearing interest at the rate of 4 per cent.

Under this act, and the amendments thereto, the debt has been refunded
from time to time until the average rate of interest does not now
exceed 3 1/2 per cent. Although these two important measures of
administration were not prepared by General Grant, they were but the
execution of his policy set forth in his inaugural address.

In respect to the rights of the negro race, General Grant must be
ranked with the advanced portion of the Republican Party. Upon the
capture of Fort Donelson, a number of slaves fell into the hands of the
Union army. General Grant issued an order, dated Feb. 26, 1862, in
which he authorized their employment for the benefit of the Government,
and at the close he said that under no circumstances would he permit
their return to their masters.

In his inaugural address he urged the States to ratify the Fifteenth
Amendment, and its ratification was due, probably, to his advice. At
that moment his influence was very great. It may well be doubted
whether any other President ever enjoyed the confidence of the country
in as high a degree. He gave to that measure the weight of his opinion
and the official influence of his administration. The amendment was
opposed by the Democratic Party generally, and a considerable body of
Republicans questioned its wisdom. General Grant was responsible for
the ratification of the amendment. Had he advised its rejection, or
had he been indifferent to its fate, the amendment would have failed,
and the country would have been left to a succession of bitter
controversies arising from the application of the second section of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which provided that the representation of a State
should be based upon the number of male citizens over twenty-one years
of age entitled to vote.

General Grant accepted the plan of Congress in regard to the
reconstruction of the Union. There were three opinions that had
obtained a lodgment in the public mind. President Johnson and his
supporters claimed that the President held the power by virtue of his
office to convene the people of the respective States, and that under
his direction constitutions might be framed, and that Senators and
Representatives might be chosen who would be entitled to seats in
Congress, as though they represented States that had not been engaged
in secession and war. Others maintained that neither by the ordinances
of secession nor by the war had the States of the Confederacy been
disturbed in their legal relations to the Union.

It was the theory of the Republican Party in Congress that the eleven
States by their own acts had destroyed their legal relations to the
Union; that the jurisdiction of the National Government over the
territory of the seceding States was full and complete; and that, as
a result of the war, the National Government could hold them in a
Territorial condition and subject to military rule. Upon this theory
the re-appearance of a seceded State as a member of the Union was made
to depend upon the assent of Congress, with the approval of the
President, or upon an act of Congress by a two-thirds vote over a
Presidential veto.

General Grant sustained the policy of Congress during the long and
bitter contest with President Johnson, and when he became President
he accepted that policy without reserve in the case of the restoration
of the States of Virginia, Georgia, Texas, and Mississippi. Upon this
statement it appears that General Grant was a Republican, and that he
became a Republican by processes that preclude the suggestion that his
nomination for the Presidency wrought any change in his position upon
questions of principle or policy in the affairs of government. Indeed,
his nomination in 1868 was distasteful to him, as he then preferred to
remain at the head of the army. It was in the nature of things,
however, that he should have wished for re-election. He was re-
elected, and at the end of his second term he accepted a return to
private life as a relief from the cares and duties of office. The
support which he received for the nomination in 1880 was not due to
any effort on his part. Not even to his warmest supporters did he
express a wish, or dictate or advise an act. His only utterance was
a message to four of his friends at the Chicago Convention, that
whatever they might do in the premises would be acceptable to him.
His political career was marked by the same abstention from personal
effort for personal advancement that distinguished him as an officer
of the army. But he did not bring into civil affairs the habits of
command that were the necessity of military life. Although by virtue
of his position he was the recognized head of the Republican Party,
he made no effort to control its action. Wherever he placed power,
there he reposed trust.

There was not in General Grant's nature any element of suspicion, and
his confidence in his friends was free and full. Hence it happened
that he had many occasions for regret.

On no man in public life in this generation were there more frequent
charges and insinuations of wrong-doing, and in this generation there
has been no man in public life who was freer from all occasion for
such insinuations and charges.

When he heard that the Treasury Department was purchasing bullion of
a company in which he was a stockholder, he sold his shares without
delay, and without reference to the market price or to their real value.

General Grant had no disposition to usurp power. He had no policy to
impose upon the country against the popular will. This was shown in
the treatment of the Santo Domingo question. General Grant was not
indisposed to see the territories of the Republic extended, but his
love of justice and fair dealing was such that he would have used
only honorable means in his intercourse with other nations. Santo
Domingo was a free offering, and he thought that its possession would
be advantageous to the country.

Yet he never made it an issue, even in his Cabinet, where, as he well
knew, very serious doubts existed as to the expediency of the measure.
He was deeply pained by the unjust attacks and groundless criticism
of which he was the subject, but he accepted the adverse judgment of
the Senate as a constitutional binding decision of the question, and
of that decision he never complained.

In a message to the Senate of the 31st of May, 1870, he urged the
annexation of Santo Domingo. He said, "I feel an unusual anxiety for
the ratification of this treaty, because I believe it will redound
greatly to the glory of the two countries interested, to civilization,
and to the extirpation of the institution of slavery." He claimed for
the scheme great commercial advantages, that it was in harmony with the
Monroe doctrine, and that the consummation of the measure would be
notice to the states of Europe that no acquisitions of territory on
this continent would be permitted. In his second inaugural address
General Grant referred to the subject in these words: "In the first
year of the past administration the proposition came up for the
admission of Santo Domingo as a Territory of the Union. . . . I believe
now, as I did then, that it was for the best interests of this country,
for the people of Santo Domingo, and all concerned, that the
proposition should be received favorably. It was, however, rejected
constitutionally, and therefore the subject was never brought up
again by me." General Grant considered the failure of the treaty as
a national misfortune, but he never criticised the action of its
opponents.

General Grant's firmness was shown in his veto of the Senate currency
bill of 1874. It is known that unusual effort was made to convince
him that the measure was wise in a financial view, and highly expedient
upon political grounds. The President wrote a message in explanation
of his act of approval, but upon its completion he was so much
dissatisfied with his own argument that he resolved to veto the bill.
Hence the veto message of April 22, 1874.

In foreign policy, the principal measure of General Grant's
administration was the treaty with Great Britain of May, 1871. The
specific and leading purpose of the negotiations was the adjustment
of the claim made by the United States that Great Britain was liable
in damages for the destruction of American vessels, and the consequent
loss of commercial power and prestige, by the depredations of
Confederate cruisers that were fitted out or had obtained supplies in
British ports. Neither the treaty of peace of 1783, nor the subsequent
treaties with Great Britain, made a full and final settlement of the
fishery question or of our northern boundary-line at its junction
with the Pacific Ocean. These outlying questions were considered in
the negotiations, and they were adjusted by the terms of the treaty.
The jurisdiction of the island of San Juan on the Pacific coast, then
in controversy, was referred to the Emperor of Germany as arbitrator,
with full and final power in the premises. By his award the claim of
the United States was sustained.

The fishery question was referred to arbitrators, but it was a
misfortune that the award was not satisfactory to the United States,
and the dispute is reopened with capacity to vex the two governments
for an indefinite period of time.

The claims against Great Britain growing out of the operations of the
Confederate cruisers, known as the Alabama claims, were referred to
arbitrators, by whose award the Government of the United States
received the sum of $15,500,000. But the value of the treaty of 1871
was not in the award made. The people of the United States were
embittered against the Government of Great Britain, and had General
Grant chosen to seek redress by arms he would have been sustained
throughout the North with substantial unanimity. But General Grant
was destitute of the war spirit, and he chose to exhaust all the powers
of negotiation before he would advise a resort to force. A passage
in his inaugural address may have had an influence upon the policy of
the British Government: "In regard to foreign policy, I would deal
with nations as equitable law requires individuals to deal with each
other. . . . I would respect the rights of all nations, demanding
equal respect for our own. _If others depart from this rule in their
dealings with us, we may be compelled to follow their precedent."_

The reference of the question at issue to the tribunal at Geneva was
a conspicuous instance of the adjustment of a grave international
dispute by peaceful methods.

By the sixth article of the treaty of 1871, three new rules were made
for the government of neutral nations. These rules are binding upon
the United States and Great Britain, and the contracting parties
agreed to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime powers, and
to invite such powers to accede to the rules.

In those rules it is stipulated that a neutral nation should not
permit a belligerent to fit out, arm, or equip in its ports any vessel
which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or
carry on war against a power with which it is at peace. It was further
agreed, as between the parties to the treaty, that neither would
suffer a belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as a base of
operations against the other. Finally, the parties agreed to use due
diligence to prevent any infraction of the rules so established.

Mr. Fish was then Secretary of State, and to him was General Grant and
the country largely indebted for the settlement of the Alabama
controversy; but the settlement was in harmony with General Grant's
inaugural address.

Before the final adjustment of the controversy, by the decision of the
tribunal at Geneva, General Grant had occasion to consider whether
the allegation against Great Britain, growing out of her recognition,
in May, 1861, of the belligerent character of the Confederacy, could
be maintained upon the principles of public law. Upon his own judgment
he reached the conclusion that the act was an act of sovereignty within
the discretion of the ruler, for which a claim in money could not be
made. This opinion was accepted, finally, by his advisers, by the
negotiators, and by the country.

General Grant was not a trained statesman. His methods of action were
direct and clear. His conduct was free from duplicity, and artifice of
every sort was foreign to his nature. In the first years of his
administration he relied upon his Cabinet in all minor matters relating
to the departments. Acting upon military ideas, he held the head of a
department to his full responsibility, and he waited, consequently,
until his opinion was sought or his instructions were solicited.

In his conferences with the members of his Cabinet he expressed his
opinions with the greatest freedom, and, upon discussion, he often
yielded to the suggestions or arguments of others. He was so great
that it was not a humiliation to acknowledge a change in opinion, or
to admit an error in policy or purpose.

In his intercourse with members of Congress upon the business of the
Government, he gave his opinions without reserve when he had reached
definite conclusions, but he often remained a silent listener to the
discussion of topics which he had not considered maturely.

His politics were not narrow nor exclusive. He believed in the growth
of the country, and in the power of republican ideas. He was free from
race prejudice, and free from national jealousy, but he believed in the
enlargement of our territory by peaceful means, in the spread of
republican institutions, and in the predominance of the English-
speaking race in the affairs of the world.

The spirit of philanthropy animated his politics, and the doctrines of
peace controlled his public policy.

[* This article was printed in Appleton's Cyclopedia for the year 1885.
Copyright, 1886, by D. Appleton & Co.]

XXXIX
REMINISCENCES OF PUBLIC MEN

GENERAL BANKS

Of the men whom I have known in public affairs, General Banks was in
his personality one of a small number who were always agreeable and
permanently attractive. He was the possessor of an elastic spirit;
he was always hopeful of the future and in adversity he saw or fancied
that he saw, days of prosperity for himself, for his party, for the
commonwealth and for the country. His interest in the fortunes of the
laboring classes was a permanent interest, and they are largely
indebted to him for the passage of the eight-hour law by the Congress
of the United States. Not infrequently his thoughts and scheme were
too vast for realization. While the contest in Kansas was going on,
he suggested an organization of capitalists for the purchase of the
low-priced lands in Delaware, then a sale to Northern farmers and the
conversion of Delaware into a free State.

His studies in law had been fragmentary and superficial, and nature had
not endowed him with all the qualities that are essential to the
successful lawyer. His reading on the literary side was considerable,
especially in the Spanish language. Early in life he accepted the idea
that our relations with the Spanish race were to be intimate in a not
far off future. He was a careful observer of character, and of
conditions in affairs, and in a free debate he was never in peril of
being overmatched. Of a mutual friend and an associate in politics
he said: "He has no serious side to his character--a defect that has
been the bane of many otherwise able men."

When the coalition came into power Banks was made speaker of the
Massachusetts House of Representatives. Wilson was president of the
Senate and I was in the office of Governor. In an evening stroll with
Banks around Boston Common, engaged in a survey of public affairs,
he changed the conversation suddenly with the remark: "It's almighty
queer that the people of this commonwealth have put their government
into the hands of men who have no last and usual place of abode." The
pertinency of this remark is to be found in the facts to which it was
applicable. There were some men of wealth in the Coalition Party but
the three places that I have named were held by men who were destitute
of even the means of well-to-do mechanics and tradespeople.

Mr. Banks had power in repartee which made him a formidable adversary
in parliamentary debate. When he was a mechanic at Waltham he took
an active part in temperance meetings. At one of the meetings a
Unitarian clergyman of conservative leanings, made a speech in which he
criticized the speeches and said finally: "I do not attend the
meetings because I cannot approve of what I hear said." He then
referred to Mr. Banks as a young man who was guilty of indiscretions
in speech. He had seen him once only at his church. He had made
inquiries of his brethren and he could not learn that Mr. Banks was a
regular attendant at any church. Banks in reply admitted that he had
been in the church of the reverend gentleman but once, and that he was
not a regular attendant at any church. Said he: "I do not go to
church because I hear things said there which I do not approve." The
reverend gentleman was forced to join in the general laugh which was
raised at his expense.

Two extracts from General Banks' letters, written to me during the war
may give an idea of his characteristics in his maturer years.

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP AT DAMSTOWN, MD.
_October_ 15, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR:--
I received your letter of the 8th inst . . . and also one of an earlier
date.

I am very glad to hear from you. I see few people and hear little news
from home. Newspapers I have little relish for and scarcely time to
read them, if I had.

I am glad to know that you contemplate the army for a pursuit. Our
people will in the end surrender all business except that of the war,
and that which pertains to the war. Our country is in a sad condition.
It is already clear that the influence of France and England is against
us. How sadly all our anticipations in regard to the war have failed
us,--the insurrection of the blacks, the material deficiencies of the
South, their want of men, and worst of all the friendship or the
indifference of England. We have now, or shall have by and by to do
what we should have done at the start, rely upon ourselves and prepare
for our work upon a scale proportionate to its magnitude. It would
amuse you to know how far the highest civil authority is subordinated
to military direction. I do not doubt in the slightest degree the
success of the Government in the end, but it grieves me to see how
slow we have been and still are in comprehension and preparation.

This continent is just as important to England and France as it is to
us. It is hardly to be doubted that they will postpone all
international questions, and secure what has never before been offered
to them--a controlling foothold here. How many times I have spoken to
you in the old Executive Chamber of the importance to the whole world
of the possession of Mexico--and of the power it would infallibly give
to this continent, as in Europe to those who possessed it. And now
Spain, France, and England are there. "Birnam Wood _has_ to great
Dunsinane come." There is but one remedy for us. Every male creature
born and unborn must become a soldier. Soldiers do not criticize, so
you must consider this _Private_. And believe me very truly yours,
etc.
N. P. BANKS.

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