Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 2

G >> George S. Boutwell >> Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 2

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25

"The department is managed by Admiral Porter, I am only a figure-head."

In a few months he resigned. His associates were much attached to him.
He was a benevolent, genial, well informed man. His successor, Mr.
Robeson, was a man of singular ability, lacking only the habit of
careful, continuous industry. This failing contributed to his
misfortunes in administration and consequently he was the subject of
many attacks in the newspapers and in Congress. After his retirement
he became a member of the House of Representatives, and it was a
noticeable fact, that from that day the attacks in Congress ceased.
As a debater he was well equipped, and in reference to his
administration of the Navy Department, he was always prepared with an
answer or an explanation in every exigency.

The appointment of Governor Fish to the Department of State, gave rise
to considerable adverse comment. The chief grounds of complaint were
that he was no longer young and that recently he had not been active
in political contests. He had been a Whig when there was a Whig Party,
and he became a Republican when the Republican Party was formed. As a
Whig he had been a member of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate of the United States, but he had not held office as a
Republican, nor was he known generally as a speaker or writer in
support of the policies or principles of the party. His age, then
about sixty, was urged as a reason against his appointment. His
selection as Secretary was extremely fortunate for General Grant and
his administration. Governor Fish was painstaking in his office,
exacting in his demands upon subordinates, without being harsh or
unjust, diligent in his duties, and fully informed as to the traditions
and usages of his department. Beyond these administrative qualities
he had the capacity to place every question of a diplomatic character
upon a foundation at once reasonable and legal. If the failure of Mr.
Stewart led to the appointment of Governor Fish the change was
fortunate for General Grant and the country. After the failure of Mr.
Stewart, Mr. Washburne spoke of his appointment to the State
Department, as only temporary, but for a few days he acted as though
he expected to remain permanently. If his transfer to France was an
afterthought, he and the President very carefully concealed that fact.
It is not probable that the President at the outset designed to take
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury from New York
City. Hence I infer that the failure of Mr. Stewart worked a change
in the headship of the State Department, and hence I am of the opinion
that the failure of Mr. Stewart was of great advantage to the
administration and to the country, and that without considering whether
there was a gain or loss in the Treasury Department. There can be no
doubt that Governor Fish was a much wiser man than Mr. Washburne for
the management of foreign affairs and there can be as little doubt that
Mr. Washburne could not have been excelled as Minister to Paris in the
troublous period of the years 1870 and 1871.

Mr. Fish had no ambitions beyond the proper and successful
administration of his own department. He did not aspire to the
Presidency, and he remained in the State Department during General
Grant's second term, at the special request of the President.

Mr. Sumner's removal from the chairmanship of the Committee on Foreign
Relations was due to the fact that a time came when he did not
recognize the President, and when he declined to have any intercourse
with the Secretary of State outside of official business. Such a
condition of affairs is always a hindrance in the way of good
government, and it may become an obstacle to success. Good government
can be secured only through conferences with those who are responsible,
by conciliation, and not infrequently by concessions to the holders of
adverse opinions. The time came when such a condition was no longer
possible between Mr. Sumner and the Secretary of State.

The President and his Cabinet were in accord in regard to the
controversy with Great Britain as to the Alabama Claims. Mr. Sumner
advocated a more exacting policy. Mr. Motley appeared to be following
Mr. Sumner's lead, and the opposition to Mr. Sumner extended to Mr.
Motley. It had happened that the President had taken on a prejudice
to Mr. Motley at their first interview. This I learned when I said
something to the President in the line of conciliation. The President
said: "Such was my impression of Motley when I saw him that I should
have withheld his appointment if I had not made a promise to Sumner."
My acquaintance with Mr. Motley began in the year 1849, when we were
members of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, and I had a
high regard for him, although it had been charged that I had had some
part in driving him from politics into literature.

When we consider the natures and the training of the two men, it is
not easy to imagine agreeable co-operation in public affairs by Mr.
Sumner and General Grant. Mr. Sumner never believed in General Grant's
fitness for the office of President, and General Grant did not
recognize in Mr. Sumner a wise and safe leader in the business of
government. General Grant's notion of Mr. Sumner, on one side of his
character, may be inferred from his answer when, being asked if he
had heard Mr. Sumner converse, he said: "No, but I have heard him
lecture."

As I am to speak of Mr. Sumner in our personal relations, which for
thirteen years before his death were intimate, I shall use some words
of preface. Never on more than two occasions did we have differences
that caused any feeling on either side. Mr. Sumner was chairman in the
Senate of the Committee on the Freedmen's Bureau, and Mr. Eliot was
chairman of the Committee of the House. A report was made in each
House, and each bill contained not less than twenty sections. Each
House passed its own bill. A committee of conference was appointed.
Its report was rejected. I was appointed a member of the second
committee.

I examined the bills, and I marked out every section that was not
essential to the working of the measure. Four sections remained.
I then added a section which provided for the lease and ultimate sale
of the confiscated lands to the freedmen and refugees. President
Johnson's restoration of those lands made that section non-operative.
The committee, upon the motion of General Schenck, transferred the
jurisdiction of the Bureau from the Treasury to the War Department.
The bill was accepted by the committee, and passed by the two Houses.

When within a few days I was in the Senate Chamber, Mr. Sumner came to
me, and said in substance: "The Freedmen's Bureau Bill as it passed is
of no value. I have spent six months upon the bill, and my work has
gone for nothing. You and General Schenck cannot pretend to know as
much as I know about the measure."

With some feeling, which was not justifiable, I said: "I have not
spent six hours upon the measure, but after what you have said I will
say that the fifth section is of more value than all the sections which
you have written." I did not wait for a reply. The subject was not
again mentioned; our friendly relations were not disturbed, and it is
to Mr. Sumner's credit on the score of toleration that he passed over
my rough remarks, even though he had given some reason for a retort.

My next difference from Mr. Sumner was a more serious difference, but
it passed without any break in our relations. He had not acquired the
church-going habit, or he had renounced it, and my church-going was
spasmodic rather than systematic. Thus it became possible and
agreeable for me to spend some small portion of each Sunday in his
rooms. The controversy over Mr. Motley and his removal from the post
of minister to Great Britain excited Mr. Sumner to a point far beyond
any excitement to which he yielded, arising from his own troubles or
from the misfortunes of the country. To him it was the topic of
conversation at all times and in all places. That habit I accepted at
his house with as much complacency as I could command. Indeed, I was
not much disturbed by what he said to me in private, and certainly not
by what he said in his own house, where I went from choice, and without
any obligation to remain resting upon me. In all his conversation he
made General Grant responsible for the removal of Motley, accompanied,
usually, with language of censure and condemnation. On two occasions
that were in a measure public, one of which was at a dinner given to me
by Mr. Franklin Haven, a personal friend of twenty years' standing,
when he insisted upon holding the Motley incident as the topic of
conversation. On one of these occasions, and in excitement, he turned
to me and said: "Boutwell, you ought to have resigned when Motley
was removed."

I said only in reply: "I am the custodian of my own duty."

This was the only personal remark that I ever made to Mr. Sumner in
connection with the removal of Motley. The removal was the only
reasonable solution of the difficulty in which Motley was involved;
but I sympathized with him in the disaster which had overtaken him,
and I was not disposed to discuss the subject. The incident at the
dinner led me to make a resolution. I called upon Mr. Sumner, and
without accepting a seat, I said: "Senator, if you ever mention
General Grant's name in my presence, I will never again cross your
threshold."

Without the delay of half a minute he said: "Agreed."

There the matter ended, and the promise was kept. In 1872, and not
many days before he left for Europe, he said: "I want to ask you a
question about General Grant."

I said: "You know that that is a forbidden topic."

"Yes, but I am not going to speak controversially."

I said: "Say on."

He said: "What do you think of Grant's election?"

I said: "I think he will be elected."

He held up his hands, and in a tone of grief said: "You and Wilson
are the only ones who tell me that he has any chance."

Upon his return from Europe it was apparent that his feelings in
regard to the Republican Party, and especially in regard to General
Grant, had undergone a great change. Our conversations concerning
General Grant were resumed free from all restrictions, and without
any disturbance of feeling on my part. Not many months before his
death Mr. Sumner made a speech in executive session that was
conciliatory and just in a marked degree. I urged him to repeat it
in public session. He seemed to regard the suggestion with favor, but
the speech was not made.

For many years Mr. Sumner had been borne down under the resolutions of
censure passed by the State of Massachusetts in disapproval of his
position in regard to the return of Confederate flags. That resolution
was rescinded at the winter session of 1874. The act brought to Mr.
Sumner the highest degree of satisfaction that it was possible for him
to realize. Above all things else of a public nature, he cherished
the good name of the commonwealth, and for himself there was nothing
more precious than her approval. The blow was unexpected, its weight
was great, and its weight was never lessened until it was wholly
removed. The rescinding resolutions came to me the Saturday next
preceding the Wednesday when Mr. Sumner died. I was then in ill
health, so ill that my attendance at the Senate did not exceed one
half of each day's session through many weeks. Mr. Sumner called upon
me to inquire, and anxious to know, whether I could attend the session
of Monday and present the resolutions. I gave him the best assurance
that my condition permitted. When the resolutions had been presented,
and when I was leaving the chamber, Mr. Sumner came to me, and, putting
his arm over my shoulder, he walked with me into the lobby, where,
after many thanks by him, and with good wishes for my health, we
parted, without a thought by me that he had not before him many years
of rugged life. For several years previous to 1874, Mr. Sumner had
been accustomed to speak of himself as an old man, and on more than one
occasion he spoke of life as a burden. To these utterances I gave but
little heed.

The chief assurance for any considerable well-doing in the world is to
be found in good purposes and in fixedness of purpose when a purpose
has been formed. These characteristics were Mr. Sumner's possession,
but in him they were subject to very important limitations as powers in
practical affairs. He did not exhibit respect or deference for the
opinions of others even when the parties were upon a plane of equality,
as is the usual situation in legislative bodies. He could not concede
small points for the sake of a great result. Hence it was that
measures in which he had an interest took on a form at the end that
was not agreeable to him. Hence it is that he has left only one piece
of legislation that is distinctly the work of his hand. When the bill
was under consideration which denied to colored persons the privilege
of naturalization in the United States, he secured an amendment by
which the exclusion was limited to the Mongolian race. His
declaration as to the status of the States that had been in rebellion
was not far away from the policy that was adopted finally, but he did
not accept as wise and necessary measures the amendments to the
Constitution which were designed to make that policy permanent.
Indeed, it was his opinion, at one period of the controversy over the
question of negro suffrage, that a legislative declaration would be
sufficient. The field of his success is to be found in the
argumentative power that he possessed and in its use for the overthrow
of slavery. Of the anti-slavery advocates who entered the Senate
previous to the opening of the war, he was the best equipped in
learning, and his influence in the country was not surpassed by the
influence of any one of his associates. In his knowledge of diplomacy,
he had the first rank in the Senate for the larger part of his career.
His influence in the Senate was measured, however, by his influence in
the country. His speeches, especially in the period of national
controversy, were addressed _to_ the country. He relied upon
authorities and precedents. His powers as a debater were limited, and
it followed inevitably that in purely parliamentary contests he was
not a match for such masters as Fessenden and Conkling, who in learning
were his inferiors.

My means for information are so limited that I do not express an
opinion upon the question whether Mr. Sumner's ambitions in public life
were or were not gratified. On one or two occasions he let fall
remarks which indicated a willingness to be transferred to the
Department of State. Major Ben. Perley Poore had received the
impression that there was a time when Mr. Sumner looked to the
Presidency as a possibility. At an accidental meeting with Major
Poore, he said to me: "I have dined with Sumner, and he gave me an
account of the conversation he had with you this morning, in which you
consoled him for not gaining the Presidency."

I recalled the conversation. It was a Sunday-morning talk, and there
was no special purpose on my part, however my remarks may have been
received by Mr. Sumner. He spoke of the opportunity furnished to Mr.
Jefferson for the exposition of his views in his first inaugural
address. I then proceeded to say that, omitting the incumbent of the
office, of whom nothing could then be said, not more than three or four
men had gained in standing by their elevation to the Presidency, beyond
the fact that their names were upon the roll. The exceptions were,
first of all, Lincoln, who had gained most. Then Jackson, who had
gained something--indeed, a good deal by his defence of the Union when
compared with what he might have lost by neglect of duty in the days of
nullification. Washington had gained much by demonstrating his
capacity for civil affairs, by the legacy of his farewell address,
and by the shaping of the new government under the Constitution in a
manner calculated to strengthen the quality of perpetuity. At the end,
I claimed that the other occupants of the Presidential office had not
gained appreciably by their promotion.

In two important particulars, Samuel Adams and Charles Sumner are
parallel characters in American history. Mr. Adams was a leader in
the contest that the colonies carried on against Great Britain. Our
legal standing in the controversy with the mother country has never
elsewhere been presented as forcibly and logically as it was stated by
Mr. Adams in his letters to the royal governors in the name of the
Massachusetts House of Representatives, between the years 1764 and
1775. When the contest of words and of arms was over he was not
only not an aid in the organization of the new Government, but he was
an obstacle to its success. He accepted the Constitution with
hesitation and under constraint. After the overthrow of slavery and
the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, Mr.
Sumner gave no wise aid to the work of reconstructing the government
upon the basis of the new conditions that had been created by the war
and by the abolition of slavery. As every guarantee for freedom
contains some element of enslavement over or against some who are not
within the guarantee, men sometimes hesitate as to the wisdom of
accepting guarantees of rights in one direction which work a limitation
of rights or privileges in other directions. The Constitution of the
United States, while it gave power to the body of States and guaranteed
security to each yet deprived the individual States of many of the
privileges and powers that they had enjoyed as colonies. Every
amendment to the Constitution, from the first to the last, has limited
the application of the doctrine of home rule in government.

Upon the election of Mr. Wilson to the office of Vice-President, I was
chosen by the Legislature of Massachusetts as his successor in the
Senate. I left the Treasury and General Grant's Cabinet with
reluctance, but my experience in both branches of the government had
led me to prefer the legislative branch, where there is at least more
freedom of action than can be had in the executive department. This
opinion is in no sense due to the nature of my relations with General
Grant. His military habits led him to put responsibility upon
subordinates and this habit he carried into civil affairs.

Moreover, in my own case, he recognized that fact that I had accepted
the place upon his urgent request, command indeed, and not to gratify
any ambition of my own. And further, I think I may assume, that his
confidence was such that he was content to leave the department in my
hands. During my time he put only one person--General Pleasanton--
into the department, and he never commanded or required the removal of
any one. On a few occasions he named persons whom he said he would be
glad to have employed if places could be found. They were always
soldiers, or widows or children of soldiers, and he never forgot his
suggestions, nor allowed the passage of time to diminish his interest
in such cases.

The important places in New York, Chicago, St. Louis, Cincinnati, New
Orleans and Philadelphia were filled by him, usually upon consultation,
but upon his judgment. He gave very little attention to others beyond
signing the commissions. I often called his attention to the more
important ones, but it was his practice to send applicants and their
friends to me with the remark that the business was in my hands.

By this course the President avoided much labor, and escaped some
responsibility. The disappointed ones charged their misfortunes to
the Secretary, and the President was able to say that he knew nothing
of the case, etc., etc.

I have reason to believe that the President did not exhibit equal
confidence in my successors, especially in Mr. Bristow. The President
received the impression very early, that Bristow was engaged in a
scheme to secure the nomination by an alliance with the enemies of
General Grant. In my time three Secretaries of the Treasury attempted
in turn to secure a nomination for the Presidency through the influence
and patronage of that department. All were failures, and failures well
deserved.

Such a policy breeds corruption inevitably. Venal men aspiring to
place, avow themselves the friends of the Secretary, and if through
such avowals they secure appointments, the offices will be used for
improper purposes.

My successor, Judge Richardson, had been Assistant Secretary for three
years and more, and no one could have surpassed him in industry,
fidelity and knowledge of the business. I recommended his appointment.
The President hesitated, but he finally nominated him to the Senate,
and the nomination was confirmed.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL GRANT UPON MY RESIGNATION OF THE OFFICE OF
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

WASHINGTON,
_March_ 17, 1873.

SIR:
Having been elected to the Senate of the United States by the
Legislature of Massachusetts, I tender my resignation of the office of
Secretary of the Treasury.

In severing my official relations with you it is a great satisfaction
to me that on all occasions you have given me full confidence and
support in the discharge of my public duties.

In these four years my earlier acquaintance with you has ripened into
earnest personal friendship, which, I am confident, will remain
unbroken. I am
Yours very truly,
GEO. S. BOUTWELL.
TO THE PRESIDENT.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, _March_ 17, 1873.

HON. GEO. S. BOUTWELL,
_Dear Sir:_--
In accepting your resignation of the office of Secretary of the
Treasury, an office which you have filled for four years with such
satisfaction to the country, allow me to express the regret I feel at
severing official relations which have been at all times so agreeable
to me, and,--as I am assured by your letter of resignation,--to you
also. Your administration of the important trust confided to you
four years since, has been so admirably conducted as to give the
greatest satisfaction to me because as I read public judgment and
opinion it has been satisfactory to the country. The policy pursued in
the office of Secretary of the Treasury by your successor I hope may
be as successful as yours has been, and that no departure from it
will be made except such as experience and change of circumstances
may make necessary.

Among your new official associates I trust you will find the same warm
friends and co-workers that you leave in the Executive branch of the
government.

You take with you my most sincere well wishes for your success as a
legislator and as a citizen, and the assurance of my desire to continue
the warm personal relations that have existed between us during the
whole of our official connection.
Very truly yours,
U. S. GRANT.

XXXVIII
GENERAL GRANT AS A STATESMAN*

General Grant's father was a Whig and an admirer and supporter of Mr.
Clay. The public policy of Mr. Clay embraced three great measures:
First, a national bank, or a fiscal agency as an aid to the Treasury
in the collection and disbursement of the public revenues; secondly,
a system of internal improvements to be created at the public expense
and controlled by the National Government; and, thirdly, a tariff
system which should protect the American laborer against the active
competition of the laborers of other countries who were compelled to
work for smaller compensation.

From the year 1834 to the year 1836 the country was engaged in an
active controversy over the policy of the Whig Party, of which Mr.
Clay was then the recognized head. Indeed, the controversy began as
early as the year 1824, and it contributed, more than all other causes,
to the new organization of parties under the leadership, respectively,
of Mr. Clay and General Jackson.

General Grant was educated under these influences, and in the belief
that the policy of the Whig Party would best promote the prosperity
of the country. Those early impressions ripened into opinions, which
he held and on which he acted during his public life. It happened
by the force of circumstances that the Republican Party was compelled
to adopt the policy of Mr. Clay--not in measures, but in the ideas on
which his policy was based. It is not now necessary to inquire
whether the weight of argument was with Mr. Clay or with his opponents.
The war made inevitable the adoption of a policy which Mr. Clay had
advocated as expedient and wise.

The Pacific Railways were built by the aid of the Government and under
the pressure of a general public opinion that the East must be brought
into a more intimate connection with our possessions on the Pacific
Ocean, for mutual support and for the common defence.

The national banking system was established for the purpose of securing
the aid of the banks as purchasers and negotiators of the bonds of the
Government, at a time when the public credit was so impaired that it
seemed impossible to command the funds necessary for the prosecution
of the war.

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25