Charles Lamb and Mary Lamb - "Tales from Shakespeare"

S.D. Gordon - "Quiet Talks on Power"

Bernie Babcock - "The Coming of the King"

Samuel Pegge - "The Forme of Cury"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 2

G >> George S. Boutwell >> Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 2




The records of the Treasury Department show that on the 23rd day of
December, 1869, I sent to General Schenck of the House, a draught of a
bill for refunding the Public Debt. The same records show that on the
19th of January, 1870, I sent to Senator Sherman eight copies of a
bill. These bills were framed in conformity to the plan marked out in
my report of December, 1869. Previous to the preparation of that
report I had not any conference with any member of Congress nor with
any other person in regard to the details of the scheme.

On the 12th of July, 1870, Mr. Sumner introduced a bill for refunding
the Pubic Debt (Sen. S. 80). As might have been expected it was not
a practical measure, and on the 3rd day of the following February Mr.
Sherman reported the bill of Mr. Sumner in a new draught. A single
copy of that bill is on file in the office of the secretary of the
Senate, and no other copy can be found.

This bill conforms to my report, and upon my recollection it is the
bill as prepared by me. The division of the loan conforms to my
recommendation in the report, and it provides that the interest may be
made payable abroad. Subsequently these provisions were changed.
General Schenck had then recently returned from Europe and he was of
the opinion that the loan could all be negotiated at four or four and
one half per cent and it was this opinion on his part which led to
delays. The bill was not passed till July, 1870, at the very moment
when the Franco-Prussian War opened. Had the bill been passed in
March, quite large negotiations could have been made in April of that
year. But the sale of the new five per cent bonds was an undertaking
of great difficulty. It is now impossible to realize that a six per
cent bond was not worth par in 1869-'70. At that time the leading
bankers of the world were unwilling to engage in the undertaking. The
Rothschilds and Barings stood aloof. The Amsterdam bankers wrote
letters of inquiry, but they did nothing more. Mr. Morton, of the firm
of Morton, Bliss & Co., New York, was inclined to engage in the
business, but his partner, Mr. Bliss was doubtful of the success of
the scheme, and they therefore stood aside when the first negotiations
were attempted. Finally an arrangement was made with Jay Cooke & Co.,
by which they advertised what was called a popular loan, asking for a
subscription to the five per cent bonds.

Subsequently I advised Congress to issue four per cent fifty year bonds
as a basis of the banking system, coupled with an offer to the existing
banks of a preference, but in case any bank should refuse to exchange
the bonds then held by such bank, its charter after one year should be
annulled and its banking privileges should be open to any other
association that would purchase the four per cent bonds. This
proposition aroused the hostility of the national banks and forthwith
the city was invaded by bank officers and agents who succeeded in
defeating the bill.

I had early foreseen that the Public Debt could be paid without much
delay, and without a system of oppressive taxation. In July, 1863, in
the introduction to my volume on the tax system of the country, I had
predicted that the revenues would be equal to the payment of interest
on a debt twice as large as the Public Debt then was, together with
large annual payments of principal. I predicted also that these
payments would menace the national banking system. My scheme looked
for the perpetuation of that system for fifty years at least. The
banks looked upon the scheme as a hostile project and they were
therefore led to defeat a measure which in fact was liberal in the
extreme. At that time the capital of all the national banks was
limited to three hundred million dollars. Thus did the banks defeat a
measure which was designed to secure their perpetuity and calculated
to promote their financial interests. They acted upon the idea that
the credit of the country could never be so far advanced that a four
per cent bond would be worth par.

The success of the five per cent loan of 1871, of which I give a full
account elsewhere, should have ended the contest in regard to the
credit of the United States. A five per cent bond had been sold at par
in the London market. The principal of the Public Debt was undergoing
a monthly reduction and the gain in the interest account was sufficient
to guarantee the payment of the principal in half a century. From that
time forward, the leading bankers of Europe and American were ready to
co-operate in placing the remaining five per cents, and then the four
and a half and four per cents.

From that time forward the credit of the Government has been improving
constantly. It was no longer difficult to borrow money at the rate of
five per cent, and with the adjustment of our controversy with Great
Britain there remained no reason to question the rapid progress of the
United States in wealth and population. Indeed, it was then entirely
feasible for the Government to have resumed specie payments, as any
demand upon the Treasury for gold could have been met with proceeds of
bonds sold in Europe. It was my opinion, however, that it would be
wiser to delay resumption until the balance of trade should be so much
in our favor that specie payments could be maintained by our own
resources. And this was accomplished in less than six years. It is
with a state as it is with an individual. With an established credit,
or with a credit improving constantly and an income in excess of
expenditures, there is no difficulty in meeting all liabilities as
they mature. Such was the condition of the Treasury when I left it in
March, 1873. In March, 1869, the Government was paying interest,
measured at the gold value of its securities at the rate of seven per
cent. In 1873 the rate was five per cent or less. In that time the
net Public Debt had been reduced in the sum of three hundred and sixty-
four million dollars, and the interest account had been reduced about
thirty million dollars.

When I was engaged in placing bonds in Europe, a discussion arose among
bankers in regard to the conflict of statements as to the amount of the
Public Debt. By the reports of the Treasurer, which were the basis of
the monthly statements, the debt was represented by the securities
actually issued after deducting those which had been redeemed. By the
report from the Registrar's Office which once each year corresponded
in time to the monthly report, the balance was widely different. These
facts impaired our standing financially. Upon the register's books the
Government was charged with every issue that passed out of his office,
and it was days, usually, and not infrequently it was weeks, before the
securities passed from the Treasury into the hands of creditors or
purchasers of securities. On the other hand the Treasurer would be
entitled to credit for redemptions made days or weeks before the
evidence of such payments would appear on the register's books. An
analogous fact exists in the discrepancy between a depositor's account
with his bank and the account at the bank as long as there are
outstanding checks. The books would not agree and yet each might be
accurate. As it was a necessity of the situation that the business
of the Treasury should proceed day by day without interruption and it
was difficult to explain the discrepancy to the many inquirers, I
ordered Mr. Allison, the register, to accept for his annual reports the
statement of the Treasurer, as his statements conformed to the existing
facts on the days when the statements were made. The register
protested that the order was not justified by the law, and that was
the truth although there was no law forbidding such an act. The
transaction, including my order, was brought before a committee of the
House of Representatives, but as far as I know, the question of the
legality of the proceedings, was not canvassed, or if attention was
directed to the subject the committee may have treated it as an act in
the public interest and from which no injury had arisen. Upon these
facts, Senator Henry G. Davis, of West Virginia, made the charge that
the books of the Treasury had been altered by my direction and that it
was possible that some great fraud had been perpetrated which might be
discovered if a committee were appointed to investigate the Treasury.
A committee was granted, of which Senator Davis was a member. The
investigation was a failure from his standpoint. Indeed, the
alteration of the books of the Treasury would required the collusive
co-operation of many persons, and evidence of the fact of the
alteration would, of necessity, become known to hundreds of clerks.

Mr. Davis and some other Democrats implicated me in an analogous matter
which they tried to understand but did not. The Loan Accounts of the
Treasury Department showed that the payments on the Public Debt
exceeded the receipts from loans in the enormous sum of one hundred and
sixteen million dollars. I appointed a committee of clerks to examine
the account in detail for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
discrepancy was real or only apparent. The fact of the discrepancy was
reported to Congress and the progress made in the investigation was
noted in the appendix to the Annual Reports. It is probable, however,
that these reports were never seen by Mr. Davis, and hence his
suspicion that an investigation into the accuracy of the Treasury
accounts would show an alteration of Treasury books, and of course, for
some improper purpose.

The error began in Mr. Hamilton's time, and in consequence of the
assumption of the State debts. Bonds were issued for those debts but
there were no receipts paid into the Treasury, and consequently the
debit side of the account was a blank. When the bonds were paid the
payment became a credit on the loan account. In after times bonds were
issued and sold below par. The account was charged with the receipts
and upon payment the loan account was credited with the full amount
paid. In some cases the discrepancy was augmented by the purchase of
bonds and the payment of a premium, as was done in the second term of
General Jackson. The investigation showed that the discrepancy was
only apparent, and the criticisms and complaints ceased.

During my administration of the Treasury Department, the government of
the Territory of Alaska was in my hands. The legislation of Congress
was brief and indefinite and the only officers were collectors of
customs, treasury agents and the revenue cutter officials. The
principal topics of thought were the exclusion of liquors and firearms
and the protection of the fur seal fishery. During the session of the
Forty-first Congress a bill was passed which required the Secretary to
lease the seal fishery to the best bidder, with a preference to the
company which was then engaged in the fishery. On the question of the
nature of the preference I took the opinion of the Attorney-General in
advance of the contract. At that time I was opposed to any system of
leasing and I so advised the House of Representatives in a report upon
the subject. Congress, however, adopted the system of leasing and upon
experience that system was shown to be more advantageous to the
country. The value of the fur seal fishery depends upon the market for
the dressed furs, and the value of the dressed furs depends upon the
fashions, and the fashions are manipulated by the producers of the
varied competing goods. The Government could never engage in the
business of promoting fashions and training the markets. Fur seal
skins have only a moderate commercial value when the fashion is not
with them.

The question of the claim on Behring Sea was not then much considered.
By the law of nations it is difficult to maintain the position that
that vast body of salt water can be treated as a closed sea, but there
are peculiarities which distinguish it from other bodies of water as
the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, which are partially
enclosed.

Russia for a long time was the possessor of the adjacent mainland and
of the islands which mark the limits and in a degree enclose the sea.
That country claimed jurisdiction over the water. That claim was
known and its validity was not disputed seriously. By the treaty
Russia ceded about one half of the sea to the United States. Russia
and the United States are the countries directly interested. England
has no territorial rights and therefore she has no interest that is
not common to other nations. The United States and Russia are
interested in the seal fishery which can be preserved only by the
protection of the animals in Behring Sea. It may be claimed fairly
that Russia and the United State have property in these animals due to
the fact that they gather upon the territory of the countries at
certain seasons of the year. At other seasons they roam over the water
as other animals roam over the land. They are, at least, partially
domesticated. They are accustomed to the presence of the inhabitants
of the islands which they occupy as breeding grounds and which they
visit annually. Moreover, England has an interest in the preservation
of the fishery. The skins are dressed in London, and thus far no one
has been found, either in Europe or in the United States, who can
compete with the London workmen. For the purpose of protecting and
preserving the seal fishery, Behring Sea ought to be treated as a
closed sea. For general commercial purposes it may be used as other
parts of the ocean are used.

At a time, while I was Secretary of the Treasury, when I was detained
at my lodgings by a slight illness, I received a visit from William E.
Dodge a New York merchant and an importer of tin, whom I had known some
years before when I was a member of Congress. He said that he had
called to see me in regard to charges against his house preferred by
the revenue officers relating to the importation of tin. I said, what
was true, that I had not heard of the charges and that I had never
suspected his house of any wrong-doing in their business. His
statement in reply was a great surprise to me. He said that if there
was anything which appeared to be wrong, or that was in fact a
violation of law, the error or wrong was unintentional--that he and his
partners intended to act always in good faith. He then stated that
the claim amounted to more than two hundred thousand dollars, and he
proposed then and there to pay the amount claimed, coupled, however,
with the condition that the payment should be kept secret. I replied
that I could not take the money upon such terms and that secrecy was
impossible. Upon his statement there were three persons besides
ourselves who had knowledge of the existence of the charges and the
payment of money must come to the knowledge of the Treasury officials.
I then said:

"Mr. Dodge, you cannot afford to pay this money. If you are innocent
you should contest the matter in the courts, and if you convince the
judge, even if you are technically wrong, that there was no intent to
defraud the Government the Secretary can remit all the penalty, leaving
you to pay the duty." His counsel, if they were competent, must have
given him similar advice and yet he paid voluntarily, about two hundred
and seventy-six thousand dollars to the officials in New York, of
which he and his friends proceeded to complain. There was a suit, but
it was the duty of the firm to contest the claim of the Government,
if they had a defence. And if they had had a defence they were in no
danger even if they had violated the law ignorantly, for no Secretary
would have allowed honest men to suffer for an ignorant violation of
the revenue laws. Senator Edmunds placed upon the records of the
Senate a full statement of the case.


XXXIV
THE MINT BILL AND THE "CRIME OF 1873"

Of the many measures of my administration of the Treasury Department,
the Mint Bill of 1873 is the only one which has been made a party
issue, and which has entered permanently into the policy of the
country.

In the month of March, in the year 1869, I came to the head of the
Treasury Department. At an early day my attention was directed to
the disordered condition of the mint service, which was then, as it
ever had been, without a responsible head. The proceedings at the
mints were unsystematic, and I resolved upon an attempt to codify the
laws and to place the administration in the hands of a recognized,
responsible officer. President Grant appointed John Jay Knox
comptroller of the currency. For many years Mr. Knox had held the
office of deputy comptroller. He had been a careful, constant student,
and he was already a recognized authority in financial matters.

I appointed Mr. Knox commissioner to codify the mint laws and to
suggest alterations. He was assisted by Dr. Linderman, then an eminent
expert in the theory and practice of coinage, by Mr. Patterson,
superintendent of the mint at Philadelphia, and by others.

When the codification of the laws relating to the mint service had been
completed the statute, as passed, contained seventy-one sections,
including a number of new provisions. The political and personal
controversy of twenty years and more was directed to a single section,
which was in these words: "No coins, either of gold, silver, or minor
coinage, shall hereafter be issued from the mints other than those of
the denominations, standards and weights herein set forth." The
coinage of the silver dollar piece was discontinued in the bill as
prepared by the commissioners and the purpose to discontinue its
coinage was thus announced in the report that was made to Congress:

"The coinage of the silver dollar piece, the history of which is here
given, is discontinued in the proposed bill. . . . The present gold
dollar piece is made the dollar unit in the proposed bill, and the
silver piece is discontinued."

In 1873 I had come to believe that it was wise for every nation to
recognize, establish, and maintain the gold standard. I was of the
opinion then, as I am of the opinion now, that nations cannot escape
from the gold standard in all inter-state transactions. The value of
every article is resolved finally by the ascertainment of its value
in gold. Silver or paper may be used for domestic purposes, but the
value of that silver or paper is determined by its value in gold.

In America, as in England, all the attempts to fix a ratio between
gold and silver coins and to maintain that ratio in business had
failed, and hence it was that I determined to abandon the idea of a
double standard, reserving in mind, however, the possibility that an
agreement by commercial countries might overcome the difficulty. That
possibility has now disappeared. The history of the United States is
an instructive history. The coin ratio between gold and silver was
fixed in Mr. Hamilton's time and with the concurrence of Mr. Jefferson.

In 1870 silver was at a premium upon the legal ratio between gold and
silver coins, and such had been the fact from the year 1837, and
probably from the year 1792. Indeed, there has never been a day,
from the organization of the government, when the actual standard was
silver. Until the act of 1878 was passed, silver coins had had no
appreciable influence upon the volume of currency or the business of
the country. The total coinage of silver dollars had been 8,000,000
pieces only. The coinage was suspended in 1805 or 1806, and the silver
dollars had been exported or they had disappeared in melting pots.
Such was the commercial demand for American silver coins that in 1853
Congress authorized the debasement of the subsidiary silver coins as
the only means of securing their circulation.

It is quite doubtful whether in the year 1860 there was a person living
who had seen an American silver dollar doing duty in the channels of
trade. From 1806 to 1873 the business standard of the country was the
gold standard. Silver had been recognized in the Coinage Act, but
practically it had not played any part in the financial policy or
fortunes of the country.

The choice of gold as the standard was not due to hostility to silver
or to the silver mining interests, but to the well grounded opinion
that gold was a universal currency, while in some countries, as in
England and Germany, silver coins were not a debt-paying currency.

These--within the limits of a statement--are the reasons for the
demonetization of the silver dollar and the adoption of the single gold
standard. The measure was in accord with my policy, and it was in
accord with the unbiased judgment of the commission.

It is a singular instance in legislative proceedings that a measure
that had no active support and that was free from opposition at its
enactment should be assailed vigorously after the lapse of years and
through a long period of time. The measure was soon followed by the
depreciation of silver and coincident with that change came the
attacks upon the Mint Bill, and the denunciation of the "Crime of 1873."

The charges were two:

First: The authors of the change had been corrupted by English gold
through one Ernest Seyd, a writer on economic topics. It was alleged
that Seyd came to this country at the time when the measure was under
consideration. Seyd was not living when the charges were made, but the
fact of a visit to this country was denied by his son. Hon. Samuel
Hooper was chairman of the Committee on Coinage. In the search for
information Mr. Hooper invited Mr. Seyd to give him his opinion. Seyd
was a writer, a man of good reputation, and a bimetallist. In a letter
to Mr. Hooper, which is still in existence, and which is printed in the
_Congressional Record,_ Seyd condemned the demonetization of the silver
dollar. His letter was dated at London, February 17, 1872.

The second charge was secrecy. The answer to this charge was to be
found in historical facts.

The evidence is this: Mr. Knox's report contained two specific
statements that it was a purpose of the bill to prohibit the coinage
of the silver dollar; the report of the Secretary of the Treasury for
the year 1872 made a specific recommendation to that effect; the bill
was printed six times; it was considered in each House during the
Forty-first and Forty-second Congresses; the precise question in
controversy was the subject of discussion, and two years and ten months
were given to the consideration of the bill.

The bill was discussed in the House of Representatives. Mr. Reed has
stated that the report of the debate covers one hundred and ninety-six
columns of the _Congressional Record_. Senator Jones, in his report
of 1876, as chairman of the Silver Commission, refers to the debate in
these words: "In the brief discussion on the bill in the House of
Representatives, the principal reason assigned in favor of those
sections which interdicted the future coinage of the silver dollar was
that its value was three per cent greater than the value of the gold
dollar." Thus Senator Jones admits that the debate in the House of
Representatives was upon the question of the abolition of the silver
dollar, and he recognizes his knowledge of the fact of the debate.

Finally the bill passed the Senate without one dissenting vote.

The downfall of silver has not been due to any legislation in America
or Europe, nor to any decrees or despotic policy in Asia, but to the
inventive faculties of one Charles Burleigh, of Fitchburg,
Massachusetts, the inventor of the power drill.

If through him many silver mines have been rendered valueless, so it
is to him that the world is indebted for a new application of force by
which mountains are penetrated and mining in all its forms is carried
on at one fourth part of the former cost. Every step in civilization,
every advance movement that we call progress, is a peril to many and a
ruin to some. By one stroke of genius, and limiting our thoughts to
one only of its many consequences we may say that Burleigh has made
gold so abundant and cheap that all substitutes for a currency from
wampum to silver must soon disappear.

There is historical evidence tending to show that the representatives
of the silver mining interest had sufficient and worthy reasons for
assenting to the suspension of the silver dollar. In 1872 silver was
at a slight premium as compared with gold. Therefore the privilege of
coinage of the dollar was of no advantage to the owners of bullion.

The Mint Bill had a new and attractive feature. It provided for the
coinage of a dollar that was to contain 420 grains of standard silver,
and was to be known as the trade dollar.

This passage may be found in my report to Congress for the year 1872:

"Therefore, in renewing the recommendations heretofore made for the
passage of the Mint Bill, I suggest such alterations as will prohibit
the coinage of silver for circulation in this country, but that
authority be given for the coinage of a silver dollar that shall be as
valuable as the Mexican dollar and to be furnished at its actual cost."

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