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This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Under Wellington\'s Command

G >> G. A. Henty >> Under Wellington\'s Command




"That is something like news, Colonel," Macwitty exclaimed. "It
will cut the French off from this line of retreat, altogether, and
they must either fall back by the line of the Tagus, or through
Badajoz and Merida."

Terence laughed.

"You are counting your chickens before they are hatched, Macwitty.
At the present moment, it seems more likely that Wellington will
have to embark his troops than that Massena will have to retreat.
He must have nearly a hundred thousand men, counting those who
fought with him at Busaco and the two divisions that marched down
through Foz d'Aronce; while Wellington, all told, cannot have above
40,000. Certainly some of the peasants told me they had heard that
a great many men were employed in fortifying the heights of Torres
Vedras, and Wellington may be able to make a stand there; but as we
have never heard anything about them before, I am afraid that they
cannot be anything very formidable.

"However, just at present we have nothing to do with that. If we
can take Coimbra it will certainly hamper Massena and, if the worst
comes to the worst, we can fall back across the Douro.

"Don't let the bugles sound in the morning. It is not likely, but
it is possible that the French may send out cavalry patrols at
night. If a bugle were heard they might ride back and report that a
force was in the neighbourhood, and we should find the garrison
prepared for us. Now we had better do no more talking. It is past
eleven, and we have but four and a half hours to sleep."

At half-past three the troops were roused. They were surprised at
the early call, for they had expected two or three days' rest,
after the heavy work of the last eight days; but the company
officers soon learned the news from their majors and, as it quickly
spread through the ranks, the men were at once alert and ready.
Fording the river, they marched at a rapid pace by the road to
Coimbra and, soon after five o'clock, arrived within a few hundred
yards of the town. Then they were halted and broken up into four
columns, which were to enter the town at different points. The
signal for moving was to be the sound of a body of cavalry,
galloping along the road. Terence listened attentively for the
rattle of musketry in the distance, but all was quiet; and he had
little doubt that the French had been surprised, and captured,
without a shot being fired.

Soon after half-past five he heard a dull sound which, before long,
grew louder and, in five minutes, a body of horsemen swept past at
a gallop. The troops at once got into motion, and entered the town.
There was no longer any motive for concealment. The bugles sounded
and, with loud shouts, the Portuguese ran forward. French officers
ran out of private houses, and were at once seized and captured.
Several bodies of troops were taken, in public buildings, before
they were fairly awake. Some of the inhabitants--of whom many,
unable to make their escape, had remained behind; or who had
returned from the villages to which they had at first fled--came
out and acted as guides to the various buildings where the French
troops were quartered and, in little over a quarter of an hour, the
whole town, with the exception of the convent of Santa Clara, was
in their hands.

By this time Trant had come up, with his command. The troops
rapidly formed up again and, issuing from several streets, advanced
against the convent. The astonished enemy fired a few shots; then,
on being formally summoned to surrender, laid down their arms.
Thus, on the third day after Massena quitted the Mondego his
hospitals, depots, and nearly 6000 prisoners, wounded and
unwounded, among them a company of the Imperial Guard, fell into
the hands of the Portuguese.

The next day Miller and Wilson came up; and their men, crossing the
bridge and spreading over the country, gathered in 300 more
prisoners; while Trant marched, with those he had captured, to
Oporto.

[Illustration: Plan of the Lines of Torres Vedras.]

On the 10th of October the whole of Wellington's army was safely
posted on the tremendously strong position that he had, unknown to
the army, carefully prepared and fortified for the protection of
Lisbon. It consisted of three lines of batteries and intrenchments.
The second was the most formidable; but the first was so strong,
also, that Wellington determined to defend this, instead of falling
back to the stronger line. At the foot of the line of mountains on
which the army was posted, stretching from the Tagus to the sea,
ran two streams; the Zandre, a deep river, which extended nearly
halfway along the twenty-nine miles of lines, covered the left of
the position; while a stream running into the Tagus protected the
right. The centre, therefore, was almost the only part at which the
line could be attacked with any chance of success; and this was
defended by such tremendous fortifications as to be almost
impregnable.

Massena, who had only heard vague rumours of the existence of these
fortifications, four days before, was astounded at the unexpected
obstacle which barred his way. The British troops, as soon as they
arrived, were set to work to strengthen the intrenchments. Trees
were felled, and every accessible point was covered by formidable
abattis. The faces of the rocks were scarped, so that an enemy who
won his way partly up the hill would find his farther progress
arrested by a perpendicular wall of rock. Soon the eminences on the
crest bristled with guns; and Massena, after carefully reconnoitring
the whole position, came to the conclusion that it could not be
attacked; and disposed his troops in permanent positions, facing the
British centre and right, from Sobral to Villafranca on the Tagus;
and sent his cavalry out over the country, to bring in provisions.

To lessen the district available for this operation, Wellington
sent orders for the northern militia to advance and, crossing the
Mondego, to drive in the foraging parties. Trant, Wilson and the
other partisan corps were also employed in the work. A strong force
took up its position between Castello Branco and Abrantes, while
the militia and partisans occupied the whole country north of
Leiria; and the French were thus completely surrounded.
Nevertheless, the store of provisions left behind in the towns and
villages was so large that the French cavalry were able to bring in
sufficient supplies for the army.

During the week that followed, the Minho regiment was engaged in
watching the defiles by which Massena might communicate with Ciudad
Rodrigo, or through which reinforcements might reach him. Wilson
and Trant were both engaged on similar service, the one farther to
the north; while the other, who was on the south bank of the Tagus
with a number of Portuguese militia and irregulars, endeavoured to
prevent the French from crossing the river and carrying off the
flocks, herds, and corn which, in spite of Wellington's entreaties
and orders, the Portuguese government had permitted to remain, as
if in handiness for the French foraging parties.

Owing to the exhausted state of both the British and Portuguese
treasuries, it was impossible to supply the corps acting in rear of
the French with money for the purchase of food. But Terence had
received authority to take what provisions were absolutely
necessary for the troops, and to give orders that would, at some
time or other, be honoured by the military chest. A comparatively
small proportion of his men were needed to guard the defiles,
against such bodies of troops as would be likely to traverse them,
in order to keep up Massena's communications. Leaving, therefore, a
hundred men in each of the principal defiles; and ordering them to
entrench themselves in places where they commanded the road, and
could only be attacked with the greatest difficulty; while the road
was barred by trees felled across it, so as to form an impassable
abattis, behind which twenty men were stationed; Terence marched,
with 1500 men, towards the frontier.

Five hundred of these were placed along the Coa, guarding the roads
and, with the remainder, he forded the river and placed himself in
the woods, in the plain between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. Here he
captured several convoys of waggons, proceeding with provisions for
the garrison of the former place. A portion of these he despatched,
under guard, for the use of the troops on the Coa, and for those in
the passes; thus rendering it unnecessary to harass the people, who
had returned to their villages after Massena had advanced against
Lisbon.

Growing bolder with success, he crossed the Aqueda and, marching
round to the rear of Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off and destroyed convoys
intended for that town, causing great alarm to the garrison. These
were absolutely ignorant of the operations of Massena, for so
active were the partisans, in the French rear, that no single
messenger succeeded in getting through and, even when accompanied
by strong escorts, the opposition encountered was so determined
that the French were obliged to fall back, without having
accomplished their purpose. Thus, then, the garrison at Ciudad
Rodrigo were ignorant both of Massena's whereabouts, and of the
nature of the force that had thrown itself in his rear. Several
times, strong parties of troops were sent out. When these were
composed of cavalry only, they were boldly met and driven in. When
it was a mixed force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, they
searched in vain for the foe.

So seriously alarmed and annoyed was the governor that 3000 troops
were withdrawn, from Salamanca, to strengthen the garrison. In
December Massena, having exhausted the country round, fell back to
a very strong position at Santarem; and Terence withdrew his whole
force, save those guarding the defiles, to the neighbourhood of
Abrantes; so that he could either assist the force stationed there,
should Massena retire up the Tagus; and prevent his messengers
passing through the country between the river and the range of
mountains, south of the Alva, by Castello Branco or Velha; posting
strong parties to guard the fords of the Zezere.

So thoroughly was the service of watching the frontier line carried
out, that it was not until General Foy, himself, was sent off by
Massena, that Napoleon was informed of the state of things. He was
accompanied by a strong cavalry force and 4000 French infantry
across the Zezere, and ravaged the country for a considerable
distance.

Before such strength, Terence was obliged to fall back. Foy was
accompanied by his cavalry, until he had passed through Castello
Branco; and was then able to ride, without further opposition, to
Ciudad Rodrigo.

Beresford was guarding the line of the Tagus, between the mouth of
the Zezere and the point occupied on the opposite bank by
Wellington, sending a portion of his force up the Zezere; and these
harassed the French marauding parties, extending their devastations
along the line of the Mondego.

Although the Minho regiment had suffered some loss, during these
operations, their ranks were kept up to the full strength without
difficulty. Great numbers of the Portuguese army deserted during
the winter, owing to the hardships they endured, from want of food
and the irregularity of their pay. Many of these made for the Minho
regiment, which they had learned was well fed, and received their
pay with some degree of regularity, the latter circumstance being
due to the fact that Terence had the good luck to capture, with one
of the convoys behind Ciudad Rodrigo, a considerable sum of money
intended for the pay of the garrison. From this he had, without
hesitation, paid his men the arrears due to them; and had still
30,000 dollars, with which he was able to continue to feed and pay
them, after moving to the line of the Zezere.

He only enrolled sufficient recruits to fill the gaps made by war
and disease; refusing to raise the number above 2000, as this was
as many as could be readily handled; for he had found that the
larger number had but increased the difficulties of rationing and
paying them.



Chapter 12: Fuentes D'Onoro.


In the early spring Soult, who was besieging Cadiz, received orders
from Napoleon to cooperate with Massena and, although ignorant of
the latter's plans, and even of his position, prepared to do so at
once. He crushed the Spanish force on the Gebora; captured Badajoz,
owing to the treachery and cowardice of its commander; and was
moving north, when the news reached him that Massena was falling
back. The latter's position had, indeed, become untenable. His army
was wasted by sickness; and famine threatened it, for the supplies
obtainable from the country round had now been exhausted.
Wellington was, as he knew from his agents in the Portuguese
government, receiving reinforcements; and would shortly be in a
position to assume the offensive.

The discipline in the French army under Massena had been greatly
injured by its long inactivity. The only news he received as to
Soult's movements was that he was near Badajoz; therefore, the
first week in March he began his retreat, by sending off 10,000
sick and all his stores to Thomar. Then he began to fall back.
Thick weather favoured him, and Ney assembled a large force near
Leiria, as if to advance against the British position. Two other
corps left Santarem, on the night of the fifth, and retired to
Thomar. The rest of the army moved by other routes.

For four days Wellington, although discovering that a retreat was
in progress, was unable to ascertain by which line Massena was
really retiring. As soon as this point was cleared up, he ordered
Beresford to concentrate near Abrantes; while he himself followed
the line the main body of the French army seemed to be taking. It
was soon found that they were concentrating at Pombal, with the
apparent intention of crossing the Mondego at Coimbra; whereby they
would have obtained a fresh and formidable position behind the
Mondego, with the rich and untouched country between that river and
the Douro, upon which they could have subsisted for a long time.

Therefore, calling back the troops that were already on the march
to relieve Badajos, which had not yet surrendered, he advanced with
all speed upon Pombal, his object being to force the French to take
the line of retreat through Miranda for the frontier, and so to
prevent him from crossing the Mondego.

Ney commanded the rear guard, and carried out the operation with
the same mixture of vigour, valour, and prudence with which he,
afterwards, performed the same duty to the French army on its
retreat from Moscow. He fought at Pombal and at Redinha, and that
so strenuously that, had it not been for Trant, Wilson, and other
partisans who defended all the fords and bridges, Massena would
have been able to have crossed the Mondego. Wellington however
turned, one by one, the positions occupied by Ney; and Massena,
believing that the force at Coimbra was far stronger than it really
was, changed his plans and took up a position at Cazal Nova.

Here he left Ney and marched for Miranda but, although Ney covered
the movement with admirable skill, disputing every ridge and post
of vantage, the British pressed forward so hotly that Massena was
obliged to destroy all his baggage and ammunition. Ney rashly
remained on the east side of the river Cerra, in front of the
village of Foz d'Aronce and, being attacked suddenly, was driven
across the river with a loss of 500 men; many being drowned by
missing the fords, and others crushed to death in the passage.
However, Ney held the line of the river, blew up the bridge, and
his division withdrew in good order.

Massena tarnished the reputation, gained by the manner in which he
had drawn off his army from its dangerous position, by the ruthless
spirit with which the operation was conducted; covering his retreat
by burning every village through which he passed, and even ordering
the town of Leiria to be destroyed, although altogether out of the
line he was following.

After this fight the British pursuit slackened somewhat, for
Wellington received the news of the surrender of Badajoz and,
seeing that Portugal was thus open to invasion by Soult, on the
south, despatched Cole's division to join that of Beresford;
although this left him inferior in force to the army he was
pursuing. The advance was retarded by the necessity of making
bridges across the Cerra, which was now in flood, and the delay
enabled Massena to fall back unmolested to Guarda; where he
intended to halt, and then to move to Coria, whence he could have
marched to the Tagus, effected a junction with Soult, and be in a
position to advance again upon Lisbon, with a larger force than
ever. He had, however, throughout been thwarted by the factious
disobedience of his lieutenants Ney, Regnier, Brouet, Montbrun, and
Junot; and this feeling now broke into open disobedience and, while
Ney absolutely defied his authority, the others were so disobedient
that fierce and angry personal altercations took place.

Massena removed Ney from his command. His own movements were,
however, altogether disarranged by two British divisions, marching
over the mountains by paths deemed altogether impassable for
troops; which compelled him to abandon his intention of marching
south, and to retire to Sabuga on the Coa. Here he was attacked.
Regnier's corps, which covered the position, was beaten with heavy
loss but, owing to the combinations--which would have cut Massena
off from Ciudad Rodrigo--failing, from some of the columns going
altogether astray in a thick fog, Massena gained that town with his
army. He had lost in battle, from disease, or taken prisoners,
30,000 men since the day when, confident that he was going to drive
Wellington to take refuge on board his ships, he had advanced from
that town.

Even now he did not feel safe, though rejoined by a large number of
convalescents; and, drawing rations for his troops from the stores
of the citadel, he retired with the army to Salamanca. Having
reorganized his force, procured fresh horses for his guns, and
rested the troops for a few days; Massena advanced to cover Ciudad
Rodrigo, and to raise the siege of Almeida--which Wellington had
begun without loss of time--and, with upwards of 50,000 men,
Massena attacked the British at Fuentes d'Onoro.

[Illustration: Plan of the Battle of Fuentes d'Onoro.]

The fight was long and obstinate, and the French succeeded in
driving back the British right; but failed in a series of desperate
attempts to carry the village of Fuentes. Both sides claimed the
battle as a victory, but the British with the greater ground; for
Massena fell back across the Aqueda, having failed to relieve
Almeida; whose garrison, by a well-planned night march, succeeded
in passing through the besieging force, and effected their retreat
with but small loss, the town falling into the possession of the
British.

Terence had come up, after a series of long marches, on the day
before the battle. His arrival was very opportune, for the
Portuguese troops with Wellington were completely demoralized, and
exhausted, by the failure of their government to supply them with
food, pay, or clothes. So deplorable was their state that
Wellington had been obliged to disband the militia regiments, and
great numbers of desertions had taken place from the regular
troops.

The regiment had been stationed on the British right. Here the
fighting had been very severe. The French cavalry force was
enormously superior to the British, who had but a thousand troopers
in the field. These were driven back by the French, and Ramsay's
battery of horse artillery was cut off. But Ramsay placed himself
at the head of his battery and, at full gallop, dashed through the
French infantry and cavalry, and succeeded in regaining his
friends.

The two battalions of the Minho regiment, who were posted in a
wood, defended themselves with the greatest resolution against an
attack by vastly superior numbers; until the French, advancing on
each side of the wood, had cut them off from the rest of the
division. Then a bugle call summoned the men to assemble at the
rear of the wood and, forming squares, the two battalions marched
out.

Twelve French guns played upon them and, time after time, masses of
cavalry swept down on them but, filling up the gaps in their ranks,
they pressed on; charged two French regiments, at the double, that
endeavoured to block their way; burst a path through them, and
succeeded in rejoining the retiring division, which received them
with a burst of hearty cheering. Two hundred had fallen, in the
short time that had elapsed since they left the wood.

Terence had been in the centre of one of the squares but, just as
they were breaking through the French ranks, he had ridden to the
rear face; and called upon the men to turn and repulse a body of
French cavalry, that was charging down upon them. At this moment a
bullet struck his horse in the flank. Maddened with the sudden
pain, the animal sprang forward, broke through the ranks of the
Portuguese in front of it and, before Terence could recover its
command, dashed at full speed among the French cavalry. Before he
could strike a blow in defence, Terence was cut down. As he fell
the cavalry passed over him but, fortunately, the impetus of his
charge had carried him nearly through their ranks before he fell;
and the horses of the rear rank leapt over his body, without
touching him. It was the force of the blow that had felled him for,
in the hurry of striking, the trooper's sword had partly turned,
and it was with the flat rather than the edge that he was struck.

Although half stunned with the blow and the heavy fall, he did not
altogether lose consciousness. He heard, as he lay, a crashing
volley; which would, he felt sure, repulse the horsemen and,
fearing that in their retreat they might ride over him, trampling
him to death, he struggled to his feet. The French, however, though
repulsed, did not retire far, but followed upon the retreating
regiment until it joined the British; when a battery opened upon
them, and their commander called upon them to fall back. This was
done in good order, and at a steady trot.

On seeing Terence standing in their path, an officer rode up to
him.

"I surrender," Terence said.

A trooper was called out, and ordered to conduct him to the rear;
where many other prisoners, who had been taken during the French
advance, were gathered. Here an English soldier bound up Terence's
wound, from which the blood was streaming freely, a portion of the
scalp having been shorn clean off.

"That was a narrow escape, sir," the man said.

"Yes; I don't know how it was that it did not sever my skull; but I
suppose that it was a hasty blow, and the sword must have turned.
It might have been worse, by a good deal. I am afraid things are
going badly with us."

"Badly enough, here," the soldier said; "but I think we are holding
our own, in the centre. There is a tremendous roar of fire going
on, round that village there. I was captured half an hour ago, and
it has been growing louder and louder, ever since."

For another two hours the battle continued and, as it still centred
round the village, the spirits of the prisoners rose; for it was
evident that, although the right had been driven back, the centre
was at least holding its position, against all the efforts of the
French. In the afternoon the fire slackened, and only a few shots
were fired.

The next morning at daybreak the prisoners, 300 in number, were
marched away under a strong escort. Both armies still occupied the
same positions they had held the day before, and there seemed every
probability of the battle being renewed. When, however, they had
marched several miles, and no sound of heavy firing was heard, the
prisoners concluded that either Wellington had retired; or that
Massena, seeing his inability to drive the British from their
position, intended himself to fall back upon Ciudad.

The convoy marched twenty miles, and then halted for the night. Two
hours after they did so a great train of waggons containing wounded
came up, and halted at the same place. The wounded were lifted out
and laid on the ground, where the surgeons attended to the more
serious cases.

"Pardon, monsieur," Terence said in French, to one of the doctors
who was near him, "are there any of our countrymen among the
wounded?"

"No, sir, they are all French," the doctor replied.

"That is a good sign," Terence said, to an English officer who was
standing by him when he asked the question.

"Why so, Colonel?"

"Because, if Massena intended to attack again tomorrow, he would
have sent the British wounded back, as well as his own men. The
French, like ourselves, make no distinction between friends and
foes; and that he has not sent them seems, to me, to show that he
intends himself to fall back, and to leave the British wounded to
the care of their own surgeons, rather than embarrass himself with
them."

"Yes, I have no doubt that is the case," the officer said. "It
seems, then, that we must have won the day, after all. That is some
comfort, anyhow, and I shall sleep more soundly than I expected. If
we had been beaten, there would have been nothing for it but for
the army to fall back again to the lines of Torres Vedras; and
Wellington would have had to fight very hard to regain them. If
Massena does fall back, Almeida will have to surrender."

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