G. E. Farrow - "The Jungle Baby"

Gottfried Keller - "Die Leute von Seldwyla, Vol. 1"

G. A. Henty - "Through Three Campaigns"

Thomas Babington Macaulay - "The History of England from the Accession of James II, Vol. 3"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Ethics

A >> Aristotle >> Ethics




Thus then the Prodigal, if unguided, slides into these faults; but if he
could get care bestowed on him he might come to the mean and to what is
right.

Stinginess, on the contrary, is incurable: old age, for instance, and
incapacity of any kind, is thought to make people Stingy; and it is more
congenial to human nature than Prodigality, the mass of men being fond
of money rather than apt to give: moreover it extends far and has many
phases, the modes of stinginess being thought to be many. For as it
consists of two things, defect of giving and excess of receiving,
everybody does not have it entire, but it is sometimes divided, and one
class of persons exceed in receiving, the other are deficient in giving.
I mean those who are designated by such appellations as sparing,
close-fisted, niggards, are all deficient in giving; but other men's
property they neither desire nor are willing to receive, in some
instances from a real moderation and shrinking from what is base.

There are some people whose motive, either supposed or alleged, for
keeping their property is this, that they may never be driven to do
anything dishonourable: to this class belongs the skinflint, and every
one of similar character, so named from the excess of not-giving. Others
again decline to receive their neighbour's goods from a motive of fear;
their notion being that it is not easy to take other people's things
yourself without their taking yours: so they are content neither to
receive nor give.

[Sidenote:1122a] The other class again who are Stingy in respect of
receiving exceed in that they receive anything from any source; such as
they who work at illiberal employments, brothel keepers, and such-like,
and usurers who lend small sums at large interest: for all these receive
from improper sources, and improper amounts. Their common characteristic
is base-gaining, since they all submit to disgrace for the sake of gain
and that small; because those who receive great things neither whence
they ought, nor what they ought (as for instance despots who sack cities
and plunder temples), we denominate wicked, impious, and unjust, but not
Stingy.

Now the dicer and bath-plunderer and the robber belong to the class of
the Stingy, for they are given to base gain: both busy themselves and
submit to disgrace for the sake of gain, and the one class incur the
greatest dangers for the sake of their booty, while the others make gain
of their friends to whom they ought to be giving.

So both classes, as wishing to make gain from improper sources, are
given to base gain, and all such receivings are Stingy. And with good
reason is Stinginess called the contrary of Liberality: both because it
is a greater evil than Prodigality, and because men err rather in this
direction than in that of the Prodigality which we have spoken of as
properly and completely such.

Let this be considered as what we have to say respecting Liberality and
the contrary vices.

II

Next in order would seem to come a dissertation on Magnificence,
this being thought to be, like liberality, a virtue having for its
object-matter Wealth; but it does not, like that, extend to all
transactions in respect of Wealth, but only applies to such as are
expensive, and in these circumstances it exceeds liberality in respect
of magnitude, because it is (what the very name in Greek hints at)
fitting expense on a large scale: this term is of course relative: I
mean, the expenditure of equipping and commanding a trireme is not the
same as that of giving a public spectacle: "fitting" of course also is
relative to the individual, and the matter wherein and upon which he has
to spend. And a man is not denominated Magnificent for spending as he
should do in small or ordinary things, as, for instance,

"Oft to the wandering beggar did I give,"

but for doing so in great matters: that is to say, the Magnificent man
is liberal, but the liberal is not thereby Magnificent. The falling
short of such a state is called Meanness, the exceeding it Vulgar
Profusion, Want of Taste, and so on; which are faulty, not because they
are on an excessive scale in respect of right objects but, because they
show off in improper objects, and in improper manner: of these we will
speak presently. The Magnificent man is like a man of skill, because he
can see what is fitting, and can spend largely in good taste; for, as
we said at the commencement, [Sidenote: 1122b] the confirmed habit is
determined by the separate acts of working, and by its object-matter.

Well, the expenses of the Magnificent man are great and fitting: such
also are his works (because this secures the expenditure being not great
merely, but befitting the work). So then the work is to be proportionate
to the expense, and this again to the work, or even above it: and the
Magnificent man will incur such expenses from the motive of honour, this
being common to all the virtues, and besides he will do it with pleasure
and lavishly; excessive accuracy in calculation being Mean. He will
consider also how a thing may be done most beautifully and fittingly,
rather, than for how much it may be done, and how at the least expense.

So the Magnificent man must be also a liberal man, because the liberal
man will also spend what he ought, and in right manner: but it is the
Great, that is to say tke large scale, which is distinctive of the
Magnificent man, the object-matter of liberality being the same, and
without spending more money than another man he will make the work more
magnificent. I mean, the excellence of a possession and of a work is not
the same: as a piece of property that thing is most valuable which is
worth most, gold for instance; but as a work that which is great and
beautiful, because the contemplation of such an object is admirable,
and so is that which is Magnificent. So the excellence of a work is
Magnificence on a large scale. There are cases of expenditure which we
call honourable, such as are dedicatory offerings to the gods, and the
furnishing their temples, and sacrifices, and in like manner everything
that has reference to the Deity, and all such public matters as are
objects of honourable ambition, as when men think in any case that it is
their duty to furnish a chorus for the stage splendidly, or fit out and
maintain a trireme, or give a general public feast.

Now in all these, as has been already stated, respect is had also to the
rank and the means of the man who is doing them: because they should be
proportionate to these, and befit not the work only but also the doer of
the work. For this reason a poor man cannot be a Magnificent man, since
he has not means wherewith to spend largely and yet becomingly; and if
he attempts it he is a fool, inasmuch as it is out of proportion and
contrary to propriety, whereas to be in accordance with virtue a thing
must be done rightly.

Such expenditure is fitting moreover for those to whom such things
previously belong, either through themselves or through their ancestors
or people with whom they are connected, and to the high-born or people
of high repute, and so on: because all these things imply greatness and
reputation.

So then the Magnificent man is pretty much as I have described him,
and Magnificence consists in such expenditures: because they are the
greatest and most honourable: [Sidenote:1123a] and of private ones such
as come but once for all, marriage to wit, and things of that kind; and
any occasion which engages the interest of the community in general, or
of those who are in power; and what concerns receiving and despatching
strangers; and gifts, and repaying gifts: because the Magnificent man
is not apt to spend upon himself but on the public good, and gifts are
pretty much in the same case as dedicatory offerings.

It is characteristic also of the Magnificent man to furnish his house
suitably to his wealth, for this also in a way reflects credit; and
again, to spend rather upon such works as are of long duration, these
being most honourable. And again, propriety in each case, because the
same things are not suitable to gods and men, nor in a temple and a
tomb. And again, in the case of expenditures, each must be great of its
kind, and great expense on a great object is most magnificent, that is
in any case what is great in these particular things.

There is a difference too between greatness of a work and greatness of
expenditure: for instance, a very beautiful ball or cup is magnificent
as a present to a child, while the price of it is small and almost
mean. Therefore it is characteristic of the Magnificent man to do
magnificently whatever he is about: for whatever is of this kind cannot
be easily surpassed, and bears a proper proportion to the expenditure.

Such then is the Magnificent man.

The man who is in the state of excess, called one of Vulgar Profusion,
is in excess because he spends improperly, as has been said. I mean in
cases requiring small expenditure he lavishes much and shows off out of
taste; giving his club a feast fit for a wedding-party, or if he has to
furnish a chorus for a comedy, giving the actors purple to wear in the
first scene, as did the Megarians. And all such things he will do, not
with a view to that which is really honourable, but to display his
wealth, and because he thinks he shall be admired for these things; and
he will spend little where he ought to spend much, and much where he
should spend little.

The Mean man will be deficient in every case, and even where he has
spent the most he will spoil the whole effect for want of some trifle;
he is procrastinating in all he does, and contrives how he may spend
the least, and does even that with lamentations about the expense, and
thinking that he does all things on a greater scale than he ought.

Of course, both these states are faulty, but they do not involve
disgrace because they are neither hurtful to others nor very unseemly.

III

The very name of Great-mindedness implies, that great things are its
object-matter; and we will first settle what kind of things. It makes no
difference, of course, whether we regard the moral state in the abstract
or as exemplified in an individual.

[Sidenote: 1123b] Well then, he is thought to be Great-minded who values
himself highly and at the same time justly, because he that does so
without grounds is foolish, and no virtuous character is foolish or
senseless. Well, the character I have described is Great-minded. The man
who estimates himself lowly, and at the same time justly, is modest; but
not Great-minded, since this latter quality implies greatness, just as
beauty implies a large bodily conformation while small people are neat
and well made but not beautiful.

Again, he who values himself highly without just grounds is a Vain
man: though the name must not be applied to every case of unduly
high self-estimation. He that values himself below his real worth is
Small-minded, and whether that worth is great, moderate, or small, his
own estimate falls below it. And he is the strongest case of this error
who is really a man of great worth, for what would he have done had his
worth been less?

The Great-minded man is then, as far as greatness is concerned, at
the summit, but in respect of propriety he is in the mean, because he
estimates himself at his real value (the other characters respectively
are in excess and defect). Since then he justly estimates himself at a
high, or rather at the highest possible rate, his character will have
respect specially to one thing: this term "rate" has reference of course
to external goods: and of these we should assume that to be the greatest
which we attribute to the gods, and which is the special object of
desire to those who are in power, and which is the prize proposed to the
most honourable actions: now honour answers to these descriptions, being
the greatest of external goods. So the Great-minded man bears himself as
he ought in respect of honour and dishonour. In fact, without need of
words, the Great-minded plainly have honour for their object-matter:
since honour is what the great consider themselves specially worthy of,
and according to a certain rate.

The Small-minded man is deficient, both as regards himself, and also
as regards the estimation of the Great-minded: while the Vain man is in
excess as regards himself, but does not get beyond the Great-minded
man. Now the Great-minded man, being by the hypothesis worthy of the
greatest things, must be of the highest excellence, since the better a
man is the more is he worth, and he who is best is worth the most: it
follows then, that to be truly Great-minded a man must be good,
and whatever is great in each virtue would seem to belong to the
Great-minded. It would no way correspond with the character of the
Great-minded to flee spreading his hands all abroad; nor to injure any
one; for with what object in view will he do what is base, in whose eyes
nothing is great? in short, if one were to go into particulars, the
Great-minded man would show quite ludicrously unless he were a good man:
he would not be in fact deserving of honour if he were a bad man, honour
being the prize of virtue and given to the good.

This virtue, then, of Great-mindedness seems to be a kind of ornament
of all the other virtues, in that it makes them better and cannot be
without them; and for this reason it is a hard matter to be really and
truly Great-minded; for it cannot be without thorough goodness and
nobleness of character.

[Sidenote:1124a] Honour then and dishonour are specially the
object-matter of the Great-minded man: and at such as is great, and
given by good men, he will be pleased moderately as getting his own, or
perhaps somewhat less for no honour can be quite adequate to perfect
virtue: but still he will accept this because they have nothing higher
to give him. But such as is given by ordinary people and on trifling
grounds he will entirely despise, because these do not come up to his
deserts: and dishonour likewise, because in his case there cannot be
just ground for it.

Now though, as I have said, honour is specially the object-matter of the
Great-minded man, I do not mean but that likewise in respect of wealth
and power, and good or bad fortune of every kind, he will bear himself
with moderation, fall out how they may, and neither in prosperity will
he be overjoyed nor in adversity will he be unduly pained. For not even
in respect of honour does he so bear himself; and yet it is the greatest
of all such objects, since it is the cause of power and wealth being
choiceworthy, for certainly they who have them desire to receive honour
through them. So to whom honour even is a small thing to him will all
other things also be so; and this is why such men are thought to be
supercilious.

It seems too that pieces of good fortune contribute to form this
character of Great-mindedness: I mean, the nobly born, or men of
influence, or the wealthy, are considered to be entitled to honour, for
they are in a position of eminence and whatever is eminent by good is
more entitled to honour: and this is why such circumstances dispose men
rather to Great-mindedness, because they receive honour at the hands of
some men.

Now really and truly the good man alone is entitled to honour; only if
a man unites in himself goodness with these external advantages he is
thought to be more entitled to honour: but they who have them without
also having virtue are not justified in their high estimate of
themselves, nor are they rightly denominated Great-minded; since perfect
virtue is one of the indispensable conditions to such & character.

[Sidenote:1124b] Further, such men become supercilious and insolent, it
not being easy to bear prosperity well without goodness; and not being
able to bear it, and possessed with an idea of their own superiority to
others, they despise them, and do just whatever their fancy prompts; for
they mimic the Great-minded man, though they are not like him, and they
do this in such points as they can, so without doing the actions which
can only flow from real goodness they despise others. Whereas the
Great-minded man despises on good grounds (for he forms his opinions
truly), but the mass of men do it at random.

Moreover, he is not a man to incur little risks, nor does he court
danger, because there are but few things he has a value for; but he will
incur great dangers, and when he does venture he is prodigal of his life
as knowing that there are terms on which it is not worth his while to
live. He is the sort of man to do kindnesses, but he is ashamed to
receive them; the former putting a man in the position of superiority,
the latter in that of inferiority; accordingly he will greatly overpay
any kindness done to him, because the original actor will thus be laid
under obligation and be in the position of the party benefited. Such men
seem likewise to remember those they have done kindnesses to, but not
those from whom they have received them: because he who has received is
inferior to him who has done the kindness and our friend wishes to be
superior; accordingly he is pleased to hear of his own kind acts but not
of those done to himself (and this is why, in Homer, Thetis does
not mention to Jupiter the kindnesses she had done him, nor did the
Lacedaemonians to the Athenians but only the benefits they had received).

Further, it is characteristic of the Great-minded man to ask favours not
at all, or very reluctantly, but to do a service very readily; and to
bear himself loftily towards the great or fortunate, but towards people
of middle station affably; because to be above the former is difficult
and so a grand thing, but to be above the latter is easy; and to be high
and mighty towards the former is not ignoble, but to do it towards those
of humble station would be low and vulgar; it would be like parading
strength against the weak.

And again, not to put himself in the way of honour, nor to go where
others are the chief men; and to be remiss and dilatory, except in the
case of some great honour or work; and to be concerned in few things,
and those great and famous. It is a property of him also to be open,
both in his dislikes and his likings, because concealment is a
consequent of fear. Likewise to be careful for reality rather than
appearance, and talk and act openly (for his contempt for others makes
him a bold man, for which same reason he is apt to speak the truth,
except where the principle of reserve comes in), but to be reserved
towards the generality of men.

[Sidenote: II25a] And to be unable to live with reference to any other
but a friend; because doing so is servile, as may be seen in that all
flatterers are low and men in low estate are flatterers. Neither is his
admiration easily excited, because nothing is great in his eyes; nor
does he bear malice, since remembering anything, and specially wrongs,
is no part of Great-mindedness, but rather overlooking them; nor does he
talk of other men; in fact, he will not speak either of himself or of
any other; he neither cares to be praised himself nor to have others
blamed; nor again does he praise freely, and for this reason he is
not apt to speak ill even of his enemies except to show contempt and
insolence.

And he is by no means apt to make laments about things which cannot be
helped, or requests about those which are trivial; because to be thus
disposed with respect to these things is consequent only upon real
anxiety about them. Again, he is the kind of man to acquire what
is beautiful and unproductive rather than what is productive and
profitable: this being rather the part of an independent man. Also slow
motion, deep-toned voice, and deliberate style of speech, are thought to
be characteristic of the Great-minded man: for he who is earnest about
few things is not likely to be in a hurry, nor he who esteems nothing
great to be very intent: and sharp tones and quickness are the result of
these.

This then is my idea of the Great-minded man; and he who is in the
defect is a Small-minded man, he who is in the excess a Vain man.
However, as we observed in respect of the last character we discussed,
these extremes are not thought to be vicious exactly, but only mistaken,
for they do no harm.

The Small-minded man, for instance, being really worthy of good deprives
himself of his deserts, and seems to have somewhat faulty from not
having a sufficiently high estimate of his own desert, in fact from
self-ignorance: because, but for this, he would have grasped after what
he really is entitled to, and that is good. Still such characters are
not thought to be foolish, but rather laggards. But the having such
an opinion of themselves seems to have a deteriorating effect on the
character: because in all cases men's aims are regulated by their
supposed desert, and thus these men, under a notion of their own want of
desert, stand aloof from honourable actions and courses, and similarly
from external goods.

But the Vain are foolish and self-ignorant, and that palpably: because
they attempt honourable things, as though they were worthy, and then
they are detected. They also set themselves off, by dress, and carriage,
and such-like things, and desire that their good circumstances may
be seen, and they talk of them under the notion of receiving
honour thereby. Small-mindedness rather than Vanity is opposed to
Great-mindedness, because it is more commonly met with and is worse.

[Sidenote:1125b] Well, the virtue of Great-mindedness has for its object
great Honour, as we have said: and there seems to be a virtue having
Honour also for its object (as we stated in the former book), which may
seem to bear to Great-mindedness the same relation that Liberality does
to Magnificence: that is, both these virtues stand aloof from what is
great but dispose us as we ought to be disposed towards moderate and
small matters. Further: as in giving and receiving of wealth there is
a mean state, an excess, and a defect, so likewise in grasping after
Honour there is the more or less than is right, and also the doing so
from right sources and in right manner.

For we blame the lover of Honour as aiming at Honour more than he ought,
and from wrong sources; and him who is destitute of a love of Honour as
not choosing to be honoured even for what is noble. Sometimes again we
praise the lover of Honour as manly and having a love for what is noble,
and him who has no love for it as being moderate and modest (as we
noticed also in the former discussion of these virtues).

It is clear then that since "Lover of so and so" is a term capable of
several meanings, we do not always denote the same quality by the term
"Lover of Honour;" but when we use it as a term of commendation we
denote more than the mass of men are; when for blame more than a man
should be.

And the mean state having no proper name the extremes seem to dispute
for it as unoccupied ground: but of course where there is excess and
defect there must be also the mean. And in point of fact, men do grasp
at Honour more than they should, and less, and sometimes just as they
ought; for instance, this state is praised, being a mean state in regard
of Honour, but without any appropriate name. Compared with what is
called Ambition it shows like a want of love for Honour, and compared
with this it shows like Ambition, or compared with both, like both
faults: nor is this a singular case among the virtues. Here the
extreme characters appear to be opposed, because the mean has no name
appropriated to it.


V

Meekness is a mean state, having for its object-matter Anger: and as the
character in the mean has no name, and we may almost say the same of the
extremes, we give the name of Meekness (leaning rather to the defect,
which has no name either) to the character in the mean.

The excess may be called an over-aptness to Anger: for the passion is
Anger, and the producing causes many and various. Now he who is angry at
what and with whom he ought, and further, in right manner and time, and
for proper length of time, is praised, so this Man will be Meek since
Meekness is praised. For the notion represented by the term Meek man is
the being imperturbable, and not being led away by passion, but being
angry in that manner, and at those things, and for that length of time,
which Reason may direct. This character however is thought to err rather
on [Sidenote:1126a] the side of defect, inasmuch as he is not apt to
take revenge but rather to make allowances and forgive. And the defect,
call it Angerlessness or what you will, is blamed: I mean, they who are
not angry at things at which they ought to be angry are thought to be
foolish, and they who are angry not in right manner, nor in right time,
nor with those with whom they ought; for a man who labours under this
defect is thought to have no perception, nor to be pained, and to have
no tendency to avenge himself, inasmuch as he feels no anger: now to
bear with scurrility in one's own person, and patiently see one's own
friends suffer it, is a slavish thing.

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