United States Tariff Commission - "Men's Sewed Straw Hats"

Washington Irving - "The Crayon Papers"

Rev. E. Donald Carr - "A Night in the Snow"

Various - "Scientific American Supplement, No. 288"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Ethics

A >> Aristotle >> Ethics




For this reason it is thought to be a greater proof of Courage to be
fearless and undisturbed under the pressure of sudden fear than under
that which may be anticipated, because Courage then comes rather from a
fixed habit, or less from preparation: since as to foreseen dangers a
man might take his line even from calculation and reasoning, but in
those which are sudden he will do so according to his fixed habit of
mind.

Fifthly and lastly, those who are acting under Ignorance have a show
of Courage and are not very far from the Hopeful; but still they are
inferior inasmuch as they have no opinion of themselves; which the
others have, and therefore stay and contest a field for some little
time; but they who have been deceived fly the moment they know things to
be otherwise than they supposed, which the Argives experienced when they
fell on the Lacedaemonians, taking them for the men of Sicyon. We have
described then what kind of men the Brave are, and what they who are
thought to be, but are not really, Brave.

[Sidenote: IX]

It must be remarked, however, that though Courage has for its
object-matter boldness and fear it has not both equally so, but objects
of fear much more than the former; for he that under pressure of these
is undisturbed and stands related to them as he ought is better entitled
to the name of Brave than he who is properly affected towards objects
of confidence. So then men are termed Brave for withstanding painful
things.

It follows that Courage involves pain and is justly praised, since it
is a harder matter to withstand things that are painful than to abstain
from such as are pleasant.

[Sidenote: 1117_b_]

It must not be thought but that the End and object of Courage is
pleasant, but it is obscured by the surrounding circumstances: which
happens also in the gymnastic games; to the boxers the End is pleasant
with a view to which they act, I mean the crown and the honours; but the
receiving the blows they do is painful and annoying to flesh and blood,
and so is all the labour they have to undergo; and, as these drawbacks
are many, the object in view being small appears to have no pleasantness
in it.

If then we may say the same of Courage, of course death and wounds must
be painful to the Brave man and against his will: still he endures these
because it is honourable so to do or because it is dishonourable not to
do so. And the more complete his virtue and his happiness so much the
more will he be pained at the notion of death: since to such a man as
he is it is best worth while to live, and he with full consciousness is
deprived of the greatest goods by death, and this is a painful idea. But
he is not the less Brave for feeling it to be so, nay rather it may be
he is shown to be more so because he chooses the honour that may be
reaped in war in preference to retaining safe possession of these other
goods. The fact is that to act with pleasure does not belong to all the
virtues, except so far as a man realises the End of his actions.

But there is perhaps no reason why not such men should make the best
soldiers, but those who are less truly Brave but have no other good to
care for: these being ready to meet danger and bartering their lives
against small gain.

Let thus much be accepted as sufficient on the subject of Courage; the
true nature of which it is not difficult to gather, in outline at least,
from what has been said.

[Sidenote: X]

Next let us speak of Perfected Self-Mastery, which seems to claim the
next place to Courage, since these two are the Excellences of the
Irrational part of the Soul.

That it is a mean state, having for its object-matter Pleasures, we have
already said (Pains being in fact its object-matter in a less degree
and dissimilar manner), the state of utter absence of self-control has
plainly the same object-matter; the next thing then is to determine what
kind of Pleasures.

Let Pleasures then be understood to be divided into mental and bodily:
instances of the former being love of honour or of learning: it being
plain that each man takes pleasure in that of these two objects which he
has a tendency to like, his body being no way affected but rather his
intellect. Now men are not called perfectly self-mastering or wholly
destitute of self-control in respect of pleasures of this class: nor in
fact in respect of any which are not bodily; those for example who love
to tell long stories, and are prosy, and spend their days about
mere chance matters, we call gossips but not wholly destitute of
self-control, nor again those who are pained at the loss of money or
friends.

[Sidenote: 1118_a_]

It is bodily Pleasures then which are the object-matter of Perfected
Self-Mastery, but not even all these indifferently: I mean, that they
who take pleasure in objects perceived by the Sight, as colours, and
forms, and painting, are not denominated men of Perfected Self-Mastery,
or wholly destitute of self-control; and yet it would seem that one may
take pleasure even in such objects, as one ought to do, or excessively,
or too little.

So too of objects perceived by the sense of Hearing; no one applies the
terms before quoted respectively to those who are excessively pleased
with musical tunes or acting, or to those who take such pleasure as they
ought.

Nor again to those persons whose pleasure arises from the sense
of Smell, except incidentally: I mean, we do not say men have no
self-control because they take pleasure in the scent of fruit, or
flowers, or incense, but rather when they do so in the smells of
unguents and sauces: since men destitute of self-control take pleasure
herein, because hereby the objects of their lusts are recalled to their
imagination (you may also see other men take pleasure in the smell of
food when they are hungry): but to take pleasure in such is a mark of
the character before named since these are objects of desire to him.

Now not even brutes receive pleasure in right of these senses, except
incidentally. I mean, it is not the scent of hares' flesh but the eating
it which dogs take pleasure in, perception of which pleasure is caused
by the sense of Smell. Or again, it is not the lowing of the ox but
eating him which the lion likes; but of the fact of his nearness the
lion is made sensible by the lowing, and so he appears to take pleasure
in this. In like manner, he has no pleasure in merely seeing or finding
a stag or wild goat, but in the prospect of a meal.

The habits of Perfect Self-Mastery and entire absence of self-control
have then for their object-matter such pleasures as brutes also share
in, for which reason they are plainly servile and brutish: they are
Touch and Taste.

But even Taste men seem to make little or no use of; for to the sense of
Taste belongs the distinguishing of flavours; what men do, in fact, who
are testing the quality of wines or seasoning "made dishes."

But men scarcely take pleasure at all in these things, at least those
whom we call destitute of self-control do not, but only in the actual
enjoyment which arises entirely from the sense of Touch, whether in
eating or in drinking, or in grosser lusts. This accounts for the wish
said to have been expressed once by a great glutton, "that his throat
had been formed longer than a crane's neck," implying that his pleasure
was derived from the Touch.

[Sidenote: 1118b] The sense then with which is connected the habit of
absence of self-control is the most common of all the senses, and this
habit would seem to be justly a matter of reproach, since it attaches to
us not in so far as we are men but in so far as we are animals. Indeed
it is brutish to take pleasure in such things and to like them best of
all; for the most respectable of the pleasures arising from the touch
have been set aside; those, for instance, which occur in the course of
gymnastic training from the rubbing and the warm bath: because the touch
of the man destitute of self-control is not indifferently of _any_ part
of the body but only of particular parts.

XI

Now of lusts or desires some are thought to be universal, others
peculiar and acquired; thus desire for food is natural since every one
who really needs desires also food, whether solid or liquid, or both
(and, as Homer says, the man in the prime of youth needs and desires
intercourse with the other sex); but when we come to this or that
particular kind, then neither is the desire universal nor in all men is
it directed to the same objects. And therefore the conceiving of such
desires plainly attaches to us as individuals. It must be admitted,
however, that there is something natural in it: because different things
are pleasant to different men and a preference of some particular
objects to chance ones is universal. Well then, in the case of the
desires which are strictly and properly natural few men go wrong and all
in one direction, that is, on the side of too much: I mean, to eat and
drink of such food as happens to be on the table till one is overfilled
is exceeding in quantity the natural limit, since the natural desire
is simply a supply of a real deficiency. For this reason these men are
called belly-mad, as filling it beyond what they ought, and it is the
slavish who become of this character.

But in respect of the peculiar pleasures many men go wrong and in many
different ways; for whereas the term "fond of so and so" implies either
taking pleasure in wrong objects, or taking pleasure excessively, or as
the mass of men do, or in a wrong way, they who are destitute of all
self-control exceed in all these ways; that is to say, they take
pleasure in some things in which they ought not to do so (because they
are properly objects of detestation), and in such as it is right to take
pleasure in they do so more than they ought and as the mass of men do.

Well then, that excess with respect to pleasures is absence of
self-control, and blameworthy, is plain. But viewing these habits on the
side of pains, we find that a man is not said to have the virtue for
withstanding them (as in the case of Courage), nor the vice for not
withstanding them; but the man destitute of self-control is such,
because he is pained more than he ought to be at not obtaining things
which are pleasant (and thus his pleasure produces pain to him), and the
man of Perfected Self-Mastery is such in virtue of not being pained by
their absence, that is, by having to abstain from what is pleasant.

[Sidenote:III9a] Now the man destitute of self-control desires either
all pleasant things indiscriminately or those which are specially
pleasant, and he is impelled by his desire to choose these things in
preference to all others; and this involves pain, not only when he
misses the attainment of his objects but, in the very desiring them,
since all desire is accompanied by pain. Surely it is a strange case
this, being pained by reason of pleasure.

As for men who are defective on the side of pleasure, who take
less pleasure in things than they ought, they are almost imaginary
characters, because such absence of sensual perception is not natural to
man: for even the other animals distinguish between different kinds of
food, and like some kinds and dislike others. In fact, could a man be
found who takes no pleasure in anything and to whom all things are
alike, he would be far from being human at all: there is no name for
such a character because it is simply imaginary.

But the man of Perfected Self-Mastery is in the mean with respect to
these objects: that is to say, he neither takes pleasure in the things
which delight the vicious man, and in fact rather dislikes them, nor at
all in improper objects; nor to any great degree in any object of the
class; nor is he pained at their absence; nor does he desire them; or,
if he does, only in moderation, and neither more than he ought, nor at
improper times, and so forth; but such things as are conducive to health
and good condition of body, being also pleasant, these he will grasp at
in moderation and as he ought to do, and also such other pleasant things
as do not hinder these objects, and are not unseemly or disproportionate
to his means; because he that should grasp at such would be liking such
pleasures more than is proper; but the man of Perfected Self-Mastery
is not of this character, but regulates his desires by the dictates of
right reason.

XII

Now the vice of being destitute of all Self-Control seems to be more
truly voluntary than Cowardice, because pleasure is the cause of the
former and pain of the latter, and pleasure is an object of choice,
pain of avoidance. And again, pain deranges and spoils the natural
disposition of its victim, whereas pleasure has no such effect and is
more voluntary and therefore more justly open to reproach.

It is so also for the following reason; that it is easier to be inured
by habit to resist the objects of pleasure, there being many things of
this kind in life and the process of habituation being unaccompanied by
danger; whereas the case is the reverse as regards the objects of fear.

Again, Cowardice as a confirmed habit would seem to be voluntary in
a different way from the particular instances which form the habit;
because it is painless, but these derange the man by reason of pain so
that he throws away his arms and otherwise behaves himself unseemly,
for which reason they are even thought by some to exercise a power of
compulsion.

But to the man destitute of Self-Control the particular instances are on
the contrary quite voluntary, being done with desire and direct exertion
of the will, but the general result is less voluntary: since no man
desires to form the habit.

[Sidenote: 1119b]

The name of this vice (which signifies etymologically unchastened-ness)
we apply also to the faults of children, there being a certain
resemblance between the cases: to which the name is primarily applied,
and to which secondarily or derivatively, is not relevant to the present
subject, but it is evident that the later in point of time must get the
name from the earlier. And the metaphor seems to be a very good one;
for whatever grasps after base things, and is liable to great increase,
ought to be chastened; and to this description desire and the child
answer most truly, in that children also live under the direction of
desire and the grasping after what is pleasant is most prominently seen
in these.

Unless then the appetite be obedient and subjected to the governing
principle it will become very great: for in the fool the grasping after
what is pleasant is insatiable and undiscriminating; and every acting
out of the desire increases the kindred habit, and if the desires are
great and violent in degree they even expel Reason entirely; therefore
they ought to be moderate and few, and in no respect to be opposed
to Reason. Now when the appetite is in such a state we denominate it
obedient and chastened.

In short, as the child ought to live with constant regard to the orders
of its educator, so should the appetitive principle with regard to those
of Reason.

So then in the man of Perfected Self-Mastery, the appetitive principle
must be accordant with Reason: for what is right is the mark at which
both principles aim: that is to say, the man of perfected self-mastery
desires what he ought in right manner and at right times, which is
exactly what Reason directs. Let this be taken for our account of
Perfected Self-Mastery.




BOOK IV

I

We will next speak of Liberality. Now this is thought to be the mean
state, having for its object-matter Wealth: I mean, the Liberal man is
praised not in the circumstances of war, nor in those which constitute
the character of perfected self-mastery, nor again in judicial
decisions, but in respect of giving and receiving Wealth, chiefly the
former. By the term Wealth I mean "all those things whose worth is
measured by money."

Now the states of excess and defect in regard of Wealth are respectively
Prodigality and Stinginess: the latter of these terms we attach
invariably to those who are over careful about Wealth, but the former we
apply sometimes with a complex notion; that is to say, we give the name
to those who fail of self-control and spend money on the unrestrained
gratification of their passions; and this is why they are thought to be
most base, because they have many vices at once.

[Sidenote: 1120a]

It must be noted, however, that this is not a strict and proper use of
the term, since its natural etymological meaning is to denote him who
has one particular evil, viz. the wasting his substance: he is unsaved
(as the term literally denotes) who is wasting away by his own fault;
and this he really may be said to be; the destruction of his substance
is thought to be a kind of wasting of himself, since these things
are the means of living. Well, this is our acceptation of the term
Prodigality.

Again. Whatever things are for use may be used well or ill, and Wealth
belongs to this class. He uses each particular thing best who has the
virtue to whose province it belongs: so that he will use Wealth best
who has the virtue respecting Wealth, that is to say, the Liberal
man. Expenditure and giving are thought to be the using of money, but
receiving and keeping one would rather call the possessing of it. And so
the giving to proper persons is more characteristic of the Liberal man,
than the receiving from proper quarters and forbearing to receive
from the contrary. In fact generally, doing well by others is more
characteristic of virtue than being done well by, and doing things
positively honourable than forbearing to do things dishonourable;
and any one may see that the doing well by others and doing things
positively honourable attaches to the act of giving, but to that of
receiving only the being done well by or forbearing to do what is
dishonourable.

Besides, thanks are given to him who gives, not to him who merely
forbears to receive, and praise even more. Again, forbearing to receive
is easier than giving, the case of being too little freehanded with
one's own being commoner than taking that which is not one's own.

And again, it is they who give that are denominated Liberal, while they
who forbear to receive are commended, not on the score of Liberality but
of just dealing, while for receiving men are not, in fact, praised at
all.

And the Liberal are liked almost best of all virtuous characters,
because they are profitable to others, and this their profitableness
consists in their giving.

Furthermore: all the actions done in accordance with virtue are
honourable, and done from the motive of honour: and the Liberal man,
therefore, will give from a motive of honour, and will give rightly;
I mean, to proper persons, in right proportion, at right times, and
whatever is included in the term "right giving:" and this too with
positive pleasure, or at least without pain, since whatever is done in
accordance with virtue is pleasant or at least not unpleasant, most
certainly not attended with positive pain.

But the man who gives to improper people, or not from a motive of honour
but from some other cause, shall be called not Liberal but something
else. Neither shall he be so [Sidenote:1120b] denominated who does it
with pain: this being a sign that he would prefer his wealth to the
honourable action, and this is no part of the Liberal man's character;
neither will such an one receive from improper sources, because the so
receiving is not characteristic of one who values not wealth: nor again
will he be apt to ask, because one who does kindnesses to others does
not usually receive them willingly; but from proper sources (his own
property, for instance) he will receive, doing this not as honourable
but as necessary, that he may have somewhat to give: neither will he be
careless of his own, since it is his wish through these to help others
in need: nor will he give to chance people, that he may have wherewith
to give to those to whom he ought, at right times, and on occasions when
it is honourable so to do.

Again, it is a trait in the Liberal man's character even to exceed
very much in giving so as to leave too little for himself, it being
characteristic of such an one not to have a thought of self.

Now Liberality is a term of relation to a man's means, for the
Liberal-ness depends not on the amount of what is given but on the moral
state of the giver which gives in proportion to his means. There is then
no reason why he should not be the more Liberal man who gives the less
amount, if he has less to give out of.

Again, they are thought to be more Liberal who have inherited, not
acquired for themselves, their means; because, in the first place, they
have never experienced want, and next, all people love most their own
works, just as parents do and poets.

It is not easy for the Liberal man to be rich, since he is neither apt
to receive nor to keep but to lavish, and values not wealth for its own
sake but with a view to giving it away. Hence it is commonly charged
upon fortune that they who most deserve to be rich are least so. Yet
this happens reasonably enough; it is impossible he should have wealth
who does not take any care to have it, just as in any similar case.

Yet he will not give to improper people, nor at wrong times, and so on:
because he would not then be acting in accordance with Liberality, and
if he spent upon such objects, would have nothing to spend on those on
which he ought: for, as I have said before, he is Liberal who spends in
proportion to his means, and on proper objects, while he who does so
in excess is prodigal (this is the reason why we never call despots
prodigal, because it does not seem to be easy for them by their gifts
and expenditure to go beyond their immense possessions).

To sum up then. Since Liberality is a mean state in respect of the
giving and receiving of wealth, the Liberal man will give and spend on
proper objects, and in proper proportion, in great things and in small
alike, and all this with pleasure to himself; also he will receive from
right sources, and in right proportion: because, as the virtue is a mean
state in respect of both, he will do both as he ought, and, in fact,
upon proper giving follows the correspondent receiving, while that which
is not such is contrary to it. (Now those which follow one another come
to co-exist in the same person, those which are contraries plainly do
not.)

[Sidenote:1121a] Again, should it happen to him to spend money beyond
what is needful, or otherwise than is well, he will be vexed, but only
moderately and as he ought; for feeling pleasure and pain at right
objects, and in right manner, is a property of Virtue.

The Liberal man is also a good man to have for a partner in respect of
wealth: for he can easily be wronged, since he values not wealth, and
is more vexed at not spending where he ought to have done so than at
spending where he ought not, and he relishes not the maxim of Simonides.

But the Prodigal man goes wrong also in these points, for he is neither
pleased nor pained at proper objects or in proper manner, which will
become more plain as we proceed. We have said already that Prodigality
and Stinginess are respectively states of excess and defect, and this in
two things, giving and receiving (expenditure of course we class under
giving). Well now, Prodigality exceeds in giving and forbearing to
receive and is deficient in receiving, while Stinginess is deficient in
giving and exceeds in receiving, but it is in small things.

The two parts of Prodigality, to be sure, do not commonly go together;
it is not easy, I mean, to give to all if you receive from none, because
private individuals thus giving will soon find their means run short,
and such are in fact thought to be prodigal. He that should combine both
would seem to be no little superior to the Stingy man: for he may be
easily cured, both by advancing in years, and also by the want of means,
and he may come thus to the mean: he has, you see, already the _facts_
of the Liberal man, he gives and forbears to receive, only he does
neither in right manner or well. So if he could be wrought upon by
habituation in this respect, or change in any other way, he would be a
real Liberal man, for he will give to those to whom he should, and will
forbear to receive whence he ought not. This is the reason too why he is
thought not to be low in moral character, because to exceed in giving
and in forbearing to receive is no sign of badness or meanness, but only
of folly.

[Sidenote:1121b] Well then, he who is Prodigal in this fashion is
thought far superior to the Stingy man for the aforementioned reasons,
and also because he does good to many, but the Stingy man to no one,
not even to himself. But most Prodigals, as has been said, combine with
their other faults that of receiving from improper sources, and on this
point are Stingy: and they become grasping, because they wish to spend
and cannot do this easily, since their means soon run short and they are
necessitated to get from some other quarter; and then again, because
they care not for what is honourable, they receive recklessly, and from
all sources indifferently, because they desire to give but care not how
or whence. And for this reason their givings are not Liberal, inasmuch
as they are not honourable, nor purely disinterested, nor done in right
fashion; but they oftentimes make those rich who should be poor, and to
those who are quiet respectable kind of people they will give nothing,
but to flatterers, or those who subserve their pleasures in any way,
they will give much. And therefore most of them are utterly devoid
of self-restraint; for as they are open-handed they are liberal in
expenditure upon the unrestrained gratification of their passions, and
turn off to their pleasures because they do not live with reference to
what is honourable.

Copyright (c) 2007. topboookz.com. All rights reserved.