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P. 41, l. 9. That is, in the same genus; to be contraries, things must
be generically connected: [Greek: ta pleiston allelon diestekota ton en
to auto genei enantia orizontai]. Categories, iv. 15.

P. 42, l. 22. "[Greek: Deuteros plous] is a proverb," says the Scholiast
on the Phaedo, "used of those who do anything safely and cautiously
inasmuch as they who have miscarried in their first voyage, set about
then: preparations for the second cautiously," and he then alludes to
this passage.

P. 42, l. 31. That is, you must allow for the _recoil_."Naturam expellas
furca tamen usque recurret."

P. 43, l. 2. This illustration sets in so clear a light the doctrines
entertained respectively by Aristotle, Eudoxus, and the Stoics regarding
pleasure, that it is worth while to go into it fully.

The reference is to Iliad iii. 154-160. The old counsellors, as Helen
comes upon the city wall, acknowledge her surpassing beauty, and have no
difficulty in understanding how both nations should have incurred such
suffering for her sake still, fair as she is, home she must go, that she
bring not ruin on themselves and their posterity.

This exactly represents Aristotle's relation to Pleasure he does not,
with Eudoxus and his followers, exalt it into the Summum Bonum (as Paris
would risk all for Helen), nor does he the the Stoics call it wholly
evil, as Hector might have said that the woes Helen had caused
had "banished all the beauty from her cheek," but, with the aged
counsellors, admits its charms, but aware of their dangerousness
resolves to deny himself, he "feels her sweetness, yet defies her
thrall."

P. 43, l. 20. [Greek: Aisthesis] is here used as an analogous noun, to
denote the faculty which, in respect of moral matters, discharges the
same function that bodily sense does in respect of physical objects. It
is worth while to notice how in our colloquial language we carry out the
same analogy. We say of a transaction, that it "looks ugly," "sounds
oddly," is a "nasty job," "stinks in our nostrils," is a "hard dealing."

P. 46, l. 16. A man is not responsible for being [Greek: theratos],
because "particular propensions, from their very nature, must be felt,
the objects of them being present, though they cannot be gratified
at all, or not with the allowance of the moral principle." But he is
responsible for being [Greek: eutheratos], because, though thus formed,
he "might have improved and raised himself to an higher and more secure
state of virtue by the contrary behaviour, by steadily following the
moral principle, supposed to be one part of his nature, and thus
withstanding that unavoidable danger of defection which necessarily
arose from propension, the other part of it. For by thus preserving his
integrity for some time, his danger would lessen, since propensions, by
being inured to submit, would do it more easily and of course and his
security against this lessening danger would increase, since the moral
principle would gain additional strength by exercise, both which things
are implied in the notion of virtuous habits." (From the chapter
on Moral Discipline m the Analogy, sect. iv.) The purpose of this
disquisition is to refute the Necessitarians; it is resumed in the third
chapter of this Book.

P. 47, l. 7. Virtue is not only the duty, but (by the laws of the Moral
Government of the World) also the interest of Man, or to express it in
Bishop Butler's manner, Conscience and Reasonable self-love are the two
principles in our nature which of right have supremacy over the rest,
and these two lead in point of fact the same course of action. (Sermon
II.)

P. 47, l. 7. Any ignorance of particular facts affects the rightness not
of the [Greek: praxis], but of the [Greek: pragma], but ignorance of
_i.e._ incapacity to discern, Principles, shows the Moral Constitution
to have been depraved, _i.e._ shows Conscience to be perverted, or the
sight of Self-love to be impaired.

P. 48, l. 18. [Greek: eneka] primarily denotes the relation of cause and
effect all circumstances which in any way contribute to a cert result
are [Greek: eneka] that result.

From the power which we have or acquire of deducing future results from
present causes we are enabled to act towards, with a view to produce,
these results thus [Greek: eneka] comes to mean not causation merely, but
_designed_ causation and so [Greek: on eneka] is used for Motive, or
final cause.

It is the primary meaning which is here intended, it would be a
contradiction in terms to speak of a man's being ignorant of his own
Motive of action.

When the man "drew a bow at a venture and smote the King of Israel
between the joints of the harnesss" (i Kings xxii 34) he did it [Greek:
eneka ton apdkteinai] the King of Israel, in the primary sense of
[Greek: eneka] that is to say, the King's death was _in fact the
result_, but could not have been the motive, of the shot, because the
King was disguised and the shot was at a venture.

P. 48, l. 22 Bishop Butler would agree to this he says of settled
deliberate anger, "It seems in us plainly connected with a sense of
virtue and vice, of moral good and evil." See the whole Sermon on
Resentment.

P. 48, l 23. Aristotle has, I venture to think, rather quibbled here,
by using [Greek: epithumia] and its verb, equivocally as there is no
following his argument without condescending to the same device, I have
used our word lust in its ancient signification Ps. xxiv. 12, "What man
is he that lusteth to live?"

P. 48, l 28. The meaning is, that the _onus probandi_ is thrown upon
the person who maintains the distinction, Aristotle has a _prima facie_
case. The whole passage is one of difficulty. Card wells text gives the
passage from [Greek: dokei de] as a separate argument Bekker's seems to
intend al 81 ir/jdLeis as a separate argument but if so, the argument
would be a mere _petitio principii_. I have adopted Cardwell's reading
in part, but retain the comma at [Greek: dmpho] and have translated the
last four words as applying to the whole discussion, whereas Cardwell's
reading seems to restrict them to the last argument.

P. 50, l ii. _i.e._ on objects of Moral Choice, opinion of this kind
is not the same as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits and
constitute character, opinions are in general _signs_ of character, but
when they begin to be acted on they cease to be opinions, and merge in
Moral Choice.

"Treason doth never prosper, what's the reason?
When it doth prosper, none dare call it Treason."

P. 53, 1. 4. The introduction of the words [Greek: dia tinos] seems a
mere useless repetition, as in the second chapter [Greek: en tini] added
to [Greek: peri ti]. These I take for some among the many indications
that the treatise is a collection of notes for lectures, and not a
finished or systematic one.

P. 53, 1. 17. Suppose that three alternatives lay before a man, each of
the three is of course an object of Deliberation; when he has made his
choice, the alternative chosen does not cease to be in nature an object
of Deliberation, but superadds the character of being chosen and so
distinguished. Three men are admitted candidates for an office, the one
chosen is the successful candidate, so of the three [Greek: bouleuta],
the one chosen is the [Greek: bouleuton proaireton].

P. 53, 1. 22. Compare Bishop Butler's "System of Human Nature," in the
Preface to the Sermons.

P. 53, 1. 33. These words, [Greek: ek tou bouleusasthai--bouleusin],
contain the account of the whole mental machinery of any action.
The first step is a Wish, implied in the first here mentioned, viz.
Deliberation, for it has been already laid down that Deliberation has
for its object-matter means to Ends supposed to be set before the mind,
the next step is Deliberation, the next Decision, the last the definite
extending of the mental hand towards the object thus selected, the
two last constitute [Greek: proairesis] in its full meaning. The word
[Greek: orexis] means literally "a grasping at or after" now as this
physically may be either vague or definite, so too may the mental act,
consequently the term as transferred to the mind has two uses, and
denotes either the first wish, [Greek: boulaesis], or the last definite
movement, Will in its strict and proper sense. These two uses are
recognised in the Rhetoric (I 10), where [Greek: orexis] is divided into
[Greek: alogos] and [Greek: logistikae].

The illustration then afforded by the polities alluded to is this, as
the Kings first decided and then announced their decision for acceptance
and execution by their subjects, so Reason, having decided on the course
to be taken, communicates its decision to the Will, which then proceeds
to move [Greek: ta organika merae]. To instance in an action of the
mixed kind mentioned in the first chapter, safe arrival at land is
naturally desired, two means are suggested, either a certain loss of
goods, or trying to save both lives and goods, the question being
debated, the former is chosen, this decision is communicated to the
Will, which causes the owner's hands to throw overboard his goods: the
act is denominated voluntary, because the Will is consenting, but in so
denominating it, we leave out of sight how that consent was obtained. In
a purely compulsory case the never gets beyond the stage of Wish, for
no means are power and deliberation therefore is useless, consequently
there is neither Decision nor Will, in other words, no Choice.

P. 54, 1. 18. Compare the statement in the Rhetoric, 1 10, [Greek: esti
d hae men boulaeis agathou orexis (oudeis gar bouletai all ae otan
oiaetho einai agathon)]

P 56, 1. 34. A stone once set in motion cannot be recalled, because
it is then placed under the operation of natural laws which cannot be
controlled or altered, so too in Moral declension, there is a point at
which gravitation operates irretrievably, "there is a certain bound to
imprudence and misbehaviour which being transgressed, there remains no
place for repentance in the natural course of things." Bishop Butler's
Analogy, First Part, chap 11.

P 58, 1. 14. Habits being formed by acting in a certain way under
certain circumstances we can only choose how we will act not what
circumstances we will have to act under.

P. 59, 1. 19. "Moral Courage" is our phrase.

P 61, 1. 6. The meaning of this passage can scarcely be conveyed except
by a paraphrase.

"The object of each separate act of working is that which accords with
the habit they go to form. Courage is the habit which separate acts of
bravery go to form, therefore the object of these is that which accords
with Courage, _i.e._ Courage itself. But Courage is honourable (which
implies that the end and object of it is honour, since things are
denominated according to their end and object), therefore the object of
each separate act of bravery is honour."

P 62, 1. 14. For true Courage is required, i. Exact appreciation of
danger. 2. A Proper motive for resisting fear. Each of the Spurious
kinds will be found to fail in one or other, or both.

P 63, 1. 11. This may merely mean, "who give strict orders" not to
flinch, which would imply the necessity of compulsion The word is
capable of the sense given above, which seems more forcible.

P 63, 1. 19. See Book VI. chap. xiii. near the end [Greek: sokrataes
aehen oun logous tas aretas oeto einai (epiotaemas gar einai pasas)]

P 63, 1. 24. Such as the noise, the rapid movements, and apparent
confusion which to an inexperienced eye and ear would be alarming. So
Livy says of the Gauls, v. 37, Nata in _vanos_ tumultus gens.

P. 64, 1. 5. In Coronea in Boeotia, on the occasion of the citadel being
betrayed to some Phocians. "The regulars" were Boeotian troops, the
[Greek: politika] Coroneans.

P. 64, 1. 9. By the difference of tense it seems Aristotle has mixed
up two things, beginning to speak of the particular instance, and then
carried into the general statement again. This it is scarce worth while
to imitate.

P. 68, 1. 8. The meaning of the phrase [Greek: kata sumbebaekos], as
here used, in given in the Seventh Book, chap. X. [Greek: ei gar tis
todi dia todi aireitai ae diokei, kath ahuto men touto diokei kai
aireitai, kata sumbebaekos de to proteron].

P. 97, 1. 2. Perhaps "things which reflect credit on them" as on page
95.

P. 100, 1. 12. Book VII.

P. 101, 1. 11. Each term is important to make up the character of
Justice, men must have the capacity, do the acts, and do them from moral
choice.

P. 102, 1. 1. But not always. [Greek: Philein], for instance, has two
senses, "to love" and "to kiss," [Greek: misein] but one. Topics, I.
chap. XIII. 5.

P. 102, 1. 6. _Things_ are [Greek: homonuma] which have only their name
in common, being in themselves different. The [Greek: homonumia] is
_close_ therefore when the difference though real is but slight. There
is no English expression for [Greek: homonumia], "equivocal" being
applied to a term and not to its various significates.

P. 102, 1. 24. See Book I. chap. 1. [Greek: toiautaen de tina planaen
echei kai tagatha k.t.l.]

P. 104, 1. 10. A man habitually drunk in private is viewed by our law as
confining his vice to himself, and the law therefore does not attempt
to touch him; a religious hermit may be viewed as one who confines his
virtue to his own person.

P. 105, 1. 5. See the account of Sejanus and Livia. Tac. Annal. IV. 3.

P. 105, 1. 31. Cardwell's text, which here gives [Greek: paranomon],
yields a much easier and more natural sense. All Injustice violates
law, but only the particular kinds violate equality; and therefore the
unlawful : the unequal :: universal Injustice the particular _i.e._ as
whole to part. There is a reading which also alters the words within the
parenthesis, but this hardly affects the gist of the passage.

P. 106, 1. 19. There are two reasons why the characters are not
necessarily coincident. He is a good citizen, who does his best to carry
out the [Greek: politeia] under which he lives, but this may be faulty,
so therefore _pro tanto_ is he.

Again, it is sufficient, so far as the Community is concerned, that
he does the _facts_ of a good man but for the perfection of his own
individual character, he must do them virtuously. A man may move rightly
in his social orbit, without revolving rightly on his own axis.

The question is debated in the Politics, III. 2. Compare also the
distinction between the brave man, and good soldier (supra, Book III.
chap. xii.), and also Bishop Butler's first Sermon.

P. 107, 1. 17. Terms used for persons.

P. 107, 1. 34. By [Greek:----] is meant numbers themselves, 4, 20, 50,
etc, by [Greek:----] these numbers exemplified, 4 horses, 20 sheep, etc.

P 108, 1 14. The profits of a mercantile transaction (say L1000) are to
be divided between A and B, in the ratio of 2 to 3 (which is the real
point to be settled); then,

A B . 400 600.

A 400 : . B 600 (permutando, and assuming a value for A and B, so as to
make them commensurable with the respectiy sums).

A+400 : B+600 : : A B. This represents the actual distribution; its
fairness depending entirely on that of the first proportion.

P. 109, 1. 10. _i.e._ Corrective Justice is wrought out by subtraction
from the wrong doer and addition to the party injured.

P. 110, 1. 3. Her Majesty's "Justices."

P. 111, 1. 1. I have omitted the next three lines, as they seem to be
out of place here, and to occur much more naturally afterwards; it not
being likely that they were originally twice written, one is perhaps at
liberty to give Aristotle the benefit of the doubt, and conclude that he
put them where they made the best sense.

P. 111, 1. 8. This I believe to be the meaning of the passage but do not
pretend to be able to get it out of the words.

P 111, 1. 27. This is apparently contrary to what was said before, but
not really so. Aristotle does not mean that the man in authority struck
wrongfully, but he takes the extreme case of simple Reciprocation, and
in the second case, the man who strikes one in authority commits two
offences, one against the person (and so far they are equal), and
another against the office.

P. 112, 1. 5. [Greek:----] denotes, 1st, a kindly feeling issuing in a
gratuitous act of kindness, 2ndly, the effect of this act of kindness
on a generous mind; 3rdly, this effect issuing in a requital of the
kindness.

P. 113, 1. 33. The Shoemaker would get a house while the Builder only
had (say) one pair of shoes, or at all events not so many as he ought to
have. Thus the man producing the least valuable ware would get the most
valuable, and _vice versa_.

Adopting, as I have done, the reading which omits [Greek:----] at
[Greek:----], we have simply a repetition of the caution, that before
Reciprocation is attempted, there must be the same ratio between the
wares as between the persons, _i.e._ the ratio of equality.

If we admit [Greek: ou], the meaning may be, that you must not bring
into the proportion the difference mentioned above [Greek: eteron kai
ouk ison], since for the purposes of commerce all men are equal.

Say that the Builder is to the Shoemaker as 10:1. Then there must be
the same ratio between the wares, consequently the highest artist
will carry off the most valuable wares, thus combining in himself both
[Greek: uperochai]. The following are the three cases, given 100 pr.
shoes = 1 house.

Builder : Shoemaker : : 1 pr. shoes : 1 house--_wrong_.
----- ----- 100 pr. shoes : 1 house--_right_
----- ----- 10 (100 pr. shoes) : 1 house--_wrong_.

P. 185, l. 30. Every unjust act embodies [Greek: to adikon], which is
a violation of [Greek: to ison], and so implies a greater and a less
share, the former being said to fall to the doer, the latter to the
sufferer, of injury.

P. 116, l. 18. In a pure democracy men are absolutely, _i.e._
numerically, equal, in other forms only proportionately equal. Thus the
meanest British subject is proportionately equal to the Sovereign, that
is to say, is as fully secured in his rights as the Sovereign in hers.

P. 118, l. 8. Or, according to Cardwell's reading ([Greek: kineton ou
mentoi pan]) "but amongst ourselves there is Just, which is naturally
variable, but certainly all Just is not such." The sense of the passage
is not affected by the reading. In Bekker's text we must take [Greek:
kineton] to mean the same as [Greek: kinoumenon], _i.e._ "we admit there
is no Just which has not been sometimes disallowed, still," etc. With
Cardwell's, [Greek: kineton] will mean "which not only _does_ but
naturally _may_ vary."

P. 118, l. 33. Murder is unjust by the law of nature, Smuggling by
enactment. Therefore any act which can be referred to either of these
heads is an unjust act, or, as Bishop Butler phrases it, an act
_materially_ unjust. Thus much may be decided without reference to the
agent. See the note on page 32, l. 16.

P. 121, l. 13. "As distinct from pain or loss." Bishop Butler's Sermon
on Resentment. See also, Rhet. 11. 2 Def. of [Greek: orgae].

P. 121, l. 19. This method of reading the passage is taken from Zell
as quoted in Cardwell's Notes, and seems to yield the best sense. The
Paraphrast gives it as follows:

"But the aggressor is not ignorant that he began, and so he feels
himself to be wrong [and will not acknowledge that he is the aggressor],
but the other does not."

P. 122, l.18. As when a man is "_justified_ at the Grass Market,"
_i.e._ hung. P. 125, 1. 36. Where the stock of good is limited, if any
individual takes more than his share some one else must have less than
his share; where it is infinite, or where there is no good at all this
cannot happen.

P. 128,1 24. The reference is to chap. vii. where it was said that the
law views the parties in a case of particular injustice as originally
equal, but now unequal, the wrong doer the gainer and the sufferer the
loser by the wrong, but in the case above supposed there is but _one_
party.

P, 129, 1. 25. So in the Politics, 1. 2. _Hae men gar psuchae tou
somatos archei despotikaen archaen, o de nous taes orexeos politikaen
kai despotikaev._ Compare also Bishop Butler's account of human nature
as a system--of the different authority of certain principles, and
specially the supremacy of Conscience.

P. 130, 1. 8. I understand the illustration to be taken from the process
of lowering a weight into its place; a block of marble or stone, for
instance, in a building.

P. 131, 1 8. Called for convenience sake Necessary and Contingent
matter.

P. 131, 1. 13. One man learns Mathematics more easily than another, in
common language, _he has a turn for_ Mathematics, _i e_ something in his
mental conformation answers to that science The Phrenologist shows the
bump denoting this aptitude.

P. 131, 1. 21. And therefore the question resolves itself into this,
"What is the work of the Speculative, and what of the Practical, faculty
of Reason." See the description of _apetae_ II. 5.

P. 131, 1. 33. _praxis_ is here used in its strict and proper meaning.

P. 131,1. 34. That is to say, the Will waits upon deliberation in which
Reason is the judge; when the decision is pronounced, the Will must act
accordingly.

The question at issue always is, _Is this Good?_ because the Will is
only moved by an impression of Good; the Decision then will be always
_Aye or No_, and the mental hand is put forth to grasp in the former
case, and retracted in the later.

So far as what must take place in _every_ Moral Action, right or wrong,
the Machinery of the mind being supposed uninjured but to constitute a
good Moral Choice, _i e._. a good Action, the Reason must have said Aye
when it ought.

The cases of faulty action will be, either when the Machinery is perfect
but wrongly directed, as in the case of a deliberate crime, or when the
direction given by the Reason is right but the Will does not move in
accordance with that direction, in other words, when the Machinery is
out of order; as in the case of the [Greek: akrates]--video meliora
proboque, Deteriora sequor.

P. 132, l. 9. See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.

P. 133, l. 6. The mind attains truth, either for the sake of truth
itself ([Greek: aplos]), or for the sake of something further ([Greek:
eneka tinos]). If the first then either syllogistically ([Greek:
episteme]), non-syllogistically ([Greek: nous]), or by union of the two
methods ([Greek: sophla]). If the second, either with a view to _act_
([Greek: phronesis]), or with a view to _make_ ([Greek: techne]).

Otherwise. The mind contemplates Matter Necessary or Contingent. If
necessary, Principles ([Greek: nous]), Deductions ([Greek: episteme]),
or Mixed ([Greek: sophla]). If Contingent, Action ([Greek: phronesis]),
Production ([Greek: techen]). (Giphanius quoted in Cardwell's notes.)

P. 133, l. 20. The cobbler is at his last, why? to make shoes, which
are to clothe the feet of someone and the price to be paid, _i.e._
the produce of his industry, is to enable him to support his wife and
children; thus his production is subordinate to Moral Action.

P. 133, l. 23. It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thus
have varied his phrase without some real difference of meaning. That
difference is founded, I think, on the two senses of [Greek: orexis]
before alluded to (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of the
mind towards Action may be given either by a vague desire or by the
suggestion of Reason. The vague desire passing through the deliberate
stage would issue in Moral Choice. Reason must enlist the Will before
any Action can take place.

Reason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butler
observes that Conscience should be. If this were so, every act of Moral
Choice would be [Greek: orektikos nous].

But one obvious function of the feelings and passions in our composite
nature is to instigate Action, when Reason and Conscience by themselves
do not: so that as a matter of fact our Moral Choice is, in general,
fairly described as [Greek: orexis dianoetike]. See Bishop Butler's
Sermon II. and the First upon Compassion.

P. 133, l. 24. It is the opening statement of the Post Analytics.

P. 133, l. 27. Aristotle in his logical analysis of Induction, Prior.
Analytics II. 25, defines it to be "the proving the inherence of the
major term in the middle (_i.e._ proving the truth of the major premiss
in fig. 1) through the minor term." He presupposes a Syllogism in the
first Figure with an universal affirmative conclusion, which reasons, of
course, from an universal, which universal is to be taken as proved by
Induction. His doctrine turns upon a canon which he there quotes. "If
of one and the same term two others be predicated, one of which is
coextensive with that one and the same, the other may be predicated of
that which is thus coextensive." The fact of this coextensiveness must
be ascertained by [Greek: nous], in other words, by the Inductive
Faculty. We will take Aldrich's instance. All Magnets attract iron \ A B
C are Magnets | Presupposed Syllogism reasoning A B C attract iron. /
from an universal.

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