Nathaniel Hawthorne - "The Dolliver Romance"

Various - "The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. II, No. 8, June 1858"

Maurice Maeterlinck - "The Blue Bird: A Fairy Play in Six Acts"

Matthew L. Davis - "Memoirs of Aaron Burr, Complete"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Ethics

A >> Aristotle >> Ethics




Well of course, you may say, it is obvious that we must assert those
which are confessedly disgraceful to be real Pleasures, except to
depraved tastes: but of those which are thought to be good what kind,
or which, must we say is _The Pleasure of Man?_ is not the answer plain
from considering the Workings, because the Pleasures follow upon these?

Whether then there be one or several Workings which belong to the
perfect and blessed man, the Pleasures which perfect these Workings must
be said to be specially and properly _The Pleasures of Man;_ and all
the rest in a secondary sense, and in various degrees according as the
Workings are related to those highest and best ones.


VI

Now that we have spoken about the Excellences of both kinds, and
Friendship in its varieties, and Pleasures, it remains to sketch out
Happiness, since we assume that to be the one End of all human things:
and we shall save time and trouble by recapitulating what was stated
before.

[Sidenote: 1176b] Well then, we said that it is not a State merely;
because, if it were, it might belong to one who slept all his life
through and merely vegetated, or to one who fell into very great
calamities: and so, if these possibilities displease us and we would
rather put it into the rank of some kind of Working (as was also said
before), and Workings are of different kinds (some being necessary
and choiceworthy with a view to other things, while others are so in
themselves), it is plain we must rank Happiness among those choiceworthy
for their own sakes and not among those which are so with a view to
something further: because Happiness has no lack of anything but is
self-sufficient.

By choiceworthy in themselves are meant those from which nothing is
sought beyond the act of Working: and of this kind are thought to be the
actions according to Virtue, because doing what is noble and excellent
is one of those things which are choiceworthy for their own sake alone.

And again, such amusements as are pleasant; because people do not choose
them with any further purpose: in fact they receive more harm than
profit from them, neglecting their persons and their property. Still the
common run of those who are judged happy take refuge in such pastimes,
which is the reason why they who have varied talent in such are highly
esteemed among despots; because they make themselves pleasant in those
things which these aim at, and these accordingly want such men.

Now these things are thought to be appurtenances of Happiness because
men in power spend their leisure herein: yet, it may be, we cannot
argue from the example of such men: because there is neither Virtue nor
Intellect necessarily involved in having power, and yet these are the
only sources of good Workings: nor does it follow that because these
men, never having tasted pure and generous Pleasure, take refuge in
bodily ones, we are therefore to believe them to be more choiceworthy:
for children too believe that those things are most excellent which are
precious in their eyes.

We may well believe that as children and men have different ideas as to
what is precious so too have the bad and the good: therefore, as we have
many times said, those things are really precious and pleasant which
seem so to the good man: and as to each individual that Working is most
choiceworthy which is in accordance with his own state to the good man
that is so which is in accordance with Virtue.

Happiness then stands not in amusement; in fact the very notion is
absurd of the End being amusement, and of one's toiling and enduring
hardness all one's life long with a view to amusement: for everything in
the world, so to speak, we choose with some further End in view, except
Happiness, for that is the End comprehending all others. Now to take
pains and to labour with a view to amusement is plainly foolish and
very childish: but to amuse one's self with a view to steady employment
afterwards, as Anacharsis says, is thought to be right: for amusement is
like rest, and men want rest because unable to labour continuously.

Rest, therefore, is not an End, because it is adopted with a view to
Working afterwards.

[Sidenote: 1177a] Again, it is held that the Happy Life must be one in
the way of Excellence, and this is accompanied by earnestness and stands
not in amusement. Moreover those things which are done in earnest, we
say, are better than things merely ludicrous and joined with amusement:
and we say that the Working of the better part, or the better man, is
more earnest; and the Working of the better is at once better and more
capable of Happiness.

Then, again, as for bodily Pleasures, any ordinary person, or even
a slave, might enjoy them, just as well as the best man living but
Happiness no one supposes a slave to share except so far as it is
implied in life: because Happiness stands not in such pastimes but in
the Workings in the way of Excellence, as has also been stated before.


VII

Now if Happiness is a Working in the way of Excellence of course that
Excellence must be the highest, that is to say, the Excellence of the
best Principle. Whether then this best Principle is Intellect or some
other which is thought naturally to rule and to lead and to conceive of
noble and divine things, whether being in its own nature divine or the
most divine of all our internal Principles, the Working of this in
accordance with its own proper Excellence must be the perfect Happiness.

That it is Contemplative has been already stated: and this would seem to
be consistent with what we said before and with truth: for, in the first
place, this Working is of the highest kind, since the Intellect is the
highest of our internal Principles and the subjects with which it
is conversant the highest of all which fall within the range of our
knowledge.

Next, it is also most Continuous: for we are better able to contemplate
than to do anything else whatever, continuously.

Again, we think Pleasure must be in some way an ingredient in Happiness,
and of all Workings in accordance with Excellence that in the way of
Science is confessedly most pleasant: at least the pursuit of Science is
thought to contain Pleasures admirable for purity and permanence; and it
is reasonable to suppose that the employment is more pleasant to those
who have mastered, than to those who are yet seeking for, it.

And the Self-Sufficiency which people speak of will attach chiefly to
the Contemplative Working: of course the actual necessaries of life are
needed alike by the man of science, and the just man, and all the other
characters; but, supposing all sufficiently supplied with these, the
just man needs people towards whom, and in concert with whom, to
practise his justice; and in like manner the man of perfected
self-mastery, and the brave man, and so on of the rest; whereas the man
of science can contemplate and speculate even when quite alone, and the
more entirely he deserves the appellation the more able is he to do so:
it may be he can do better for having fellow-workers but still he is
certainly most Self-Sufficient.

[Sidenote: 1177b] Again, this alone would seem to be rested in for
its own sake, since nothing results from it beyond the fact of having
contemplated; whereas from all things which are objects of moral action
we do mean to get something beside the doing them, be the same more or
less.

Also, Happiness is thought to stand in perfect rest; for we toil that we
may rest, and war that we may be at peace. Now all the Practical Virtues
require either society or war for their Working, and the actions
regarding these are thought to exclude rest; those of war entirely,
because no one chooses war, nor prepares for war, for war's sake: he
would indeed be thought a bloodthirsty villain who should make enemies
of his friends to secure the existence of fighting and bloodshed. The
Working also of the statesman excludes the idea of rest, and, beside the
actual work of government, seeks for power and dignities or at least
Happiness for the man himself and his fellow-citizens: a Happiness
distinct the national Happiness which we evidently seek as being
different and distinct.

If then of all the actions in accordance with the various virtues those
of policy and war are pre-eminent in honour and greatness, and these are
restless, and aim at some further End and are not choiceworthy for
their own sakes, but the Working of the Intellect, being apt for
contemplation, is thought to excel in earnestness, and to aim at no End
beyond itself and to have Pleasure of its own which helps to increase
the Working, and if the attributes of Self-Sufficiency, and capacity of
rest, and unweariedness (as far as is compatible with the infirmity
of human nature), and all other attributes of the highest Happiness,
plainly belong to this Working, this must be perfect Happiness, if
attaining a complete duration of life, which condition is added because
none of the points of Happiness is incomplete.

But such a life will be higher than mere human nature, because a man
will live thus, not in so far as he is man but in so far as there is in
him a divine Principle: and in proportion as this Principle excels
his composite nature so far does the Working thereof excel that in
accordance with any other kind of Excellence: and therefore, if pure
Intellect, as compared with human nature, is divine, so too will the
life in accordance with it be divine compared with man's ordinary life.
[Sidenote: 1178a] Yet must we not give ear to those who bid one as man
to mind only man's affairs, or as mortal only mortal things; but, so far
as we can, make ourselves like immortals and do all with a view to
living in accordance with the highest Principle in us, for small as it
may be in bulk yet in power and preciousness it far more excels all the
others.

In fact this Principle would seem to constitute each man's "Self," since
it is supreme and above all others in goodness it _would_ be absurd then
for a man not to choose his own life but that of some other.

And here will apply an observation made before, that whatever is proper
to each is naturally best and pleasantest to him: such then is to Man
the life in accordance with pure Intellect (since this Principle is most
truly Man), and if so, then it is also the happiest.


VIII

And second in degree of Happiness will be that Life which is in
accordance with the other kind of Excellence, for the Workings in
accordance with this are proper to Man: I mean, we do actions of
justice, courage, and the other virtues, towards one another, in
contracts, services of different kinds, and in all kinds of actions and
feelings too, by observing what is befitting for each: and all these
plainly are proper to man. Further, the Excellence of the Moral
character is thought to result in some points from physical
circumstances, and to be, in many, very closely connected with the
passions.

Again, Practical Wisdom and Excellence of the Moral character are
very closely united; since the Principles of Practical Wisdom are in
accordance with the Moral Virtues and these are right when they accord
with Practical Wisdom.

These moreover, as bound up with the passions, must belong to the
composite nature, and the Excellences or Virtues of the composite nature
are proper to man: therefore so too will be the life and Happiness which
is in accordance with them. But that of the Pure Intellect is separate
and distinct: and let this suffice upon the subject, since great
exactness is beyond our purpose,

It would seem, moreover, to require supply of external goods to a small
degree, or certainly less than the Moral Happiness: for, as far as
necessaries of life are concerned, we will suppose both characters to
need them equally (though, in point of fact, the man who lives in
society does take more pains about his person and all that kind of
thing; there will really be some little difference), but when we come to
consider their Workings there will be found a great difference.

I mean, the liberal man must have money to do his liberal actions with,
and the just man to meet his engagements (for mere intentions
are uncertain, and even those who are unjust make a pretence of
_wishing_ to do justly), and the brave man must have power, if
he is to perform any of the actions which appertain to his particular
Virtue, and the man of perfected self-mastery must have opportunity of
temptation, else how shall he or any of the others display his real
character?

[Sidenote: 1178b]

(By the way, a question is sometimes raised, whether the moral choice or
the actions have most to do with Virtue, since it consists in both: it
is plain that the perfection of virtuous action requires both: but for
the actions many things are required, and the greater and more numerous
they are the more.) But as for the man engaged in Contemplative
Speculation, not only are such things unnecessary for his Working, but,
so to speak, they are even hindrances: as regards the Contemplation at
least; because of course in so far as he is Man and lives in society he
chooses to do what Virtue requires, and so he will need such things
for maintaining his character as Man though not as a speculative
philosopher.

And that the perfect Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Working
may appear also from the following consideration: our conception of the
gods is that they are above all blessed and happy: now what kind of
Moral actions are we to attribute to them? those of justice? nay,
will they not be set in a ridiculous light if represented as forming
contracts, and restoring deposits, and so on? well then, shall we
picture them performing brave actions, withstanding objects of fear and
meeting dangers, because it is noble to do so? or liberal ones? but to
whom shall they be giving? and further, it is absurd to think they have
money or anything of the kind. And as for actions of perfected
self-mastery, what can theirs be? would it not be a degrading praise
that they have no bad desires? In short, if one followed the subject
into all details all the circumstances connected with Moral actions
would appear trivial and unworthy of gods.

Still, every one believes that they live, and therefore that they
Work because it is not supposed that they sleep their time away like
Endymion: now if from a living being you take away Action, still more
if Creation, what remains but Contemplation? So then the Working of
the Gods, eminent in blessedness, will be one apt for Contemplative
Speculation; and of all human Workings that will have the greatest
capacity for Happiness which is nearest akin to this.

A corroboration of which position is the fact that the other animals
do not partake of Happiness, being completely shut out from any such
Working.

To the gods then all their life is blessed; and to men in so far as
there is in it some copy of such Working, but of the other animals none
is happy because it in no way shares in Contemplative Speculation.

Happiness then is co-extensive with this Contemplative Speculation, and
in proportion as people have the act of Contemplation so far have they
also the being happy, not incidentally, but in the way of Contemplative
Speculation because it is in itself precious.

So Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Speculation; but since it
is Man we are speaking of he will need likewise External Prosperity,
because his Nature is not by itself sufficient for Speculation, but
there must be health of body, and nourishment, and tendance of all
kinds.

[Sidenote: 1179a] However, it must not be thought, because without
external goods a man cannot enjoy high Happiness, that therefore he
will require many and great goods in order to be happy: for neither
Self-sufficiency, nor Action, stand in Excess, and it is quite possible
to act nobly without being ruler of sea and land, since even with
moderate means a man may act in accordance with Virtue.

And this may be clearly seen in that men in private stations are thought
to act justly, not merely no less than men in power but even more: it
will be quite enough that just so much should belong to a man as is
necessary, for his life will be happy who works in accordance with
Virtue.

Solon perhaps drew a fair picture of the Happy, when he said that they
are men moderately supplied with external goods, and who have achieved
the most noble deeds, as he thought, and who have lived with perfect
self-mastery: for it is quite possible for men of moderate means to act
as they ought.

Anaxagoras also seems to have conceived of the Happy man not as either
rich or powerful, saying that he should not wonder if he were accounted
a strange man in the judgment of the multitude: for they judge by
outward circumstances of which alone they have any perception.

And thus the opinions of the Wise seem to be accordant with our account
of the matter: of course such things carry some weight, but truth, in
matters of moral action, is judged from facts and from actual life,
for herein rests the decision. So what we should do is to examine the
preceding statements by referring them to facts and to actual life, and
when they harmonise with facts we may accept them, when they are at
variance with them conceive of them as mere theories.

Now he that works in accordance with, and pays observance to, Pure
Intellect, and tends this, seems likely to be both in the best frame of
mind and dearest to the Gods: because if, as is thought, any care is
bestowed on human things by the Gods then it must be reasonable to think
that they take pleasure in what is best and most akin to themselves (and
this must be the Pure Intellect); and that they requite with kindness
those who love and honour this most, as paying observance to what is
dear to them, and as acting rightly and nobly. And it is quite obvious
that the man of Science chiefly combines all these: he is therefore
dearest to the Gods, and it is probable that he is at the same time most
Happy.

Thus then on this view also the man of Science will be most Happy.



IX

Now then that we have said enough in our sketchy kind of way
on these subjects; I mean, on the Virtues, and also on Friendship and
Pleasure; are we to suppose that our original purpose is completed? Must
we not rather acknowledge, what is commonly said, that in matters of
moral action mere Speculation and Knowledge is not the real End but
rather Practice: and if so, then neither in respect of Virtue is
Knowledge enough; we must further strive to have and exert it, and take
whatever other means there are of becoming good.

Now if talking and writing were of themselves sufficient to make men
good, they would justly, as Theognis observes have reaped numerous and
great rewards, and the thing to do would be to provide them: but in
point of fact, while they plainly have the power to guide and stimulate
the generous among the young and to base upon true virtuous principle
any noble and truly high-minded disposition, they as plainly are
powerless to guide the mass of men to Virtue and goodness; because it is
not their nature to be amenable to a sense of shame but only to fear;
nor to abstain from what is low and mean because it is disgraceful to do
it but because of the punishment attached to it: in fact, as they live
at the beck and call of passion, they pursue their own proper pleasures
and the means of securing them, and they avoid the contrary pains; but
as for what is noble and truly pleasurable they have not an idea of it,
inasmuch as they have never tasted of it.

Men such as these then what mere words can transform? No, indeed! it is
either actually impossible, or a task of no mean difficulty, to alter by
words what has been of old taken into men's very dispositions: and,
it may be, it is a ground for contentment if with all the means and
appliances for goodness in our hands we can attain to Virtue.

The formation of a virtuous character some ascribe to Nature, some to
Custom, and some to Teaching. Now Nature's part, be it what it may,
obviously does not rest with us, but belongs to those who in the truest
sense are fortunate, by reason of certain divine agency,

Then, as for Words and Precept, they, it is to be feared, will not avail
with all; but it may be necessary for the mind of the disciple to have
been previously prepared for liking and disliking as he ought; just as
the soil must, to nourish the seed sown. For he that lives in obedience
to passion cannot hear any advice that would dissuade him, nor, if he
heard, understand: now him that is thus how can one reform? in fact,
generally, passion is not thought to yield to Reason but to brute force.
So then there must be, to begin with, a kind of affinity to Virtue in
the disposition; which must cleave to what is honourable and loath
what is disgraceful. But to get right guidance towards Virtue from the
earliest youth is not easy unless one is brought up under laws of such
kind; because living with self-mastery and endurance is not pleasant to
the mass of men, and specially not to the young. For this reason the
food, and manner of living generally, ought to be the subject of
legal regulation, because things when become habitual will not be
disagreeable.

[Sidenote: 1180_a_] Yet perhaps it is not sufficient that men while
young should get right food and tendance, but, inasmuch as they will
have to practise and become accustomed to certain things even after they
have attained to man's estate, we shall want laws on these points as
well, and, in fine, respecting one's whole life, since the mass of men
are amenable to compulsion rather than Reason, and to punishment rather
than to a sense of honour.

And therefore some men hold that while lawgivers should employ the sense
of honour to exhort and guide men to Virtue, under the notion that they
will then obey who have been well trained in habits; they should
impose chastisement and penalties on those who disobey and are of less
promising nature; and the incurable expel entirely: because the good man
and he who lives under a sense of honour will be obedient to reason;
and the baser sort, who grasp at pleasure, will be kept in check, like
beasts of burthen by pain. Therefore also they say that the pains should
be such as are most contrary to the pleasures which are liked.

As has been said already, he who is to be good must have been brought up
and habituated well, and then live accordingly under good institutions,
and never do what is low and mean, either against or with his will. Now
these objects can be attained only by men living in accordance with some
guiding Intellect and right order, with power to back them.

As for the Paternal Rule, it possesses neither strength nor compulsory
power, nor in fact does the Rule of any one man, unless he is a king or
some one in like case: but the Law has power to compel, since it is a
declaration emanating from Practical Wisdom and Intellect. And people
feel enmity towards their fellow-men who oppose their impulses, however
rightly they may do so: the Law, on the contrary, is not the object of
hatred, though enforcing right rules.

The Lacedaemonian is nearly the only State in which the framer of the
Constitution has made any provision, it would seem, respecting the food
and manner of living of the people: in most States these points are
entirely neglected, and each man lives just as he likes, ruling his wife
and children Cyclops-Fashion.

Of course, the best thing would be that there should be a right Public
System and that we should be able to carry it out: but, since as a
public matter those points are neglected, the duty would seem to devolve
upon each individual to contribute to the cause of Virtue with his own
children and friends, or at least to make this his aim and purpose: and
this, it would seem, from what has been said, he will be best able to do
by making a Legislator of himself: since all public *[Sidenote: 1180_b_]
systems, it is plain, are formed by the instrumentality of laws and
those are good which are formed by that of good laws: whether they are
written or unwritten, whether they are applied to the training of one or
many, will not, it seems, make any difference, just as it does not in
music, gymnastics, or any other such accomplishments, which are gained
by practice.

For just as in Communities laws and customs prevail, so too in families
the express commands of the Head, and customs also: and even more in the
latter, because of blood-relationship and the benefits conferred:
for there you have, to begin with, people who have affection and are
naturally obedient to the authority which controls them.

Then, furthermore, Private training has advantages over Public, as in
the case of the healing art: for instance, as a general rule, a man who
is in a fever should keep quiet, and starve; but in a particular case,
perhaps, this may not hold good; or, to take a different illustration,
the boxer will not use the same way of fighting with all antagonists.

It would seem then that the individual will be most exactly attended to
under Private care, because so each will be more likely to obtain what
is expedient for him. Of course, whether in the art of healing, or
gymnastics, or any other, a man will treat individual cases the better
for being acquainted with general rules; as, "that so and so is good for
all, or for men in such and such cases:" because general maxims are not
only said to be but are the object-matter of sciences: still this is no
reason against the possibility of a man's taking excellent care of
some _one_ case, though he possesses no scientific knowledge but from
experience is exactly acquainted with what happens in each point; just
as some people are thought to doctor themselves best though they would
be wholly unable to administer relief to others. Yet it may seem to be
necessary nevertheless, for one who wishes to become a real artist and
well acquainted with the theory of his profession, to have recourse
to general principles and ascertain all their capacities: for we have
already stated that these are the object-matter of sciences.

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