Laura E. Richards - "The Green Satin Gown"

Ian Maclaren - "Kate Carnegie and Those Ministers"

Lydia Howard Sigourney - "Man of Uz, and Other Poems"

F. Scott Fitzgerald - "Flappers and Philosophers"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Ethics

A >> Aristotle >> Ethics




Since then Friendship stands rather in the entertaining, than in being
the object of, the sentiment, and they are praised who are fond of their
friends, it seems that entertaining--*[Sidenote: II59b]the sentiment is
the Excellence of friends; and so, in whomsoever this exists in due
proportion these are stable friends and their Friendship is permanent.
And in this way may they who are unequal best be friends, because they
may thus be made equal.

Equality, then, and similarity are a tie to Friendship, and specially
the similarity of goodness, because good men, being stable in
themselves, are also stable as regards others, and neither ask degrading
services nor render them, but, so to say, rather prevent them: for it is
the part of the good neither to do wrong themselves nor to allow their
friends in so doing.

The bad, on the contrary, have no principle of stability: in fact, they
do not even continue like themselves: only they come to be friends for
a short time from taking delight in one another's wickedness. Those
connected by motives of profit, or pleasure, hold together somewhat
longer: so long, that is to say, as they can give pleasure or profit
mutually.

The Friendship based on motives of profit is thought to be most of all
formed out of contrary elements: the poor man, for instance, is thus a
friend of the rich, and the ignorant of the man of information; that
is to say, a man desiring that of which he is, as it happens, in want,
gives something else in exchange for it. To this same class we may refer
the lover and beloved, the beautiful and the ill-favoured. For this
reason lovers sometimes show in a ridiculous light by claiming to be the
objects of as intense a feeling as they themselves entertain: of course
if they are equally fit objects of Friendship they are perhaps entitled
to claim this, but if they have nothing of the kind it is ridiculous.

Perhaps, moreover, the contrary does not aim at its contrary for its own
sake but incidentally: the mean is really what is grasped at; it being
good for the dry, for instance, not to become wet but to attain the
mean, and so of the hot, etc. However, let us drop these questions,
because they are in fact somewhat foreign to our purpose.

IX

It seems too, as was stated at the commencement, that Friendship and
Justice have the same object-matter, and subsist between the same
persons: I mean that in every Communion there is thought to be some
principle of Justice and also some Friendship: men address as friends,
for instance, those who are their comrades by sea, or in war, and in
like manner also those who are brought into Communion with them in other
ways: and the Friendship, because also the Justice, is co-extensive with
the Communion, This justifies the common proverb, "the goods of friends
are common," since Friendship rests upon Communion.

[1160a] Now brothers and intimate companions have all in common, but
other people have their property separate, and some have more in common
and others less, because the Friendships likewise differ in degree. So
too do the various principles of Justice involved, not being the same
between parents and children as between brothers, nor between companions
as between fellow-citizens merely, and so on of all the other
conceivable Friendships. Different also are the principles of Injustice
as regards these different grades, and the acts become intensified by
being done to friends; for instance, it is worse to rob your companion
than one who is merely a fellow-citizen; to refuse help to a brother
than to a stranger; and to strike your father than any one else. So then
the Justice naturally increases with the degree of Friendship, as being
between the same parties and of equal extent.

All cases of Communion are parts, so to say, of the great Social one,
since in them men associate with a view to some advantage and to procure
some of those things which are needful for life; and the great Social
Communion is thought originally to have been associated and to
continue for the sake of some advantage: this being the point at which
legislators aim, affirming that to be just which is generally expedient.
All the other cases of Communion aim at advantage in particular points;
the crew of a vessel at that which is to result from the voyage which is
undertaken with a view to making money, or some such object; comrades in
war at that which is to result from the war, grasping either at wealth
or victory, or it may be a political position; and those of the same
tribe, or Demus, in like manner.

Some of them are thought to be formed for pleasure's sake, those, for
instance, of bacchanals or club-fellows, which are with a view to
Sacrifice or merely company. But all these seem to be ranged under
the great Social one, inasmuch as the aim of this is, not merely the
expediency of the moment but, for life and at all times; with a view
to which the members of it institute sacrifices and their attendant
assemblies, to render honour to the gods and procure for themselves
respite from toil combined with pleasure. For it appears that
sacrifices and religious assemblies in old times were made as a kind of
first-fruits after the ingathering of the crops, because at such seasons
they had most leisure.

So then it appears that all the instances of Communion are parts of the
great Social one: and corresponding Friendships will follow upon such
Communions.


X

Of Political Constitutions there are three kinds; and equal in number
are the deflections from them, being, so to say, corruptions of them.

The former are Kingship, Aristocracy, and that which recognises the
principle of wealth, which it seems appropriate to call Timocracy (I
give to it the name of a political constitution because people commonly
do so). Of these the best is Monarchy, and Timocracy the worst.

[Sidenote: II6ob] From Monarchy the deflection is Despotism; both being
Monarchies but widely differing from each other; for the Despot looks to
his own advantage, but the King to that of his subjects: for he is in
fact no King who is not thoroughly independent and superior to the rest
in all good things, and he that is this has no further wants: he will
not then have to look to his own advantage but to that of his subjects,
for he that is not in such a position is a mere King elected by lot for
the nonce.

But Despotism is on a contrary footing to this Kingship, because the
Despot pursues his own good: and in the case of this its inferiority
is most evident, and what is worse is contrary to what is best. The
Transition to Despotism is made from Kingship, Despotism being a corrupt
form of Monarchy, that is to say, the bad King comes to be a Despot.

From Aristocracy to Oligarchy the transition is made by the fault of the
Rulers in distributing the public property contrary to right proportion;
and giving either all that is good, or the greatest share, to
themselves; and the offices to the same persons always, making wealth
their idol; thus a few bear rule and they bad men in the place of the
best.

From Timocracy the transition is to Democracy, they being contiguous:
for it is the nature of Timocracy to be in the hands of a multitude,
and all in the same grade of property are equal. Democracy is the least
vicious of all, since herein the form of the constitution undergoes
least change.

Well, these are generally the changes to which the various Constitutions
are liable, being the least in degree and the easiest to make.

Likenesses, and, as it were, models of them, one may find even in
Domestic life: for instance, the Communion between a Father and his Sons
presents the figure of Kingship, because the children are the Father's
care: and hence Homer names Jupiter Father because Kingship is intended
to be a paternal rule. Among the Persians, however, the Father's rule is
Despotic, for they treat their Sons as slaves. (The relation of Master
to Slaves is of the nature of Despotism because the point regarded
herein is the Master's interest): this now strikes me to be as it ought,
but the Persian custom to be mistaken; because for different persons
there should be different rules. [Sidenote: 1161a] Between Husband and
Wife the relation takes the form of Aristocracy, because he rules by
right and in such points only as the Husband should, and gives to
the Wife all that befits her to have. Where the Husband lords it in
everything he changes the relation into an Oligarchy; because he does
it contrary to right and not as being the better of the two. In some
instances the Wives take the reins of government, being heiresses: here
the rule is carried on not in right of goodness but by reason of wealth
and power, as it is in Oligarchies.

Timocracy finds its type in the relation of Brothers: they being equal
except as to such differences as age introduces: for which reason, if
they are very different in age, the Friendship comes to be no longer
a fraternal one: while Democracy is represented specially by families
which have no head (all being there equal), or in which the proper head
is weak and so every member does that which is right in his own eyes.


XI

Attendant then on each form of Political Constitution there plainly is
Friendship exactly co-extensive with the principle of Justice; that
between a King and his Subjects being in the relation of a superiority
of benefit, inasmuch as he benefits his subjects; it being assumed that
he is a good king and takes care of their welfare as a shepherd tends
his flock; whence Homer (to quote him again) calls Agamemnon, "shepherd
of the people." And of this same kind is the Paternal Friendship, only
that it exceeds the former in the greatness of the benefits done;
because the father is the author of being (which is esteemed the
greatest benefit) and of maintenance and education (these things are
also, by the way, ascribed to ancestors generally): and by the law of
nature the father has the right of rule over his sons, ancestors over
their descendants, and the king over his subjects.

These friendships are also between superiors and inferiors, for which
reason parents are not merely loved but also honoured. The principle of
Justice also between these parties is not exactly the same but according
to proportiton, because so also is the Friendship.

Now between Husband and Wife there is the same Friendship as in
Aristocracy: for the relation is determined by relative excellence, and
the better person has the greater good and each has what befits: so too
also is the principle of Justice between them.

The Fraternal Friendship is like that of Companions, because brothers
are equal and much of an age, and such persons have generally like
feelings and like dispositions. Like to this also is the Friendship of a
Timocracy, because the citizens are intended to be equal and equitable:
rule, therefore, passes from hand to hand, and is distributed on equal
terms: so too is the Friendship accordingly.

[Sidenote: 1161b] In the deflections from the constitutional forms, just
as the principle of Justice is but small so is the Friendship also: and
least of all in the most perverted form: in Despotism there is little
or no Friendship. For generally wherever the ruler and the ruled have
nothing in common there is no Friendship because there is no Justice;
but the case is as between an artisan and his tool, or between soul and
body, and master and slave; all these are benefited by those who use
them, but towards things inanimate there is neither Friendship nor
Justice: nor even towards a horse or an ox, or a slave _qua_ slave,
because there is nothing in common: a slave as such is an animate tool,
a tool an inanimate slave. _Qua_ slave, then, there is no Friendship
towards him, only _qua_ man: for it is thought that there is some
principle of Justice between every man, and every other who can share in
law and be a party to an agreement; and so somewhat of Friendship, in so
far as he is man. So in Despotisms the Friendships and the principle of
Justice are inconsiderable in extent, but in Democracies they are most
considerable because they who are equal have much in common.

XII


Now of course all Friendship is based upon Communion, as has been
already stated: but one would be inclined to separate off from the rest
the Friendship of Kindred, and that of Companions: whereas those of men
of the same city, or tribe, or crew, and all such, are more peculiarly,
it would seem, based upon Communion, inasmuch as they plainly exist in
right of some agreement expressed or implied: among these one may rank
also the Friendship of Hospitality,

The Friendship of Kindred is likewise of many kinds, and appears in all
its varieties to depend on the Parental: parents, I mean, love their
children as being a part of themselves, children love their parents as
being themselves somewhat derived from them. But parents know their
offspring more than these know that they are from the parents, and the
source is more closely bound to that which is produced than that which
is produced is to that which formed it: of course, whatever is derived
from one's self is proper to that from which it is so derived (as, for
instance, a tooth or a hair, or any other thing whatever to him that
has it): but the source to it is in no degree proper, or in an inferior
degree at least.

Then again the greater length of time comes in: the parents love their
offspring from the first moment of their being, but their offspring
them only after a lapse of time when they have attained intelligence
or instinct. These considerations serve also to show why mothers have
greater strength of affection than fathers.

Now parents love their children as themselves (since what is derived
from themselves becomes a kind of other Self by the fact of separation),
but children their parents as being sprung from them. And brothers love
one another from being sprung from the same; that is, their sameness
with the common stock creates a sameness with one another; whence come
the phrases, "same blood," "root," and so on. In fact they are the same,
in a sense, even in the separate distinct individuals.

Then again the being brought up together, and the nearness of age, are
a great help towards Friendship, for a man likes one of his own age and
persons who are used to one another are companions, which accounts
for the resemblance between the Friendship of Brothers and that of
Companions.

[Sidenote:1162a] And cousins and all other relatives derive their bond
of union from these, that is to say, from their community of origin: and
the strength of this bond varies according to their respective distances
from the common ancestor.

Further: the Friendship felt by children towards parents, and by men
towards the gods, is as towards something good and above them; because
these have conferred the greatest possible benefits, in that they are
the causes of their being and being nourished, and of their having been
educated after they were brought into being.

And Friendship of this kind has also the pleasurable and the profitable
more than that between persons unconnected by blood, in proportion as
their life is also more shared in common. Then again in the Fraternal
Friendship there is all that there is in that of Companions, and more in
the good, and generally in those who are alike; in proportion as they
are more closely tied and from their very birth have a feeling of
affection for one another to begin with, and as they are more like in
disposition who spring from the same stock and have grown up together
and been educated alike: and besides this they have the greatest
opportunities in respect of time for proving one another, and can
therefore depend most securely upon the trial. The elements
of Friendship between other consanguinities will be of course
proportionably similar.

Between Husband and Wife there is thought to be Friendship by a law of
nature: man being by nature disposed to pair, more than to associate in
Communities: in proportion as the family is prior in order of time and
more absolutely necessary than the Community. And procreation is more
common to him with other animals; all the other animals have Communion
thus far, but human creatures cohabit not merely for the sake of
procreation but also with a view to life in general: because in this
connection the works are immediately divided, and some belong to the
man, others to the woman: thus they help one the other, putting what is
peculiar to each into the common stock.

And for these reasons this Friendship is thought to combine the
profitable and the pleasurable: it will be also based upon virtue if
they are good people; because each has goodness and they may take
delight in this quality in each other. Children too are thought to be a
tie: accordingly the childless sooner separate, for the children are a
good common to both and anything in common is a bond of union.

The question how a man is to live with his wife, or (more generally) one
friend with another, appears to be no other than this, how it is just
that they should: because plainly there is not the same principle
of Justice between a friend and friend, as between strangers, or
companions, or mere chance fellow-travellers.

XIII

[Sidenote:1162b] There are then, as was stated at the commencement of
this book, three kinds of Friendship, and in each there may be friends
on a footing of equality and friends in the relation of superior and
inferior; we find, I mean, that people who are alike in goodness, become
friends, and better with worse, and so also pleasant people; again,
because of advantage people are friends, either balancing exactly their
mutual profitableness or differing from one another herein. Well then,
those who are equal should in right of this equality be equalised also
by the degree of their Friendship and the other points, and those who
are on a footing of inequality by rendering Friendship in proportion to
the superiority of the other party.

Fault-finding and blame arises, either solely or most naturally, in
Friendship of which utility is the motive: for they who are friends by
reason of goodness, are eager to do kindnesses to one another because
this is a natural result of goodness and Friendship; and when men are
vying with each other for this End there can be no fault-finding nor
contention: since no one is annoyed at one who entertains for him the
sentiment of Friendship and does kindnesses to him, but if of a refined
mind he requites him with kind actions. And suppose that one of the two
exceeds the other, yet as he is attaining his object he will not find
fault with his friend, for good is the object of each party.

Neither can there well be quarrels between men who are friends for
pleasure's sake: because supposing them to delight in living together
then both attain their desire; or if not a man would be put in a
ridiculous light who should find fault with another for not pleasing
him, since it is in his power to forbear intercourse with him. But
the Friendship because of advantage is very liable to fault-finding;
because, as the parties use one another with a view to advantage, the
requirements are continually enlarging, and they think they have less
than of right belongs to them, and find fault because though justly
entitled they do not get as much as they want: while they who do the
kindnesses, can never come up to the requirements of those to whom they
are being done.

It seems also, that as the Just is of two kinds, the unwritten and the
legal, so Friendship because of advantage is of two kinds, what may
be called the Moral, and the Legal: and the most fruitful source of
complaints is that parties contract obligations and discharge them not
in the same line of Friendship. The Legal is upon specified conditions,
either purely tradesmanlike from hand to hand or somewhat more
gentlemanly as regards time but still by agreement a _quid pro quo_.

In this Legal kind the obligation is clear and admits of no dispute, the
friendly element is the delay in requiring its discharge: and for this
reason in some countries no actions can be maintained at Law for the
recovery of such debts, it being held that they who have dealt on the
footing of credit must be content to abide the issue.

That which may be termed the Moral kind is not upon specified
conditions, but a man gives as to his friend and so on: but still he
expects to receive an equivalent, or even more, as though he had not
given but lent: he also will find fault, because he does not get the
obligation discharged in the same way as it was contracted.

[Sidenote:1163a] Now this results from the fact, that all men, or the
generality at least, _wish_ what is honourable, but, when tested,
_choose_ what is profitable; and the doing kindnesses disinterestedly
is honourable while receiving benefits is profitable. In such cases one
should, if able, make a return proportionate to the good received, and
do so willingly, because one ought not to make a disinterested friend of
a man against his inclination: one should act, I say, as having made a
mistake originally in receiving kindness from one from whom one ought
not to have received it, he being not a friend nor doing the act
disinterestedly; one should therefore discharge one's self of the
obligation as having received a kindness on specified terms: and if able
a man would engage to repay the kindness, while if he were unable even
the doer of it would not expect it of him: so that if he is able he
ought to repay it. But one ought at the first to ascertain from whom
one is receiving kindness, and on what understanding, that on that same
understanding one may accept it or not.

A question admitting of dispute is whether one is to measure a kindness
by the good done to the receiver of it, and make this the standard by
which to requite, or by the kind intention of the doer?

For they who have received kindnesses frequently plead in depreciation
that they have received from their benefactors such things as were small
for them to give, or such as they themselves could have got from others:
while the doers of the kindnesses affirm that they gave the best they
had, and what could not have been got from others, and under danger, or
in such-like straits.

May we not say, that as utility is the motive of the Friendship the
advantage conferred on the receiver must be the standard? because he it
is who requests the kindness and the other serves him in his need on the
understanding that he is to get an equivalent: the assistance rendered
is then exactly proportionate to the advantage which the receiver has
obtained, and he should therefore repay as much as he gained by it, or
even more, this being more creditable.

In Friendships based on goodness, the question, of course, is never
raised, but herein the motive of the doer seems to be the proper
standard, since virtue and moral character depend principally on motive.


XIV

Quarrels arise also in those Friendships in which the parties are
unequal because each party thinks himself entitled to the greater share,
and of course, when this happens, the Friendship is broken up.

The man who is better than the other thinks that having the greater
share pertains to him of right, for that more is always awarded to the
good man: and similarly the man who is more profitable to another than
that other to him: "one who is useless," they say, "ought not to share
equally, for it comes to a tax, and not a Friendship, unless the fruits
of the Friendship are reaped in proportion to the works done:" their
notion being, that as in a money partnership they who contribute more
receive more so should it be in Friendship likewise.

On the other hand, the needy man and the less virtuous advance the
opposite claim: they urge that "it is the very business of a good friend
to help those who are in need, else what is the use of having a good or
powerful friend if one is not to reap the advantage at all?"

[Sidenote: 1163b] Now each seems to advance a right claim and to be
entitled to get more out of the connection than the other, only _not
more of the same thing_: but the superior man should receive more
respect, the needy man more profit: respect being the reward of goodness
and beneficence, profit being the aid of need.

This is plainly the principle acted upon in Political Communities:
he receives no honour who gives no good to the common stock: for the
property of the Public is given to him who does good to the Public, and
honour is the property of the Public; it is not possible both to make
money out of the Public and receive honour likewise; because no one will
put up with the less in every respect: so to him who suffers loss as
regards money they award honour, but money to him who can be paid by
gifts: since, as has been stated before, the observing due proportion
equalises and preserves Friendship.

Like rules then should be observed in the intercourse of friends who
are unequal; and to him who advantages another in respect of money, or
goodness, that other should repay honour, making requital according to
his power; because Friendship requires what is possible, not what is
strictly due, this being not possible in all cases, as in the honours
paid to the gods and to parents: no man could ever make the due return
in these cases, and so he is thought to be a good man who pays respect
according to his ability.

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