Louis Bertrand - "Saint Augustin"

George Borrow - "Lavengro"

Richard F. Burton - "The Book of the Thousand Nights and a Night, Volume 4"

Abner Doubleday - "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Ethics

A >> Aristotle >> Ethics




Lastly, not only is it a thing necessary but honourable likewise: since
we praise those who are fond of friends, and the having numerous friends
is thought a matter of credit to a man; some go so far as to hold, that
"good man" and "friend" are terms synonymous.

Yet the disputed points respecting it are not few: some men lay down
that it is a kind of resemblance, and that men who are like one another
are friends: whence come the common sayings, "Like will to like," "Birds
of a feather," and so on. Others, on the contrary, say, that all such
come under the maxim, "Two of a trade never agree."

[Sidenote: 1155b] Again, some men push their inquiries on these points
higher and reason physically: as Euripides, who says,

"The earth by drought consumed doth love the rain,
And the great heaven, overcharged with rain,
Doth love to fall in showers upon the earth."

Heraclitus, again, maintains, that "contrariety is expedient, and that
the best agreement arises from things differing, and that all things
come into being in the way of the principle of antagonism."

Empedocles, among others, in direct opposition to these, affirms, that
"like aims at like."

These physical questions we will take leave to omit, inasmuch as they
are foreign to the present inquiry; and we will examine such as are
proper to man and concern moral characters and feelings: as, for
instance, "Does Friendship arise among all without distinction, or is it
impossible for bad men to be friends?" and, "Is there but one species of
Friendship, or several?" for they who ground the opinion that there is
but one on the fact that Friendship admits of degrees hold that upon
insufficient proof; because things which are different in species admit
likewise of degrees (on this point we have spoken before).


II

Our view will soon be cleared on these points when we have ascertained
what is properly the object-matter of Friendship: for it is thought that
not everything indiscriminately, but some peculiar matter alone, is the
object of this affection; that is to say, what is good, or pleasurable,
or useful. Now it would seem that that is useful through which accrues
any good or pleasure, and so the objects of Friendship, as absolute
Ends, are the good and the pleasurable.

A question here arises; whether it is good absolutely or that which is
good to the individuals, for which men feel Friendship (these two being
sometimes distinct): and similarly in respect of the pleasurable. It
seems then that each individual feels it towards that which is good to
himself, and that abstractedly it is the real good which is the object
of Friendship, and to each individual that which is good to each. It
comes then to this; that each individual feels Friendship not for what
_is_ but for that which _conveys to his mind the impression of being_
good to himself. But this will make no real difference, because that
which is truly the object of Friendship will also convey this impression
to the mind.

There are then three causes from which men feel Friendship: but the term
is not applied to the case of fondness for things inanimate because
there is no requital of the affection nor desire for the good of those
objects: it certainly savours of the ridiculous to say that a man fond
of wine wishes well to it: the only sense in which it is true being that
he wishes it to be kept safe and sound for his own use and benefit. But
to the friend they say one should wish all good for his sake. And when
men do thus wish good to another (he not *[Sidenote: 1156a]
reciprocating the feeling), people call them Kindly; because Friendship
they describe as being "Kindliness between persons who reciprocate it."
But must they not add that the feeling must be mutually known? for many
men are kindly disposed towards those whom they have never seen but whom
they conceive to be amiable or useful: and this notion amounts to the
same thing as a real feeling between them.

Well, these are plainly Kindly-disposed towards one another: but how can
one call them friends while their mutual feelings are unknown to one
another? to complete the idea of Friendship, then, it is requisite that
they have kindly feelings towards one another, and wish one another good
from one of the aforementioned causes, and that these kindly feelings
should be mutually known.

III


As the motives to Friendship differ in kind so do the respective
feelings and Friendships. The species then of Friendship are three, in
number equal to the objects of it, since in the line of each there may
be "mutual affection mutually known."

Now they who have Friendship for one another desire one another's good
according to the motive of their Friendship; accordingly they whose
motive is utility have no Friendship for one another really, but only in
so far as some good arises to them from one another.

And they whose motive is pleasure are in like case: I mean, they have
Friendship for men of easy pleasantry, not because they are of a given
character but because they are pleasant to themselves. So then they
whose motive to Friendship is utility love their friends for what is
good to themselves; they whose motive is pleasure do so for what is
pleasurable to themselves; that is to say, not in so far as the friend
beloved _is_ but in so far as he is useful or pleasurable. These
Friendships then are a matter of result: since the object is not beloved
in that he is the man he is but in that he furnishes advantage or
pleasure as the case may be. Such Friendships are of course very liable
to dissolution if the parties do not continue alike: I mean, that the
others cease to have any Friendship for them when they are no longer
pleasurable or useful. Now it is the nature of utility not to be
permanent but constantly varying: so, of course, when the motive which
made them friends is vanished, the Friendship likewise dissolves; since
it existed only relatively to those circumstances.

Friendship of this kind is thought to exist principally among the old
(because men at that time of life pursue not what is pleasurable but
what is profitable); and in such, of men in their prime and of the
young, as are given to the pursuit of profit. They that are such have no
intimate intercourse with one another; for sometimes they are not
even pleasurable to one another; nor, in fact, do they desire such
intercourse unless their friends are profitable to them, because they
are pleasurable only in so far as they have hopes of advantage. With
these Friendships is commonly ranked that of hospitality.

But the Friendship of the young is thought to be based on the motive
of pleasure: because they live at the beck and call of passion and
generally pursue what is pleasurable to themselves and the object of the
present moment: and as their age changes so likewise do their pleasures.

This is the reason why they form and dissolve Friendships rapidly: since
the Friendship changes with the pleasurable object and such pleasure
changes quickly.

[Sidenote: 1156b] The young are also much given up to Love; this passion
being, in great measure, a matter of impulse and based on pleasure: for
which cause they conceive Friendships and quickly drop them, changing
often in the same day: but these wish for society and intimate
intercourse with their friends, since they thus attain the object of
their Friendship.

That then is perfect Friendship which subsists between those who are
good and whose similarity consists in their goodness: for these men wish
one another's good in similar ways; in so far as they are good (and good
they are in themselves); and those are specially friends who wish good
to their friends for their sakes, because they feel thus towards them on
their own account and not as a mere matter of result; so the Friendship
between these men continues to subsist so long as they are good; and
goodness, we know, has in it a principle of permanence.

Moreover, each party is good abstractedly and also relatively to his
friend, for all good men are not only abstractedly good but also useful
to one another. Such friends are also mutually pleasurable because
all good men are so abstractedly, and also relatively to one another,
inasmuch as to each individual those actions are pleasurable which
correspond to his nature, and all such as are like them. Now when men
are good these will be always the same, or at least similar.

Friendship then under these circumstances is permanent, as we should
reasonably expect, since it combines in itself all the requisite
qualifications of friends. I mean, that Friendship of whatever kind is
based upon good or pleasure (either abstractedly or relatively to the
person entertaining the sentiment of Friendship), and results from a
similarity of some sort; and to this kind belong all the aforementioned
requisites in the parties themselves, because in this the parties are
similar, and so on: moreover, in it there is the abstractedly good and
the abstractedly pleasant, and as these are specially the object-matter
of Friendship so the feeling and the state of Friendship is found most
intense and most excellent in men thus qualified.

Rare it is probable Friendships of this kind will be, because men
of this kind are rare. Besides, all requisite qualifications being
presupposed, there is further required time and intimacy: for, as the
proverb says, men cannot know one another "till they have eaten the
requisite quantity of salt together;" nor can they in fact admit one
another to intimacy, much less be friends, till each has appeared to
the other and been proved to be a fit object of Friendship. They who
speedily commence an interchange of friendly actions may be said to wish
to be friends, but they are not so unless they are also proper objects
of Friendship and mutually known to be such: that is to say, a desire
for Friendship may arise quickly but not Friendship itself.


IV

Well, this Friendship is perfect both in respect of the time and in all
other points; and exactly the same and similar results accrue to each
party from the other; which ought to be the case between friends.

[Sidenote: II57a] The friendship based upon the pleasurable is, so to
say, a copy of this, since the good are sources of pleasure to one
another: and that based on utility likewise, the good being also
useful to one another. Between men thus connected Friendships are
most permanent when the same result accrues to both from one another,
pleasure, for instance; and not merely so but from the same source, as
in the case of two men of easy pleasantry; and not as it is in that of a
lover and the object of his affection, these not deriving their pleasure
from the same causes, but the former from seeing the latter and the
latter from receiving the attentions of the former: and when the bloom
of youth fades the Friendship sometimes ceases also, because then the
lover derives no pleasure from seeing and the object of his affection
ceases to receive the attentions which were paid before: in many cases,
however, people so connected continue friends, if being of similar
tempers they have come from custom to like one another's disposition.

Where people do not interchange pleasure but profit in matters of Love,
the Friendship is both less intense in degree and also less permanent:
in fact, they who are friends because of advantage commonly part when
the advantage ceases; for, in reality, they never were friends of one
another but of the advantage.

So then it appears that from motives of pleasure or profit bad men may
be friends to one another, or good men to bad men or men of neutral
character to one of any character whatever: but disinterestedly, for the
sake of one another, plainly the good alone can be friends; because
bad men have no pleasure even in themselves unless in so far as some
advantage arises.

And further, the Friendship of the good is alone superior to calumny;
it not being easy for men to believe a third person respecting one
whom they have long tried and proved: there is between good men mutual
confidence, and the feeling that one's friend would never have done one
wrong, and all other such things as are expected in Friendship really
worthy the name; but in the other kinds there is nothing to prevent all
such suspicions.

I call them Friendships, because since men commonly give the name of
friends to those who are connected from motives of profit (which is
justified by political language, for alliances between states are
thought to be contracted with a view to advantage), and to those who are
attached to one another by the motive of pleasure (as children are), we
may perhaps also be allowed to call such persons friends, and say there
are several species of Friendship; primarily and specially that of
the good, in that they are good, and the rest only in the way of
resemblance: I mean, people connected otherwise are friends in that way
in which there arises to them somewhat good and some mutual resemblance
(because, we must remember the pleasurable is good to those who are fond
of it).

These secondary Friendships, however, do not combine very well; that is
to say, the same persons do not become friends by reason of advantage
and by reason of the pleasurable, for these matters of result are not
often combined. And Friendship having been divided into these kinds, bad
[Sidenote: _1157b_] men will be friends by reason of pleasure or profit,
this being their point of resemblance; while the good are friends for
one another's sake, that is, in so far as they are good.

These last may be termed abstractedly and simply friends, the former as
a matter of result and termed friends from their resemblance to these
last.


V

Further; just as in respect of the different virtues some men are termed
good in respect of a certain inward state, others in respect of acts
of working, so is it in respect of Friendship: I mean, they who live
together take pleasure in, and impart good to, one another: but they who
are asleep or are locally separated do not perform acts, but only are in
such a state as to act in a friendly way if they acted at all: distance
has in itself no direct effect upon Friendship, but only prevents the
acting it out: yet, if the absence be protracted, it is thought to cause
a forgetfulness even of the Friendship: and hence it has been said,
"many and many a Friendship doth want of intercourse destroy."

Accordingly, neither the old nor the morose appear to be calculated for
Friendship, because the pleasurableness in them is small, and no one can
spend his days in company with that which is positively painful or even
not pleasurable; since to avoid the painful and aim at the pleasurable
is one of the most obvious tendencies of human nature. They who get on
with one another very fairly, but are not in habits of intimacy, are
rather like people having kindly feelings towards one another than
friends; nothing being so characteristic of friends as the living with
one another, because the necessitous desire assistance, and the happy
companionship, they being the last persons in the world for solitary
existence: but people cannot spend their time together unless they are
mutually pleasurable and take pleasure in the same objects, a quality
which is thought to appertain to the Friendship of companionship.

The connection then subsisting between the good is Friendship _par
excellence_, as has already been frequently said: since that which is
abstractedly good or pleasant is thought to be an object of Friendship
and choiceworthy, and to each individual whatever is such to him;
and the good man to the good man for both these reasons. (Now the
entertaining the sentiment is like a feeling, but Friendship itself
like a state: because the former may have for its object even things
inanimate, but requital of Friendship is attended with moral choice
which proceeds from a moral state: and again, men wish good to the
objects of their Friendship for their sakes, not in the way of a mere
feeling but of moral state.).

And the good, in loving their friend, love their own good (inasmuch as
the good man, when brought into that relation, becomes a good to him
with whom he is so connected), so that either party loves his own
good, and repays his friend equally both in wishing well and in the
pleasurable: for equality is said to be a tie of Friendship. Well, these
points belong most to the Friendship between good men.

But between morose or elderly men Friendship is less apt to arise,
because they are somewhat awkward-tempered, and take less pleasure in
intercourse and society; these being thought to be specially friendly
and productive of Friendship: and so young men become friends quickly,
old men not so (because people do not become friends with any, unless
they take pleasure in them); and in like manner neither do the morose.
Yet men of these classes entertain kindly feelings towards one another:
they wish good to one another and render mutual assistance in respect of
their needs, but they are not quite friends, because they neither
spend their time together nor take pleasure in one another, which
circumstances are thought specially to belong to Friendship.

To be a friend to many people, in the way of the perfect Friendship, is
not possible; just as you cannot be in love with many at once: it is,
so to speak, a state of excess which naturally has but one object; and
besides, it is not an easy thing for one man to be very much pleased
with many people at the same time, nor perhaps to find many really good.
Again, a man needs experience, and to be in habits of close intimacy,
which is very difficult.

But it _is_ possible to please many on the score of advantage and
pleasure: because there are many men of the kind, and the services may
be rendered in a very short time.

Of the two imperfect kinds that which most resembles the perfect is the
Friendship based upon pleasure, in which the same results accrue from
both and they take pleasure in one another or in the same objects; such
as are the Friendships of the young, because a generous spirit is most
found in these. The Friendship because of advantage is the connecting
link of shopkeepers.

Then again, the very happy have no need of persons who are profitable,
but of pleasant ones they have because they wish to have people to live
intimately with; and what is painful they bear for a short time indeed,
but continuously no one could support it, nay, not even the Chief Good
itself, if it were painful to him individually: and so they look out for
pleasant friends: perhaps they ought to require such to be good also;
and good moreover to themselves individually, because then they will
have all the proper requisites of Friendship.

Men in power are often seen to make use of several distinct friends:
for some are useful to them and others pleasurable, but the two are not
often united: because they do not, in fact, seek such as shall combine
pleasantness and goodness, nor such as shall be useful for honourable
purposes: but with a view to attain what is pleasant they look out for
men of easy-pleasantry; and again, for men who are clever at executing
any business put into their hands: and these qualifications are not
commonly found united in the same man.

It has been already stated that the good man unites the qualities of
pleasantness and usefulness: but then such a one will not be a friend to
a superior unless he be also his superior in goodness: for if this be
not the case, he cannot, being surpassed in one point, make things
equal by a proportionate degree of Friendship. And characters who unite
superiority of station and goodness are not common. Now all the kinds
of Friendship which have been already mentioned exist in a state of
equality, inasmuch as either the same results accrue to both and they
wish the same things to one another, or else they barter one thing
against another; pleasure, for instance, against profit: it has been
said already that Friendships of this latter kind are less intense in
degree and less permanent.

And it is their resemblance or dissimilarity to the same thing which
makes them to be thought to be and not to be Friendships: they show like
Friendships in right of their likeness to that which is based on virtue
(the one kind having the pleasurable, the other the profitable, both
of which belong also to the other); and again, they do not show like
Friendships by reason of their unlikeness to that true kind; which
unlikeness consists herein, that while that is above calumny and so
permanent these quickly change and differ in many other points.


VII

But there is another form of Friendship, that, namely, in which the one
party is superior to the other; as between father and son, elder and
younger, husband and wife, ruler and ruled. These also differ one from
another: I mean, the Friendship between parents and children is not the
same as between ruler and the ruled, nor has the father the same towards
the son as the son towards the father, nor the husband towards the wife
as she towards him; because the work, and therefore the excellence, of
each of these is different, and different therefore are the causes of
their feeling Friendship; distinct and different therefore are their
feelings and states of Friendship.

And the same results do not accrue to each from the other, nor in fact
ought they to be looked for: but, when children render to their parents
what they ought to the authors of their being, and parents to their sons
what they ought to their offspring, the Friendship between such parties
will be permanent and equitable.

Further; the feeling of Friendship should be in a due proportion in all
Friendships which are between superior and inferior; I mean, the better
man, or the more profitable, and so forth, should be the object of a
stronger feeling than he himself entertains, because when the feeling of
Friendship comes to be after a certain rate then equality in a certain
sense is produced, which is thought to be a requisite in Friendship.

(It must be remembered, however, that the equal is not in the same case
as regards Justice and Friendship: for in strict Justice the exactly
proportioned equal ranks first, and the actual numerically equal ranks
second, while in Friendship this is exactly reversed.)

[Sidenote: 1159a] And that equality is thus requisite is plainly shown
by the occurrence of a great difference of goodness or badness, or
prosperity, or something else: for in this case, people are not any
longer friends, nay they do not even feel that they ought to be. The
clearest illustration is perhaps the case of the gods, because they are
most superior in all good things. It is obvious too, in the case of
kings, for they who are greatly their inferiors do not feel entitled to
be friends to them; nor do people very insignificant to be friends to
those of very high excellence or wisdom. Of course, in such cases it
is out of the question to attempt to define up to what point they may
continue friends: for you may remove many points of agreement and the
Friendship last nevertheless; but when one of the parties is very far
separated (as a god from men), it cannot continue any longer.

This has given room for a doubt, whether friends do really wish to their
friends the very highest goods, as that they may be gods: because, in
case the wish were accomplished, they would no longer have them for
friends, nor in fact would they have the good things they had, because
friends are good things. If then it has been rightly said that a friend
wishes to his friend good things for that friend's sake, it must be
understood that he is to remain such as he now is: that is to say, he
will wish the greatest good to him of which as man he is capable: yet
perhaps not all, because each man desires good for himself most of all.

VIII

It is thought that desire for honour makes the mass of men wish rather
to be the objects of the feeling of Friendship than to entertain it
themselves (and for this reason they are fond of flatterers, a flatterer
being a friend inferior or at least pretending to be such and rather to
entertain towards another the feeling of Friendship than to be himself
the object of it), since the former is thought to be nearly the same as
being honoured, which the mass of men desire. And yet men seem to choose
honour, not for its own sake, but incidentally: I mean, the common run
of men delight to be honoured by those in power because of the hope it
raises; that is they think they shall get from them anything they may
happen to be in want of, so they delight in honour as an earnest of
future benefit. They again who grasp at honour at the hands of the good
and those who are really acquainted with their merits desire to confirm
their own opinion about themselves: so they take pleasure in the
conviction that they are good, which is based on the sentence of those
who assert it. But in being the objects of Friendship men delight for
its own sake, and so this may be judged to be higher than being honoured
and Friendship to be in itself choiceworthy. Friendship, moreover, is
thought to consist in feeling, rather than being the object of, the
sentiment of Friendship, which is proved by the delight mothers have in
the feeling: some there are who give their children to be adopted and
brought up by others, and knowing them bear this feeling towards them
never seeking to have it returned, if both are not possible; but seeming
to be content with seeing them well off and bearing this feeling
themselves towards them, even though they, by reason of ignorance, never
render to them any filial regard or love.

Copyright (c) 2007. topboookz.com. All rights reserved.