Camps, Quarters, and Casual Places

A >> Archibald Forbes >> Camps, Quarters, and Casual Places

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The "Plain of Balaclava" is divided into two distinct valleys by a low
ridge known as the "Causeway Heights," which bisects it in the direction
of its length and is everywhere easily practicable for all arms. The
valley nearest to the sea and the town of Balaclava has been variously
termed the "South" and the "Inner" valley; it was on the slope descending
to it from the ridge that our Heavy Cavalry won their success; the valley
beyond the ridge is the "North" or "Outer" valley, down which, their faces
set eastward, sped to glorious disaster the "noble six hundred" of the
Light Brigade. On the north the plain is bounded by the Fedoukine heights;
on the west by the steep face of the Chersonese upland whereon was the
allied main position before Sevastopol during the siege; on the south by
the broken ground between the plain and the sea; on the east by the River
Tchernaya and the Kamara hills. Our weakness in the plain invited attack.
At Kadikoei, on its southern verge, Sir Colin Campbell covered Balaclava
with a Scottish regiment, a Field battery, and some Turks. Near the
western end of the South valley were the camps of the cavalry division.
Straggled along the Causeway heights was a series of weak earthworks whose
total armament consisted of nine iron guns, and among which were
distributed some six or seven battalions of Turkish infantry. At daybreak
of 25th October the Russian General Liprandi with a force of 22,000
infantry, 3300 cavalry, and 78 guns, took the offensive by driving the
Turkish garrisons out of these earthworks in succession, beginning with
the most easterly--No. 1, known as "Canrobert's Hill." The Turks holding
it fought well and stood a storm and heavy loss before they were expelled.
The other earthworks fell with less and less resistance, and the first
three, with seven out of their nine guns, remained in the Russian
possession.

During the morning, while the Russians were taking the earthworks along
the ridge, our two cavalry brigades, in the words of General Hamley, had
been manoeuvring so as to threaten the flanks of any force which might
approach Balaclava, without committing themselves to an action in which
they would have been without the support of infantry. Ultimately, until
his infantry should become available, Lord Raglan drew in the cavalry
division to a position on the left of redoubt No. 6, near the foot of the
Chersonese upland.

While it was temporarily quiescent there Liprandi was engaging in an
operation of enterprise rare in the record of Russian cavalry. General
Ryjoff at the head of a great body of horse started on an advance up the
North valley. Presently he detached four squadrons to his left, which
moved toward where Sir Colin Campbell was in position at the head of the
Kadikoei gorge, was repulsed without difficulty by that soldier's fire, and
rode back whence it had come. The main body of Russian horse, computed by
unimaginative authorities to be about 2000 strong, continued up the valley
till it was about abreast of redoubt No. 4 [Footnote: See Map.], when it
halted; checked apparently, writes Kinglake, by the fire of two guns from
a battery on the edge of the upland. The "C" Troop chronicler states that
in addition to "a few" shots fired by this battery (manned by Turks), the
guns of "I" troop R.H.A., temporarily stationed in a little hollow in
front of the Light Brigade [Footnote: See Map.], fired rapidly one round
each, "haphazard," over the high ground in their front. General Hamley
assigns no ground for the Russian halt, but mentions that just at the
moment of collision between our Heavies and the Russian mass "three guns"
on the edge of the upland were fired on the latter. From whatever cause,
the Russian cavalry wheeled obliquely to the leftward, crossed the
Causeway heights about redoubt No. 5, and began to descend the slope of
the South valley. Kinglake heard of no ground for believing that the
Russian horse thus wheeling southward, were cognisant of the presence of
the Heavies in the valley they were entering. But the "C" Troop chronicler
states that as the Troop was crossing the plain a few Russian horsemen
were seen by it trotting fast along the top of the ridge [Footnote: See
Map.], who, when almost immediately afterwards the head of the Russian
column showed itself on the skyline, were set down as the General
commanding it and his staff.

Kinglake observes that the Russians have declared their object in this
operation to have been the destruction of a non-existent artillery park
near Kadikoei, while some of our people imagined it to have been a real
attempt on Balaclava. But up the centre of the North valley was neither
the directest nor the safest way to Kadikoei, much less to Balaclava. Is it
not more probable that the enterprise was of the nature merely of a sort
of "snap-offensive"; while as yet the allied infantry visibly pouring down
the slopes of the upland were innocuous because of distance and while the
sole occupants of the plain were a couple of weak cavalry brigades and a
single horse battery? Ryjoff on the ridge could see in his front at least
portions of the Light Brigade; its fire told him the horse battery was
thereabouts too, and there were those shots from the cannon on the upland.
Is it not feasible that, looking down on his left to Scarlett's poor six
squadrons--his two following regiments were then some distance off--and
seeing those squadrons as yet without accompanying artillery, he should
have judged them his easier quarry and ordered the wheel that should bring
his avalanche down on them?

Kinglake recounts how, while our cavalry division yet stood intact near
the foot of the upland, Lord Raglan had noticed the instability of the
Turks under Campbell's command at Kadikoei and had sent Lord Lucan
directions to move down eight squadrons of Heavies to support them; how
Scarlett started with the Inniskillings, Greys, and Fifth Dragoon Guards,
numbering six squadrons, to be followed by the two squadrons of the Royals;
how the march toward Kadikoei was proceeding along the South valley, when
all of a sudden Elliot, General Scarlett's aide-de-camp, glancing up
leftward at the ridge "saw its top fretted with lances, and in another
moment the skyline broken by evident squadrons of horse." Then, Kinglake
proceeds, Scarlett's resolve was instantaneous; he gave the command "Left
wheel into line!" and confronted the mass gathering into sight over
against him. Soon after Scarlett had started Lord Lucan had learned of the
advance up the North valley of the great mass of Russian cavalry, which he
had presently descried himself, as also its change of direction southward
across the Causeway ridge; and after giving Lord Cardigan "parting
instructions" which that officer construed into compulsory inactivity on
his part when a great opportunity presented itself, he had galloped off at
speed to overtake Scarlett and give him directions for prompt conflict
with the Russian cavalry. Thus far Kinglake.

The testimony of the "C" Troop chronicler differs from the above statement
in every detail. He significantly points out that Kinglake does not, as is
his custom, quote the words of Lord Raglan's order directing the march of
the Heavies to Kadikoei. His averment is to the following effect. When the
cavalry division after its manoeuvring of the morning was retiring by Lord
Raglan's command along the South valley toward the foot of the upland, it
was followed as closely as they dared by some Cossacks who busied
themselves in spearing and capturing the unfortunate Turks flying from the
ridge toward Kadikoei athwart the rear of the British squadrons. Eventually
the Cossacks reached the camp of the Light Brigade and set about stabbing
and hacking at the sick and non-effective horses left standing at the
picket-lines. Lord Raglan from his commanding position on the upland saw
those Cossacks working mischief in our lines, and sent a message to Lord
Lucan "to take some cavalry forward and protect the camp from being
destroyed." The "C" Troop chronicler has in his possession a letter from
the actual bearer of this message, to the effect that he duly delivered it
to Lord Lucan and that consequent on it his lordship moved forward some
heavy cavalry into the plain toward the picket-lines. Testimony to be
presently noted will indicate the importance of this statement. The
chronicler denies that Lord Lucan, as Kinglake states, galloped after
Scarlett after having given Lord Cardigan his "parting instructions." No
doubt he did give those instructions, when apprised by Lord Raglan's
aide-de-camp of the threatening advance of Russian horse. But what he then
did, assured as he was of the stationary attitude of the heavy squadrons
sent out to protect the camp, was to ride forward along the ridge-line to
discern for himself where, if indeed anywhere, the Russians were intending
to strike. He most daringly remained at a forward and commanding point of
the ridge [Footnote: See Map.] until actually chased off his ground by the
van of the Russian wheel, and he then galloped straight down the slope to
join Scarlett drawing out his squadrons for the conflict with the Russian
mass whose leading files Elliot's keen eye had discerned on the skyline.

If Kinglake were right as to his alleged movement of the Heavies toward
Kadikoei and its sudden arrestment because of Elliot's discovery, "C"
Troop, as it approached them, would have seen the squadrons still in
motion. But the chronicler testifies that "C" Troop, while moving to the
scene of action and when still more than a mile and a half distant (at
least fifteen minutes at the pace the weakened gun-teams travelled), had a
full view of the South valley. And it then saw five squadrons of heavy
cavalry thus early halted in the plain near the cavalry picket-lines,
fronting towards the ridge and apparently perfectly dressed--the Greys
(two squadrons deep) in the centre, recognised by their bearskins; a
helmeted regiment (also two squadrons deep) on the left (afterwards known
to be the 5th Dragoon Guards); and one helmeted squadron on the right (2nd
squadron Inniskillings). A sixth squadron (1st Inniskillings) was visible
some distance to the right rear and it was also fronting towards the
ridge. This force, so and thus early positioned, consisted, avers the
chronicler, of the identical troops which Kinglake erroneously describes
as straggling hurriedly into deployment under the urgency of Scarlett and
Lucan to cope with the suddenly disclosed adversary.

When "C" Troop and its chronicler reached the rear of the formed-up
squadrons they were found in the same formation as when first observed,
but the whole had in the interval been moved somewhat to the right,
farther into the plain, with intent no doubt to be clear of obstacles on
the previous front. Kinglake speaks throughout of the force that first
charged under Scarlett--"Scarlett's three hundred," as consisting of three
squadrons ranked thus:--

------------------- ------------------- -------------------
2nd squad. lst squad. 2nd squad. Inniskillings

\__________________________/
Greys.

And, although his words are not so clear as usual, he appears to believe
that the 5th Dragoon Guards, whom in his plan he places some little
distance to the left rear of the Greys, were actually the last to move to
the attack, of all the five regiments participating in the heavy cavalry
onslaught. The "C" Troop chronicler, noting details, be it remembered,
from his position immediately in rear of the cavalry force which first
charged, describes its composition and formation thus:--

------------------- ------------------- -------------------
Front squad. 5th Dr. Guards. 1st squad. Greys. 2nd squad.
Inniskillings.
------------------- -------------------
Rear squad. 5th Dr. Guards. 2nd squad. Greys.

in all five squadrons, instead of Mr. Kinglake's three. Nor, according to
the chronicler, did the three squadrons in first line start
simultaneously, as Kinglake distinctly conveys. The leading squadron of
the Greys moved off first, and just as it was breaking into a gallop was
temporarily hampered by the swerving of the horse of Colonel Griffiths,
who was struck in the head by a bullet from the halted Russians' carbine
fire. Next moved, almost simultaneously, the 2nd squadron Inniskillings
and the front squadron 5th Dragoon Guards; thirdly, the 2nd squadron
Greys, and finally the rear squadron 5th Dragoon Guards. Lord Lucan is
represented as having been "personally concerned in or approving of
everything connected with the five squadrons at this moment," galloping to
each in succession, giving orders when and in what sequence it was to
start, what section of the Russian front it was to strike, and exerting
himself to the utmost to have everything fully understood. His errors were
in omitting to call in the outlying regiments of the brigade, and either
now--or earlier before he left the ridge, specifically to order Lord
Cardigan to fall on the flank of the Russians at the moment when their
front should be _aux prises_ with Scarlett's heavy squadrons. "C" Troop's
position was such that it could command, over the heads of the stationary
Heavies, the gradual slope up to the Russian front, and every detail of
the charge was under its eyes. Scarlett's burnished helmet and plain blue
coat were conspicuous in front. The Troop also had the opportunity of
making a deliberate study of the Russian cavalry both before and during
the combat.

Its front had the appearance of three strong squadrons; its formation was
either close or quarter distance column--probably the former, since the
column could nowhere be seen through from front to rear; its depth halted
was about the same as its breadth of front; its pace across the ridge was
a sharp trot and its discipline was indicated by the smartness with which
it took ground to the left. Kinglake describes the serried mass as
encircled by a loose fringe of satellites, but the "C" Troop chronicler
saw neither skirmishers, flankers, nor scouts; and no guns were discerned
or heard, although General Hamley says that as the huge cohort swept down
batteries darted out from it and threw shells against the troops on the
upland. No Lancers were seen with the column, certainly none with pennons.
The "partial deployment" of which Kinglake speaks, consisting of "wings or
forearms" devised to cover the flanks or fold inwards on the front, did
not make itself apparent to any observer of "C" Troop; and indeed the
present writer never knew a Russian who had heard of it, the species of
formation adumbrated, so far as he is aware, being confined to Zulu impis.
It was noticed, and this is not rare, that on the halt the centre pulled
up a little earlier than the flanks, so that the latter were somewhat
prolonged and advanced. The halt was quite brief and a slower advance
ensued without correction of the frontal dressing. Presently there was
another halt and some pistol or carbine fire from the central squadron on
the advancing first squadron of the Greys. Kinglake makes the Russian
front meet our assault halted, but the "C" Troop chronicler declares that
when the collision occurred the mass were actually moving forward but at
"a pace so slow that it could hardly be called a trot." General Hamley
describes "the impetus of the enemy's column carrying it on, and pressing
our combatants back for a short space," and the chronicler speaks of the
Russians as surging forward after the impact, but without bearing back our
people.

It is extremely difficult for the reader of a detailed narrative of a
combat that may become a landmark in the military history of a nation, to
realise that it may have been fought and finished in no longer time than
it has taken him to read the few paragraphs of introductory matter. Mr.
Kinglake has devoted a whole volume to the battle of Balaclava, and
four-fifths of it deals with the two cavalry fights--Scarlett's charge,
and the charge of the Light Brigade. The latter deed was enacted from
start to finish within the space of five-and-twenty minutes; as regards
the former, from the first appearance of the Russian troopers on the
skyline to their defeat and flight a period of eight minutes is the
outside calculation. General Hamley, an eyewitness, says "some four or
five minutes." During those minutes "C" Troop R.H.A. under Brandling's
shrewd and independent guidance was moving slowly forward on the right of
the ground that had been covered by the charging Heavies. There was no
opportunity for its intervention while the melley lasted. Even when the
Russian squadrons broke it could not for the moment act while the redcoats
were still blended with the gray. But Brandling saw that his chance was
nigh; he galloped forward to the point marked C on the map, unlimbered,
and stood intent. Kinglake states that the fugitive Russians, hanging
together as closely as they could, retreated by the way they had come and
Hamley describes them as vanishing beyond the ridge. Kinglake also says
that "I" Troop R.H.A. (accompanying the Light Brigade) fired a few shots
at the retreating horsemen, against whom Barker's battery, from its
position near Kadikoei, also came into action. The "C" Troop chronicler
traverses those statements. His testimony is that the Russian line of
retreat was by their left rear along the slope of the South valley, and
not immediately over the ridge; that the mass was spread over acres of
ground; and that their officers were trying to rally the men and had
actually got some ranks formed, when "C" Troop opened fire from about
point C in the general direction of point D. "I" Troop was out of sight,
he says, and Barker out of range; neither came into action; but "C" Troop,
of whose presence in the field Kinglake apparently was unaware, fired
forty-nine shot and shells, broke up the attempted rally, and punished the
Russians severely. The range was about 750 paces.

At the time when the Light Brigade started on its "mad-brained" charge
down the North valley, "C" Troop was halted dismounted on the slope of the
South valley a little below redoubt No. 5. In rear of it was the Heavy
Cavalry Brigade, halted on the scene of its recent victorious combat. Lord
Lucan was some little distance to the front. "C" Troop presently saw him
trot away over the ridge in the direction of the Light Brigade, a scrap of
paper in his hand at which he kept looking--doubtless the memorable order
which Nolan had just brought him--and a group of staff officers, among
whom was Nolan, behind him. Out of curiosity Brandling with his trumpeter
rode up to the crest, whence he commanded a view into the North valley. By
and by some of the Heavies were moved over the crest, no doubt the Royals
and Greys which Scarlett was to lead forward in support of the Light
Brigade. All was still quiet but for an occasional shot from a Russian
battery about redoubt No. 2, when suddenly Brandling came galloping back
shouting "Mount! mount!" and telling his officers as he came in that the
Light Cavalry had begun an advance on the other side of the ridge. But
that he had happened to ride to the crest, the charge of the Light Brigade
would have begun and ended without the knowledge of "C" Troop. No order
from any source reached it, and Brandling, acting on his own initiative,
took his guns rapidly to the front along the inner edge of the ridge and
unlimbered at point G. He durst not fire into the bottom of the North
valley where our light horsemen were mixed up with the enemy; all the
diversion he could effect was to open on the Russian cannon-smoke directly
in his front, about redoubt No. 2. Even from this he had soon to desist,
being without support and threatened by the Russian cavalry, and he
retired by the way he had advanced, to point F, where the troop halted
near the Heavies, whose advance Lord Lucan had arrested resolving that
they at all events should not be destroyed. These regiments had been moved
toward the ridge out of the line of fire in the North valley, and were
kept shifting their position and gradually retiring, suffering frequent
casualties from the Russian artillery about redoubt No. 2 until they
finally halted near the crest in the vicinity of "C" Troop's latest
position at point F.

At this point only the left-hand gun of "C" Troop was on the crest, with a
view into the North valley; the other guns were on the southern slope. But
little had been previously seen of the terrible and glorious experiences
of the Light Brigade; and now what was witnessed was not the glory but the
horror of battle. For the wounded of the charge were passing to the rear,
shattered and maimed, some staggering on foot, others reeling in their
saddles, calling to the gunners and the Heavies to look at a "poor broken
leg" or a dangling arm. Brandling and his officers held their flasks to
the poor fellows' mouths as long as the contents lasted. The "C" Troop
chronicler, whose narrative I have been following, tells how Captain
Morris, who commanded the 17th Lancers, was carried past the front of the
troop towards Kadikoei, dreadfully wounded about the head and calling
loudly: "Lord, have mercy on my soul!" Kinglake gives a wholly different
account of Captain Morris's removal from the field; but the "C" Troop
chronicler is quite firm on his version, and explains that the 17th
Lancers and "C" Troop having lain together shortly before the war all the
people of the latter knew and identified Captain Morris.

Balaclava is rather an old story now, and some readers may require to be
reminded that the Light Brigade charged in two lines, the first line being
led by Lord Cardigan, the second by Lord George Paget; that the first line
rode into the Russian batteries considerably in advance of the second, the
latter having advanced at a more measured pace; and that the second line,
with sore diminished ranks and accompanied by a couple of groups rather
than detachments of the first, came back later than did the few survivors
of Cardigan's regiments other than the groups referred to. The aspersion
on Cardigan was that he returned prematurely, instead of remaining to
share the fortunes of the second line of his brigade, and this he did not
deny. Kinglake's statement is that "he rode back alone at a pace
decorously slow, towards the spot where Scarlett was halted." He adds that
General Scarlett maintained that Lord Lucan was present at the time; but
Lord Lucan's averment was that Lord Cardigan did not approach him until
afterwards when all was over. Kinglake relates further that when Lord
George Paget came back at the head of the last detachment, some officers
rode forward to greet him one of whom was Lord Cardigan. Seeing him
approach composedly from the rear Lord George exclaimed: "Halloa, Lord
Cardigan, weren't you there?" to which, according to one version of the
story, Cardigan replied: "Wasn't I, though? Here, Jenyns, didn't you see
me at the guns?"

The reasonable inferences from Kinglake are that Cardigan's first halt was
made and that his earliest remarks were uttered when he reached Scarlett,
and that he and Paget met after the charge for the first time when the
alleged question and answer passed.

The "C" Troop chronicler's narrative of events is right in the teeth of
these inferences. While the troop was halted at point F and after a great
many wounded and disabled men had already passed it going to the rear,
Lord Cardigan came riding by at a "quiet pace" close under the crest. He
had passed the troop on his left for several horse-lengths, when he came
back and halted within a yard or two of the left-hand gun, the only one
fairly on the crest. He was not alone, but attended by Cornet Yates of his
own old regiment the 11th Hussars, a recently commissioned ranker. "Lord
Cardigan was in the full dress _pelisse_ (buttoned) of the 11th Hussars,
and he rode a chestnut horse very distinctly marked and of grand
appearance. The horse seemed to have had enough of it, and his lordship
appeared to have been knocked about but was cool and collected. He
returned his sword, undid a little of the front of his dress and pulled
down his underclothing under his waistbelt. Then, in a quiet way, as if
rather talking to himself, he said, 'I tell you what it is: those
instruments of theirs,' alluding to the Russian weapons, 'are deuced blunt;
they tickle up one's ribs!' Then he pulled his revolver out of his
holster as if the thought had just struck him, and said, 'And here's this
d----d thing I have never thought of until now.' He then replaced it, drew
his sword, and said, 'Well, we've done our share of the work!' and
pointing up toward the Chasseurs d'Afrique on our left rear (ignorant of
their opportune service), he added, 'It's time they gave those dappled
gentry a chance.' Afterwards he asked, 'Has any one seen my regiment?' The
men answered, 'No, sir.'" Brandling was holding aloof; and his lordship
turned his horse and rode away farther back.

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