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Lamarck, the Founder of Evolution

A >> Alpheus Spring Packard >> Lamarck, the Founder of Evolution




"If the vertebral column of the human body should form the axis of
this body, and sustain the head in equilibrium, as also the other
parts, the man standing would be in a state of rest. But who does
not know that this is not so; that the head is not articulated at
its centre of gravity; that the chest and stomach, as also the
viscera which these cavities contain, weigh heavily almost entirely
on the anterior part of the vertebral column; that the latter rests
on an oblique base, etc.? Also, as M. Richerand observes, there is
needed in standing a force active and watching without ceasing to
prevent the body from falling over, the weight and disposition of
parts tending to make the body fall forward.

"After having developed the considerations regarding the standing
posture of man, the same savant then expresses himself: 'The
relative weight of the head, of the thoracic and abdominal viscera,
tends therefore to throw it in front of the line, according to which
all the parts of the body bear down on the ground sustaining it; a
line which should be exactly perpendicular to this ground in order
that the standing position may be perfect. The following fact
supports this assertion: I have observed that infants with a large
head, the stomach protruding and the viscera loaded with fat,
accustom themselves with difficulty to stand up straight, and it is
not until the end of their second year that they dare to surrender
themselves to their proper forces; they stand subject to frequent
falls and have a natural tendency to revert to the quadrupedal
state.' (_Physiologie_, vol. ii., p. 268.)

"This disposition of the parts which cause the erect position of
man, being a state of activity, and consequently fatiguing, instead
of being a state of rest, would then betray in him an origin
analogous to that of the mammals, if his organization alone should
be taken into consideration.

"Now in order to follow, in all its particulars, the hypothesis
presented in the beginning of these observations, it is fitting to
add the following considerations:

"The individuals of the dominant race previously mentioned, having
taken possession of all the inhabitable places which were suitable
for them, and having to a very considerable extent multiplied their
necessities in proportion as the societies which they formed became
more numerous, were able equally to increase their ideas, and
consequently to feel the need of communicating them to their
fellows. We conceive that there would arise the necessity of
increasing and of varying in the same proportion the _signs_ adopted
for the communication of these ideas. It is then evident that the
members of this race would have to make continual efforts, and to
employ every possible means in these efforts, to create, multiply,
and render sufficiently varied the _signs_ which their ideas and
their numerous wants would render necessary.

"It is not so with any other animals; because, although the most
perfect among them, such as the _Quadrumana_, live mostly in troops,
since the eminent supremacy of the race mentioned they have remained
stationary as regards the improvement of their faculties, having
been driven out from everywhere and banished to wild, desert,
usually restricted regions, whither, miserable and restless, they
are incessantly constrained to fly and hide themselves. In this
situation these animals no longer contract new needs, they acquire
no new ideas; they have but a small number of them, and it is always
the same ones which occupy their attention, and among these ideas
there are very few which they have need of communicating to the
other individuals of their species. There are, then, only very few
different _signs_ which they employ among their fellows, so that
some movements of the body or of certain of its parts, certain
hisses and cries raised by the simple inflexions of the voice,
suffice them.

"On the contrary, the individuals of the dominant race already
mentioned, having had need of multiplying the _signs_ for the rapid
communication of their ideas, now become more and more numerous,
and, no longer contented either with pantomimic signs or possible
inflexions of their voice to represent this multitude of signs now
become necessary, would succeed by different efforts in forming
_articulated sounds_: at first they would use only a small number,
conjointly with the inflexions of their voice; as the result they
would multiply, vary, and perfect them, according to their
increasing necessities, and according as they would be more
accustomed to produce them. Indeed, the habitual exercise of their
throat, their tongue, and their lips to make articulate sounds, will
have eminently developed in them this faculty.

"Hence for this particular race the origin of the wonderful power of
_speech_; and as the distance between the regions where the
individuals composing it would be spread would favor the corruption
of the signs fitted to express each idea, from this arose the origin
of languages, which must be everywhere diversified.

"Then in this respect necessities alone would have accomplished
everything; they would give origin to efforts; and the organs fitted
for the articulation of sounds would be developed by their habitual
use.

"Such would be the reflections which might be made if man,
considered here as the preeminent race in question, were
distinguished from the animals only by his physical characters, and
if his origin were not different from theirs."

This is certainly, for the time it was written, an original,
comprehensive, and bold attempt at explaining in a tentative way, or at
least suggesting, the probable origin of man from some arboreal creature
allied to the apes. It is as regards the actual evolutional steps
supposed to have been taken by the simian ancestors of man, a more
detailed and comprehensive hypothesis than that offered by Darwin in his
_Descent of Man_,[197] which Lamarck has anticipated. Darwin does not
refer to this theory of Lamarck, and seems to have entirely overlooked
it, as have others since his time. The theory of the change from an
arboreal life and climbing posture to an erect one, and the
transformation of the hinder pair of hands into the feet of the erect
human animal, remind us of the very probable hypothesis of Mr. Herbert
Spencer, as to the modification of the quadrumanous posterior pair of
hands to form the plantigrade feet of man.


FOOTNOTES:

[195] Author's italics.

[196] "How much this unclean beast resembles man!"--_Ennius_.

"Indeed, besides other resemblances the monkey has mammae, a clitoris,
nymphs, uterus, uvula, eye-lobes, nails, as in the human species; it
also lacks a suspensory ligament of the neck. Is it not astonishing that
man, endowed with wisdom, differs so little from such a disgusting
animal!"--_Linnaeus_.

[197] Vol. i., chapter iv., pp. 135-151; ii., p. 372.




CHAPTER XIX

LAMARCK'S THOUGHTS ON MORALS, AND ON THE RELATION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND
RELIGION


One who has read the writings of the great French naturalist, who may be
regarded as the founder of evolution, will readily realize that
Lamarck's mind was essentially philosophic, comprehensive, and
synthetic. He looked upon every problem in a large way. His breadth of
view, his moral and intellectual strength, his equably developed nature,
generous in its sympathies and aspiring in its tendencies, naturally led
him to take a conservative position as to the relations between science
and religion. He should, as may be inferred from his frequent references
to the Author of nature, be regarded as a deist.

When a very young man, he was for a time a friend of the erratic and
gifted Rousseau, and was afterwards not unknown to Condorcet, the
secretary of the French Academy of Sciences, so liberal in his views and
so bitter an enemy of the Church; and though constantly in contact with
the radical views and burning questions of that day, Lamarck throughout
his life preserved his philosophic calm, and maintained his lofty tone
and firm temper. We find no trace in his writings of sentiments other
than the most elevated and inspiring, and we know that in character he
was pure and sweet, self-sacrificing, self-denying, and free from
self-assertion.

The quotations from his _Philosophie zoologique_, published in 1809,
given below, will show what were the results of his meditations on the
relations between science and religion. Had his way of looking at this
subject prevailed, how much misunderstanding and ill-feeling between
theologians and savants would have been avoided! Had his spirit and
breadth of view animated both parties, there would not have been the
constant and needless opposition on the part of the Church to the grand
results of scientific discovery and philosophy, or too hasty dogmatism
and scepticism on the part of some scientists.

In Lamarck, at the opening of the past century, we behold the spectacle
of a man devoting over fifty years of his life to scientific research in
biology, and insisting on the doctrine of spontaneous generation; of the
immense length of geological time, so opposed to the views held by the
Church; the evolution of plants and animals from a single germ, and even
the origin of man from the apes, yet as earnestly claiming that nature
has its Author who in the beginning established the order of things,
giving the initial impulse to the laws of the universe.

As Duval says, after quoting the passage given below: "Deux faits son a
noter dans ce passage: d'une part, les termes dignes et conciliants dans
lesquels Lamarck etablit la part de la science et de la religion; cela
vaut, mieux, meme en tenant compte des differences d'epoques, que les
abjurations de Buffon."[198]

The passage quoted by M. Duval is the following one:

"Surely nothing exists except by the will of the Sublime Author of
all things. But can we not assign him laws in the execution of his
will, and determine the method which he has followed in this
respect? Has not his infinite power enabled him to create an order
of things which has successively given existence to all that we see,
as well as to that which exists and that of which we have no
knowledge? As regards the decrees of this infinite wisdom, I have
confined myself to the limits of a simple observer of nature."[199]

In other places we find the following expressions:

"There is then, for the animals as for the plants, an order which
belongs to nature, and which results, as also the objects which this
order makes exist, from the power which it has received from the
SUPREME AUTHOR of all things. She is herself only the general and
unchangeable order that this Sublime Author has created throughout,
and only the totality of the general and special laws to which this
order is subject. By these means, whose use it continues without
change, it has given and will perpetually give existence to its
productions; it varies and renews them unceasingly, and thus
everywhere preserves the whole order which is the result of
it."[200]

~ ~ ~ ~ ~

"To regard nature as eternal, and consequently as having existed
from all time, is to me an abstract idea, baseless, limitless,
improbable, and not satisfactory to my reason. Being unable to know
anything positive in this respect, and having no means of reasoning
on this subject, I much prefer to think that _all nature_ is only a
result: hence, I suppose, and I am glad to admit it, a first cause,
in a word, a supreme power which has given existence to nature, and
which has made it in all respects what it is."[201]

~ ~ ~ ~ ~

"Nature, that immense totality of different beings and bodies, in
every part of which exists an eternal circle of movements and
changes regulated by law; totality alone unchangeable, so long as it
pleases its SUBLIME AUTHOR to cause its existence, should be
regarded as a whole constituted by its parts, for a purpose which
its Author alone knows, and not exclusively for any one of them.

"Each part is necessarily obliged to change, and to cease to be one
in order to constitute another, with interests opposed to those of
all; and if it has the power of reasoning it finds this whole
imperfect. In reality, however, this whole is perfect and completely
fulfils the end for which it was designed."[202]

Lamarck's work on general philosophy[203] was written near the end of
his life, in 1820. He begins his "Discours preliminaire" by referring to
the sudden loss of his eyesight, his work on the invertebrate animals
being thereby interrupted. The book was, he says, "rapidly" dictated to
his daughter, and the ease with which he dictated was due, he says, to
his long-continued habit of meditating on the facts he had observed.

In the "Principes primordiaux" he considers man as the only being who
has the power of observing nature, and the only one who has perceived
the necessity of recognizing a superior and only cause, creator of the
order of the wonders of the world of life. By this he is led to raise
his thoughts to the _Supreme Author_ of all that exists.

"In the creation of his works, and especially those we can observe,
this omnipotent Being has undoubtedly been the ruling power in
pursuing the method which has pleased him, namely, his will has
been:

"Either to create instantaneously and separately every particular
living being observed by us, to personally care for and watch over
them in all their changes, their movements, or their actions, to
unremittingly care for each one separately, and by the exercise of
his supreme will to regulate all their life;

"Or to reduce his creations to a small number, and among these, to
institute an order of things general and continuous, pervaded by
ceaseless activity (_mouvement_), especially subject to laws by
means of which all the organisms of whatever nature, all the changes
they undergo, all the peculiarities they present, and all the
phenomena that many of them exhibit, may be produced.

"In regard to these two modes of execution, if observation taught us
nothing we could not form any opinion which would be well grounded.
But it is not so; we distinctly see that there exists an order of
things truly created (_veritablement cree_), as unchangeable as its
author allows, acting on matter alone, and which possesses the power
of producing all visible beings, of executing all the changes, all
the modifications, even the extinctions, so also the renewals or
recreations that we observe among them. It is to this order of
things that we have given the name of _nature_. The Supreme Author
of all that exists is, then, the immediate creator of matter as also
of nature, but he is only indirectly the creator of what nature can
produce.

"The end that God has proposed to himself in creating matter, which
forms the basis of all bodies, and nature, which divides (_divise_)
this matter, forms the bodies, makes them vary, modifies them,
changes them, and renews them in different ways, can be easily known
to us; for the Supreme Being cannot meet with any obstacle to his
will in the execution of his works; the general results of these
works are necessarily the object he had in view. Thus this end could
be no other than the existence of nature, of which matter alone
forms the sphere, and should not be that causing the creation of any
special being.

"Do we find in the two objects created, _i.e._, _matter_ and
_nature_, the source of the good and evil which have almost always
been thought to exist in the events of this world? To this question
I shall answer that good and evil are only relative to particular
objects, that they never affect by their temporary existence the
general result expected (_prevu_), and that for the end which the
Creator designed, there is in reality neither good nor evil, because
everything in nature perfectly fulfils its object.

"Has God limited his creations to the existence of only matter and
nature? This question is vain, and should remain without an answer
on our part; because, being reduced to knowing anything only through
observation, and to bodies alone, also to what concerns them, these
being for us the only observable objects, it would be rash to speak
affirmatively or negatively on this subject.

"What is a spiritual being? It is what, with the aid of the
imagination, one would naturally suppose (_l'on vaudra supposer_).
Indeed, it is only by means of opposing that which is material that
we can form the idea of spirit; but as this hypothetical being is
not in the category of objects which it is possible for us to
observe, we do not know how to take cognizance of it. The idea that
we have of it is absolutely without base.

"We only know physical objects and only objects relative to these
beings (_etres_): such is the condition of our nature. If our
thoughts, our reasonings, our principles have been considered as
metaphysical objects, these objects, then, are not beings (_etres_).
They are only relations or consequences of relations (_rapports_),
or only results of observed laws.

"We know that relations are distinguished as general and special.
Among these last are regarded those of nature, form, dimension,
solidity, size, quantity, resemblance, and difference; and if we add
to these objects the being observed and the consideration of known
laws, as also that of conventional objects, we shall have all the
materials on which our thoughts are based.

"Thus being able to observe only the phenomena of nature, as well as
the laws which regulate these phenomena, also the products of these
last, in a word, only bodies (_corps_) and what concerns them, all
that which immediately proceeds from supreme power is
incomprehensible to us, as it itself [_i.e._, supreme power] is to
our minds. To create, or to make anything out of nothing, this is an
idea we cannot conceive of, for the reason that in all that we can
know, we do not find any model which represents it. GOD alone, then,
can create, while nature can only produce. We must suppose that, in
his creations, the Divinity is not restricted to the use of any
time, while, on the other hand, nature can effect nothing without
the aid of long periods of time."

Without translating more of this remarkable book, which is very rare,
much less known than the _Philosophie zoologique_, the spirit of the
remainder may be imagined from the foregoing extracts.

The author refers to the numerous evils resulting from ignorance, false
knowledge, lack of judgment, abuse of power, demonstrating the necessity
of our confining ourselves within the circle of the objects presented by
nature, and never to go beyond them if we do not wish to fall into
error, because the profound study of nature and of the organization of
man alone, and the exact observation of facts alone, will reveal to us
"the truths most important for us to know," in order to avoid the
vexations, the perfidies, the injustices, and the oppressions of all
sorts, and "incalculable disorders" which arise in the social body. In
this way only shall we discover and acquire the means of obtaining the
enjoyment of the advantages which we have a right to expect from our
state of civilization. The author endeavors to state what science can
and should render to society. He dwells on the sources from which man
has drawn the knowledge which he possesses, and from which he can obtain
many others--sources the totality of which constitutes for him the field
of realities.

Lamarck also in this work has built up a system for moral philosophy.

Self-love, he says, perfectly regulated, gives rise:

1. To moral force which characterizes the laborious man, so that the
length and difficulties of a useful work do not repel him.

2. To the courage of him who, knowing the danger, exposes himself when
he sees that this would be useful.

3. To love of wisdom.

Wisdom, according to Lamarck, consists in the observance of a certain
number of rules or virtues. These we cite in a slightly abridged form.

Love of truth in all things; the need of improving one's mind;
moderation in desires; decorum in all actions; a wise reserve in
unessential wants; indulgence, toleration, humanity, good will towards
all men; love of the public good and of all that is necessary to our
fellows; contempt for weakness; a kind of severity towards one's self
which preserves us from that multitude of artificial wants enslaving
those who give up to them; resignation and, if possible, moral
impassibility in suffering reverses, injustices, oppression, and losses;
respect for order, for public institutions, civil authorities, laws,
morality, and religion.

The practice of these maxims and virtues, says Lamarck, characterizes
true philosophy.

And it may be added that no one practised these virtues more than
Lamarck. Like Cuvier's, his life was blameless, and though he lived a
most retired life, and was not called upon to fill any public station
other than his chair of zooelogy at the Jardin des Plantes, we may feel
sure that he had the qualities of courage, independence, and patriotism
which would have rendered such a career most useful to his country.

As Bourguin eloquently asserts: "Lamarck was the brave man who never
deserted a dangerous post, the laborious man who never hesitated to meet
any difficulty, the investigating spirit, firm in his convictions,
tolerant of the opinions of others, the simple man, moderate in all
things, the enemy of weakness, devoted to the public good, imperturbable
under the attaints of fortune, of suffering, and of unjust and
passionate attacks."


FOOTNOTES:

[198] Mathias Duval: "Le transformiste francais Lamarck," _Bulletin de
la Societe d'Anthropologie de Paris_, xii., 1889, p. 345.

[199] _Philosophie zoologique_, p. 56.

[200] _Loc. cit._, i., p. 113.

[201] _Loc. cit._, i., p. 361.

[202] _Loc. cit._, ii., p. 465.

[203] _Systeme analytique des Connaissances de l'Homme_, etc.




CHAPTER XX

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LAMARCKISM AND DARWINISM; NEOLAMARCKISM


Since the appearance of Darwin's _Origin of Species_, and after the
great naturalist had converted the world to a belief in the general
doctrine of evolution, there has arisen in the minds of many working
naturalists a conviction that natural selection, or Darwinism as such,
is only one of other evolutionary factors; while there are some who
entirely reject the selective principle. Darwin, moreover, assumed a
tendency to fortuitous variation, and did not attempt to explain its
cause. Fully persuaded that he had discovered the most efficient and
practically sole cause of the origin of species, he carried the doctrine
to its extreme limits, and after over twenty years of observation and
experiment along this single line, pushing entirely aside the
Erasmus-Darwin and Lamarckian factors of change of environment, though
occasionally acknowledging the value of use and disuse, he triumphantly
broke over all opposition, and lived to see his doctrine generally
accepted. He had besides the support of some of the strongest men in
science: Wallace in a twin paper advocated the same views; Spencer,
Lyell, Huxley, Hooker, Haeckel, Bates, Semper, Wyman, Gray, Leidy, and
other representative men more or less endorsed Darwin's views, or at
least some form of evolution, and owing largely to their efforts in
scientific circles and in the popular press, the doctrine of descent
rapidly permeated every avenue of thought and became generally accepted.

Meanwhile, the general doctrine of evolution thus proved, and the
"survival of the fittest" an accomplished fact, the next step was to
ascertain "how," as Cope asked, "the fittest originated?" It was felt by
some that natural selection alone was not adequate to explain the first
steps in the origin of genera, families, orders, classes, and branches
or phyla. It was perceived by some that natural selection by itself was
not a _vera causa_, an efficient agent, but was passive, and rather
expressed the results of the operations of a series of factors. The
transforming should naturally precede the action of the selective
agencies.

We were, then, in our quest for the factors of organic evolution,
obliged to fall back on the action of the physico-chemical forces such
as light, or its absence, heat, cold, change of climate; and the
physiological agencies of food, or in other words on changes in the
physical environment, as well as in the biological environment. Lamarck
was the first one who, owing to his many years' training in systematic
botany and zooelogy, and his philosophic breadth, had stated more fully
and authoritatively than any one else the results of changes in the
action of the primary factors of evolution. Hence a return on the part
of many in Europe, and especially in America, to Lamarckism or its
modern form, Neolamarckism. Lamarck had already, so far as he could
without a knowledge of modern morphology, embryology, cytology, and
histology, suggested those fundamental principles of transformism on
which rests the selective principle.

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