American Institutions And Their Influence

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] The wars of the French revolution and of 1812 had created
manufacturing establishments in the north of the Union, by
cutting off all free communication between America and Europe.
When peace was concluded, and the channel of intercourse reopened
by which the produce of Europe was transmitted to the New World,
the Americans thought fit to establish a system of import duties,
for the twofold purpose of protecting their incipient
manufactures, and of paying off the amount of the debt contracted
during the war. The southern states, which have no manufactures
to encourage, and which are exclusively agricultural, soon
complained of this measure. Such were the simple facts, and I do
not pretend to examine in this place whether their complaints
were well founded or unjust.

As early as the year 1820, South Carolina declared, in a petition
to Congress, that the tariff was "unconstitutional, oppressive,
and unjust." And the states of Georgia, Virginia, North
Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi, subsequently remonstrated
against it with more or less vigor. But Congress, far from
lending an ear to these complaints, raised the scale of tariff
duties in the years 1824 and 1828, and recognized anew the
principle on which it was founded. A doctrine was then
proclaimed, or rather revived, in the south, which took the name
of nullification.

I have shown in the proper place that the object of the federal
constitution was not to form a league, but to create a national
government. The Americans of the United States form a sole and
undivided people, in all the cases which are specified by that
constitution; and upon these points the will of the nation is
expressed, as it is in all constitutional nations, by the voice
of the majority. When the majority has pronounced its decision,
it is the duty of the minority to submit. Such is the sound
legal doctrine, and the only one which agrees with the text of
the constitution, and the known intention of those who framed it.

The partisans of nullification in the south maintain, on the
contrary, that the intention of the Americans in uniting was not
to reduce themselves to the condition of one and the same people;
that they meant to constitute a league of independent states; and
that each state, consequently, retains its entire sovereignty, if
not _de facto_, at least _de jure_; and has the right
of putting its own construction upon the laws of congress, and of
suspending their execution within the limits of its own
territory, if they are held to be unconstitutional or unjust.

The entire doctrine of nullification is comprised in a sentence
uttered by Vice-President Calhoun, the head of that party in the
south, before the senate of the United States, in the year 1833:
"The constitution is a compact to which the states were parties
in their sovereign capacity; now, whenever a contract is entered
into by parties which acknowledge no tribunal above their
authority to decide in the last resort, each of them has a right
to judge for himself in relation to the nature, extent, and
obligations of the instrument." It is evident that a similar
doctrine destroys the very basis of the federal constitution, and
brings back all the evils of the old confederation, from which
the Americans were supposed to have had a safe deliverance.

When South Carolina perceived that Congress turned a deaf ear to
its remonstrances, it threatened to apply the doctrine of
nullification to the federal tariff bill. Congress persisted in
its former system; and at length the storm broke out. In the
course of 1832 the citizens of South Carolina[Footnote:

That is to say, the majority of the people; for the opposite
party, called the Union party, always formed a very strong and
active minority. Carolina may contain about 47,000 electors;
30,000 were in favor of nullification, and 17,000 opposed to it.

] named a national [state] convention, to consult upon the
extraordinary measures which they were called upon to take; and
on the 24th November of the same year, this convention
promulgated a law, under the form of a decree, which annulled the
federal law of the tariff, forbade the levy of the imposts which
that law commands, and refused to recognize the appeal which
might be made to the federal courts of law.[Footnote:

This decree was preceded by a report of the committee by which it
was framed, containing the explanation of the motives and object
of the law. The following passage occurs in it, p. 34: "When the
rights reserved by the constitution to the different states are
deliberately violated, it is the duty and the right of those
states to interfere, in order to check the progress of the evil,
to resist usurpation, and to maintain, within their respective
limits, those powers and privileges which belong to them as
_independent sovereign states_. If they were destitute of
this right, they would not be sovereign. South Carolina declares
that she acknowledges no tribunal upon earth above her authority.
She has indeed entered into a solemn compact of union with the
other states: but she demands, and will exercise, the right of
putting her own construction upon it; and when this compact is
violated by her sister states, and by the government which they
have created, she is determined to avail herself of the
unquestionable right of judging what is the extent of the
infraction, and what are the measures best fitted to obtain
justice."

] This decree was only to be put into execution in the ensuing
month of February, and it was intimated, that if Congress
modified the tariff before that period, South Carolina might be
induced to proceed no farther with her menaces; and a vague
desire was afterward expressed of submitting the question to an
extraordinary assembly of all the confederate states.

In the meantime South Carolina armed her militia, and prepared
for war. But congress, which had slighted its suppliant
subjects, listened to their complaints as soon as they were found
to have taken up arms.[Footnote:

Congress was finally decided to take this step by the conduct of
the powerful state of Virginia, whose legislature offered to
serve as a mediator between the Union and South Carolina.
Hitherto the latter state had appeared to be entirely abandoned
even by the states which had joined her in her remonstrances.

] A law was passed, by which the tariff duties were to be
progressively reduced for ten until they were brought so low as
not to exceed the amount of supplies necessary to the
government.[Footnote:

This law was passed on the 2d March, 1833.

] Thus congress completely abandoned the principle of the
tariff; and substituted a mere fiscal impost for a system of
protective duties.[Footnote:

This bill was brought in by Mr. Clay, and it passed in four day
through both houses of Congress, by an immense majority.

] The government of the Union, in order to conceal its defeat,
had recourse to an expedient which is very much in vogue with
feeble governments. It yielded the point _de facto_, but it
remained inflexible upon the principles in question; and while
congress was altering the tariff law, it passed another bill, by
which the president was invested with extraordinary powers,
enabling him to overcome by force a resistance which was then no
longer to be apprehended.

But South Carolina did not consent to leave the Union in the
enjoyment of these scanty trophies of success: the same national
[state] convention which annulled the tariff bill, met again, and
accepted the proffered concession: but at the same time it
declared its unabated perseverance in the doctrine of
nullification; and to prove what it said, it annulled the law
investing the president with extraordinary powers, although it
was very certain that the clauses of that law would never be
carried into effect.

Almost all the controversies of which I have been speaking have
taken place under the presidency of General Jackson; and it
cannot be denied that in the question of the tariff he has
supported the claims of the Union with vigor and with skill. I
am however of opinion that the conduct of the individual who now
represents the federal government, may be reckoned as one of the
dangers which threaten its continuance.

Some persons in Europe have formed an opinion of the possible
influence of General Jackson upon the affairs of his country,
which appears highly extravagant to those who have seen more of
the subject. We have been told that General Jackson has won
sundry battles, that he is an energetic man, prone by nature and
by habit to the use of force, covetous of power, and a despot by
taste. All this may perhaps be true; but the inferences which
have been drawn from these truths are exceedingly erroneous. It
has been imagined that General Jackson is bent on establishing a
dictatorship in America, on introducing a military spirit, and on
giving a degree of influence to the central authority which
cannot but be dangerous to provincial liberties. But in America,
the time for similar undertakings, and the age for men of this
kind, is not yet come; if General Jackson had entertained a hope
of exercising his authority in this manner, he would infallibly
have forfeited his political station, and compromised his life;
accordingly he has not been so imprudent as to make any such
attempt.

Far from wishing to extend the federal power, the president
belongs to the party which is desirous of limiting that power to
the bare and precise letter of the constitution, and which never
puts a construction upon that act, favorable to the government of
the Union; far from standing forth as the champion of
centralization, General Jackson is the agent of all the
jealousies of the states; and he was placed in the lofty station
he occupies, by the passions of the people which are most opposed
to the central government. It is by perpetually flattering these
passions, that he maintains his station and his popularity.
General Jackson is the slave of the majority: he yields to its
wishes, its propensities, and its demands; say rather, that he
anticipates and forestalls them.

Whenever the governments of the states come into collision with
that of the Union, the president is generally the first to
question his own rights: he almost always outstrips the
legislature; and when the extent of the federal power is
controverted he takes part, as it were, against himself; he
conceals his official interests, and extinguishes his own natural
inclinations. Not indeed that he is naturally weak or hostile to
the Union; for when the majority decided against the claims of
the partisans of nullification, he put himself at its head,
asserted the doctrines which the nation held, distinctly and
energetically, and was the first to recommend forcible measures;
but General Jackson appears to me, if I may use the American
expressions, to be a federalist by taste, and a republican by
calculation.

General Jackson stoops to gain the favor of the majority but when
he feels that his popularity is secure, he overthrows all
obstacles in the pursuit of the objects which the community
approves, or of those which it does not look upon with a jealous
eye. He is supported by a power with which his predecessors were
unacquainted; and he tramples on his personal enemies wherever
they cross his path, with a facility which no former president
ever enjoyed; he takes upon himself the responsibility of
measures which no one, before him, would have ventured to
attempt; he even treats the national representatives with disdain
approaching to insult; he puts his veto upon the laws of
congress, and frequently neglects to reply to that powerful body.
He is a favorite who sometimes treats his master roughly. The
power of General Jackson perpetually increases; but that of the
President declines: in his hands the federal government is
strong, but it will pass enfeebled into the hands of his
successor.

I am strangely mistaken if the federal government of the United
States be not constantly losing strength, retiring gradually from
public affairs, and narrowing its circle of action more and more.
It is naturally feeble, but it now abandons even its pretensions
to strength. On the other hand, I thought that I remarked a more
lively sense of independence, and a more decided attachment to
provincial government, in the states. The Union is to subsist,
but to subsist as a shadow; it is to be strong in certain cases,
and weak in all others; in time of warfare, it is to be able to
concentrate all the forces of the nation and all the resources of
the country in its hands; and in time of peace its existence is
to be scarcely perceptible: as if this alternate debility and
vigor were natural or possible.

I do not foresee anything for the present which may be able to
check this general impulse of public opinion: the causes in which
it originated do not cease to operate with the same effect. The
change will therefore go on, and it may be predicted that, unless
some extraordinary event occurs, the government of the Union will
grow weaker and weaker every day.

I think, however, that the period is still remote, at which the
federal power will be entirely extinguished by its inability to
protect itself and to maintain peace in the country. The Union
is sanctioned by the manners and desires of the people; its
results are palpable, its benefits visible. When it is perceived
that the weakness of the federal government compromises the
existence of the Union, I do not doubt that a reaction will take
place with a view to increase its strength.

The government of the United States is, of all the federal
governments which have hitherto been established, the one which
is most naturally destined to act. As long as it is only
indirectly assailed by the interpretation of its laws, and as
long as its substance is not seriously altered, a change of
opinion, an internal crisis, or a war, may restore all the vigor
which it requires. The point which I have been most anxious to
put in a clear light is simply this; many people, especially in
France, imagine that a change of opinion is going on in the
United States, which is favorable to a centralization of power in
the hands of the president and the congress. I hold that a
contrary tendency may be distinctly observed. So far is the
federal government from acquiring strength, and from threatening
the sovereignty of the states, as it grows older, that I maintain
it to be growing weaker and weaker, and that the sovereignty of
the Union alone is in danger. Such are the facts which the
present time discloses. The future conceals the final result of
this tendency, and the events which may check, retard, or
accelerate, the changes I have described; but I do not affect to
be able to remove the veil which hides them from our sight.

* * * * *

OF THE REPUBLICAN INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND
WHAT THEIR CHANCES OF DURATION ARE.

The Union is Accidental.--The Republican Institutions have more
prospect of Permanence.--A Republic for the Present the Natural
State of the Anglo-Americans.--Reason of this.--In order to
destroy it, all Laws must be changed at the same time, and a
great alteration take place in Manners--Difficulties
experienced by the Americans in creating an Aristocracy.

The dismemberment of the Union, by the introduction of war into
the heart of those states which are now confederate, with
standing armies, a dictatorship, and a heavy taxation, might
eventually compromise the fate of the republican institutions.
But we ought not to confound the future prospects of the republic
with those of the Union. The Union is an accident, which will
last only so long as circumstances are favorable to its
existence; but a republican form of government seems to me to be
the natural state of the Americans; which nothing but the
continued action of hostile causes, always acting in the same
direction, could change into a monarchy. The Union exists
principally in the law which formed it; one revolution, one
change in public opinion, might destroy it for ever; but the
republic has a much deeper foundation to rest upon.

What is understood by republican government in the United States,
is the slow and quiet action of society upon itself. It is a
regular state of things really founded upon the enlightened will
of the people. It is a conciliatory government under which
resolutions are allowed time to ripen, and in which they are
deliberately discussed, and executed with mature judgment. The
republicans in the United States set a high value upon morality,
respect religious belief, and acknowledge the existence of
rights. They profess to think that a people ought to be moral,
religious, and temperate, in proportion as it is free. What is
called the republic in the United States, is the tranquil rule of
the majority, which, after having had time to examine itself, and
to give proof of its existence, is the common source of all the
powers of the state. But the power of the majority is not of
itself unlimited. In the moral world humanity, justice, and
reason, enjoy an undisputed supremacy; in the political world
vested rights are treated with no less deference. The majority
recognizes these two barriers; and if it now and then overstep
them, it is because, like individuals, it has passions, and like
them, it is prone to do what is wrong, while it discerns what is
right.

But the demagogues of Europe have made strange discoveries. A
republic is not, according to them, the rule of the majority, as
has hitherto been taught, but the rule of those who are strenuous
partisans of the majority. It is not the people who
preponderates in this kind of government, but those who best know
what is for the good of the people. A happy distinction, which
allows men to act in the name of nations without consulting them,
and to claim their gratitude while their rights are spurned. A
republican government, moreover, is the only one which claims the
right of doing whatever it chooses, and despising what men have
hitherto respected, from the highest moral obligations to the
vulgar rules of common sense. It had been supposed, until our
time, that despotism was odious, under whatever form it appeared.
But it is a discovery of modern days that there are such things
as legitimate tyranny and holy injustice, provided they are
exercised in the name of the people.

The ideas which the Americans have adopted respecting the
republican form of government, render it easy for them to live
under it, and ensure its duration. If, in their country, this
form be often practically bad, at least it is theoretically good;
and, in the end, the people always acts in conformity with it.

It was impossible, at the foundation of the states, and it would
still be difficult, to establish a central administration in
America. The inhabitants are dispersed over too great a space,
and separated by too many natural obstacles, for one man to
undertake to direct the details of their existence. America is
therefore pre-eminently the country of provincial and municipal
government. To this cause, which was plainly felt by all the
Europeans of the New World, the Anglo-Americans added several
others peculiar to themselves.

At the time of the settlement of the North American colonies,
municipal liberty had already penetrated into the laws as well as
the manners of the English, and the emigrants adopted it, not
only as a necessary thing, but as a benefit which they knew how
to appreciate. We have already seen the manner in which the
colonies were founded: every province, and almost every district,
was peopled separately by men who were strangers to each other,
or who associated with very different purposes. The English
settlers in the United States, therefore, early perceived that
they were divided into a great number of small and distinct
communities which belonged to no common centre; and that it was
needful for each of these little communities to take care of its
own affairs, since there did not appear to be any central
authority which was naturally bound and easily enabled to provide
for them. Thus, the nature of the country, the manner in which
the British colonies were founded, the habits of the first
emigrants, in short everything, united to promote, in an
extra-ordinary degree, municipal and provincial liberties.

In the United States, therefore, the mass of the institutions of
the country is essentially republican; and in order permanently
to destroy the laws which form the basis of the republic, it
would be necessary to abolish all the laws at once. At the
present day, it would be even more difficult for a party to
succeed in founding a monarchy in the United States, than for a
set of men to proclaim that France should henceforward be a
republic. Royalty would not find a system of legislation
prepared for it beforehand; and a monarchy would then exist,
really surrounded by republican institutions. The monarchical
principle would likewise have great difficulty in penetrating
into the manners of the Americans.

In the United States, the sovereignty of the people is not an
isolated doctrine bearing no relation to the prevailing manners
and ideas of the people: it may, on the contrary, be regarded as
the last link of a chain of opinions which binds the whole
Anglo-American world. That Providence has given to every human
being the degree of reason necessary to direct himself in the
affairs which interest him exclusively; such is the grand maxim
upon which civil and political society rests in the United
States. The father of a family applies it to his children; the
master to his servants; the township to its officers; the
province to its townships; the state to the provinces; the Union
to the states; and when extended to the nation, it becomes the
doctrine of the sovereignty of the people.

Thus, in the United States, the fundamental principle of the
republic is the same which governs the greater part of human
actions; republican notions insinuate themselves into all the
ideas, opinions, and habits of the Americans, while they are
formally recognized by the legislation: and before this
legislation can be altered, the whole community must undergo very
serious changes. In the United States, even the religion of most
of the citizens is republican, since it submits the truths of the
other world to private judgment: as in politics the care of its
temporal interests is abandoned to the good sense of the people.
Thus every man is allowed freely to take that road which he
thinks will lead him to heaven; just as the law permits every
citizen to have the right of choosing his government.

It is evident that nothing but a long series of events, all
having the same tendency, can substitute for this combination of
laws, opinions, and manners, a mass of opposite opinions, manners
and laws.

If republican principles are to perish in America, they can only
yield after a laborious social process, often interrupted, and as
often resumed; they will have many apparent revivals, and will
not become totally extinct until an entirely new people shall
have succeeded to that which now exists. Now, it must be
admitted that there is no symptom or presage of the approach of
such a revolution. There is nothing more striking to a person
newly arrived in the United States, than the kind of tumultuous
agitation in which he finds political society. The laws are
incessantly changing, and at first sight it seems impossible that
a people so variable in its desires should avoid adopting, within
a short space of time, a completely new form of government. Such
apprehensions are, however, premature; the instability which
affects political institutions is of two kinds, which ought not
to be confounded: the first, which modifies secondary laws, is
not incompatible with a very settled state of society; the other
shakes the very foundations of the constitution, and attacks the
fundamental principles of legislation; this species of
instability is always followed by troubles and revolutions, and
the nation which suffers under it, is in a state of violent
transition.

Experience shows that these two kinds of legislative instability
have no necessary connexion; for they have been found united or
separate, according to times and circumstances. The first is
common in the United States, but not the second: the Americans
often change their laws, but the foundation of the constitution
is respected.

In our days the republican principle rules in America, as the
monarchical principle did in France under Louis XIV. The French
of that period were not only friends of the monarchy, but they
thought it impossible to put anything in its place; they received
it as we receive the rays of the sun and the return of the
seasons. Among them the royal power had neither advocates nor
opponents. In like manner does the republican government exist
in America, without contention or opposition; without proofs and
arguments, by a tacit agreement, a sort of _consensus
universalis_. It is, however, my opinion, that, by changing
their administrative forms as often as they do, the inhabitants
of the United States compromise the future stability of their
government.