American Institutions And Their Influence

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If great writers have not at present existed in America, the
reason is very simply given in these facts; there can be no
literary genius without freedom of opinion, and freedom of
opinion does not exist in America. The inquisition has never
been able to prevent a vast number of anti-religious books from
circulating in Spain. The empire of the majority succeeds much
better in the United States, since it actually removes the wish
of publishing them. Unbelievers are to be met with in America,
but, to say the truth, there is no public organ of infidelity.
Attempts have been made by some governments to protect the
morality of nations by prohibiting licentious books. In the
United States no one is punished for this sort of works, but no
one is induced to write them; not because all the citizens are
immaculate in their manners, but because the majority of the
community is decent and orderly.

In these cases the advantages derived from the exercise of this
power are unquestionable; and I am simply discussing the nature
of the power itself. This irresistible authority is a constant
fact, and its beneficent exercise is an accidental occurrence.

* * * * *

EFFECTS OF THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY UPON THE NATIONAL
CHARACTER IN THE AMERICANS.

Effects of the Tyranny of the Majority more sensibly felt
hitherto in the Manners than in the Conduct of Society.--They
check the development of leading Characters.--Democratic
Republics, organized like the United States, bring the Practice
of courting favor within the reach of the many.--Proofs of this
Spirit in the United States.--Why there is more Patriotism in
the People than in those who govern in its name.

The tendencies which I have just alluded to are as yet very
slightly perceptible in political society; but they already begin
to exercise an unfavorable influence upon the national character
of the Americans. I am inclined to attribute the paucity of
distinguished political characters to the ever-increasing
activity of the despotism of the majority in the United States.

When the American revolution broke out, they arose in great
numbers; for public opinion then served, not to tyrannize over,
but to direct the exertions of individuals. Those celebrated men
took a full part in the general agitation of mind common at that
period, and they attained a high degree of personal fame, which
was reflected back upon the nation, but which was by no means
borrowed from it.

In absolute governments, the great nobles who are nearest to the
throne flatter the passions of the sovereign, and voluntarily
truckle to his caprices. But the mass of the nation does not
degrade itself by servitude; it often submits from weakness, from
habit, or from ignorance, and sometimes from loyalty. Some
nations have been known to sacrifice their own desires to those
of the sovereign with pleasure and with pride; thus exhibiting a
sort of independence in the very act of submission. These
peoples are miserable, but they are not degraded. There is a
great difference between doing what one does not approve, and
feigning to approve what one does; the one is the necessary case
of a weak person, the other befits the temper of a lacquey.

In free countries, where every one is more or less called upon to
give his opinions in the affairs of state; in democratic
republics, where public life is incessantly commingled with
domestic affairs, where the sovereign authority is accessible on
every side, and where its attention can almost always be
attracted by vociferation, more persons are to be met with who
speculate upon its foibles, and live at the cost of its passions,
than in absolute monarchies. Not because men are naturally worse
in these states than elsewhere, but the temptation is stronger,
and of easier access at the same time. The result is a far more
extensive debasement of the characters of citizens.

Democratic republics extend the practice of currying favor with
the many, and they introduce it into a great number of classes at
once: this is one of the most serious reproaches that can be
addressed to them. In democratic states organized on the
principles of the American republics, this is more especially the
case, where the authority of the majority is so absolute and so
irresistible, that a man must give up his rights as a citizen,
and almost abjure his quality as a human being, if he intends to
stray from the track which it lays down.

In that immense crowd which throngs the avenues to power in the
United States, I found very few men who displayed any of that
manly candor, and that masculine independence of opinion, which
frequently distinguished the Americans in former times, and which
constitute the leading feature in distinguished characters
wheresoever they may be found. It seems, at first sight, as if
all the minds of the Americans were formed upon one model, so
accurately do they correspond in their manner of judging. A
stranger does, indeed, sometimes meet with Americans who dissent
from these rigorous formularies; with men who deplore the defects
of the laws, the mutability and the ignorance of democracy; who
even go so far as to observe the evil tendencies which impair the
national character, and to point out such remedies as it might be
possible to apply; but no one is there to hear these things
besides yourself, and you, to whom these secret reflections are
confided, are a stranger and a bird of passage. They are very
ready to communicate truths which are useless to you, but they
continue to hold a different language in public.

If ever these lines are read in America, I am well assured of two
things: in the first place, that all who peruse them will raise
their voices to condemn me; and in the second place, that very
many of them will acquit me at the bottom of their conscience.

[The author's views upon what he terms the tyranny of the
majority, the despotism of public opinion in the United States,
have already excited some remarks in this country, and will
probably give occasion to more. As stated in the preface to this
edition, the editor does not conceive himself called upon to
discuss the speculative opinions of the author and supposes he
will best discharge his duty by confining his observations to
what he deems errors of fact or law. But in reference to this
particular subject, it seems due to the author to remark, that he
visited the United States at a particular time, when a successful
political chieftain had succeeded in establishing his party in
power, as it seemed, firmly and permanently; when the
preponderance of that party was immense, and when there seemed
little prospect of any change. He may have met with men, who
sank under the astonishing popularity of General Jackson, who
despaired of the republic, and who therefore shrank from the
expression of their opinions. It must be confessed, however,
that the author is obnoxious to the charge which has been made,
of the want of perspicuity and distinctness in this part of his
work. He does not mean that the press was silent, for he has
himself not only noticed, but furnished proof of the great
freedom, not to say licentiousness, with which it assailed the
character of the president, and the measures of his
administration.

He does not mean to represent the opponents of the dominant party
as having thrown down their weapons of warfare, for his book
shows throughout his knowledge of the existence of an active and
able party, constantly opposing and harassing the administration.

But, after a careful perusal of the chapters on this subject, the
editor is inclined to the opinion, that M. de Tocqueville intends
to speak of the _tyranny of the party_ in excluding from
public employment all those who do not adopt the
_Shibboleth_ of the majority. The language at pp. 266, 267,
which he puts in the mouth of a majority, and his observations
immediately preceding this note, seem to furnish the key to his
meaning; although it must be admitted that there are other
passages to which a wider construction may be given. Perhaps
they may be reconciled by the idea that the author considers the
acts and opinions of the dominant party as the just and true
expression of public opinion. And hence, when he speaks of the
intolerance of public opinion, he means the exclusiveness of the
party, which, for the time being, may be predominant. He had
seen men of acknowledged competency removed from office, or
excluded from it, wholly on the ground of their entertaining
opinions hostile to those of the dominant party, or majority.
And he had seen this system extended to the very lowest officers
of the government, and applied by the electors in their choice of
all officers of all descriptions; and this he deemed
persecution--tyranny--despotism. But he surely is mistaken in
representing the effect of this system of terror as stifling all
complaint, silencing all opposition, and inducing "enemies and
friends to yoke themselves alike to the triumphant car of the
majority." He mistook a temporary state of parties for a
permanent and ordinary result, and he was carried away by the
immense majority that then supported the administration, to the
belief of a universal acquiescence. Without intending here to
speak of the merits or demerits of those who represented that
majority, it is proper to remark, that the great change which has
taken place since the period when the author wrote, in the
political condition of the very persons who he supposed then
wielded the terrors of disfranchisement against their opponents,
in itself furnishes a full and complete demonstration of the
error of his opinions respecting the "true independence of mind
and freedom of discussion" in America. For without such
discussion to enlighten the minds of the people, and without a
stern independence of the rewards and threats of those in power,
the change alluded to could not have occurred.

There is reason to complain not only of the ambiguity, but of the
style of exaggeration which pervades all the remarks of the
author on this subject--so different from the well considered and
nicely adjusted language employed by him on all other topics.
Thus, p. 262, he implies that there is no means of redress
afforded even by the judiciary, for a wrong committed by the
majority. His error is, _first,_ in supposing the jury to
constitute the judicial power; _second,_ overlooking what he
has himself elsewhere so well described, the independence of the
judiciary, and its means of controlling the action of a majority
in a state or in the federal government; and _thirdly,_ in
omitting the proper consideration of the frequent changes of
popular sentiment by which the majority of yesterday becomes the
minority of to-day, and its acts of injustice are reversed.

Certain it is that the instances which he cites at this page, do
not establish his position respecting the disposition of the
majority. The riot at Baltimore was, like other riots in England
and in France, the result of popular phrensy excited to madness
by conduct of the most provoking character. The majority in the
state of Maryland and throughout the United States, highly
disapproved the acts of violence committed on the occasion. The
acquittal by a jury of those arraigned for the murder of General
Lingan, proves only that there was not sufficient evidence to
identify the accused, or that the jury was governed by passion.
It is not perceived how the majority of the people are answerable
for the verdicts rendered. The guilty have often been
erroneously acquitted in all countries, and in France
particularly, recent instances are not wanting of acquittals
especially in prosecutions for political offences, against clear
and indisputable testimony. And it was entirely fortuitous that
the jury was composed of men whose sympathies were with the
rioters and murderers, if the fact was so. It not unfrequently
happens that a jury taken from lists furnished years perhaps, and
always a long time, before the trial, are decidedly hostile to
the temporary prevailing sentiments of their city, county, or
state.

As in the other instance, if the inhabitant of Pennsylvania
intended to intimate to our author, that a colored voter would be
in personal jeopardy for venturing to appear at the polls to
exercise his right, it must be said in truth, that the incident
was local and peculiar, and contrary to what is annually seen
throughout the states where colored persons are permitted to
vote, who exercise that privilege with as full immunity from
injury or oppression, as any white citizen. And, after all, it
is believed that the state of feeling intimated by the informant
of our author, is but an indication of dislike to a _caste_
degraded by servitude and ignorance; and it is not perceived how
it proves the despotism of a majority over the freedom and
independence of opinion. If it be true, it proves a detestable
tyranny over _acts,_ over the exercise of an acknowledged
right. The apprehensions of a mob committing violence deterred
the colored voters from approaching the polls. Are instances
unknown in England or even in France, of peaceable subjects being
prevented by mobs or the fear of them, from the exercise of a
right, from the discharge of a duty? And are they evidences of
the despotism of a majority in those countries?--_American
Editor._]

I have heard of patriotism in the United States, and it is a
virtue which may be found among the people, but never among the
leaders of the people. This may be explained by analogy;
despotism debases the oppressed, much more than the oppressor; in
absolute monarchies the king has often great virtues, but the
courtiers are invariably servile. It is true that the American
courtiers do not say, "sire," or "your majesty"--a distinction
without a difference. They are for ever talking of the natural
intelligence of the populace they serve; they do not debate the
question as to which of the virtues of their master are
pre-eminently worthy of admiration; for they assure him that he
possesses all the virtues under heaven without having acquired
them, or without caring to acquire them: they do not give him
their daughters and their wives to be raised at his pleasure to
the rank of his concubines, but, by sacrificing their opinions,
they prostitute themselves. Moralists and philosophers in
America are not obliged to conceal their opinions under the veil
of allegory; but, before they venture upon a harsh truth, they
say: "We are aware that the people which we are addressing is too
superior to all the weaknesses of human nature to lose the
command of its temper for an instant; and we should not hold this
language if we were not speaking to men, whom their virtues and
their intelligence render more worthy of freedom than all the
rest of the world."

It would have been impossible for the sycophants of Louis XIV. to
flatter more dexterously. For my part, I am persuaded that in
all governments, whatever their nature may be, servility will
cower to force, and adulation will cling to power. The only
means of preventing men from degrading themselves, is to invest
no one with that unlimited authority which is the surest method
of debasing them.

* * * * *

THE GREATEST DANGERS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS PROCEED
FROM THE UNLIMITED POWER OF THE MAJORITY.

Democratic Republics liable to perish from a misuse of their
Power, and not by Impotence.--The Governments of the American
Republics are more Centralized and more Energetic than those of
the Monarchies of Europe.--Dangers resulting from
this.--Opinions of Hamilton and Jefferson upon this Point.

Governments usually fall a sacrifice to impotence or to tyranny.
In the former case their power escapes from them: it is wrested
from their grasp in the latter. Many observers who have noticed
the anarchy of domestic states, have imagined that the government
of those states was naturally weak and impotent. The truth is,
that when once hostilities are begun between parties, the
government loses its control over society. But I do not think
that a democratic power is naturally without resources: say
rather, that it is almost always by the abuse of its force, and
the misemployment of its resources, that a democratic government
fails. Anarchy is almost always produced by its tyranny or its
mistakes, but not by its want of strength.

It is important not to confound stability with force, or the
greatness of a thing with its duration. In democratic republics,
the power which directs[Footnote:

This power may be centred in an assembly, in which case it will
be strong without being stable; or it may be centred in an
individual, in which case it will be less strong, but more
stable.

] society is not stable; for it often changes hands and assumes a
new direction. But whichever way it turns, its force is almost
irresistible. The governments of the American republics appear
to me to be as much centralized as those of the absolute
monarchies of Europe, and more energetic than they are. I do
not, therefore, imagine that they will perish from
weakness.[Footnote:

I presume that it is scarcely necessary to remind the reader
here, as well as throughout the remainder of this chapter, that I
am speaking not of the federal government, but of the several
governments of each state which the majority controls at its
pleasure.

]

If ever the free institutions of America are destroyed, that
event may be attributed to the unlimited authority of the
majority, which may at some future time urge the minorities to
desperation, and oblige them to have recourse to physical force.
Anarchy will then be the result, but it will have been brought
about by despotism.

Mr. Hamilton expresses the same opinion in the Federalist,
No. 51. "It is of great importance in a republic not only to
guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to
guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other
part. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil
society. It ever has been, and ever will be pursued until it be
obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society,
under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite
and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as
in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured
against the violence of the stronger: and as in the latter state
even the stronger individuals are prompted by the uncertainty of
their condition to submit to a government which may protect the
weak as well as themselves, so in the former state will the more
powerful factions be gradually induced by a like motive to wish
for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as
well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted, that if the
state of Rhode Island was separated from the confederacy and left
to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of
government within such narrow limits, would be displayed by such
reiterated oppression of the factious majorities, that some power
altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by
the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the
necessity of it."

Jefferson has also expressed himself in a letter to
Madison:[Footnote:

15th March, 1789.

] "The executive power in our government is not the only, perhaps
not even the principal object of my solicitude. The tyranny of
the legislature is really the danger most to be feared, and will
continue to be so for many years to come. The tyranny of the
executive power will come in its turn, but at a more distant
period."

I am glad to cite the opinion of Jefferson upon this subject
rather than that of another, because I consider him to be the
most powerful advocate democracy has ever sent forth.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XVI.

CAUSES WHICH MITIGATE THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY IN
THE UNITED STATES.

* * * * *

ABSENCE OF CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION.

The national Majority does not pretend to conduct all
Business.--Is obliged to employ the town and county Magistrates
to execute its supreme Decisions.

I have already pointed out the distinction which is to be made
between a centralized government and a centralized
administration. The former exists in America, but the latter is
nearly unknown there. If the directing power of the American
communities had both these instruments of government at its
disposal, and united the habit of executing its own commands to
the right of commanding; if, after having established the general
principles of government, it descended to the details of public
business; and if, having regulated the great interests of the
country, it would penetrate into the privacy of individual
interest, freedom would soon be banished from the New World.

But in the United States the majority, which so frequently
displays the tastes and the propensities of a despot, is still
destitute of the more perfect instruments of tyranny.

In the American republics the activity of the central government
has never as yet been extended beyond a limited number of objects
sufficiently prominent to call forth its attention. The
secondary affairs of society have never been regulated by its
authority; and nothing has hitherto betrayed its desire of
interfering in them. The majority is become more and more
absolute, but it has not increased the prerogatives of the
central government; those great prerogatives have been confined
to a certain sphere; and although the despotism of the majority
may be galling upon one point, it cannot be said to extend to
all. However the predominant party of the nation may be carried
away by its passions; however ardent it may be in the pursuit of
its projects, it cannot oblige all the citizens to comply with
its desire in the same manner, and at the same time, throughout
the country. When the central government which represents that
majority has issued a decree, it must intrust the execution of
its will to agents, over whom it frequently has no control, and
whom it cannot perpetually direct. The townships, municipal
bodies, and counties, may therefore be looked upon as concealed
breakwaters, which check or part the tide of popular excitement.
If an oppressive law were passed, the liberties of the people
would still be protected by the means by which that law would be
put in execution: the majority cannot descend to the details, and
(as I will venture to style them) the puerilities of
administrative tyranny. Nor does the people entertain that full
consciousness of its authority, which would prompt it to
interfere in these matters; it knows the extent of its natural
powers, but it is unacquainted with the increased resources which
the art of government might furnish.

This point deserves attention; for if a democratic republic,
similar to that of the United States, were ever founded in a
country where the power of a single individual had previously
subsisted, and the effects of a centralized administration had
sunk deep into the habits and the laws of the people, I do not
hesitate to assert, that in that country a more insufferable
despotism would prevail than any which now exists in the absolute
monarchies of Europe; or indeed than any which could be found on
this side the confines of Asia.

* * * * *

THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES SERVES
TO COUNTERPOISE THE DEMOCRACY.

Utility of discriminating the natural Propensities of the Members
of the legal Profession--These Men called upon to act a
prominent Part in future Society.--In what Manner the peculiar
Pursuits of Lawyers give an aristocratic turn to their
Ideas.--Accidental Causes which may check this Tendency.--Ease
with which the Aristocracy coalesces with legal Men.--Use of
Lawyers to a Despot.--The Profession of the Law constitutes the
only aristocratic Element with which the natural Elements of
Democracy will combine.--Peculiar Causes which tend to give an
aristocratic turn of Mind to the English and American
Lawyer.--The Aristocracy of America is on the Bench and at the
Bar.--Influence of Lawyers upon American Society.--Their
peculiar magisterial Habits affect the Legislature, the
Administration, and even the People.

In visiting the Americans and in studying their laws, we perceive
that the authority they have intrusted to members of the legal
profession, and the influence which these individuals exercise in
the government, is the most powerful existing security against
the excesses of democracy.

This effect seems to me to result from a general cause which it
is useful to investigate, since it may produce analogous
consequences elsewhere.

The members of the legal profession have taken an important part
in all the vicissitudes of political society in Europe during the
last five hundred years. At one time they have been the
instruments of those who are invested with political authority,
and at another they have succeeded in converting political
authorities into their instrument. In the middle ages they
afforded a powerful support to the crown; and since that period
they have exerted themselves to the utmost to limit the royal
prerogative. In England they have contracted a close alliance
with the aristocracy; in France they have proved to be the most
dangerous enemies of that class. It is my object to inquire
whether, under all these circumstances, the members of the legal
profession have been swayed by sudden and momentary impulses; or
whether they have been impelled by principles which are inherent
in their pursuits, and which will always recur in history. I am
incited to this investigation by reflecting that this particular
class of men will most likely play a prominent part in that order
of things to which the events of our time are giving birth.