American Institutions And Their Influence

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The right of governing society, which the majority supposes
itself to derive from its superior intelligence, was introduced
into the United States by the first settlers; and this idea,
which would be sufficient of itself to create a free nation, has
now been amalgamated with the manners of the people, and the
minor incidents of social intercourse.

The French, under the old monarchy, held it for a maxim (which is
still a fundamental principle of the English constitution), that
the king could do no wrong; and if he did wrong, the blame was
imputed to his advisers. This notion was highly favorable to
habits of obedience; and it enabled the subject to complain of
the law, without ceasing to love and honor the lawgiver. The
Americans entertain the same opinion with respect to the
majority.

The moral power of the majority is founded upon yet another
principle, which is, that the interests of the many are to be
preferred to those of the few. It will readily be perceived that
the respect here professed for the rights of the majority must
naturally increase or diminish according to the state of parties.
When a nation is divided into several irreconcilable factions,
the privilege of the majority is often overlooked, because it is
intolerable to comply with its demands.

If there existed in America a class of citizens whom the
legislating majority sought to deprive of exclusive privileges,
which they had possessed for ages, and to bring down from an
elevated station to the level of the ranks of the multitude, it
is probable that the minority would be less ready to comply with
its laws. But as the United States were colonized by men holding
an equal rank among themselves, there is as yet no natural or
permanent source of dissension between the interests of its
different inhabitants.

There are certain communities in which the persons who constitute
the minority can never hope to draw over the majority to their
side, because they must then give up the very point which is at
issue between them. Thus, an aristocracy can never become a
majority while it retains its exclusive privileges, and it cannot
cede its privileges without ceasing to be an aristocracy.

In the United States, political questions cannot be taken up in
so general and absolute a manner; and all parties are willing to
recognize the rights of the majority, because they all hope to
turn those rights to their own advantage at some future time.
The majority therefore in that country exercises a prodigious
actual authority, and a moral influence which is scarcely less
preponderant; no obstacles exist which can impede, or so much as
retard its progress, or which can induce it to heed the
complaints of those whom it crushes upon its path. This state of
things is fatal in itself and dangerous for the future.

* * * * *

HOW THE UNLIMITED POWER OF THE MAJORITY INCREASES, IN
AMERICA, THE INSTABILITY OF LEGISLATION AND THE ADMINISTRATION
INHERENT IN DEMOCRACY.

The Americans increase the mutability of the Laws which is
inherent in Democracy by changing the Legislature every Year,
and by vesting it with unbounded Authority.--The same Effect is
produced upon the Administration.--In America social
Melioration is conducted more energetically, but less
perseveringly than in Europe.

I have already spoken of the natural defects of democratic
institutions, and they all of them increase in the exact ratio of
the power of the majority. To begin with the most evident of
them all; the mutability of the laws is an evil inherent in
democratic government, because it is natural to democracies to
raise men to power in very rapid succession. But this evil is
more or less sensible in proportion to the authority and the
means of action which the legislature possesses.

In America the authority exercised by the legislative bodies is
supreme; nothing prevents them from accomplishing their wishes
with celerity, and with irresistible power, while they are
supplied by new representatives every year. That is to say, the
circumstances which contribute most powerfully to democratic
instability, and which admit of the free application of caprice
to every object in the state, are here in full operation. In
conformity with this principle, America is, at the present day,
the country in the world where laws last the shortest time.
Almost all the American constitutions have been amended within
the course of thirty years: there is, therefore, not a single
American state which has not modified the principles of its
legislation in that lapse of time. As for the laws themselves, a
single glance upon the archives of the different states of the
Union suffices to convince one, that in America the activity of
the legislator never slackens. Not that the American democracy
is naturally less stable than any other, but that it is allowed
to follow its capricious propensities in the formation of the
laws.[Footnote:

The legislative acts promulgated by the state of Massachusetts
alone, from the year 1780 to the present time, already fill three
stout volumes: and it must not be forgotten that the collection
to which I allude was published in 1823, when many old laws which
had fallen into disuse were omitted. The state of Massachusetts,
which is not more populous than a department of France, may be
considered as the most stable, the most consistent, and the most
sagacious in its undertakings of the whole Union.

]

The omnipotence of the majority and the rapid as well as absolute
manner in which its decisions are executed in the United States,
have not only the effect of rendering the law unstable, but they
exercise the same influence upon the execution of the law and the
conduct of the public administration. As the majority is the
only power which it is important to court, all its projects are
taken up with the greatest ardor; but no sooner is its attention
distracted, than all this ardor ceases; while in the free states
of Europe, the administration is at once independent and secure,
so that the projects of the legislature are put into execution,
although its immediate attention may be directed to other
objects.

In America certain meliorations are undertaken with much more
zeal and activity than elsewhere; in Europe the same ends are
promoted by much less social effort, more continuously applied.

Some years ago several pious individuals undertook to meliorate
the condition of the prisons. The public was excited by the
statements which they put forward, and the regeneration of
criminals became a very popular undertaking. New prisons were
built; and, for the first time, the idea of reforming as well as
of punishing the delinquent, formed a part of prison discipline.
But this happy alteration, in which the public had taken so
hearty an interest, and which the exertions of the citizens had
irresistibly accelerated, could not be completed in a moment.
While the new penitentiaries were being erected (and it was the
pleasure of the majority they should be terminated with all
possible celerity), the old prisons existed, which still
contained a great number of offenders. These jails became more
unwholesome and more corrupt in proportion as the new
establishments were beautified and improved, forming a contrast
which may readily be understood. The majority was so eagerly
employed in founding the new prisons, that those which already
existed were forgotten; and as the general attention was diverted
to a novel object, the care which had hitherto been bestowed upon
the others ceased. The salutary regulations of discipline were
first relaxed, and afterward broken; so that in the immediate
neighborhood of a prison which bore witness to the mild and
enlightened spirit of our time, dungeons might be met with, which
reminded the visitor of the barbarity of the middle ages.

* * * * *

TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY.

How the Principle of the Sovereignty of the People is to be
understood.--Impossibility of conceiving a mixed
Government.--The sovereign Power must centre
somewhere.--Precautions to be taken to control its
Action.--These Precautions have not been taken in the United
States.--Consequences.

I hold it to be an impious and an execrable maxim that,
politically speaking, a people has a right to do whatsoever it
pleases; and yet I have asserted that all authority originates in
the will of the majority. Am I, then, in contradiction with
myself?

A general law--which bears the name of justice--has been made and
sanctioned, not only by a majority of this or that people, but by
a majority of mankind. The rights of every people are
consequently confined within the limits of what is just. A
nation may be considered in the light of a jury which is
empowered to represent society at large, and to apply the great
and general law of justice. Ought such a jury, which represents
society, to have more power than the society in which the laws it
applies originate?

When I refuse to obey an unjust law, I do not contest the right
which the majority has of commanding, but I simply appeal from
the sovereignty of the people to the sovereignty of mankind. It
has been asserted that a people can never entirely outstep the
boundaries of justice and of reason in those affairs which are
more peculiarly its own; and that consequently full power may
fearlessly be given to the majority by which it is represented.
But this language is that of a slave.

A majority taken collectively may be regarded as a being whose
opinions, and most frequently whose interests, are opposed to
those of another being, which is styled a minority. If it be
admitted that a man, possessing absolute power, may misuse that
power by wronging his adversaries, why should a majority not be
liable to the same reproach? Men are not apt to change their
characters by agglomeration; nor does their patience in the
presence of obstacles increase with the consciousness of their
strength.[Footnote:

No one will assert that a people cannot forcibly wrong another
people: but parties may be looked upon as lesser nations within a
greater one, and they are aliens to each other: if therefore it
be admitted that a nation can act tyrannically toward another
nation, it cannot be denied that a party may do the same toward
another party.

] And for these reasons I can never willingly invest any number
of my fellow-creatures with that unlimited authority which I
should refuse to any one of them.

I do not think it is possible to combine several principles in
the same government, so as at the same time to maintain freedom,
and really to oppose them to one another. The form of government
which is usually termed _mixed_ has always appeared to me to
be a mere chimera. Accurately speaking, there is no such thing
as a mixed government (with the meaning usually given to that
word), because in all communities some one principle of action
may be discovered, which preponderates over the others. England
in the last century, which has been more especially cited as an
example of this form of government, was in point of fact an
essentially aristocratic state, although it comprised very
powerful elements of democracy: for the laws and customs of the
country were such, that the aristocracy could not but
preponderate in the end, and subject the direction of public
affairs to its own will. The error arose from too much attention
being paid to the actual struggle which was going on between the
nobles and the people, without considering the probable issue of
the contest, which was in reality the important point. When a
community really has a mixed government, that is to say, when it
is equally divided between two adverse principles, it must either
pass through a revolution, or fall into complete dissolution.

I am therefore of opinion that some one social power must always
be made to predominate over the others; but I think that liberty
is endangered when this power is checked by no obstacles which
may retard its course, and force it to moderate its own
vehemence.

Unlimited power is in itself a bad and dangerous thing; human
beings are not competent to exercise it with discretion; and God
alone can be omnipotent, because his wisdom and his justice are
always equal to his power. But no power upon earth is so worthy
of honor for itself, or of reverential obedience to the rights
which it represents, that I would consent to admit its
uncontrolled and all-predominate authority. When I see that the
right and the means of absolute command are conferred on a people
or upon a king, upon an aristocracy or a democracy, a monarchy or
a republic, I recognize the germ of tyranny, and I journey onward
to a land of more hopeful institutions.

In my opinion the main evil of the present democratic
institutions of the United States does not arise, as is often
asserted in Europe, from their weakness, but from their
overpowering strength; and I am not so much alarmed at the
excessive liberty which reigns in that country, as at the very
inadequate securities which exist against tyranny.

When an individual or a party is wronged in the United States, to
whom can he apply for redress? If to public opinion, public
opinion constitutes the majority; if to the legislature, it
represents the majority, and implicitly obeys its instructions:
if to the executive power, it is appointed by the majority and is
a passive tool in its hands; the public troops consist of the
majority under arms; the jury is the majority invested with the
right of hearing judicial cases; and in certain states even the
judges are elected by the majority. However iniquitous or absurd
the evil of which you complain may be, you must submit to it as
well as you can.[Footnote:

A striking instance of the excesses which may be occasioned by
the despotism of the majority occurred at Baltimore in the year
1812. At that time the war was very popular in Baltimore. A
journal which had taken the other side of the question excited
the indignation of the inhabitants by its opposition. The
populace assembled, broke the printing-presses, and attacked the
houses of the newspaper editors. The militia was called out, but
no one obeyed the call; and the only means of saving the poor
wretches who were threatened by the phrensy of the mob, was to
throw them into prison as common malefactors. But even this
precaution was ineffectual; the mob collected again during the
night; the magistrates again made a vain attempt to call out the
militia; the prison was forced, one of the newspaper editors was
killed upon the spot, and the others were left for dead: the
guilty parties were acquitted by the jury when they were brought
to trial.

I said one day to an inhabitant of Pennsylvania: "Be so good as
to explain to me how it happens, that in a state founded by
quakers, and celebrated for its toleration, freed blacks are not
allowed to exercise civil rights. They pay the taxes: is it not
fair that they should have a vote."

"You insult us," replied my informant, "if you imagine that our
legislators could have committed so gross an act of injustice and
intolerance."

"What, then, the blacks possess the right of voting in this
country?"

"Without the smallest doubt."

"How comes it then, that at the polling-booth this morning I did
not perceive a single negro in the whole meeting?"

"This is not the fault of the law; the negroes have the
undisputed right of voting; but they voluntarily abstain from
making their appearance."

"A very pretty piece of modesty on their parts," rejoined I.

"Why, the truth is, that they are not disinclined to vote, but
they are afraid of being maltreated; in this country the law is
sometimes unable to maintain its authority without the support of
the majority. But in this case the majority entertains very
strong prejudices against the blacks, and the magistrates are
unable to protect them in the exercise of their legal
privileges."

"What, then, the majority claims the right not only of making the
laws, but of breaking the laws it has made?"

]

If, on the other hand, a legislative power could be so
constituted as to represent the majority without necessarily
being the slave of its passions; an executive, so as to retain a
certain degree of uncontrolled authority; and a judiciary, so as
to remain independent of the two other powers; a government would
be formed which would still be democratic, without incurring any
risk of tyrannical abuse.

I do not say that tyrannical abuses frequently occur in America
at the present day; but I maintain that no sure barrier is
established against them, and that the causes which mitigate the
government are to be found in the circumstances and the manners
of the country more than its laws.

* * * * *

EFFECTS OF THE UNLIMITED POWER OF THE MAJORITY UPON
THE ARBITRARY AUTHORITY OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
OFFICERS.

Liberty left by the American Laws to public Officers within a
certain Sphere.--Their Power.

A distinction must be drawn between tyranny and arbitrary power.
Tyranny may be exercised by means of the law, and in that case it
is not arbitrary; arbitrary power may be exercised for the good
of the community at large, in which case it is not tyrannical.
Tyranny usually employs arbitrary means, but, if necessary, it
can rule without them.

In the United States the unbounded power of the majority, which
is favorable to the legal despotism of the legislature, is
likewise favorable to the arbitrary authority of the magistrates.
The majority has an entire control over the law when it is made
and when it is executed; and as it possesses an equal authority
over those who are in power, and the community at large, it
considers public officers as its passive agents, and readily
confides the task of serving its designs to their vigilance. The
details of their office and the privileges which they are to
enjoy are rarely defined beforehand; but the majority treats them
as a master does his servants, when they are always at work in
his sight, and he has the power of directing or reprimanding them
at every instant.

In general the American functionaries are far more independent
than the French civil officers, within the sphere which is
prescribed to them. Sometimes, even, they are allowed by the
popular authority to exceed those bounds; and as they are
protected by the opinion, and backed by the cooperation of the
majority, they venture upon such manifestations of their power as
astonish a European. By this means habits are formed in the
heart of a free country which may some day prove fatal to its
liberties.

* * * * *

POWER EXERCISED BY THE MAJORITY IN AMERICA UPON OPINION.

In America, when the Majority has once irrevocably decided a
Question, all Discussion ceases.--Reason of this.--Moral Power
exercised by the Majority upon Opinion.--Democratic Republics
have deprived Despotism of its physical Instruments.--Their
Despotism sways the Minds of Men.

It is in the examination of the display of public opinion in the
United States, that we clearly perceive how far the power of the
majority surpasses all the powers with which we are acquainted in
Europe. Intellectual principles exercise an influence which is
so invisible and often so inappreciable, that they baffle the
toils of oppression. At the present time the most absolute
monarchs in Europe are unable to prevent certain notions, which
are opposed to their authority, from circulating in secret
throughout their dominions, and even in their courts. Such is
not the case in America; so long as the majority is still
undecided, discussion is carried on; but as soon as its decision
is irrevocably pronounced, a submissive silence is observed; and
the friends, as well as the opponents of the measure, unite in
assenting to its propriety. The reason of this is perfectly
clear: no monarch is so absolute as to combine all the powers of
society in his own hands, and to conquer all opposition, with the
energy of a majority, which is invested with the right of making
and of executing the laws.

The authority of a king is purely physical, and it controls the
actions of the subject without subduing his private will; but the
majority possesses a power which is physical and moral at the
same time; it acts upon the will as well as upon the actions of
men, and it represses not only all contest, but all controversy.

I know no country in which there is so little true independence
of mind and freedom of discussion as in America. In any
constitutional state in Europe every sort of religious and
political theory may be advocated and propagated abroad; for
there is no country in Europe so subdued by any single authority,
as not to contain citizens who are ready to protect the man who
raises his voice in the cause of truth, from the consequences of
his hardihood. If he is unfortunate enough to live under an
absolute government, the people is upon his side; if he inhabits
a free country, he may find a shelter behind the authority of the
throne, if he require one. The aristocratic part of society
supports him in some countries, and the democracy in others. But
in a nation where democratic institutions exist, organized like
those of the United States, there is but one sole authority, one
single element of strength and success, with nothing beyond it.

In America, the majority raises very formidable barriers to the
liberty of opinion: within these barriers an author may write
whatever he pleases, but he will repent it if he ever step beyond
them. Not that he is exposed to the terrors of an auto-da-fe,
but he is tormented by the slights and persecutions of daily
obloquy. His political career is closed for ever, since he has
offended the only authority which is able to promote his success.
Every sort of compensation, even that of celebrity, is refused to
him. Before he published his opinions, he imagined that he held
them in common with many others; but no sooner has he declared
them openly, than he is loudly censured by his overbearing
opponents, while those who think, without having the courage to
speak, like him, abandon him in silence. He yields at length,
oppressed by the daily efforts he has been making, and he
subsides into silence as if he was tormented by remorse for
having spoken the truth.

Fetters and headsmen were the coarse instruments which tyranny
formerly employed; but the civilisation of our age has refined
the arts of despotism, which seemed however to have been
sufficiently perfected before. The excesses of monarchical power
had devised a variety of political means of oppression; the
democratic republics of the present day have rendered it as
entirely an affair of the mind, as that will which it is intended
to coerce. Under the absolute sway of an individual despot, the
body was attacked in order to subdue the soul; and the soul
escaped the blows which were directed against it, and rose
superior to the attempt; but such is not the course adopted by
tyranny in democratic republics; there the body is left free, and
the soul is enslaved. The sovereign can no longer say, "You
shall think as I do on pain of death;" but he says, "You are free
to think differently from me, and to retain your life, your
property, and all that you possess; but if such be your
determination, you are henceforth an alien among your people.
You may retain your civil rights, but they will be useless to
you, for you will never be chosen by your fellow-citizens, if you
solicit their suffrages; and they will affect to scorn you, if
you solicit their esteem. You will remain among men, but you
will be deprived of the rights of mankind. Your fellow-creatures
will shun you like an impure being; and those who are most
persuaded of your innocence will abandon you too, lest they
should be shunned in their turn. Go in peace! I have given you
your life, but it is an existence incomparably worse than death."

Absolute monarchies have thrown an odium upon despotism; let us
beware lest democratic republics should restore oppression, and
should render it less odious and less degrading in the eyes of
the many, by making it still more onerous to the few.

Works have been published in the proudest nations of the Old
World, expressly intended to censure the vices and deride the
follies of the time; Labruyere inhabited the palace of Louis
XIV. when he composed his chapter upon the Great, and Moliere
criticised the courtiers in the very pieces which were acted
before the court. But the ruling power in the United States is
not to be made game of; the smallest reproach irritates its
sensibility, and the slightest joke which has any foundation in
truth, renders it indignant; from the style of its language to
the more solid virtues of its character, everything must be made
the subject of encomium. No writer, whatever be his eminence,
can escape from this tribute of adulation to his fellow-citizens.
The majority lives in the perpetual exercise of self-applause;
and there are certain truths which the Americans can only learn
from strangers or from experience.