American Institutions And Their Influence

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If, then, the men who conduct the government of an aristocracy
sometimes endeavor to corrupt the people, the heads of a
democracy are themselves corrupt. In the former case the
morality of the people is directly assailed; in the latter, an
indirect influence is exercised upon the people, which is still
more to be dreaded.

As the rulers of democratic nations are almost always exposed to
the suspicion of dishonorable conduct, they in some measure lend
the authority of the government to the base practices of which
they are accused. They thus afford an example which must prove
discouraging to the struggles of virtuous independence, and must
foster the secret calculations of a vicious ambition. If it be
asserted that evil passions are displayed in all ranks of
society; that they ascend the throne by hereditary right; and
that despicable characters are to be met with at the head of
aristocratic nations as well as in the sphere of a democracy;
this objection has but little weight in my estimation. The
corruption of men who have casually risen to power has a coarse
and vulgar infection in it, which renders it contagious to the
multitude. On the contrary, there is a kind of aristocratic
refinement, and an air of grandeur, in the depravity of the
great, which frequently prevents it from spreading abroad.

The people can never penetrate the perplexing labyrinth of court
intrigue, and it will always have difficulty in detecting the
turpitude which lurks under elegant manners, refined tastes, and
graceful language. But to pillage the public purse, and to vend
the favors of the state, are arts which the meanest villain may
comprehend, and hope to practise in his turn.

In reality it is far less prejudicial to be a witness to the
immorality of the great, than to that immorality which leads to
greatness. In a democracy, private citizens see a man of their
own rank in life, who rises from that obscure position, and who
becomes possessed of riches and of power in a few years: the
spectacle excites their surprise and their envy: and they are led
to inquire how the person who was yesterday their equal, is
to-day their ruler. To attribute his rise to his talents or his
virtues is unpleasant; for it is tacitly to acknowledge that they
are themselves less virtuous and less talented than he was. They
are therefore led (and not unfrequently their conjecture is a
correct one) to impute his success mainly to some of his defects;
and an odious mixture is thus formed of the ideas of turpitude
and power, unworthiness and success, utility and dishonor.

* * * * *

EFFORTS OF WHICH A DEMOCRACY IS CAPABLE.

The Union has only had one struggle hitherto for its
Existence.--Enthusiasm at the Commencement of the
War.--Indifference toward its Close.--Difficulty of
establishing a military Conscription or impressment of Seamen
in America.--Why a democratic People is less capable of
sustained Effort than another.

I here warn the reader that I speak of a government which
implicitly follows the real desires of the people, and not of a
government which simply commands in its name. Nothing is so
irresistible as a tyrannical power commanding in the name of the
people, because, while it exercises that moral influence which
belongs to the decisions of the majority, it acts at the same
time with the promptitude and the tenacity of a single man.

It is difficult to say what degree of exertion a democratic
government may be capable of making, at a crisis in the history
of the nation. But no great democratic republic has hitherto
existed in the world. To style the oligarchy which ruled over
France in 1793, by that name, would be to offer an insult to the
republican form of government. The United States afford the
first example of the kind.

The American Union has now subsisted for half a century, in the
course of which time its existence has only once been attacked,
namely, during the war of independence. At the commencement of
that long war, various occurrences took place which betokened an
extraordinary zeal for the service of the country.[Footnote:

One of the most singular of these occurrences was the resolution
which the Americans took of temporarily abandoning the use of
tea. Those who know that men usually cling more to their habits
than to their life, will doubtless admire this great and obscure
sacrifice which was made by a whole people.

] But as the contest was prolonged, symptoms of private egotism
began to show themselves. No money was poured into the public
treasury; few recruits could be raised to join the army; the
people wished to acquire independence, but was very ill disposed
to undergo the privations by which alone it could be obtained.
"Tax laws," says Hamilton in the Federalist (No. 12), "have in
vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the collection have
in vain been tried; the public expectation has been uniformly
disappointed; and the treasuries of the states have remained
empty. The popular system of administration inherent in the
nature of popular government, coinciding with the real scarcity
of money incident to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has
hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive collections, and
has at length taught the different legislatures the folly of
attempting them."

The United States have not had any serious war to carry on since
that period. In order, therefore, to appreciate the sacrifices
which democratic nations may impose upon themselves, we must wait
until the American people is obliged to put half its entire
income at the disposal of the government, as was done by the
English; or until it sends forth a twentieth part of its
population to the field of battle, as was done by France.

In America the use of conscription is unknown, and men are
induced to enlist by bounties. The notions and habits of the
people of the United States are so opposed to compulsory
enlistments, that I do not imagine that it can ever be sanctioned
by the laws. What is termed the conscription in France is
assuredly the heaviest tax upon the population of that country;
yet how could a great continental war be carried on without it?
The Americans have not adopted the British impressment of seamen,
and they have nothing which corresponds to the French system of
maritime conscription; the navy, as well as the merchant service,
is supplied by voluntary engagement. But it is not easy to
conceive how a people can sustain a great maritime war, without
having recourse to one or the other of these two systems.
Indeed, the Union, which has fought with some honor upon the
seas, has never possessed a very numerous fleet, and the
equipment of the small number of American vessels has always been
excessively expensive.

[The remark that "in America the use of conscription is unknown,
and men are induced to enlist by bounties," is not exactly
correct. During the last war with Great Britain, the state of
New York, in October, 1814 (see the laws of that session, p. 15),
passed an act to raise troops for the defence of the state, in
which the whole body of the militia were directed to be classed,
and each class to furnish one soldier, so as to make up the whole
number of 12,000 directed to be raised. In case of the refusal
of a class to furnish a man, one was to be detached from them by
ballot, and was compelled to procure a substitute or serve
personally. The intervention of peace rendered proceedings under
the act unnecessary, and we have not, therefore, the light of
experience to form an opinion whether such a plan of raising a
military force is practicable. Other states passed similar laws.
The system of classing was borrowed from the practice of the
revolution.--_American Editor_.]

I have heard American statesmen confess that the Union will have
great difficulty in maintaining its rank on the seas, without
adopting the system of impressment or of maritime conscription;
but the difficulty is to induce the people, which exercises the
supreme authority, to submit to impressment or any compulsory
system.

It is incontestable, that in times of danger a free people
displays far more energy than one which is not so. But I incline
to believe, that this is more especially the case in those free
nations in which the democratic element preponderates. Democracy
appears to me to be much better adapted for the peaceful conduct
of society, or for an occasional effort of remarkable vigor, than
for the hardy and prolonged endurance of the storms which beset
the political existence of nations. The reason is very evident;
it is enthusiasm which prompts men to expose themselves to
dangers and privations; but they will not support them long
without reflection. There is more calculation, even in the
impulses of bravery, than is generally attributed to them; and
although the first efforts are suggested by passion, perseverance
is maintained by a distinct regard of the purpose in view. A
portion of what we value is exposed, in order to save the
remainder.

But it is this distinct perception of the future, founded upon a
sound judgment and an enlightened experience, which is most
frequently wanting in democracies. The populace is more apt to
feel than to reason; and if its present sufferings are great, it
is to be feared that the still greater sufferings attendant upon
defeat will be forgotten.

Another cause tends to render the efforts of a democratic
government less persevering than those of an aristocracy, Not
only are the lower classes less awakened than the higher orders
to the good or evil chances of the future, but they are liable to
suffer far more acutely from present privations. The noble
exposes his life, indeed, but the chance of glory is equal to the
chance of harm. If he sacrifices a large portion of his income
to the state, he deprives himself for a time of the pleasure of
affluence; but to the poor man death is embellished by no pomp or
renown; and the imposts which are irksome to the rich are fatal
to him.

This relative impotence of democratic republics is, perhaps, the
greatest obstacle to the foundation of a republic of this kind in
Europe. In order that such a state should subsist in one country
of the Old World, it would be necessary that similar institutions
should be introduced into all the other nations.

I am of opinion that a democratic government tends in the end to
increase the real strength of society; but it can never combine,
upon a single point and at a given time, so much power as an
aristocracy or a monarchy. If a democratic country remained
during a whole century subject to a republican government, it
would probably at the end of that period be more populous and
more prosperous than the neighboring despotic states. But it
would have incurred the risk of being conquered much oftener than
they would in that lapse of years.

* * * * *

SELF-CONTROL OF THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY.

The American People acquiesces slowly, or frequently does not
acquiesce in what is beneficial to its Interests.--The faults
of the American Democracy are for the most part reparable.

The difficulty which a democracy has in conquering the passions,
and in subduing the exigencies of the moment, with a view to the
future, is conspicuous in the most trivial occurrences in the
United States. The people which is surrounded by flatterers, has
great difficulty in surmounting its inclinations; and whenever it
is solicited to undergo a privation or any kind of inconvenience,
even to attain an end which is sanctioned by its own rational
conviction, it almost always refuses to comply at first. The
deference of the Americans to the laws has been very justly
applauded; but it must be added, that in America the legislation
is made by the people and for the people. Consequently, in the
United States, the law favors those classes which are most
interested in evading it elsewhere. It may therefore be supposed
that an offensive law, which should not be acknowledged to be one
of immediate utility, would either not be enacted or would not be
obeyed.

In America there is no law against fraudulent bankruptcies; not
because they are few, but because there are a great number of
bankruptcies. The dread of being prosecuted as a bankrupt acts
with more intensity upon the mind of the majority of the people,
than the fear of being involved in losses or ruin by the failure
of other parties; and a sort of guilty tolerance is extended by
the public conscience, to an offence which every one condemns in
his individual capacity. In the new states of the southwest, the
citizens generally take justice into their own hands, and murders
are of very frequent occurrence. This arises from the rude
manners and the ignorance of the inhabitants of those deserts,
who do not perceive the utility of investing the law with
adequate force, and who prefer duels to prosecutions.

Some one observed to me one day, in Philadelphia, that almost all
crimes in America are caused by the abuse of intoxicating
liquors, which the lower classes can procure in great abundance
from their excessive cheapness.--"How comes it," said I, "that
you do not put a duty upon brandy?"--"Our legislators," rejoined
my informant, "have frequently thought of this expedient; but the
task of putting it in operation is a difficult one: a revolt
might be apprehended; and the members who should vote for a law
of this kind would be sure of losing their seats."--"Whence I am
to infer," I replied, "that the drinking population constitutes
the majority in your country and that temperance is somewhat
unpopular."

When these things are pointed out to the American statesmen, they
content themselves with assuring you that time will operate the
necessary change, and that the experience of evil will teach the
people its true interests. This is frequently true; although a
democracy is more liable to error than a monarch or a body of
nobles, the chances of its regaining the right path, when once it
has acknowledged its mistake, are greater also; because it is
rarely embarrassed by internal interests, which conflict with
those of the majority, and resist the authority of reason. But a
democracy can only obtain truth as the result of experience; and
many nations may forfeit their existence, while they are awaiting
the consequences of their errors.

The great privilege of the Americans does not simply consist in
their being more enlightened than other nations, but in their
being able to repair the faults they may commit. To which it
must be added, that a democracy cannot derive substantial benefit
from past experience, unless it be arrived at a certain pitch of
knowledge and civilisation. There are tribes and peoples whose
education has been so vicious, and whose character presents so
strange a mixture of passion, of ignorance, and of erroneous
notions upon all subjects, that they are unable to discern the
cause of their own wretchedness, and they fall a sacrifice to
ills with which they are unacquainted.

I have crossed vast tracts of country that were formerly
inhabited by powerful Indian nations which are now extinct; I
have myself passed some time in the midst of mutilated tribes,
which see the daily decline of their numerical strength, and of
the glory of their independence; and I have heard these Indians
themselves anticipate the impending doom of their race. Every
European can perceive means which would rescue these unfortunate
beings from inevitable destruction. They alone are insensible to
the expedient; they feel the wo which year after year heaps upon
their heads, but they will perish to a man without accepting the
remedy. It would be necessary to employ force to induce them to
submit to the protection and the constraint of civilisation.

The incessant revolutions which have convulsed the South American
provinces for the last quarter of a century have frequently been
adverted to with astonishment, and expectations have been
expressed that those nations would speedily return to their
natural state. But can it be affirmed that the turmoil of
revolution is not actually the most natural state of the South
American Spaniards at the present time? In that country society
is plunged into difficulties from which all its efforts are
insufficient to rescue it. The inhabitants of that fair portion
of the western hemisphere seem obstinately bent on pursuing the
work of inward havoc. If they fall into a momentary repose from
the effects of exhaustion, that repose prepares them for a fresh
state of phrensy. When I consider their condition, which
alternates between misery and crime, I should be inclined to
believe that despotism itself would be a benefit to them, if it
were possible that the words despotism and benefit could ever be
united in my mind.

* * * * *

CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS BY THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY.

Direction given to the foreign Policy of the United States by
Washington and Jefferson.--Almost all the defects inherent in
democratic Institutions are brought to light in the Conduct of
foreign Affairs.--Their advantages are less perceptible.

We have seen that the federal constitution intrusts the permanent
direction of the external interests of the nation to the
president and the senate;[Footnote:

"The president," says the constitution, art. ii., sect. 2, Sec. 2,
"shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the
senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators
present concur." The reader is reminded that the senators are
returned for a term of six years, and that they are chosen by the
legislature of each state.

] which tends in some degree to detach the general foreign policy
of the Union from the control of the people. It cannot therefore
be asserted, with truth, that the external affairs of state are
conducted by the democracy. The policy of America owes its rise
to Washington, and after him to Jefferson, who established those
principles which it observes at the present day. Washington
said, in the admirable letter which he addressed to his
fellow-citizens, and which may be looked upon as his political
bequest to the country:--

"The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations
is, extending our commercial relations, to have with them as
little _political_ connexion as possible. So far as we have
already formed engagements, let them lie fulfilled with perfect
good faith. Here let us stop.

"Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or
a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent
controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our
concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate
ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of
her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her
friendships or enmities.

"Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to
pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an
efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy
material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an
attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve
upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations,
under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not
lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose
peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.

"Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit
our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our
destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and
prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship,
interest, humor, or caprice?

"It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with
any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now
at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of
patronising infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim
no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that
honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let
those engagements be observed in their genuine sense; but in my
opinion it is unnecessary, and would be unwise, to extend them.

"Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable
establishments, in a respectable defensive posture, we may safely
trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies."

In a previous part of the same letter, Washington makes the
following admirable and just remark: "The nation which indulges
toward another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is,
in some degree, a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or its
affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from
its duty and its interest."

The political conduct of Washington was always guided by these
maxims. He succeeded in maintaining his country in a state of
peace, while all the other nations of the globe were at war; and
he laid it down as a fundamental doctrine, that the true interest
of the Americans consisted in a perfect neutrality with regard to
the internal dissensions of the European powers.

Jefferson went still farther, and introduced a maxim into the
policy of the Union, which affirms, that "the Americans ought
never to solicit any privileges from foreign nations, in order
not to be obliged to grant similar privileges themselves."

These two principles, which were so plain and so just as to be
adapted to the capacity of the populace, have greatly simplified
the foreign policy of the United States. As the Union takes no
part in the affairs of Europe, it has, properly speaking, no
foreign interests to discuss, since it has at present no powerful
neighbors on the American continent. The country is as much
removed from the passions of the Old World by its position, as by
the line of policy which it has chosen; and it is neither called
upon to repudiate nor to espouse the conflicting interests of
Europe; while the dissensions of the New World are still
concealed within the bosom of the future.

The Union is free from all pre-existing obligations; and it is
consequently enabled to profit by the experience of the old
nations of Europe, without being obliged, as they are, to make
the best of the past, and to adapt it to their present
circumstances; or to accept that immense inheritance which they
derive from their forefathers--an inheritance of glory mingled
with calamities, and of alliances conflicting with national
antipathies. The foreign policy of the United States is reduced
by its very nature to await the chances of the future history of
the nation; and for the present it consists more in abstaining
from interference than in exerting its activity.

It is therefore very difficult to ascertain, at present, what
degree of sagacity the American democracy will display in the
conduct of the foreign policy of the country; and upon this point
its adversaries, as well as its advocates, must suspend their
judgment. As for myself, I have no hesitation in avowing my
conviction, that it is most especially in the conduct of foreign
relations, that democratic governments appear to me to be
decidedly inferior to governments carried on upon different
principles. Experience, instruction, and habit, may almost
always succeed in creating a species of practical discretion in
democracies, and that science of the daily occurrences of life
which is called good sense. Good sense may suffice to direct the
ordinary course of society; and among a people whose education
has been provided for, the advantages of democratic liberty in
the internal affairs of the country may more than compensate for
the evils inherent in a democratic government. But such is not
always the case in the mutual relations of foreign nations.

Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a
democracy possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the
perfect use of almost all those faculties in which it is
deficient. Democracy is favorable to the increase of the
internal resources of a state; it tends to diffuse a moderate
independence; it promotes the growth of public spirit, and
fortifies the respect which is entertained for law in all classes
of society: and these are advantages which only exercise an
indirect influence over the relations which one people bears to
another. But a democracy is unable to regulate the details of an
important undertaking, to persevere in a design, and to work out
its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. It cannot
combine its measures with secrecy, and will not await their
consequences with patience. These are qualities which more
especially belong to an individual or to an aristocracy; and they
are precisely the means by which an individual people attains a
predominant position.

If, on the contrary, we observe the natural defects of
aristocracy, we shall find that their influence is comparatively
innoxious in the direction of the external affairs of a state.
The capital fault of which aristocratic bodies may be accused, is
that they are more apt to contrive their own advantage than that
of the mass of the people. In foreign politics it is rare for
the interest of the aristocracy to be in any way distinct from
that of the people.