American Institutions And Their Influence

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The easy circumstances in which secondary functionaries are
placed in the United States, result also from another cause,
which is independent of the general tendencies of democracy:
every kind of private business is very lucrative, and the state
would not be served at all if it did not pay its servants. The
country is in the position of a commercial undertaking, which is
obliged to sustain an expensive competition, notwithstanding its
taste for economy.

] but when the question turns upon the salaries of the great
officers of state, this rule fails, and chance alone can guide
the popular decision. The poor have no adequate conceptions of
the wants which the higher classes of society may feel. The sum
which is scanty to the rich, appears enormous to the poor man,
whose wants do not extend beyond the necessaries of life: and in
his estimation the governor of a state, with his two or three
hundred a year, is a very fortunate and enviable being.[Footnote:

The state of Ohio, which contains a million of inhabitants, gives
its governor a salary of only $1,200 (260_l._) a year.

] If you undertake to convince him that the representative of a
great people ought to be able to maintain some show of splendor
in the eyes of foreign nations, he will perhaps assent to your
meaning; but when he reflects on his own humble dwelling, and on
the hard-earned produce of his wearisome toil, he remembers all
that he could do with a salary which you say is insufficient, and
he is startled or almost frightened at the sight of such uncommon
wealth. Besides, the secondary public officer is almost on a
level with the people, while the others are raised above it. The
former may therefore excite his interest, but the latter begins
to arouse his envy.

This is very clearly seen in the United States, where the
salaries seem to decrease as the authority of those who receive
them augments.[Footnote:

To render this assertion perfectly evident, it will suffice to
examine the scale of salaries of the agents of the federal
government. I have added the salaries attached to the
corresponding officers in France, to complete the comparison:--

UNITED STATES. FRANCE.
_Treasury Department_. _Ministere des Finances_
Messenger . . . $ 700 150_l_. Huissier, 3,500 fr. . . . 60_l_.
Clerk with lowest salary Clerk with lowest salary,
. . . . . 1,000 217 1,000 to 1,300 fr. . . 40 to 72
Clerk with highest Clerk with highest salary
salary . . . . 1,600 347 3,200 to 3,600 fr. . 128 to 144
Chief clerk . . . 2,000 434 Secretaire-general, 20,000 fr. 800
Secretary of state . 6,000 1,300 The minister, 80,000 fr. . 3,200
The President . . 25,000 5,400 The king, 12,000,000 fr. 480,000

I have perhaps done wrong in selecting France as my standard of
comparison. In France the democratic tendencies of the nation
exercise an ever-increasing influence upon the government, and
the chambers show a disposition to raise the lowest salaries and
to lower the principal ones. Thus the minister of finance, who
received 160,000 fr. under the empire, receives 80,000 fr., in
1835; the directeurs-generaux of finance, who then received
50,000 fr., now receive only 20,000 fr.

]

Under the rule of an aristocracy it frequently happens, on the
contrary, that while the high officers are receiving munificent
salaries, the inferior ones have not more than enough to procure
the necessaries of life. The reason of this fact is easily
discoverable from causes very analogous to those to which I have
just alluded. If a democracy is unable to conceive the pleasures
of the rich, or to see them without envy, an aristocracy is slow
to understand, or, to speak more correctly, is unacquainted with
the privations of the poor. The poor man is not (if we use the
term aright) the fellow of the rich one; but he is the being of
another species. An aristocracy is therefore apt to care but
little for the fate of its subordinate agents: and their salaries
are only raised when they refuse to perform their service for too
scanty a remuneration.

It is the parsimonious conduct of democracy toward its principal
officers, which has countenanced a supposition of far more
economical propensities than any which it really possesses. It
is true that it scarcely allows the means of honorable
subsistence to the individuals who conduct its affairs; but
enormous sums are lavished to meet the exigencies or to
facilitate the enjoyments of the people.[Footnote:

See the American budgets for the cost of indigent citizens and
gratuitous instruction. In 1831, 50,000_l_. were spent in
the state of New York for the maintenance of the poor; and at
least 200,000_l_. were devoted to gratuitous instruction.
(Williams's New York Annual Register, 1832, pp. 205, 243.) The
state of New York contained only 1,900,000 inhabitants in the
year 1830; which is not more than double the amount of population
in the department du Nord in France.

] The money raised by taxation may be better employed, but it is
not saved. In general, democracy gives largely to the community,
and very sparingly to those who govern it. The reverse is the
case in the aristocratic countries, where the money of the state
is expended to the profit of the persons who are at the head of
affairs.

* * * * *

DIFFICULTY OF DISTINGUISHING THE CAUSES WHICH CONTRIBUTE
TO THE ECONOMY OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.

We are liable to frequent errors in the research of those facts
which exercise a serious influence upon the fate of mankind,
since nothing is more difficult than to appreciate their real
value. One people is naturally inconsistent and enthusiastic;
another is sober and calculating; and these characteristics
originate in their physical constitution, or in remote causes
with which we are unacquainted.

There are nations which are fond of parade and the bustle of
festivity, and which do not regret the costly gaieties of an
hour. Others, on the contrary, are attached to more retiring
pleasures, and seem almost ashamed of appearing to be pleased.
In some countries the highest value is set upon the beauty of
public edifices; in others the productions of art are treated
with indifference, and everything which is unproductive is looked
down upon with contempt. In some renown, in others money, is the
ruling passion.

Independently of the laws, all these causes concur to exercise a
very powerful influence upon the conduct of the finances of the
state. If the Americans never spend the money of the people in
galas, it is not only because the imposition of taxes is under
the control of the people, but because the people takes no
delight in public rejoicings. If they repudiate all ornament
from their architecture, and set no store on any but the more
practical and homely advantages, it is not only because they live
under democratic institutions, but because they are a commercial
nation. The habits of private life are continued in public; and
we ought carefully to distinguish that economy which depends upon
their institutions, from that which is the natural result of
their manners and customs.

* * * * *

WHETHER THE EXPENDITURE OF THE UNITED STATES CAN BE
COMPARED TO THAT OF FRANCE.

Two Points to be established in order to estimate the Extent of
the public Charges, viz.: the national Wealth, and the Rate of
Taxation. The Wealth and the Charges of France not accurately
known.--Why the Wealth and Charges of the Union cannot be
accurately known. Researches of the Author with a View to
discover the Amount of Taxation in Pennsylvania.--General
Symptoms which may serve to indicate the Amount of the public
Charges in a given Nation.--Result of this Investigation for
the Union.

Many attempts have recently been made in France to compare the
public expenditure of that country with the expenditure of the
United States; all these attempts have, however, been unattended
by success; and a few words will suffice to show that they could
not have had a satisfactory result.

In order to estimate the amount of the public charges of a
people, two preliminaries are indispensable; it is necessary, in
the first place, to know the wealth of that people; and in the
second, to learn what portion of that wealth is devoted to the
expenditure of the state. To show the amount of taxation without
showing the resources which are destined to meet the demand, is
to undertake a futile labor; for it is not the expenditure, but
the relation of the expenditure to the revenue, which it is
desirable to know.

The same rate of taxation which may easily be supported by a
wealthy contributor, will reduce a poor one to extreme misery.
The wealth of nations is composed of several distinct elements,
of which population is the first, real property the second, and
personal property the third. The first of these three elements
may be discovered without difficulty.

Among civilized nations it is easy to obtain an accurate census
of the inhabitants; but the two others cannot be determined with
so much facility. It is difficult to take an exact account of
all the lands in a country which are under cultivation, with
their natural or their acquired value; and it is still more
impossible to estimate the entire personal property which is at
the disposal of the nation, and which eludes the strictest
analysis by the diversity and number of shapes under which it may
occur. And, indeed, we find that the most ancient civilized
nations of Europe, including even those in which the
administration is most central, have not succeeded, as yet, in
determining the exact condition of their wealth.

In America the attempt has never been made; for how would such an
investigation be possible in a country where society has not yet
settled into habits of regularity and tranquillity; where the
national government is not assisted by a multitude of agents
whose exertions it can command, and direct to one sole end; and
where statistics are not studied, because no one is able to
collect the necessary documents, or can find time to peruse them?
Thus the primary elements of the calculations which have been
made in France, cannot be obtained in the Union; the relative
wealth of the two countries is unknown: the property of the
former is not accurately determined, and no means exist of
computing that of the latter.

I consent, therefore, for the sake of the discussion, to abandon
this necessary term of the comparison, and I confine myself to a
computation of the actual amount of taxation, without
investigating the relation which subsists between the taxation
and the revenue. But the reader will perceive that my task has
not been facilitated by the limits which I here lay down for my
researches.

It cannot be doubted that the central administration of France,
assisted by all the public officers who are at its disposal,
might determine with exactitude the amount of the direct and
indirect taxes levied upon the citizens. But this investigation,
which no private individual can undertake, has not hitherto been
completed by the French government, or, at least, its results
have not been made public. We are acquainted with the sum total
of the state; we know the amount of the departmental expenditure;
but the expenses of the communal divisions have not been
computed, and the amount of the public expenses of France is
unknown.

If we now turn to America, we shall perceive that the
difficulties are multiplied and enhanced. The Union publishes an
exact return of the amount of its expenditure; the budgets of the
four-and-twenty states furnish similar returns of their revenues;
but the expenses incident to the affairs of the counties and the
townships are unknown.[Footnote:

The Americans, as we have seen, have four separate budgets; the
Union, the states, the counties, and the townships, having each
severally their own. During my stay in America I made every
endeavor to discover the amount of the public expenditure in the
townships and counties of the principal states of the Union, and
I readily obtained the budget of the larger townships, but I
found it quite impossible to procure that of the smaller ones. I
possess, however, some documents relating to county expenses,
which, although incomplete, are still curious. I have to thank
Mr. Richards, mayor of Philadelphia, for the budgets of thirteen
of the counties of Pennsylvania, viz.: Lebanon, Centre, Franklin,
Fayette, Montgomery, Luzerne, Dauphin, Butler, Allegany,
Columbia, Northampton, Northumberland, and Philadelphia, for the
year 1830. Their population at that time consisted of 495,207
inhabitants. On looking at the map of Pennsylvania, it will be
seen that these thirteen counties are scattered in every
direction, and so generally affected by the causes which usually
influence the condition of a country, that they may easily be
supposed to furnish a correct average of the financial state of
the counties of Pennsylvania in general; and thus, upon reckoning
that the expenses of these counties amounted in the year 1830 to
about 72,330_l_., or nearly 3_s_. for each inhabitant,
and calculating that each of them contributed in the same year
about 10_s_. 2_d_. toward the Union, and about
3_s_. to the state of Pennsylvania, it appears that they
each contributed as their share of all the public expenses
(except those of the townships), the sum of
16_s_. 2_d_. This calculation is doubly incomplete, as
it applies only to a single year and to one part of the public
charges; but it has at least the merit of not being conjectural.

]

The authority of the federal government cannot oblige the
provincial governments to throw any light upon this point; and
even if these governments were inclined to afford their
simultaneous co-operation, it may be doubted whether they possess
the means of procuring a satisfactory answer. Independently of
the natural difficulties of the task, the political organization
of the country would act as a hindrance to the success of their
efforts. The county and town magistrates are not appointed by
the authorities of the state, and they are not subjected to their
control. It is therefore very allowable to suppose, that if the
state was desirous of obtaining the returns which we require, its
designs would be counteracted by the neglect of those subordinate
officers whom it would be obliged to employ.[Footnote:

Those who have attempted to draw a comparison between the
expenses of France and America, have at once perceived that no
such comparison could be drawn between the total expenditures of
the two countries; but they have endeavored to contrast detached
portions of this expenditure. It may readily be shown that this
second system is not at all less defective than the first.

If I attempt to compare the French budget with the budget of the
Union, it must be remembered that the latter embraces much fewer
objects than the central government of the former country, and
that the expenditure must consequently be much smaller. If I
contrast the budgets of the departments to those of the states
which constitute the Union, it must be observed, that as the
power and control exercised by the states is much greater than
that which is exercised by the departments, their expenditure is
also more considerable. As for the budgets of the counties,
nothing of the kind occurs in the French system of finance; and
it is, again, doubtful whether the corresponding expenses should
be referred to the budget of the state or to those of the
municipal divisions.

Municipal expenses exist in both countries, but they are not
always analogous. In America the townships discharge a variety
of offices which are reserved in France to the departments or the
state. It may, moreover, be asked, what is to be understood by
the municipal expenses of America. The organization of the
municipal bodies or townships differs in the several states: Are
we to be guided by what occurs in New England or in Georgia, in
Pennsylvania or the state of Illinois?

A kind of analogy may very readily be perceived between certain
budgets in the two countries: but as the elements of which they
are composed always differ more or less, no fair comparison can
be instituted between them.

] It is, in point of fact, useless to inquire what the Americans
might do to forward this inquiry, since it is certain that they
have hitherto done nothing at all. There does not exist a single
individual at the present day, in America or in Europe, who can
inform us what each citizen of the Union annually contributes to
the public charges of the nation.[Footnote:

Even if we knew the exact pecuniary contributions of every French
and American citizen to the coffers of the state, we should only
come at a portion of the truth. Governments not only demand
supplies of money, but they call for personal services, which may
be looked upon as equivalent to a given sum. When a state raises
an army, beside the pay of the troops which is furnished by the
entire nation, each soldier must give up his time, the value of
which depends on the use he might make of it if he were not in
the service. The same remark applies to the militia: the citizen
who is in the militia devotes a certain portion of valuable time
to the maintenance of the public peace, and he does in reality
surrender to the state those earnings which he is prevented from
gaining. Many other instances might be cited in addition to
these. The governments of France and America both levy taxes of
this kind, which weigh upon the citizens; but who can estimate
with accuracy their relative amount in the two countries?

This, however, is not the last of the difficulties which prevent
us from comparing the expenditure of the Union with that of
France. The French government contracts certain obligations
which do not exist in America, and _vice versa_. The
French government pays the clergy; in America, the voluntary
principle prevails. In America, there is a legal provision for
the poor; in France they are abandoned to the charity of the
public. The French public officers are paid by a fixed salary:
in America they are allowed certain perquisites. In France,
contributions in kind take place on very few roads; in America
upon almost all the thoroughfares: in the former country the
roads are free to all travellers: in the latter turnpikes abound.
All these differences in manner in which contributions are levied
in the two countries, enhance the difficulty of comparing their
expenditure; for there are certain expenses which the citizens
would not be subjected to, or which would at any rate be much
less considerable, if the state did not take upon itself to act
in the name of the public.

]

Hence we must conclude, that it is no less difficult to compare
the social expenditure, than it is to estimate the relative
wealth of France and of America. I will even add, that it would
be dangerous to attempt this comparison; for when statistics are
not founded upon computations which are strictly accurate, they
mislead instead of guiding aright. The mind is easily imposed
upon by the false affectation of exactitude which prevails even
in the mis-statements of the science, and adopts with confidence
the errors which are apparelled in the forms of mathematical
truth.

We abandon, therefore, our numerical investigation, with the hope
of meeting with data of another kind. In the absence of positive
documents, we may form an opinion as to the proportion which the
taxation of a people bears to its real prosperity, by observing
whether its external appearance is flourishing; whether, after
having discharged the calls of the state, the poor man retains
the means of subsistence, and the rich the means of enjoyment;
and whether both classes are contented with their position,
seeking however to meliorate it by perpetual exertions, so that
industry is never in want of capital, nor capital unemployed by
industry. The observer who draws his inferences from these signs
will, undoubtedly, be led to the conclusion, that the American of
the United States contributes a much smaller portion of his
income to the state than the citizen of France. Nor, indeed, can
the result be otherwise.

A portion of the French debt is the consequence of two successive
invasions; and the Union has no similar calamity to fear. A
nation placed upon the continent of Europe is obliged to maintain
a large standing army; the isolated position of the Union enables
it to have only 6,000 soldiers. The French have a fleet of 300
sail; the Americans have 52 vessels.[Footnote:

See the details in the budget of the French minister of marine,
and for America, the National Calendar of 1833, p. 228.

] How, then, can the inhabitant of the Union be called upon to
contribute as largely as the inhabitant of France? No parallel
can be drawn between the finances of two countries so differently
situated.

It is by examining what actually takes place in the Union, and
not by comparing the Union with France, that we may discover
whether the American government is really economical. On casting
my eyes over the different republics which form the
confederation, I perceive that their governments lack
perseverance in their undertakings, and that they exercise no
steady control over the men whom they employ. Whence I naturally
infer, that they must often spend the money of the people to no
purpose, or consume more of it than is really necessary to their
undertakings. Great efforts are made, in accordance with the
democratic origin of society, to satisfy the exigencies of the
lower orders, to open the career of power to their endeavors, and
to diffuse knowledge and comfort among them. The poor are
maintained, immense sums are annually devoted to public
instruction, all services whatsoever are remunerated, and the
most subordinate agents are liberally paid. If this kind of
government appears to me to be useful and rational, I am
nevertheless constrained to admit that it is expensive.

Wherever the poor direct public affairs and dispose of the
national resources, it appears certain, that as they profit by
the expenditure of the state, they are apt to augment that
expenditure.

I conclude therefore, without having recourse to inaccurate
computations, and without hazarding a comparison which might
prove incorrect, that the democratic government of the Americans
is not a cheap government, as is sometimes asserted; and I have
no hesitation in predicting, that if the people of the United
States is ever involved in serious difficulties, its taxation
will speedily be increased to the rate of that which prevails in
the greater part of the aristocracies and the monarchies of
Europe.

* * * * *

CORRUPTION AND VICES OF THE RULERS IN A DEMOCRACY, AND
CONSEQUENT EFFECTS UPON PUBLIC MORALITY.

In Aristocracies Rulers sometimes endeavor to corrupt the
People.--In Democracies Rulers frequently show themselves to be
corrupt.--In the former their Vices are directly prejudicial to
the Morality of the People.--In the latter their indirect
Influence is still more pernicious.

A distinction must be made, when the aristocratic and the
democratic principles mutually inveigh against each other, as
tending to facilitate corruption. In aristocratic governments
the individuals who are placed at the head of affairs are rich
men, who are solely desirous of power. In democracies statesmen
are poor, and they have their fortunes to make. The consequence
is, that in aristocratic states the rulers are rarely accessible
to corruption, and have very little craving for money; while the
reverse is the case in democratic nations.

But in aristocracies, as those who are desirous of arriving at
the head of affairs are possessed of considerable wealth, and as
the number of persons by whose assistance they may rise is
comparatively small, the government is, if I may use the
expression, put up to a sort of auction. In democracies, on the
contrary, those who are covetous of power are very seldom
wealthy, and the number of citizens who confer that power is
extremely great. Perhaps in democracies the number of men who
might be bought is by no means smaller, but buyers are rarely to
be met with; and, besides, it would be necessary to buy so many
persons at once, that the attempt is rendered nugatory.

Many of the men who have been in the administration in France
during the last forty years, have been accused of making their
fortunes at the expense of the state or of its allies; a reproach
which was rarely addressed to the public characters of the
ancient monarchy. But in France the practice of bribing electors
is almost unknown, while it is notoriously and publicly carried
on in England. In the United States I never heard a man accused
of spending his wealth in corrupting the populace; but I have
often heard the probity of public officers questioned; still more
frequently have I heard their success attributed to low intrigues
and immoral practices.