American Institutions And Their Influence

A >> Alexis de Tocqueville >> American Institutions And Their Influence

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49

I here use the word _magistrates_ in the widest sense in
which it can be taken; I apply it to all the officers to whom the
execution of the laws is intrusted.

]
UNDER THE RULE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY.

For what Reason the arbitrary Power of Magistrates is greater in
absolute Monarchies and in democratic Republics that it is in
limited Monarchies.--Arbitrary Power of the Magistrates in New
England.

In two different kinds of government the magistrates exercise a
considerable degree of arbitrary power; namely, under the
absolute government of a single individual, and under that of a
democracy.

This identical result proceeds from causes which are nearly
analogous.

In despotic states the fortune of no citizen is secure; and
public officers are not more safe than private individuals. The
sovereign, who has under his control the lives, the property, and
sometimes the honor of the men whom he employs, does not scruple
to allow them a great latitude of action, because he is convinced
that they will not use it to his prejudice. In despotic states
the sovereign is so attached to the exercise of his power, that
he dislikes the constraint even of his own regulations; and he is
well pleased that his agents should follow a somewhat fortuitous
line of conduct, provided he be certain that their actions will
never counteract his desires.

In democracies, as the majority has every year the right of
depriving the officers whom it has appointed of their power, it
has no reason to fear abuse of their authority. As the people is
always able to signify its wishes to those who conduct the
government, it prefers leaving them to make their own exertions,
to prescribing an invariable rule of conduct which would at once
fetter their activity and the popular authority.

It may even be observed, on attentive consideration, that under
the rule of a democracy the arbitrary power of the magistrate
must be still greater than in despotic states. In the latter,
the sovereign has the power of punishing all the faults with
which he becomes acquainted, but it would be vain for him to hope
to become acquainted with all those which are committed. In the
former the sovereign power is not only supreme, but it is
universally present. The American functionaries are, in point of
fact, much more independent in the sphere of action which the law
traces out for them, than any public officer in Europe. Very
frequently the object which they are to accomplish is simply
pointed out to them, and the choice of the means is left to their
own discretion.

In New England, for instance, the selectmen of each township are
bound to draw up the list of persons who are to serve on the
jury; the only rule which is laid down to guide them in their
choice is that they are to select citizens possessing the
elective franchise and enjoying a fair reputation.[Footnote:

See the act 27th February, 1813. General Collection of the Laws
of Massachusetts, vol. ii., p. 331. It should be added that the
Jurors are afterward drawn from these lists by lot.

] In France the lives and liberties of the subjects would be
thought to be in danger, if a public officer of any kind was
intrusted with so formidable a right. In New England, the same
magistrates are empowered to post the names of habitual drunkards
in public houses, and to prohibit the inhabitants of a town from
supplying them with liquor.[Footnote:

See the act of 28th February, 1787. General Collection of the
Laws of Massachusetts, vol. i., p. 302.

] A censorial power of this excessive kind would be revolting to
the population of the most absolute monarchies; here, however, it
is submitted to without difficulty.

Nowhere has so much been left by the law to the arbitrary
determination of the magistrates as in democratic republics,
because this arbitrary power is unattended by any alarming
consequences. It may even be asserted that the freedom of the
magistrate increases as the elective franchise is extended, and
as the duration of the time of office is shortened. Hence arises
the great difficulty which attends the conversion of a democratic
republic into a monarchy. The magistrate ceases to be elective,
but he retains the rights and the habits of an elected officer,
which lead directly to despotism.

It is only in limited monarchies that the law which prescribes
the sphere in which public officers are to act, superintends all
their measures. The cause of this may be easily detected. In
limited monarchies the power is divided between the king and the
people, both of whom are interested in the stability of the
magistrate. The king does not venture to place the public
officers under the control of the people, lest they should be
tempted to betray his interests; on the other hand, the people
fears lest the magistrates should serve to oppress the liberties
of the country, if they were entirely dependent upon the crown:
they cannot therefore be said to depend on either the one or the
other. The same cause which induces the king and the people to
render public officers independent, suggests the necessity of
such securities as may prevent their independence from
encroaching upon the authority of the former and the liberties of
the latter. They consequently agree as to the necessity of
restricting the functionary to a line of conduct laid down
beforehand, and they are interested in confining him by certain
regulations which he cannot evade.

[The observations respecting the arbitrary powers of magistrates
are practically among the most erroneous in the work. The author
seems to have confounded the idea of magistrates being
_independent_ with their being arbitrary. Yet he had just
before spoken of their dependance on popular election as a reason
why there was no apprehension of the abuse of their authority.
The independence, then, to which he alludes must be an immunity
from responsibility to any other department. But it is a
fundamental principle of our system, that all officers are liable
to criminal prosecution "whenever they act partially or
oppressively from a malicious or corrupt motive." See 15
Wendell's Reports, 278. That our magistrates are independent
when they do not act partially or oppressively is very true, and,
it is to be hoped, is equally true in every form of government.
There would seem, therefore, not to be such a degree of
independence as necessarily to produce arbitrariness. The author
supposes that magistrates are more arbitrary in a despotism and
in a democracy than in a limited monarchy. And yet, the limits
of independence and of responsibility existing in the United
States are borrowed from and identical with those established in
England--the most prominent instance of a limited monarchy. See
the authorities referred to in the case in Wendell's Reports,
before quoted. Discretion in the execution of various
ministerial duties, and in the awarding of punishment by judicial
officers, is indispensable in every system of government, from
the utter impossibility of "laying down beforehand a line of
conduct" (as the author expresses it) in such cases. The very
instances of discretionary power to which he refers, and which he
considers _arbitrary_, exist in England. There, the persons
from whom juries are to be formed for the trial of causes, civil
and criminal, are selected by the sheriffs, who are appointed by
the crown--a power, certainly more liable to abuse in their
hands, than in those of selectmen or other town-officers, chosen
annually by the people. The other power referred to, that of
posting the names of habitual drunkards, and forbidding their
being supplied with liquor, is but a reiteration of the
principles contained in the English statute of 32 Geo. III.,
ch. 45, respecting idle and disorderly persons. Indeed it may be
said with great confidence, that there is not an instance of
discretionary power being vested in American magistrates which
does not find its prototype in the English laws. The whole
argument of the author on this point, therefore, would seem to
fail.--_American Editor_.]

* * * * *

INSTABILITY OF THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

In America the public Acts of a Community frequently leave fewer
Traces than the Occurrences of a Family.--Newspapers the only
historical Remains.--Instability of the Administration
prejudicial to the Art of Government.

The authority which public men possess in America is so brief,
and they are so soon commingled with the ever-changing population
of the country, that the acts of a community frequently leave
fewer traces than the occurrences of a private family. The
public administration is, so to speak, oral and traditionary.
But little is committed to writing, and that little is wafted
away for ever, like the leaves of the sibyl, by the smallest
breeze.

The only historical remains in the United States are the
newspapers; but if a number be wanting, the chain of time is
broken, and the present is severed from the past. I am convinced
that in fifty years it will be more difficult to collect
authentic documents concerning the social condition of the
Americans at the present day, than it is to find remains of the
administration of France during the middle ages; and if the
United States were ever invaded by barbarians, it would be
necessary to have recourse to the history of other nations, in
order to learn anything of the people which now inhabits them.

The instability of the administration has penetrated into the
habits of the people: it even appears to suit the general taste,
and no one cares for what occurred before his time. No
methodical system is pursued; no archives are formed; and no
documents are brought together when it would be very easy to do
so. Where they exist little store is set upon them; and I have
among my papers several original public documents which were
given to me in answer to some of my inquiries. In America
society seems to live from hand to mouth, like an army in the
field. Nevertheless, the art of administration may undoubtedly
be ranked as a science, and no sciences can be improved, if the
discoveries and observations of successive generations are not
connected together in the order in which they occur. One man, in
the short space of his life, remarks a fact; another conceives an
idea; the former invents a means of execution, the latter reduces
a truth to a fixed proposition; and mankind gathers the fruits of
individual experience upon its way, and gradually forms the
sciences. But the persons who conduct the administration in
America can seldom afford any instruction to each other; and when
they assume the direction of society, they simply possess those
attainments which are most widely disseminated in the community,
and no experience peculiar to themselves. Democracy, carried to
its farthest limits, is therefore prejudicial to the art of
government; and for this reason it is better adapted to a people
already versed in the conduct of an administration, than to a
nation which is uninitiated in public affairs.

This remark, indeed, is not exclusively applicable to the science
of administration. Although a democratic government is founded
upon a very simple and natural principle, it always presupposes
the existence of a high degree of culture and enlightenment in
society.[Footnote:

It is needless to observe, that I speak here of the democratic
form of government as applied to a people, not merely to a tribe.

] At the first glance it may be imagined to belong to the
earliest ages of the world; but maturer observation will convince
us that it could only come last in the succession of human
history.

[These remarks upon the "instability of administration" in
America, are partly correct, but partly erroneous. It is
certainly true that our public men are not educated to the
business of government; even our diplomatists are selected with
very little reference to their experience in that department.
But the universal attention that is paid by the intelligent, to
the measures of government and to the discussions to which they
give rise, is in itself no slight preparation for the ordinary
duties of legislation. And, indeed, this the author subsequently
seems to admit. As to there being "no archives formed" of public
documents, the author is certainly mistaken. The journals of
congress, the journals of state legislatures, the public
documents transmitted to and originating in those bodies, are
carefully preserved and disseminated through the nation: and they
furnish in themselves the materials of a full and accurate
history. Our great defect, doubtless, is in the want of
statistical information. Excepting the annual reports of the
state of our commerce, made by the secretary of the treasury,
under law, and excepting the census which is taken every ten
years under the authority of congress, and those taken by the
states, we have no official statistics. It is supposed that the
author had this species of information in his mind when he
alluded to the general deficiency of our archives.--_American
Editor_.]

* * * * *

CHARGES LEVIED BY THE STATE UNDER THE RULE OF THE
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY.

In all Communities Citizens divisible into three Classes.--Habits
of each of these Classes in the Direction of public
Finances.--Why public Expenditures must tend to increase when
the People governs.--What renders the Extravagance of a
Democracy less to be feared in America.--Public Expenditure
under a Democracy.

Before we can affirm whether a democratic form of government is
economical or not, we must establish a suitable standard of
comparison. The question would be one of easy solution if we
were to attempt to draw a parallel between a democratic republic
and an absolute monarchy. The public expenditure would be found
to be more considerable under the former than under the latter;
such is the case with all free states compared to those which are
not so. It is certain that despotism ruins individuals by
preventing them from producing wealth, much more than by
depriving them of the wealth they have produced: it dries up the
source of riches, while it usually respects acquired property.
Freedom, on the contrary, engenders far more benefits than it
destroys; and the nations which are favored by free institutions,
invariably find that their resources increase even more rapidly
than their taxes.

My present object is to compare free nations to each other; and
to point out the influence of democracy upon the finances of a
state.

Communities, as well as organic bodies, are subject to certain
fixed rules in their formation which they cannot evade. They are
composed of certain elements which are common to them at all
times and under all circumstances. The people may always be
mentally divided into three distinct classes. The first of these
classes consists of the wealthy; the second, of those who are in
easy circumstances; and the third is composed of those who have
little or no property, and who subsist more especially by the
work which they perform for the two superior orders. The
proportion of the individuals who are included in these three
divisions may vary according to the condition of society; but the
divisions themselves can never be obliterated.

It is evident that each of these classes will exercise an
influence, peculiar to its own propensities, upon the
administration of the finances of the state. If the first of the
three exclusively possess the legislative power, it is probable
that it will not be sparing of the public funds, because the
taxes which are levied on a large fortune only tend to diminish
the sum of superfluous enjoyment, and are, in point of fact, but
little felt. If the second class has the power of making the
laws, it will certainly not be lavish of taxes, because nothing
is so onerous as a large impost which is levied upon a small
income. The government of the middle classes appears to me to be
the most economical, though perhaps not the most enlightened, and
certainly not the most generous, of free governments.

But let us now suppose that the legislative authority is vested
in the lowest orders: there are two striking reasons which show
that the tendency of the expenditure will be to increase, not to
diminish.

As the great majority of those who create the laws are possessed
of no property upon which taxes can be imposed, all the money
which is spent for the community appears to be spent to their
advantage, at no cost of their own; and those who are possessed
of some little property readily find means of regulating the
taxes so that they are burthensome to the wealthy and profitable
to the poor, although the rich are unable to take the same
advantage when they are in possession of the government.

In countries in which the poor[Footnote:

The word _poor_ is used here, and throughout the remainder
of this chapter, in a relative and not in an absolute sense.
Poor men in America would often appear rich in comparison with
the poor of Europe but they may with propriety be styled poor in
comparison with their more affluent countrymen.

] should be exclusively invested with the power of making the
laws, no great economy of public expenditure ought to be
expected; that expenditure will always be considerable; either
because the taxes do not weigh upon those who levy them, or
because they are levied in such a manner as not to weigh upon
those classes. In other words, the government of the democracy
is the only one under which the power which lays on taxes escapes
the payment of them.

It may be objected (but the argument has no real weight) that the
true interest of the people is indissolubly connected with that
of the wealthier portion of the community, since it cannot but
suffer by the severe measures to which it resorts. But is it not
the true interest of kings to render their subjects happy; and
the true interest of nobles to admit recruits into their order on
suitable grounds? If remote advantages had power to prevail over
the passions and the exigencies of the moment, no such thing as a
tyrannical sovereign or an exclusive aristocracy could ever
exist.

Again, it may be objected that the poor are never invested with
the sole power of making the laws; but I reply, that wherever
universal suffrage has been established, the majority of the
community unquestionably exercises the legislative authority, and
if it be proved that the poor always constitute the majority, it
may be added, with perfect truth, that in the countries in which
they possess the elective franchise, they possess the sole power
of making laws. But it is certain that in all the nations of the
world the greater number has always consisted of those persons
who hold no property, or of those whose property is insufficient
to exempt them from the necessity of working in order to procure
an easy subsistence. Universal suffrage does therefore in point
of fact invest the poor with the government of society.

The disastrous influence which popular authority may sometimes
exercise upon the finances of a state, was very clearly seen in
some of the democratic republics of antiquity, in which the
public treasure was exhausted in order to relieve indigent
citizens, or to supply the games and theatrical amusements of the
populace. It is true that the representative system was then
very imperfectly known, and that, at the present time, the
influence of popular passions is less felt in the conduct of
public affairs; but it may be believed that the delegate will in
the end conform to the principles of his constituents, and favor
their propensities as much as their interests.

The extravagance of democracy is, however, less to be dreaded in
proportion as the people acquires a share of property, because on
the one hand the contributions of the rich are then less needed,
and on the other, it is more difficult to lay on taxes which do
not affect the interests of the lower classes. On this account
universal suffrage would be less dangerous in France than in
England, because in the latter country the property on which
taxes may be levied is vested in fewer hands. America, where the
great majority of the citizens is possessed of some fortune, is
in a still more favorable position than France.

There are still farther causes which may increase the sum of
public expenditures in democratic countries. When the
aristocracy governs, the individuals who conduct the affairs of
state are exempted, by their own station in society, from every
kind of privation: they are contented with their position; power
and renown are the objects for which they strive; and, as they
are placed far above the obscurer throng of citizens, they do not
always distinctly perceive how the well-being of the mass of the
people ought to redound to their own honor. They are not indeed,
callous to the sufferings of the poor, but they cannot feel those
miseries as acutely as if they were themselves partakers of them.
Provided that the people appear to submit to its lot, the rulers
are satisfied and they demand nothing farther from the
government. An aristocracy is more intent upon the means of
maintaining its influence, than upon the means of improving its
condition.

When, on the contrary, the people is invested with the supreme
authority, the perpetual sense of their own miseries impels the
rulers of society to seek for perpetual meliorations. A thousand
different objects are subjected to improvement; the most trivial
details are sought out as susceptible of amendment; and those
changes which are accompanied with considerable expense, are more
especially advocated, since the object is to render the condition
of the poor more tolerable, who cannot pay for themselves.

Moreover, all democratic communities are agitated by an
ill-defined excitement, and by a kind of feverish impatience,
that engenders a multitude of innovations, almost all of which
are attended with expense.

In monarchies and aristocracies, the natural taste which the
rulers have for power and for renown, is stimulated by the
promptings of ambition, and they are frequently incited by these
temptations to very costly undertakings. In democracies, where
the rulers labor under privations, they can only be courted by
such means as improve their well-being, and these improvements
cannot take place without a sacrifice of money. When a people
begins to reflect upon its situation, it discovers a multitude of
wants, to which it had not before been subject, and to satisfy
these exigencies, recourse must be had to the coffers of the
state. Hence it arises, that the public charges increase in
proportion as civilisation spreads, and that the imposts are
augmented as knowledge pervades the community.

The last cause which frequently renders a democratic government
dearer than any other is, that a democracy does not always
succeed in moderating its expenditure, because it does not
understand the art of being economical. As the designs which it
entertains are frequently changed, and the agents of those
designs are more frequently removed, its undertakings are often
ill-conducted or left unfinished; in the former case the state
spends sums out of all proportion to the end which it proposes to
accomplish; in the second, the expense itself is unprofitable.

* * * * *

TENDENCIES OF THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AS REGARDS THE
SALARIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS.

In Democracies those who establish high Salaries have no Chance
of profiting by them.--Tendency of the American Democracy to
increase the Salaries of subordinate Officers, and to lower
those of the more important functionaries.--Reason of
this.--Comparative Statement of the Salaries of public Officers
in the United States and in France.

There is a powerful reason which usually induces democracies to
economise upon the salaries of public officers. As the number of
citizens who dispense the remuneration is extremely large in
democratic countries, so the number of persons who can hope to be
benefited by the receipt of it is comparatively small. In
aristocratic countries, on the contrary, the individuals who
appoint high salaries, have almost always a vague hope of
profiting by them. These appointments may be looked upon as a
capital which they create for their own use, or at least, as a
resource for their children.

It must, however, be allowed that a democratic state is most
parsimonious toward its principal agents. In America the
secondary officers are much better paid, and the dignitaries of
the administration much worse than they are elsewhere.

These opposite effects result from the same cause: the people
fixes the salaries of the public officers in both cases; and the
scale of remuneration is determined by the consideration of its
own wants. It is held to be fair that the servants of the public
should be placed in the same easy circumstances as the public
itself;[Footnote: