American Institutions And Their Influence

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[The difficulty supposed by the author in this note is imaginary.
The question of title to the lands in the case put, must depend
upon the constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States;
and a decision in the state court adverse to the claim or title
set up under those laws, must, by the very words of the
constitution and of the judiciary act, be subject to review by
the supreme court of the United States, whose decision is final.

The remarks in the text of this page upon the relative weakness
of the government of the Union, are equally applicable to any
form of republican or democratic government, and are not peculiar
to a federal system. Under the circumstances supposed by the
author, of all the citizens of a state, or a large majority of
them, aggrieved at the same time and in the same manner, by the
operation of any law, the same difficulty would arise in
executing the laws of the state as those of the Union. Indeed,
such instances of the total inefficacy of state laws are not
wanting. The fact is, that all republics depend on the
willingness of the people to execute the laws. If they will not
enforce them, there is, so far, an end to the government, for it
possesses no power adequate to the control of the physical power
of the people.

Not only in theory, but in fact, a republican government must be
administered by the people themselves. They, and they alone,
must execute the laws. And hence, the first principles in such
governments, that on which all others depend, and without which
no other can exist, is and must be, obedience to the existing
laws at all times and under all circumstances. It is the vital
condition of the social compact. He who claims a dispensing
power for himself, by which he suspends the operation of the law
in his own case, is worse than a usurper, for he not only
tramples under foot the constitution of his country, but violates
the reciprocal pledge which he has given to his fellow-citizens,
and has received from them, that he will abide by the laws
constitutionally enacted; upon the strength of which pledge, his
own personal rights and acquisitions are protected by the rest of
the community.--_American Editor_.]

]

He would have but a partial knowledge of the world who should
imagine that it is possible, by the aid of legal fictions, to
prevent men from finding out and employing those means of
gratifying their passions which have been left open to them; and
it may be doubted whether the American legislators, when they
rendered a collision between the two sovereignties less probable,
destroyed the causes of such a misfortune. But it may even be
affirmed that they were unable to ensure the preponderance of the
federal element in a case of this kind. The Union is possessed
of money and of troops, but the affections and the prejudices of
the people are in the bosom of the states. The sovereignty of
the Union is an abstract being, which is connected with but few
external objects; the sovereignty of the states is hourly
perceptible, easily understood, constantly active; and if the
former is of recent creation, the latter is coeval with the
people itself. The sovereignty of the Union is factitious, that
of the states is natural, and derives its existence from its own
simple influence, like the authority of a parent. The supreme
power of the nation affects only a few of the chief interests of
society; it represents an immense but remote country, and claims
a feeling of patriotism which is vague and ill-defined; but the
authority of the states controls every individual citizen at
every hour and in all circumstances; it protects his property,
his freedom, and his life; and when we recollect the traditions,
the customs, the prejudices of local and familiar attachment with
which it is connected, we cannot doubt the superiority of a power
which is interwoven with every circumstance that renders the love
of one's native country instinctive to the human heart.

Since legislators are unable to obviate such dangerous collisions
as occur between the two sovereignties which co-exist in the
federal system, their first object must be, not only to dissuade
the confederate states from warfare, but to encourage such
institutions as may promote the maintenance of peace. Hence it
results that the federal compact cannot be lasting unless there
exists in the communities which are leagued together, a certain
number of inducements to union which render their common
dependance agreeable, and the task of the government light; and
that system cannot succeed without the presence of favorable
circumstances added to the influence of good laws. All the
people which have ever formed a confederation have been held
together by a certain number of common interests, which served as
the intellectual ties of association.

But the sentiments and the principles of man must be taken into
consideration as well as his immediate interest. A certain
uniformity of civilisation is not less necessary to the
durability of a confederation, than a uniformity of interests in
the states which compose it. In Switzerland the difference which
exists between the canton of Uri and the canton of Vaud is equal
to that between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries; and,
properly speaking, Switzerland has never possessed a federal
government. The Union between these two cantons only subsists
upon the map; and their discrepancies would soon be perceived if
an attempt were made by a central authority to prescribe the same
laws to the whole territory.

One of the circumstances which most powerfully contribute to
support the federal government in America, is that the states
have not only similar interests, a common origin, and a common
tongue, but that they are also arrived at the same stage of
civilisation; which almost always renders a union feasible. I do
not know of any European nation, how small soever it may be,
which does not present less uniformity in its different provinces
than the American people, which occupies a territory as extensive
as one half of Europe. The distance from the state of Maine to
that of Georgia is reckoned at about one thousand miles; but the
difference between the civilisation of Maine and that of Georgia
is slighter than the difference between the habits of Normandy
and those of Britany. Maine and Georgia, which are placed at the
opposite extremities of a great empire, are consequently in the
natural possession of more real inducements to form a
confederation than Normandy and Britany, which are only separated
by a bridge.

The geographical position of the country contributed to increase
the facilities which the American legislators derived from the
manners and customs of the inhabitants; and it is to this
circumstance that the adoption and the maintenance of the federal
system are mainly attributable.

The most important occurrence which can mark the annals of a
people is the breaking out of a war. In war a people struggle
with the energy of a single man against foreign nations, in the
defence of its very existence. The skill of a government, the
good sense of the community, and the natural fondness which men
entertain for their country, may suffice to maintain peace in the
interior of a district, and to favor its internal prosperity; but
a nation can only carry on a great war at the cost of more
numerous and more painful sacrifices; and to suppose that a great
number of men will of their own accord comply with the exigencies
of the state, is to betray an ignorance of mankind. All the
peoples which have been obliged to sustain a long and serious
warfare have consequently been led to augment the power of their
government. Those which have not succeeded in this attempt have
been subjugated. A long war almost always places nations in the
wretched alternative of being abandoned to ruin by defeat, or to
despotism by success. War therefore renders the symptoms of the
weakness of a government most palpable and most alarming; and I
have shown that the inherent defect of federal governments is
that of being weak.

The federal system is not only deficient in every kind of
centralized administration, but the central government itself is
imperfectly organized, which is invariably an influential cause
of inferiority when the nation is opposed to other countries
which are themselves governed by a single authority. In the
federal constitution of the United States, by which the central
government possesses more real force, this evil is still
extremely sensible. An example will illustrate the case to the
reader.

The constitution confers upon congress the right of "calling
forth militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions;" and another article declares
that the president of the United States is the commander-in-chief
of the militia. In the war of 1812, the president ordered the
militia of the northern states to march to the frontiers; but
Connecticut and Massachusetts, whose interests were impaired by
the war, refused to obey the command. They argued that the
constitution authorizes the federal government to call forth the
militia in cases of insurrection or invasion, but that, in the
present instance, there was neither invasion nor insurrection.
They added, that the same constitution which conferred upon the
Union the right of calling forth the militia, reserved to the
states that of naming the officers; and that consequently (as
they understood the clause) no officer of the Union had any right
to command the militia, even during war, except the president in
person: and in this case they were ordered to join an army
commanded by another individual. These absurd and pernicious
doctrines received the sanction not only of the governors and
legislative bodies, but also of the courts of justice in both
states; and the federal government was constrained to raise
elsewhere the troops which it required.[Footnote:

Kent's Commentaries, vol. i., p. 244. I have selected an example
which relates to a time posterior to the promulgation of the
present constitution. If I had gone back to the days of the
confederation, I might have given still more striking instances.
The whole nation was at that time in a state of enthusiastic
excitement; the revolution was represented by a man who was the
idol of the people; but at that very period congress had, to say
the truth, no resources at all at its disposal. Troops and
supplies were perpetually wanting. The best devised projects
failed in the execution, and the Union, which was constantly on
the verge of destruction, was saved by the weakness of its
enemies far more than by its own strength.

]

The only safeguard which the American Union, with all the
relative perfection of its laws, possesses against the
dissolution which would be produced by a great war, lies in its
probable exemption from that calamity. Placed in the centre of
an immense continent, which offers a boundless field for human
industry, the Union is almost as much insulated from the world as
if its frontiers were girt by the ocean. Canada contains only a
million of inhabitants, and its population is divided into two
inimical nations. The rigor of the climate limits the extension
of its territory, and shuts up its ports during the six months of
winter. From Canada to the Gulf of Mexico a few savage tribes
are to be met with, which retire, perishing in their retreat,
before six thousand soldiers. To the south, the Union has a
point of contact with the empire of Mexico; and it is thence that
serious hostilities may one day be expected to arise. But for a
long while to come, the uncivilized state of the Mexican
community, the depravity of its morals, and its extreme poverty,
will prevent that country from ranking high among nations. As
for the powers of Europe, they are too distant to be
formidable.[Footnote:

Appendix O.

]

The great advantage of the United States does not, then, consist
in a federal constitution which allows them to carry on great
wars, but in a geographical position, which renders such
enterprises improbable.

No one can be more inclined than I am myself to appreciate the
advantages of the federal system, which I hold to be one of the
combinations most favorable to the prosperity and freedom of man.
I envy the lot of those nations which have been enabled to adopt
it; but I cannot believe that any confederate peoples could
maintain a long or an equal contest with a nation of similar
strength in which the government should be centralised. A people
which should divide its sovereignty into fractional powers, in
the presence of the great military monarchies of Europe, would,
in my opinion, by that very act, abdicate its power, and perhaps
its existence and its name. But such is the admirable position
of the New World, that man has no other enemy than himself; and
that in order to be happy and to be free, it suffices to seek the
gifts of prosperity and the knowledge of freedom.

* * * * *

CHAPTER IX.

I have hitherto examined the institutions of the United States; I
have passed their legislation in review, and I have depicted the
present characteristics of political society in that country.
But a sovereign power exists above these institutions and beyond
these characteristic features, which may destroy or modify them
at its pleasure; I mean that of the people. It remains to be
shown in what manner this power, which regulates the laws, acts:
its propensities and its passions remain to be pointed out, as
well as the secret springs which retard, accelerate, or direct
its irresistible course; and the effects of its unbounded
authority, with the destiny which is probably reserved for it.

* * * * *

WHY THE PEOPLE MAY STRICTLY BE SAID TO GOVERN IN THE
UNITED STATES.

In America the people appoints the legislative and the executive
power, and furnishes the jurors who punish all offences against
the laws. The American institutions are democratic, not only in
their principle but in all their consequences; and the people
elects its representatives _directly_, and for the most part
_annually_, in order to ensure their dependence. The people
is therefore the real directing power; and although the form of
government is representative, it is evident that the opinions,
the prejudices, the interests, and even the passions of the
community are hindered by no durable obstacles from exercising a
perpetual influence on society. In the United States the
majority governs in the name of the people, as is the case in all
the countries in which the people is supreme. This majority is
principally composed of peaceable citizens, who, either by
inclination or by interest, are sincerely desirous of the welfare
of their country. But they are surrounded by the incessant
agitation of parties, which attempt to gain their co-operation
and to avail themselves of their support.

* * * * *

CHAPTER X.

PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES.

Great Division to be made between Parties.--Parties which are to
each other as rival Nations.--Parties properly so
called.--Difference between great and small Parties.--Epochs
which produce them.--Their Characteristics.--America has had
great Parties.--They are
extinct.--Federalists.--Republicans.--Defeat of the
Federalists.--Difficulty of creating Parties in the United
States.--What is done with this Intention.--Aristocratic and
democratic Character to be met with in all Parties.--Struggle
of General Jackson against the Bank.

A great division must be made between parties. Some countries
are so large that the different populations which inhabit them
have contradictory interests, although they are the subjects of
the same government; and they may thence be in a perpetual state
of opposition. In this case the different fractions of the
people may more properly be considered as distinct nations than
as mere parties; and if a civil war breaks out, the struggle is
carried off by rival peoples rather than by factions in the
state.

But when the citizens entertain different opinions upon subjects
which affect the whole country alike, such, for instance, as the
principles upon which the government is to be conducted, then
distinctions arise which may correctly be styled parties.
Parties are a necessary evil in free governments; but they have
not at all times the same character and the same propensities.

At certain periods a nation may be oppressed by such
insupportable evils as to conceive the design of effecting a
total change in its political constitution; at other times the
mischief lies still deeper, and the existence of society itself
is endangered. Such are the times of great revolutions and of
great parties. But between these epochs of misery and of
confusion there are periods during which human society seems to
rest, and mankind to make a pause. This pause is, indeed, only
apparent; for time does not stop its course for nations any more
than for men; they are all advancing toward a goal with which
they are unacquainted; and we only imagine them to be stationary
when their progress escapes our observation; as men who are going
at a foot pace seem to be standing still to those who run.

But however this may be, there are certain epochs at which the
changes that take place in the social and political constitution
of nations are so slow and so insensible, that men imagine their
present condition to be a final state; and the human mind,
believing itself to be firmly based upon certain foundations,
does not extend its researches beyond the horizon which it
descries. These are the times of small parties and of intrigue.

The political parties which I style great are those which cling
to principles more than to consequences; to general, and not to
especial cases; to ideas, and not to men. These parties are
usually distinguished by a nobler character, by more generous
passions, more genuine convictions, and a more bold and open
conduct than the others. In them, private interest, which always
plays the chief part in political passions, is more studiously
veiled under the pretext of the public good; and it may even be
sometimes concealed from the eyes of the very person whom it
excites and impels.

Minor parties are, on the other hand, generally deficient in
political faith. As they are not sustained or dignified by a
lofty purpose, they ostensibly display the egotism of their
character in their actions. They glow with a factitious zeal;
their language is vehement, but their conduct is timid and
irresolute. The means they employ are as wretched as the end at
which they aim. Hence it arises that when a calm state of things
succeeds a violent revolution, the leaders of society seem
suddenly to disappear, and the powers of the human mind to lie
concealed. Society is convulsed by great parties, by minor ones
it is agitated; it is torn by the former, by the latter it is
degraded; and if these sometimes save it by a salutary
perturbation, those invariably disturb it to no good end.

America has already lost the great parties which once divided the
nation; and if her happiness is considerably increased, her
morality has suffered by their extinction. When the war of
independence was terminated, and the foundations of the new
government were to be laid down, the nation was divided between
two opinions--two opinions which are as old as the world, and
which are perpetually to be met with under all the forms and all
the names which have ever obtained in free communities--the one
tending to limit, the other to extend indefinitely, the power of
the people. The conflict of these two opinions never assumed
that degree of violence in America which it has frequently
displayed elsewhere. Both parties of the Americans were in fact
agreed upon the most essential points; and neither of them had to
destroy a traditionary constitution, or to overthrow the
structure of society, in order to insure its own triumph. In
neither of them, consequently, were a great number of private
interests affected by success or by defeat; but moral principles
of a high order, such as the love of equality and of
independence, were concerned in the struggle, and they sufficed
to kindle violent passions.

The party which desired to limit the power of the people,
endeavored to apply its doctrines more especially to the
constitution of the Union, whence it derived its name of
_federal_. The other party, which affected to be more
exclusively attached to the cause of liberty, took that of
_republican_. America is the land of democracy, and the
federalists were always in a minority; but they reckoned on their
side almost all the great men who had been called forth by the
war of independence, and their moral influence was very
considerable. Their cause was, moreover, favored by
circumstances. The ruin of the confederation had impressed the
people with a dread of anarchy, and the federalists did not fail
to profit by this transient disposition of the multitude. For
ten or twelve years they were at the head of affairs, and they
were able to apply some, though not all, of their principles; for
the hostile current was becoming from day to day too violent to
be checked or stemmed. In 1801 the republicans got possession of
the government: Thomas Jefferson was named president; and he
increased the influence of their party by the weight of his
celebrity, the greatness of his talents, and the immense extent
of his popularity.

The means by which the federalists had maintained their position
were artificial, and their resources were temporary: it was by
the virtues or the talents of their leaders that they had risen
to power. When the republicans attained to that lofty station,
their opponents were overwhelmed by utter defeat. An immense
majority declared itself against the retiring party, and the
federalists found themselves in so small a minority, that they at
once despaired of their future success. From that moment the
republican or democratic party has proceeded from conquest to
conquest, until it has acquired absolute supremacy in the
country. The federalists, perceiving that they were vanquished
without resource, and isolated in the midst of the nation, fell
into two divisions, of which one joined the victorious
republicans, and the other abandoned its rallying point and its
name. Many years have already elapsed since they ceased to exist
as a party.

The accession of the federalists to power was, in my opinion, one
of the most fortunate incidents which accompanied the formation
of the great American Union: they resisted the inevitable
propensities of their age and of their country. But whether
their theories were good or bad, they had the defect of being
inapplicable, as a system, to the society which they professed to
govern; and that which occurred under the auspices of Jefferson
must therefore have taken place sooner or later. But their
government gave the new republic time to acquire a certain
stability, and afterward to support the rapid growth of the very
doctrines which they had combated. A considerable number of
their principles were in point of fact embodied in the political
creed of their opponents; and the federal constitution, which
subsists at the present day, is a lasting monument of their
patriotism and their wisdom.

Great political parties are not, then, to be met with in the
United States at the present time. Parties, indeed, may be found
which threaten the future tranquillity of the Union; but there
are none which seem to contest the present form of government, or
the present course of society. The parties by which the Union is
menaced do not rest upon abstract principles, but upon temporal
interests. These interests, disseminated in the provinces of so
vast an empire, may be said to constitute rival nations rather
than parties. Thus, upon a recent occasion, the north contended
for the system of commercial prohibition, and the south look up
arms in favor of free trade, simply because the north is a
manufacturing, and the south an agricultural district; and that
the restrictive system which was profitable to the one, was
prejudicial to the other.

In the absence of great parties, the United States abound with
lesser controversies; and public opinion is divided into a
thousand minute shades of difference upon questions of very
little moment. The pains which are taken to create parties are
inconceivable, and at the present day it is no easy task. In the
United States there is no religious animosity, because all
religion is respected, and no sect is predominant; there is no
jealousy of rank, because the people is everything, and none can
contest its authority; lastly, there is no public misery to serve
as a means of agitation, because the physical position of the
country opens so wide a field to industry, that man is able to
accomplish the most surprising undertakings with his own native
resources. Nevertheless, ambitious men are interested in the
creation of parties, since it is difficult to eject a person from
authority upon the mere ground that his place is coveted by
others. The skill of the actors in the political world lies,
therefore, in the art of creating parties. A political aspirant
in the United States begins by discriminating his own interest,
and by calculating upon those interests which may be collected
around, and amalgamated with it; he then contrives to discover
some doctrine or some principle which may suit the purposes of
this new association, and which he adopts in order to bring
forward his party and to secure its popularity: just as the
_imprimatur_ of a king was in former days incorporated with
the volume which it authorized, but to which it nowise belonged.
When these preliminaries are terminated, the new party is ushered
into the political world.